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



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THE  
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,  
AND  
LITERARY MAGAZINE.

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"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PERVALEBIT."

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## PREFACE.

BEFORE men can expect to supersede the terrific controversy of war by the pacific arbitration of wise counsel, they must consent to subordinate the rhetoric of passion to the logic of justice, and be accustomed, by the discipline of reason and the moralization of public opinion, to form accurate judgments founded on just principles. In the present age we are too prone to permit what we call "the inexorable logic of facts" to overrule and override the eternal verities of righteousness. Were it not so, the inevitable necessities of true reasoning would be the masters of events, and astute diplomacy would yield the management of the world's interests to acute ratiocination. On this account we look upon the education of public opinion as one of the noblest and most necessary tasks of our day. Only by that can we bring the desirable and the reasonable into union and harmony, and eliminate craft from statesmanship, church government, and social life.

The journalism of our age is now more aggressive and more suggestive than at any previous time. But it is also, perhaps, more thoroughly propagandist—sectarian and partizan—than it has ever previously been. The advocacy of opinions and interests is systematized, and has become a main aim of literary effort. The press is in bondage to parties and proprietories, whose purpose is fixed and whose aims are settled, and hence it exhorts rather than discusses, and pleads more earnestly than it proves. The opinions entertained and expressed are somewhat more reasonable, but not unfrequently less reasoned, than in bygone years, when the battles of principles were waged. Principles are often nowadays assumed as incontrovertible which are, indeed, but traditions; and the watchwords of factions in Church and State are frequently used as if they were "the bright consummate flower" of thought rather than of passion. It is taken for granted that they are rooted and grounded in truth, and that they have been diligently trained from the original seeds of experience by the disciplinary culture of reason. That this is far from being the true state of the case may be seen in the haste and hurry with which expediency is pursued, and how shifty the tactics are by which the purposes of parties are accomplished. The importance of the culture of thought, and of exercising the habit of reasoning, cannot be doubted, however much it may be decried.

We aim, not at the decision, but the discussion of questions,—at training to thoughtfulness, and refraining from dogmatism; and we offer a practical education in the consideration of arguments, the weighing of evidence, and the careful testing of assertions, opinions, and proposals. The *debates* contained in this volume are not, perhaps, so intensely exciting as some others which have been brought before our readers, but they have been considered from more varied points of view, and with greater care to reach a safe ground of principle, we think, than usual. The subjects though few are important, and they are such as are likely frequently to recur, so that thoroughness in these discussions has been carefully attempted. The Contributors merit the Conductors' thanks for their acquiescence in this matter, and the skill and earnestness they have displayed.



The "Topic" has been sustained in its useful form—concise, pithy, clear, and vigorous notes and thoughts forming the staple of it; the "Reviewer" has been diligent in his vocation, and has made important contributions to the value of our pages; the "Essayist" has been unwillingly curtailed in our eagerness to give "The Greek Days and Roman Nights" fair play as a new comer, and to afford to our "*Poetic Critique*" sufficient space for illustrative quotation. Our "Inquirer" has been indefatigable in seeking replies to the queries put, writing often here and there in the hope of getting answers—sometimes, we are sorry to say, in vain; but not seldom bringing out special bits of informing interest. "The Societies' Section" has not attained a satisfactory condition. But we hope soon to improve permanently this portion of our serial. "Our Collegiate Courses" has given good help in study, and shown how full of suggestion and scholarship the masterpieces of English literature are. The "Literary Notes" contain a condensed record of books and their authors, carefully selected and often original. In "Toiling Upward," besides a finely written notice of one of the old strivers after poetical renown, we have in this volume added to the biography of our age a carefully composed account of the achievings, mental, moral, and literary, of one of the choice spirits of our own times; thus adding another to the numerous life histories which have been given, full of original matter and research, in this serial for the thoughtful and the effortful. And—though spoken of last, certainly not the least esteemed by ourselves or our readers—we note that of two distinguished contemporary thinkers and friends—Bacon and Hobbes—our pages contain original estimates; of the former, Dr. Ingleby has contributed a finely toned intellectual criticism, at once discriminative and learned; of the latter, Mr. Neil has furnished a more complete biography than has hitherto been attainable in literature, while he has added to our obligations by a more thorough and condensed analysis of his notable works than is elsewhere procurable. The value of the facts and opinions brought together in the papers on Joseph Henry Green cannot be doubted by any one who can appreciate the amount of original research involved in them, and the clearness of the philosophic vision exercised upon them. On the "Philosophy of Politics," scholarship, range of reading, singular suggestiveness, and a most rare conciseness of exposition are noticeable; and we greatly regret that we have not had space to include in this volume at least another of these luminous essays on the Science of Government. To the writers of these contributions we owe a set of papers which will bear comparison, we believe, with the highest and best additions made to recent literature, not only in narrative excellence and expository power, but grace of composition and suggestive originality of thought.

In closing our review of the labours of this year we cannot refrain from acknowledging the kindly appreciation which in many quarters our work has met. Year by year a sense of the importance of our task grows on us. Let our readers also weigh their responsibilities aright to us—"the hewers of wood and drawers of water" for them; to our contributors, and to their age; and let them do their utmost to speed the cause of progress, in their own use of this Magazine of Self-culture, and in procuring for it extended usefulness by an extended circulation.

# THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

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## The Philosophy of Politics : REPRESENTATION.

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THE study of the philosophy of politics has become now more than ever a necessity in our country. The extension of an interest in the government of England to a very large class of men who had formerly been held to be incompetent to the duty of rightly exercising the elective franchise has made it imperative on all hands to encourage among and to render accessible to the people—political education. Those who conferred the boon are honourably concerned to see such means employed as shall prove the wisdom of the measure by which power has been put into so many hands; those who opposed the enlargement and popularization of constituencies ought to be eager, as far as possible, to increase the likelihood of the proper employment of the franchise now granted; and, most of all, those to whom a share in the guardianship of the nation has been granted should be earnest to show that the fears of the latter were baseless, that the trust of the former was well-founded, and that they are resolved, with intelligent virtue, to endeavour to comprehend and perform the duties implied in their new status as citizens having a practical responsibility laid upon them in regard to the progress and welfare of the state. Our desire to aid in the accomplishment of this great national task and duty has led us to consider with some care a few of the most vital elements in the science of politics, and to attempt a brief and handy exposition of the ideas which we have been induced to regard as most thorough and sound in speculative and practical politics.

Nothing is easier than to decry “political metaphysics” as not at all likely to be of much service in improving the arrangements of the complicated life of social communities which have arrived at a stage of civilization so advanced as that in which we live. Some regard politics as an abstruse, uninteresting, and difficult subject, and therefore unfitted for general study or ordinary comprehension; others consider that there is no such profound mystery in it

after all; and that common sense, applied with but a little earnestness to the topics as they arise, would enable them to understand all that they require to know; and in contempt of the talk of the students of politics generally they exclaim—each in his own tone,—

“I ask not proud philosophy to teach me what thou art.”

They feel themselves competent to discuss and settle all the difficulties which suggest themselves to ordinary minds, extempore, as they occur in practical life or casual actuality, without the necessity of previous study or learning, and without reversion to first principles and speculative theories. Philosophy with them is usually a synonym for sophistry; and they affirm that “theoretical speculators easily perform in imagination feats which are found impossible by practical politicians;” and hence they rashly, as we think, conclude that the philosophy of politics is little likely to be useful to us or to our age.

On any subject within the scope of human reason we believe, but most of all on this, which touches at every point on the tests of experience, thoughtful, diligent, and methodical investigation will be more likely to lead to truth than to error; and careful deliberate reasoning ought to bring us into the presence of at least the possibilities, if not the probabilities, of political safety. If philosophy cannot invent improvements, it can suggest them, and it can insist upon careful experiment, scrutinized observation, and the guarded acceptance of rough and ready assertions.

In fact, every political movement, endeavour, and proposal depends upon some theory, true or false; and philosophy simply investigates the antecedent probability or improbability, evidence or disproof, allegeable against the theory, and determines the points on which the theory may be exposed to a crucial experiment; so that the unphilosophical or haphazard school of politicians, as distinguished from the scientific or philosophical students of civil and social life, differ only in this,—that the former employ experience only as a positive guide, while the latter admit it as a negative one as well. Experience can, it is true, affirm and confirm; but what does it so assert and maintain? Surely only the preconceptions of the thinking mind; that is, the theories it has formed. Experience can also correct and modify, contradict and test; and philosophy employs experience in all its plenitude of power to suggest, test, affirm, and confirm; and to deny, decry, and disprove. Any idea to which experience excepts, Philosophy rejects; only those which experience favours does she accept and regard.

Every man exerts in our day an influence, direct or indirect, on the formation of Public Opinion—that great power which in free countries ultimately sways the destinies of empires. Yet each man is a compound of instincts, impulses, interests, prejudices, opinions, and aims which have been formed by a vast concourse and aggregation of causes. Hence we find all around us extreme differences of character, remarkably opposite states of feeling, and

great contrarieties of opinion. Men accept of statements which they have not examined, and assent to propositions which they have not tested, instead of inquiring, reflecting, discussing, and investigating; and they too frequently content themselves with opinions when they ought to strive after the attainment of convictions. How important it is that man should be led or brought—

“Rightly his complex knowledge to employ!”—

so that, instead of acting upon whims, impulses, notions, and mere opinions, he should be able to attain to truth and to act upon conviction. As Professor Seeley recently remarked at the Royal Institution,—“For the Public to become a great ruler, and to accomplish great works, it needs much more enlightenment than a daily half-hour’s perusal of the most skilfully constructed leading article. Our present political education is of little value, because we want a thorough knowledge of the first principles of politics.”

There are, as we all know, no opinions which so eagerly seek to elaborate themselves into practicality as those which relate to politics. In the contest between authority and right, submission and oppression, there has now arisen an arbiter in law. To law has been entrusted the settlement of conflicting opinions regarding duties and rights; and Parliament, as the organized wisdom of the nation, has had assigned to it the duty of determining, after due deliberation, what shall, by the will of the people, become law.

Of late years the speculations of theoretical politicians have been almost as much devoted to the consideration of the best means of securing safe and efficient Representative Government as practical politicians have been engaged in arranging the details of an extension of the franchise. For a long time, indeed, it seemed that the theorists were to be allowed to theorize as they chose, and that the practical politicians were bent on maintaining the impracticability of bringing the proposals of the speculative philosophers into working order. Ever and anon during a quarter of a century, under the influence of the zeal of the thinkers or the impatience of the people, the great parties in the State took up the question, while agitation stirred the hearts of men:—

“So two cold limbs, touched by Galvani’s wire,  
Move with new life and feel awakened fire;  
Quivering awhile their flaccid forms remain,  
Then turn to cold torpidity again.”

On the withdrawal of the immediate excitement, Parliamentary Reform became a dropped question—given over to be dealt with by the thinkers again. A short time ago the needs of party effected what the creeds of party did not, except nominally, admit; namely, an extensive increase in the persons to be represented in the Commons House. The main end in view having been attained, it would serve little purpose to detail the progress of political strife. But though any attempt to condense the history of failures in

Reform Bills would be considerably beyond our aim—not to say power.—some brief notice of the progress of modern opinion on the philosophy of parliamentary representation may help us to clarify our views in regard to the objects and methods of the franchise reformers.

The Reform Bill of 1832 marks an epoch of great importance in constitutional history. "There is hardly a question which has exercised the wisdom of legislators and the talents of debaters since, of which the history does not begin from, or in some degree turn upon its treatment by, that astonishing Parliament" which met in 1833 under the extended franchise to which that Bill gave legal effect. It was felt then by advanced thinkers that the people to whom the Reform Bill had given a corporate share in the duties and responsibilities of legislation required some political education to fit them for the proper exercise of their electoral privileges.

In 1835 Samuel Bailey, author of "Essays on the Formation of Opinions," who had offered himself in 1832 as a candidate for Sheffield on the Liberal platform, but was defeated, issued his "Rationale of Political Representation," a work which carried with it the greater portion of the advanced Liberalists, and very greatly affected the subsequent agitations for reform in Parliament, blossoming into Chartism, the Suffrage movement, &c. In this work the author considered the principles on which representative government ought to be constructed, so that the greatest possible advantage might be derived from it in such a manner as to be at once popular, intelligible, and effective. In 1838 the agitation on representation assumed form by the adoption of a programme of political rights which was received with great enthusiasm under the title of "The People's Charter." A large amount of political writing preceded and followed the issue of this document and the ten years of agitation which succeeded. For a time, after the repeal of the Corn Laws, representative reform was less thought of than it had been; and the stimulation of the question fell again into the hands of the thinkers. The main part in the discussion of the question was, however, now taken by the organs of thought which supply the bulk of the English public with their opinions—reviews, magazines, newspapers, and pamphlets. In these a fierce, formidable, and ably sustained skirmishing was kept up until the whole literature of the country was more or less implicated in the debate and the excitement. It was roundly declared that "the representation of the people was a fiction cunningly contrived and cleverly concealed by the brilliant rhetoric of false patriots and popular orators;" that "Parliament did not legislate for the benefit of the people as a whole," and that it should be so reformed as "to carry out effectively the properly formed and lawfully expressed desires of the entire people of the country."

Promises of parliamentary reform now became part of the political programme, and the consideration of the subject was again brought by the theorists back to first principles. This was

very ably done by Mr. Toulmin Smith in an exceedingly valuable work on "Local Self-government," which maintained that a life of order and freedom could only be properly secured when every individual was welded into the state without having his individuality destroyed; when free institutions extended from parish to Parliament; when political life and energy were encouraged by the full and public discussion of all questions among the people; and when all our representative institutions were formed upon the understanding that all law must spring from the people, and the administration of it must be under the control of the people.

In 1854 Lord John Russell so far redeemed his political pledges as to propose a Reform Bill, but the Crimean war caused its abandonment: and for a while there was a lull in the country on reform. Thoughtful men nevertheless saw that, however exacting war may be, the proper popularization of parliamentary representation was indispensable to true social progress, and the subject continued to receive the consideration of the impracticable theorists, and a number of possible forms of improving the representation of the people were suggested and discussed, so that the minds of men might be prepared to deal with the subject when the hour arrived for the practical realization of a reform in the representation.

Among these perhaps the most influential were "Political Progress not necessarily Democratical," by Professor Lorimer; a treatise on "The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal," by Thomas Hare, Barrister-at-Law,—a work which has excited much attention among politicians of all schools, and which has given to the country the cry of "The Representation of Minorities;" and "Considerations on Representative Government," by John Stuart Mill. The former writer proposes a method of representative election based mainly on wealth and social position as indexes of intelligence and worth; and the two latter suggest intelligence as indicated by instruction as the fittest condition for parliamentary suffrages,—the object of all being to get some means of approximating to the unit of social value which would best give grounds for the right of exercising the franchise. In addition to these works specially devoted to representation as the question of the hour, the interest in this topic was continued and increased by the issue of two colonial works,—*"The Government of England; its Structure and Development,"* by W. E. Hearn, LL.D., Professor of History at Melbourne; and *"Parliamentary Government in England; its Origin, Development, and Practical Operation,"* by Alpheus Todd, Librarian to the Legislative Assembly of Canada. Subsequently to this an extension of the franchise became a Government measure by consent of all parties, and very able debates on representation occurred in both Houses of Parliament. The years 1858-59 were greatly occupied by this question; and the agitation was resumed in 1865, and continued till 1869. The debates of the Parliament during these periods gave occasion to the production of many important speeches, and in several cases

these have been published. In "The Speeches on Questions of Public Policy," by John Bright, M.P., we have many on parliamentary reform. We have also "Speeches on Parliamentary Reform, delivered in the House of Commons by the Right Hon. B. Disraeli, 1849—1866." The "Speeches and Letters" of the Right Hon. Robert Lowe have been given to the press, as well as the speeches of W. E. Gladstone, Earl Russell, Lord Cairns, &c., &c. To the literature of the subject belong also J. S. Mill's "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform;" and two collections of contributions to the elucidation and solution of the questions arising from a consideration of representation,—*"Essays on Reform,"* and *"Questions for a Reformed Parliament."* To those who wish for farther information than our brief and imperfect paper can supply, the references here given may be enough to point them to the sources whence their desires may be gratified; but we may add here, as bearing close relation to the matter in hand, Lord Lindsay's *"Progress by Antagonism,"*—a work evincing great power of thought applied to an extensive series of historic facts; David Rowland's *"Manual of the British Constitution;"* H. S. Trevelyan's *"Constitution of the United States compared with our own;"* Lord Wrottesley's *"Thoughts on Government and Legislation;"* George Cornewall Lewis's *"Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics;"* Richard Congreve's *"Politics of Aristotle," with notes;* and Lord Brougham's *"The British Constitution."*

In the preceding paragraph we have quoted impartially able and interesting works by advocates of all the opinions prevalent on this topic, entirely irrespective of party,—as the object aimed at in mentioning them is the information of those who desire to study with the aim of gaining the truth. We are all the more free to do this as our prelection concerns the philosophy, not the partisanship, of politics; and all the more bound to do so are we, because we seek a basis for our theory of representative institutions, which differs in some measure from the ground-thought of either party. Our present object is to discover, if we can, the reason and grounds of representation, its conditions and its implications; in a subsequent paper we expect to overtake the remainder of the question,—the methods, forms, and requirements of representation in civic, social, ecclesiastical, and national life. Sufficient, if not more than sufficient, is our present task, to expound the theoretical grounds of representation, natural, moral, and official; to gain and give as clear a view as possible of the nature, influence, and expediency of it, and to point out the ends it subserves in the body politic, as well as in individual life; to explain in short the relations between representation and the intelligence and will of the people, as the means of bringing together a congress of opinions, and an assembly of delegated willingness; a deliberating and determining essence, epitome, and abstract of the people's aims.

Presentation implies the actual and real presence of the person

whose interests are in question, or whose participation is required. Presentation requires the personal appearance and activity of all the parties concerned in an action proposed to be done, or in an arrangement proposed to be entered into. In the city-states of Greece the sovereign power was held by the whole adult male citizenry; and presentation, or the actual engagement of the citizens in the practical business of government and legislation, was possible. In these city-states, though passion ran high and opinion was varied and changeable under the masterful influence of the sympathy of numbers, the citizens exercised the entire powers of government; their senate only forming in reality a committee for the formal arrangement and management of public business. Each citizen not only could present himself in the assemblies called for the despatch of business, but had the right of presenting his opinion on the subject under consideration, and could present his vote or his protest, as the case might be, in regard to the decision of the question adopted. In these, the citizen by personal influence and act upheld his personal right as a member of the commonwealth; in the election of magistrates, the audiences of ambassadors, the management of civil, military, or judicial matters, deliberations in connection with property or party, and in the enactment of laws, the Greek citizen was self-presentative.

In large communities and in extensive states presentative political right is not only inexpedient, but impossible. The entire community cannot meet together; and even though it could, the deliberate consideration, discussion, formation, and determination of opinions would, at any such congress, be impossible by any method within the compass of "art or man's device." However regular, fixed, frequent, and accessible the assemblies of such communities could be made, an actual personal opportunity of discussing questions, or even hearing them discussed, could not be afforded to or provided for all; and no form of impressing unanimity upon them could be contrived except that of the advocates of formed opinions addressing them in sections, and taking the vote upon the questions so submitted to their judgment. This being the case, expediency at once suggests that the justice of the matter might be as clearly and honestly seen to in local institutions and assemblies where, on a small scale, the presentative system should be as possible as in the city-states of Greece; and where the higher principle of representative opinion might be introduced by the election of one or more deputies to convey to a more general assembly the opinion formed by those who deputed them, and so bring together in a small manageable body the representatives of the interests, intelligence, and will of the whole body of the people.

In states of such an extent and so complicated in the machinery of government, national and international, as those of modern Europe and the West generally, it has been found that in order to secure assemblies of the people which shall deliberate and act with



public spirit and freedom, and yet in harmony with order and virtue, the number of citizens called to attend them must neither be too numerous nor too mixed, and must have a local fellow-feeling and common interest, so that while the sentiment of personal independence in each may be fully respected, advantage may be taken of the sympathy of man with man to induce concessions, and conduce to practical unanimity. In this way, while freedom of expression and of debate may be freely exercised, hasty, rash, and tumultuous proceedings may be avoided by the spontaneous activity of those feelings which tend to peace and good neighbourhood. The calmness and reasonableness of the discussions and decisions of such assemblies are thus enhanced, while the training of the whole public in the formation and utterance of sound opinions on matters pertaining to law, order, civic interests, and social life, is quickened and improved. The right of the individual to presentative participancy in the making of the laws is thus preserved in the representative system; and the power of the representatives to accept or reject the proposals made on behalf of the State, by maintaining ministerial responsibility, preserves the personal right of each to partnership in the national life.

The natural play and progress of this political activity is to bring into prominence and trusted popularity those who most sedulously and intelligently concern themselves with the consideration of political questions. These acquire a known character in their own localities, and gradually become, though only by a sort of insensible and unconscious passive or active selection, the *de facto* representatives of the holders of opinions similar to their own in the district, and are so far the volunteer forces of public opinion in each locality, having a certain following and a tacitly allowed superiority over those who think with them, or take their political creed from similar sources. These, again, form a kind of semi-organized set of inquirers on political movements, always on the outlook for measures which they think are important, and taking note of the men who approve or condemn them. Thus, by a spontaneous sympathy of sentiment, the several parties in each state are bound together by feelings which lead to fraternization when any great movement seems to be required. This may be called the latent moral representative system, out of which our legal representative system is developed; and it may be regarded as forming the moral bond which unites and combines the several grades of society into a sympathetic oneness which renders the actual political consideration of questions much more easy, more satisfactory, and more trustworthy. These men are exposed to public notice and criticism, and generally act under a sense of responsibility.

Holding their supremacy as the real tribunes of the locality in which they are known by the tacit consent of those who believe with them chiefly on the tenure of personal popularity or political consistency, they form a powerful class of semi-acknowledged representatives; often able to gain for themselves actual nomination and

official recognition when need arises for carrying out any important political purpose. They are the leading spirits of the district, and as such naturally exercise a considerable educative and regulative influence on public opinion. These men frequently become the agents through whom the tendency of a district is made known to those who desire the office and honour of being Members of Parliament; not only do they form a judgment regarding what the opinion of the locality is, but also regarding what sort of representative would be most likely to be acceptable to those with whom they usually act, and with whom they sympathize. These men, influential themselves by their intelligence and known consistency, often constitute wise and trustworthy advisers, and the persons who through them solicit the suffrages of the people must give them some reasons, direct or indirect, for believing that they are worthy of confidence and honour. In this way representatives may be said to be selected by the select from among those more notably select, and so are, in general, superior in some respects to those for whom they act, and whose interests and welfare they become bound to endeavour to secure. The special devotion which representatives are generally able to give to the consideration of questions affecting the common weal, enables them more watchfully and more intelligently to maintain the interests of order and freedom, the consistency of the State and the independence of the individual, than any one chosen at haphazard from among those who are called to consult for and determine concerning the legislation best suited for the country. At the same time the people have their minds set free from the absorbing and passionate interests of political life, and are thus enabled to live in greater comfort, ease, and enjoyment, than they would otherwise have been able to do. To find a man of honesty, intelligence, influence, and power of speech and thought, is a much more easy task for the people than to acquire for themselves such knowledge as would impart competency to them to judge of and determine regarding questions of polity, policy, economy, and law, adapted to the several circumstances of cases as they arise. Representation, then, while it releases the ordinary and average man from the taskwork of political study, yet supplies a mild and efficacious inducement to him to gain a general acquaintance with politics and its problems, and at the same time provides a higher and better class of advisers for the State, and a more skilful class of expositors of policy.

The nation is not to be regarded as consisting of a passive aggregation of individuals who are to be superintended, and to have such measures taken on their behalf as shall secure the greatest possible happiness to the greatest possible numbers, by the members of a strong cabinet and a wise administration. The State exists in, of, and through, as well as for the people. Administration is not the highest function of Government; it is the exciting, sustaining, and promoting of selfhood—activity, thoughtfulness, self-reliance, truthfulness, and helpfulness, might and will, not only to do duty, but

to claim and exercise right. Administration is mechanical and instrumental, but the motive power of the entire administrative system depends on the amount and energy of the selfhood it receives its impetus from. The Sovereign is the State only when he is the representative of the people's will; the Cabinet is only the Government when it effects the purposes which the people have agreed to and embodied in legislation; and legislation itself is only law when it expresses and contains the will of the people freely, fully, and deliberately formed and registered in the choice of representatives, in the presenting of petitions, and in the acquiescent acceptance of the legislation proposed, as the embodied and fixed decision of the Commons, agreed to by the nobles, and formally ratified by the assent and consent of the supreme representative—the Sovereign.

The Government is administrative and executive, but in administration it is controlled and regulated by the representatives of the people, and in the exercise of its executive functions it is restrained and overmastered by the law. The people govern, the cabinet administers, the sovereign ratifies; and these together form the State. The nobles exercise their presentative rights directly because they are few, and are supposed to have given guarantees to the country of community of feeling with it, and whenever their sympathy dulls or their interests run counter to the general good—or what is deliberately believed to be so—means are always taken to bring into harmony in the long run the opinions of the peers and the people. The people exercise their presentative rights when, by their individual votes, unswayed by any outward force, and undictated to by any person, clique, party, or power whatsoever, in accordance with and in conformity to their own free, deliberate, and unbiassed personal conviction, they make choice of a representative to the Commons House of Parliament. These representatives instruct the cabinet, and advise the sovereign; and in the name, with the authority, and on behalf of the people, they revise, review, amend, control, suggest, or countermand the acts proposed to be done in or by the State—through its officials, subordinate or sovereign.

Man is first of all to himself a *self*, an individual, a possessor and exerciser of personal life, with all the natural *rights* which the possession of individual personality implies, and bound to all the *duties* which it involves. All the duties towards *self* which the individuality of the individual demands are summed up in *self-conservation*. As this is an original and inalienable duty which each owes to himself, it both measures and marks out the rights to which he must lay claim, and the duties to which he must yield obedience. He must neither suffer nor agree to anything which would make this conservancy of his own being and well-being impossible; and conversely he must neither ask nor do anything which would impair or lessen the power of self-conservancy in others. The State is a conservator, and as the most precious of all things to *man* is himself, so he requires that the State shall guarantee his personality—in-

cluding as far as may be existence, subsistence, and persistence, or progressive continuance; and he guarantees to the State by his person, including his property, in return, a due observance of the being and well-being of others. The State, in this way, acknowledges and recognises the individuality of each as the grand ultimate of conserving care, while the individual acknowledges and recognises the State as his representative guardian and defender; and the protector and upholder of the rights of others, as well as the claimant of the proper performance of duty by each and all.

Each being thus bound to each by a life for life guarantee, the State is ultimately based upon the individuality of its members or shareholders; the body of a nation's laws being the conditions of the covenant, into which he enters by birth, *i. e.*, personal being as a partaker—and he becomes a proper claimant of all the rights of life when he becomes properly effective in the discharge of all life's duties. He has only at most a claim upon the State in proportion to his actual performance of (or willingness to perform) the duties of his station. Citizenry, therefore, is an acknowledgment on the part of the State of a person's claim of rights, and on the part of the subject a confession of the claim of the State to dutifulness and obedience. The moment at which the substitutionary citizenship of parentage, and the novitiate of subjection in youth should cease and determine, is clearly a matter of pact or usage, but citizenship is itself a fact, and implies functions.

It requires to be conceded as the basis of individuality in citizenship that (1) each man is the steward of his own being, and either knows or ought to know how best to work out his life to the best ends; and hence it follows that it is each man's right and duty to manage his own concerns in his own way and for his own ends—each duty being reciprocally a limit to each right; (2) that in regard to all matters by which he either is or is likely to be affected it is the right and the duty of each to have the opportunity of knowing and understanding all the possible effects which each such matter may have on him; to discuss their incidence, and to determine how far he shall voluntarily agree to be affected by such matters; (3) that he shall be free from any dictation or intimidation whatever, except such as arises from the suasive influences of reasoning, or of the sympathy of those who agree and act with him; (4) that any coercive restraint to which he may be subjected shall be declared openly and administered fairly by those who are placed in similar circumstances as himself, and who, therefore, in case of acting as he did, would undergo a like coercive restraint. The true safeguard and protection of the personality of each person is summarily expressed in the law, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them." This is the charter of personal independence as well as the law of social duty, and is of very high authority, as well as necessity, in a state of civilization such as that in which we live, wherein personality is so hard to preserve, "and the individual withers, and the world is more and

more." On the right to be an individual depends the farther right of presentation to assert, maintain, or defend his rights, and the duty of presentation to consider, uphold, and administer the rights of others. From the right of presentation there follows the right of representation, which is the accomplishment by proxy of those duties which we owe to society, and the exercise of those rights by deputy which have been guaranteed by the State.

When in any local associated group, or assembly of persons, individuals present themselves to take into consideration any matter that concerns them, to discuss its fitness, or to decide upon its advisability, a vote or voice is granted, in the determination of the question, to all who are present, in conformity with the conditions of the assembly. This is presentative political action. If the decision come to be made by motion, be embodied in petition, or take the form of resolutions affirmed by the meeting, and to be given effect to by a committee or a deputation, we have representative political action; and when the committee, deputation, or other form of representative activity succeeds in so bringing the decision arrived at before the executive or administrative functionaries of the State as to have it consented to and acted upon, we have ministerial political action. The individual concedes his effective influence to his representatives, and these representatives again concede their effective influence to the administration, so that the State is the result of the conceded individuality of the people, and not the source of the people's influence. Representation concentrates, emboldens, conserves, and energizes public opinion: as rilllets conjoin to form rivers, and rivers, by their confluent waters, form seas, so do laws result from the decisions of individuals on moral questions, collected into proposals, and urged by representatives till they acquire the sanction of the Legislature, and are placed in the statute-book.

It has been a matter of considerable difficulty among speculative politicians to determine whether representation ought to be a representation of persons, property, position, intelligence, or class, and much may be said on behalf of each. It is, however, all but impossible without cross-division, which philosophy and practical life equally abhor, to fix upon any permanent and general basis except the personal one. It is for the individual that society exists; abolish human individuality, and the State becomes a tyranny, and Government a despotism; we may have law, but we cannot have legislation; and there may be subjects, but not people. Representation presupposes personal presentativeness, and therefore implies individuality. But each individual, in so far as he possesses property, attains position, acquires intelligence, or becomes aggregated with a class, must—so far as these affect and move, impress or sway the individual—less or more add to his personal feeling and interest the desire and design of preserving and conserving all that has thus become attached to his individuality, and hence will, in the ultimate, see to it that personality shall be represented, as far as

possible, with its adjuncts and its acquisitions, so that a properly regulated personal representation will afford all due facilities for making Parliament a mirror in miniature of the opinions and feelings of the nation.

Hence it is that not only sovereigns and cabinets but people

" Musttake care  
To cherish these Assemblies of Estate,  
Which in great monarchies true glasses are  
To show men's grief, excesses to abate;  
Brave moulds for Laws—a medium that in one  
Joins, with content a people to the throne."

We are unable within our space to pursue this portion of the subject farther, and we condense the sum of our ideas into the following table, which we recommend the reader to think out and test for himself; self-culture approves of this plan, and the interest of the topic will induce to the adoption of it.

Representation implies	I. Among the <i>People</i> .	1. Individualism.	{ (1) in opinion. (2) in consideration. (3) in voting.
		2. Associative concurrence	{ (1) in aim. (2) in choice. (3) in responsibility.
		3. Selection	{ (1) of purpose. (2) of party. (3) of person.
	II. In the <i>State</i> .	1. Freedom	{ (1°) of debate. (2°) of choice. (3°) of representation.
		2. Order	{ (1°) in proceedings. (2°) at elections. (3°) in business.
		3. Justice	{ (4°) after elections. (1°) to person. (2°) to property.
			{ (3°) to party.
		1. Ability	{ (i.) in thought. (ii.) in speech. (iii.) in investigation.
		III. In the <i>Candidate</i> .	{ (iv.) in adaptation. (i.) towards electors. (ii.) towards the State.
		2. Honesty	{ (iii.) towards the Sovereign. (i.) in Parliament. (ii.) in study.
		3. Industry	{ (iii.) in communications to, for, and with his clients.

## Epoch Men.

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### THOMAS HOBBES, OF MALMESBURY.

(*Continued from page 260.*)

"Great books are not within everybody's reach ; and it is a good work to give a little to those who have neither time nor means to get more."—*S. T. Coleridge.*

We continue our analysis of "The Leviathan." We have now reached "Part II. Of Commonwealth," which begins with chapter xvii. of the original ; and here, there follows, in the briefest form consistent with comprehensibility, an outline of the opinions on this subject of the bearer of, as G. L. Craik thinks, "one of the most distinguished names, both in English literature and in modern metaphysical, ethical, and political philosophy." The work proceeds :—

"Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth" (17). "The final cause, end, or design of men, who naturally love liberty and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby." "For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and in same doing to others as we would be done to of ourselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." "The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy, we fear." "And be there never so great a multitude ; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence nor protection, neither against a common enemy nor against the injuries of one another."

"Nor is it enough . . . that they be governed and directed by one judgment for a limited time." "The only way to erect such a common power . . . is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will ;" "and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment." "As if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth." "And he that carrieth this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power ; and every one besides his subject." "Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution" (18). "A commonwealth is said to be instituted when a multitude of

men do agree and covenant, every one with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative; every one, as well he that voted for it as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own." "From this are derived all the rights and faculties of him, or them, on whom sovereign power is conferred." Hence (1) "the subjects cannot change the form of government;" (2) "sovereign power cannot be forfeited;" (3) "no man can without injustice protest against the institution of the sovereign declared by the major part;" (4) "the sovereign's actions cannot be justly accused by the subject;" (5) "whatsoever the sovereign doth is unpunishable by the subject;" (6) "the sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace and defence of his subjects, and judge of what doctrines are fit to be taught them;" (7) "the right of making rules, whereby the subjects may every man know what is so his own as no other subject can, without injustice, take it from him;" (8) "to him also belongeth the right of judgment, and decision of controversy;" (9) "and of making war and peace as he shall think best;" (10) "and of choosing all counsellors and ministers both of peace and war;" (11) "and of rewarding and punishing, and that (where no former law hath determined the measure of it) arbitrarily;" (12) and of honour and order. These are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty; and which are the marks whereby a man may discern in what man, or assembly of men, the sovereign power is placed and resideth. For these are incommunicable and inseparable." "The power of sovereignty is the same in whosoever it be placed." "Of the several kinds of Commonwealth by Institution, and of Succession to the Sovereign power" (19). "The difference of commonwealths consisteth in the difference of the sovereign, or the personal representative of all and every one of the multitude." "When the representative is one man, then is the commonwealth a *Monarchy*: when an assembly of all that will come together, then it is a *Democracy*, or popular commonwealth; when an assembly of a part only, then it is called an *Aristocracy*." "The difference between these three kinds of commonwealth consisteth not in the difference of power, but in the difference of convenience or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people, for which end they were instituted." "Of Dominion Paternal and Despotical" (20). "A *commonwealth by acquisition* is that where the sovereign power is acquired by force;" "and this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by institution only in this, that men who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute." "But the rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both." "Dominion is acquired two ways; by generation and by conquest. The right of dominion by generation is called paternal." "Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some writers call *despotical*."

"The rights and consequences of both *paternal* and *despotical* dominion are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution." "The sovereign powers, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular and aristocratical commonwealths, is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it." "Of the Liberty of Subjects" (21). "*Liberty*, or *freedom*, signifieth properly the absence of opposition; by opposition I mean external impediments of motion." "A freeman is he that



in those things which, by his strength and wit, he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to." In this chapter he affirms, "1. Fear and liberty are consistent; generally all actions which men do in commonwealths, for fear of the law, are actions which the doers had liberty to omit."

"2. Liberty and necessity are consistent; therefore God, that seeth and disposeth all things, seeth also that the *liberty* of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the *necessity* of doing that which God will, and no more nor less." "But men have made artificial chains, called civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end to the lips of the sovereign power, and at the other end to their own ears."

"In relation to these bonds only it is that I am to speak now, of the liberty of subjects, which consisteth in liberty from covenants." "Such as is the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute (*i. e.*, bring up) their children as they themselves think fit; and the like."

"Nevertheless the liberty of the subject (is) consistent with the unlimited power of the sovereign." "The liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention in the histories and philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and in the writings and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in politics, is not the liberty of particular men, but the liberty of the commonwealth." "The Athenians and Romans were free; that is, free commonwealths: not that any particular men had the liberty to resist their own representative; but that their representative had the liberty to resist or invade other people." "It is an easy thing for men to be deceived by the specious name of liberty; and, for want of judgment to distinguish, mistake that for their private inheritance and birth-right which is the right of the public only." "In the act of our *submission* consisteth both our *obligation* and our *liberty*; hence, 1. Subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade them; and, 2. They are not bound to hurt themselves; 3. Nor to engage in warfare unless they voluntarily undertake it." "Other liberties depend on the silence of the law." "Subjects are absolved of their obedience to their sovereign—1. In case of captivity; 2. In case the sovereign cast off the government from himself and his heirs; 3. In case of banishment; 4. In case the sovereign render himself subject to another."

"Of Systems Subject, Political and Private" (22). "By *systems* I understand any numbers of men joined in one interest or one business; of which some are *regular*, and some *irregular*. *Regular* are those where one man, or assembly of men, is constituted representative of the whole number. All other are *irregular*. Of regular some are absolute and independent, subject to none but their own representative." "Others are dependent; that is to say, subordinate to some sovereign power, to which every one, as also their representative, is subject. Of systems subordinate some are *political*, and some *private*. *Political*, otherwise called *bodies politic*, and *persons in law*." "*Private* are those which are constituted by subjects amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger." "And of private systems some are *lawful*, some *unlawful*. *Lawful* are those which are allowed by the commonwealth; all other are *unlawful*." "*Irregular systems* are those which, having no representative, consist only of a concourse of people." "In bodies politic the power of the representative is always limited; and that which prescribeth the limits thereof is the power sovereign. For power unlimited is absolute sovereignty." Of "the bounds of

power one is their writ, or letters from the sovereign : the other is the law of the Commonwealth." "The variety of bodies politic is almost infinite of a province, colony, or town." "If the sovereign power be in a great assembly, and a number of men, part of the assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the guidance of the rest ; this is a faction, or conspiracy unlawful, as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular interest." "Of the Public Ministers of Sovereign Power" (23). "A *public minister* is he that, by the sovereign, whether a monarch or an assembly, is employed in any affairs, with authority to represent in that employment the person of that commonwealth." "Of public ministers some have charge committed to them of a general administration, either of a whole dominion or of a part thereof." "Others have special administration ; that is to say, charges of some special business, either at home or abroad." "For instruction of the people, for judicature, and for execution." "A body of counsellors are never without some other authority, either of judicature, or of immediate administration."

"Of the Nutrition and Procreation of a Commonwealth" (24). "The *nutrition* of a commonwealth consisteth in the *plenty* and *distribution* of *materials* conducing to life ; in *concoction*, or *preparation* ; and when concocted, in the *conveyance* of it, by convenient conduits, to the public use." "This matter, commonly called *commodities*, is partly *native* and partly *foreign* : *native*, that which is to be had within the territory of the commonwealth ; *foreign*, that which is imported from without." "The distribution of the materials of this nourishment is the constitution of *mine*, and *thine*, and *his* ; that is to say, in one word, propriety ; and belongeth in all kinds of commonwealth to the sovereign power." "It belongeth to the commonwealth, that is to say, to the sovereign, to appoint in what manner all kinds of contract between subjects, as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire, are to be made ; and by what words and signs they shall be understood for valid." "Money, of what matter soever, coined by the sovereign of a commonwealth, is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the subjects of that commonwealth." "The conduits and ways by which it is conveyed to the public use are of two sorts ; one, that conveyeth it to the public coffers ; the other, that issueth the same out again for public payments." "When a colony is settled, they are either a commonwealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their sovereign that sent them, as hath been done by many commonwealths of ancient time, in which case the commonwealth from mere of them than fathers require of their children, whom they emancipate and make free from their domestic government, which is honour and friendship ; or else they remain united to their metropolis, as were the colonies of the people of Rome ; and then they are no commonwealths themselves, but provinces, and parts of the commonwealth that sent them." "Of Counsel" (25). "Command is where a man saith, *do this*, or *do not this*, without expecting other reason than the will of him that says it." "Counsel is where a man saith, *do* or *do not this*, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it." "Between counsel and command one great difference is, that command is directed to a man's own benefit ; and counsel to the benefit of another man." "He that giveth counsel to his sovereign, whether a monarch or an assembly, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion

of the most or not, so it be to the proposition in debate." *"Exhortation and dehortation* is counsel, accompanied with signs in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, *counsel vehemently pressed*. For he that exhorteth encourages him he counselleth to action; as he that dehorteth deterreth him from it." "We may set down for the first condition of a good counsellor, *that his ends and interests be not inconsistent with the ends and interests of him he counselleth*. Secondly, *rash and unevident inferences, obscure, confused, and ambiguous expressions, also all metaphorical speeches, tending to the stirring up of passion, are repugnant to the office of a counsellor*. Thirdly, *no man is presumed to be a good counsellor but in such business as he hath not only been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on and considered*. Fourthly, to be able to give counsel to a commonwealth, in a business that hath reference to another commonwealth, it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences and letters that come from thence, and with all the record of treaties and other transactions of state between them. And fifthly, supposing the number of counsellors equal, a man is better counselled by hearing them apart than in an assembly. A man that doth his business by the help of many and prudent counsellors, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best. But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed counsel, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly out of envy or interest, retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all." "Of Civil Laws" (26). "By *civil laws*, I understand the laws that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are members, not of this or that commonwealth in particular, but of a commonwealth." "Civil law is to every subject, those rules which the commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule." "Law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particuler men, in such a manner as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a common enemy." "The legislator is he, not by whose authority the laws were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be laws." "All laws, written and unwritten, have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth." "The two arms of a commonwealth are force and justice; the first whereof is in the king; the other deposited in the hands of the Parliament." "Law made, if not also made known, is no law." "Nothing is law where the legislator cannot be known. There is, therefore, requisite not only a declaration of the law, but also sufficient signs of the author and authority by which all laws are sufficiently verified; verified I say, not authorized; for the verification is but the testimony and record, not the authority of the law. The law is verified (1) by the subordinate judge; (2) by the public registers; (3) by letters patent and public seal." "The interpretation of the law dependeth on the sovereign power. All laws, written and unwritten, have need of interpretation."

"Of Crimes, Excuses, and Extenuations (28). A sin is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. For such contempt is a breach of all his laws at once." "A crime is a sin consisting in the committing, by deed or word, of that which the law forbiddeth, or the omission of what it hath commanded. So every crime is a sin; but not every sin a crime. The source of every crime is some defect of the under-

standing, or some error in reasoning, or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in the understanding is ignorance; in reasoning, erroneous opinion. Again, ignorance is of three sorts; of the law, and of the sovereign, and of the penalty." "No law, made after a fact done, can make it a crime." "From defect in reasoning, that is to say, from error, men are prone to violate the laws three ways. First, by presumption of false principles: Secondly, by false teachers: Thirdly, by erroneous inferences from true principles." "The passions most frequently are the causes of crime." "There is a place, not only for excuse, by which that which seemed a crime is proved to be none at all; but also for extenuation, by which the crime that seemed great is made less." "The same crime, when the accusation is in the name of the commonwealth, is called public crime: and when in the name of a private man, a private crime." "Of Punishment and Rewards (28)." "A punishment is an evil inflicted by public authority on him that hath done or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience." "Reward is either of gift, or by contract. When by contract, it is called salary and wages; which is benefit due for service performed or promised." "Thus much will suffice for the nature of punishment and reward; which are, as it were, the nerves and tendons that move the limbs and joints of a commonwealth.

"Hitherto I have set forth the nature of man, whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himself to government: together with the great power of his governor, whom I compared to leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the forty-first chapter of Job; where God, having set forth the great power of leviathan, calleth him king of the proud. There is nothing, saith he, on earth to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the children of pride. But because he is mortal, and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, though not on earth, that he should stand in fear of, and whose laws he ought to obey, I shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases and the causes of his mortality; and of what laws of nature he is bound to obey." "Of those things that tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth" (29). "Though nothing can be immortal which mortals make; yet commonwealths, by the nature of their institution, are designed to live as long as mankind, or as the laws of nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life. Among the infirmities, therefore, of a commonwealth, I will reckon, 1st, That a man, to obtain a kingdom, is sometimes content with less power than to the peace and defence of the commonwealth is necessarily required; 2nd, The poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is, That every private man is judge of good and evil actions. Another doctrine repugnant to civil society is, 3rd, That whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin. But it hath been commonly taught that faith and sanctity are not to be attained by study and reason, but by supernatural inspiration, or infusion. Which granted, I see not why any man should take the law of his country, rather than his own inspiration, for the rule of his action. A 4th opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth is this, that he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws. A 5th doctrine that tendeth to the dissolution of a commonwealth is, that every private man has an absolute propriety in

his goods; such as excludeth the right of the sovereign. A 6th doctrine is this, that the sovereign power may be divided." "There are also that think there may be more sovereigns than one in a commonwealth, and set up a supremacy against the sovereignty; canons against laws; and a ghostly authority against the civil." "Of the Office of the Sovereign representative" (30). "The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely, the procuration of safety of the people. By safety here is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life which every man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the commonwealth, shall acquire to himself. This should be done, not by care applied to individuals further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a general providence contained in public instruction, both of doctrine and example; and in the making and executing of good laws, to which individual persons may apply their own cases." "It belongeth also to the office of the sovereign to make a right application of punishments and rewards." "The sovereign is to choose good counsellors; I mean such whose advice he is to take in the government of the commonwealth." "Every sovereign hath the same right in procuring the safety of his people that any particular man can have in procuring the safety of his own body. Of the kingdom of God, as King of kings, and as King also of a peculiar people, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse." "Of the Kingdom of God by Nature" (31). "There wants only, for the entire knowledge of civil duty, to know what are those laws of God. And seeing the knowledge of all law dependeth on the knowledge of the sovereign power, I shall say something in that which followeth of the kingdom of God." "Whether men will or will not, they must be subject always to divine power. They, therefore, that believe there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given precepts, and propounded rewards and punishments to mankind, are God's subjects; all the rest are to be understood as enemies." "God declareth His laws three ways; by the dictates of natural reason, by revelation, and by the voice of some man, to whom, by the operation of miracles, He procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a triple word of God—rational, sensible, and prophetic: to which correspondeth a triple hearing; right reason, sense supernatural, and faith. There may be attributed to God a twofold kingdom: natural and prophetic." "The right of afflicting men at his pleasure belongeth naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator and gracious, but as omnipotent." "The divine laws are equity, justice, mercy, humility, and the rest of the moral virtues." "Honour consisteth in the inward thought and opinion of the power and goodness of another; and therefore to honour God is to think as highly of His power and goodness as is possible. And of that opinion, the external signs appearing in the words and actions of men are called worship. "There is a public and a private worship. Public is the worship that a commonwealth performeth as one person. Private is that which a private person exhibiteth. Public, in respect of the whole commonwealth, is free; but in respect of particular men it is not so. Private is in secret free; but in the sight of the multitude it is never without some restraint, either from the laws or from the opinion of men, which is contrary to the nature of liberty." "Seeing a commonwealth is but one person, it ought also to exhibit to God but one worship; which then it doth when it commandeth it to be exhibited by private men publicly.

And this is public worship, the property whereof is to be uniform." "That which is said in Scripture, It is better to obey God than man, hath place in the kingdom of God by pact, and not by nature." "There is no action of man in this life that is not the beginning of so long a chain of consequences as no human providence is high enough to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this chain there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner as he that will do anything for his pleasure must engage himself to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains are the natural punishments of those actions which are the beginning of more harm than good." "I hope that, one time or other, this writing of mine may fall into a sovereign who will consider it himself (for it is short, and, I think, clear) without the help of any interested or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice."

Thus far proceedeth Part ii. of "Leviathan," which extends in Molesworth's edition to upwards of 200 pages. Brief as our epitome is, we believe that it will be found to contain a fair abstract of the author's opinions, unmixed with any foreign matter. It may be regarded as an analytic index of his opinions, and presents probably as much as any one would be able to remember after a diligent perusal of the original. On a future opportunity we intend to complete our analysis by giving a concise outline of Part iii., which, however, as it occupies upwards of 390 pages, we must very materially if not arbitrarily condense. Meantime we leave our readers to consider the system of "Commonwealth" presented by Hobbes to the subjects of Charles, sovereign *de jure*, and of Cromwell, sovereign *de facto*, in 1651.

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SHAKESPEARE.—"The meagreness of Shakspeare's biography, that standing wonder when contrasted with the fulness of the accounts that have come down to us of his less gifted contemporaries, we are inclined to attribute to the evenness of his temperament and the simplicity of his life. If he had been ambitious or eccentric, an innovator or a brawler; if he had believed that his position was inferior to his deserts, and had therefore striven to force himself into notice by hanging on to the skirts of a great man, or by meddling with the political or religious squabbles of the day, there would have been something to tell about him, some striking incidents to record, some failures or successes to chronicle. As it was he left nothing but his plays and his name behind him. All that we know of his history can be told in a dozen words, and we must infer his character from his works, in which he says nothing about himself. He came to London a penniless boy, wrote his dramas and acted in them, lived quietly but joyously, amassed a competency, retired to his native place, bought lands, and died an honest and unpretending burgher of Stratford. There was nothing obtrusive in his character or his life, and consequently so little is known of either, that the Wolfs and Haynes of a future generation will probably deny his personality, as they now do that of Homer. But what copious accounts we have of the roisterous, conceited, and quarrelsome Ben Jonson!"—*North American Review on Lowell's Poems, April, 1848, p. 484.*

## Social Economy.

### OUGHT THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO BE DISCONTINUED?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"THE principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on one side, nor disability on the other."—*J. S. Mill*.

The time has long gone by in which, with even the smallest approach to truth, it could be said—

"Man's love is, of man's life, a thing apart;  
'Tis woman's whole existence."

Circumstances have entirely changed the fashion of the world. Woman was in its earlier ages a toy and a plaything for man's voluptuous hours, a sport and a ministrant to his passionate delights. Concubinage and bondage were nearly akin, and virile jealousy guarded the objects, not of the love, but the lusts of men, by sequestered living and concealment. By and by the course and progress of life led to the adoption of the ideas of chivalry, and the exterior forms of respect for women and protection to her chastity were agreed upon. That it should ever have been a point of knighthood to defend female innocence and protect virginity shows how far society had become degraded and debased by confounding the best delights of life with bestiality of practical intercourse.

We know from the books of chivalry that the relations of the sexes were exceedingly vicious, and that the usage to which woman was exposed was singularly vile. Not only rapine, but ravishment were constant consequents of war, and the crimes of rape and outrage were frequent, while the purity of the female sex and the chastity of the male were matters of much scoffing and scurrility. The social condition of women, even in ages nearer to our own time, was a sad one. We learn from our literature, which is, perhaps, even purer than that of any other land, how flagrantly low was the estimate of women entertained by our ancestors. That mirror of each age, the stage, gives the impression that the relations of the sexes were very depraved; and, if we dare credit our early novels, the country was not much less vile than the town in this respect. There is, in regard to all matters relating to sex, no honesty in man nor woman neither, according to the testimony of the stage of Congreve, Vanburgh, and Wycherley, and the novels

of Behn and Fielding—even Richardson's "Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded," is calculated to give a very sorry impression of the purest of those who held their course through the prurient paths of intrigue in which the amusements of genteel life consisted. Women have been alternately the idols and the dupes, the traitresses and the avengers of the moral condition in which the customs of society placed her. Deception was called gallantry, and the vilest stratagems of every sort were had recourse to, that the relations of the sexes should be such as to make women dependent, submissive, and suffering. Even now it is to be feared, from the revelations of our various courts, that social life, though becoming gradually purer, has not by any means attained to that state in which its members could be complimented on being the salt of the earth; or else in a great many instances the salt has lost its savour.

The time has come, however, in which the law must step in to equalize the guilt of the sexes, and protect alike from seduction and blandishment, and to do this must equalize the rights of the sexes and the conditions of the sexes, so that no mere subordination shall have place; but that the person, property, good name, prospects, prosperity, and estate of women shall be as carefully and thoroughly protected and defended by the law as those of men. The customs of society, too, must be so re-arranged and settled as to bring the risks and the privileges of both sexes nearer to a *par*; and the idea of partnership with full rights and equal status shall be granted and given to the, at present, too much subjugated half of humanity.

The ideas of crime and criminality in the sexes must be adjusted on a fairer platform, and the legal protection given to each must no longer be that of prescription, but of justice and equity. Sentiment need not in the least be abolished or weakened by the adjustment of the relations of men and women on such a basis as shall preserve and improve, promote and increase the purity of each.

We affirm, first, that marriage ought to be a relation of perfect equality—equality of rights, privileges, responsibilities, and requirements: that there should be no subjection except such as is mutual and in just counterpoise; that there should be a deletion from the form for the Solemnization of Matrimony of the promise compelled from the woman to *obey* and *serve*, and a substitution on her part of the same promise only as that to be made by the man, to love, *comfort*, honour, and keep. Only in this can the troth-plight of the married life be just or justified. The woman, by the very fact of the pact, undertakes a most serious and onerous duty—a duty on which the continuance of the world depends. This, of itself, should give her a claim to the favour rather than the tyranny of the law. If she is to undertake "the procreation of children" for the family and for the continuance of civil society and of the Church, she ought certainly not to be subjected by the Church and by society to servitude and obedience; rather ought she to be rewarded for her labour of love by the most su



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protections and most cautious provisions against any slight, hurt, damage, or injury. Being, in fact, so much more bound by nature and the requirements of the family and civil service she undertakes, she ought to have her burden equalized by the husband being weighted with due and requisite covenants to guard and comfort, provide and tend her. Wifehood should be recognised as a relation of family and social equality, but motherhood should be regarded as giving civil and ecclesiastical rights justly proportioned to the burden and the care, the responsibility and the risk. Motherhood ought in all cases to involve the father—putative or real—in proper and just providence for the care of the mother and the security of the child, and any one who flatters, deceives, practices on innocence, or bribes, entices, or procures any one to undertake the risk and responsibility of motherhood without proper guarantees for the care of the mother and the protection of the offspring, ought to be treated as a traitor to society, an enemy to civil life, and receive the reward justly due to a rogue and a vagabond.

To obtain enjoyment under false pretences is much worse than to obtain money under false pretences; to forge on a young spirit the fetters of fornication, and to lay upon a life the burden of the birth and rearing of a child, is worse than to trespass on property, or to engage in the pursuit of game; and no law can be too severe which enforces, in all cases, the proper performance of the duties involved in fatherhood towards both mother and child. It is a scandal to our civilization that the laws of affiliation and marriage should be so basely grounded on the subjection of woman to the pains and penalties of nature, to the unjust laws of marital supremacy, or to the scathe and scorn of the usages of society. The pressure of the law and of social usage is all against the one party, who, by the very doom of nature, is exposed to pain and risk, and is all in favour of the party who is light of foot and vile of conscience. The physical relations of the sexes ought to be settled upon the principles of equity; and if woman is by nature "the weaker vessel," then let her, by the justice of the law, be made strong by the protection it affords; and cause the scandal of the subjection of women to the tyranny of the strong over the weak to cease in our land.

The abolition of the disabilities of women in the married state is urgently demanded. As things are at present, a woman is not mistress of her own person, and cannot refuse to place herself at the disposal of her husband if he chooses to force and enforce his will, wish, or desire—without regard to her pain, distress, dislike, or prudential desire. This is not as it should be; concourse ought to be the result of mutual regard, and not a forced and forcible self-gratification.

Again, the equity of life demands that the personal property of a woman should be at her own disposal, and not, as it is now, usable at the husband's pleasure irrespective of her wishes. The justice of the case demands that free contract alone should be the means

by which the use and disposal of her money should pass from a wife to her husband: and this ought to be specially guarded by the provision that the husband performs his duties as a husband and a householder, as it not unfrequently happens that a vile husband uses his wife's means for the gratification of his own licentiousness. This again suggests that the relations of the sexes with regard to divorce ought to be equalized; at present, proved adultery, even in a single case, makes the wife liable to divorce; but continuous adultery on the part of a husband, unless accompanied by personal cruelty habitually exercised towards the wife, is not regarded as a ground of divorce. This is eminently unjust, as well as socially injurious. According to our forms of life, men have larger opportunities for being unchaste without discovery than women, and yet the criminality, in the eye of the law, is winked at on his side and severely dealt with on hers. Besides, the social stain on the woman is made indelible, while to the man it often adds only a little increase of fascination, as every woman fancies that even out of this nettle danger, she can pluck the flower in safety.

This leads to the remark that the subjection of women in social life should be discontinued.

Social life ought to be a life of companionship. Equal rights and just laws should govern it. In social life, however, there are constant inversions of the laws of righteousness and fair play. Women are neither fairly educated nor justly trained in comparison with men. In the family they are almost always regarded as the born slaves and natural drudges of the boy-brotherhood, who, seeing the mastery exercised by the father over the mother, reenact it with all the added tyranny of the nature of boys upon their sisters. In the social circle, though outwardly treated with deference, there is a constant warfare of ingenuity exercised against them by men to withdraw them from the right path; and social life ought as rigidly to be guarded against conspiracy to defraud women as commercial life is guarded against conspiracy to defraud or overreach dealers in goods. Why should embezzlement, force, fraud, or wilful imposition be punishable with severity when they are concerned with money, and not when they regard chastity? Why should it be crime to take in a merchant and only gallantry to beguile and betray a woman? Why should hypocrisy, deception, and heartless vice be gilded over with the fine names of pleasure, gallantry, and intrigue; or glozed over by the Frenchified terms of *liaison*, *libertinage*, &c.? One who steals the good name, the chastity, and the happiness of a woman, is a thief of a deeper and more flagrant dye than devils have a name for. This must not only be recognised, but acted on in the customs of society before life can be pure and humanity happy.

Besides, the style of treatment towards women does not end even with this vile conduct. Men have got the idea that women ought to have no manner of fair play, even in social life. It has been ruled that a married woman cannot conduct business for her-

self or by herself, and it not unfrequently happens that the agents in whom she is compelled to trust have the same ideas regarding honesty in business with women, as the generality of men have in regard to honesty of dealing in the matter of sex. Single women are often the objects of plunder by trickery and fraud. Widows and orphans have often to suffer from man's depraved ideas on honesty towards women.

The subjection of women in civil life ought to be discontinued.

In the eye of the law every citizen ought to be equal; law is agreed to for the protection of the weak against the strong; but as regards women, law has been framed by the strong against the weak. It is a maxim in law that no one should benefit by his own fraud, but the law—being man-made—provides no form for emancipation for woman from the tyranny of the law which has been put in force against her. On this account we claim that women, so long as they are not represented—as married and having a head to their household—ought to be represented and should have full share in the election of poor-law guardians, magistrates, members of parliament, and all other persons who are elected by the voices of the people. We say, so be it, to the proposal that “whatever are the limits or conditions attached to the possession of the franchise, (municipal or parliamentary) let them operate freely and impartially, without interference or misdirection; make no exceptions, bestow the suffrage on man or woman on equal terms, whatever the qualifications may be on which you make the concession or the possession of the franchise to depend.” Then women may have a chance of practising self-protection.

Perhaps it is more necessary than any form else that the subjection of women to ecclesiastical rule or law should be discontinued.

Women are said to be much guided and ruled by their sentiments or affections, and the church has made a great point of keeping them in bondage. I do not wonder much at a celibate clergy endeavouring to entrap silly women into convents and nunneries, as well as keeping their eye upon those who had yielded their chastity. But I do marvel that in Protestant countries so much influence should be exercised by parsons over women. This is, of course, only a remnant of the traditionary submission felt in the days when ecclesiastical censures and penalties were in the hands of the clergy. But it exerts a strong influence yet. In many cases spiritual advisers have become a necessity to women, and the present spread of the confessional, and the present agitation for the establishment of sisterhoods, implies a stupid and insipid submissiveness to clerical rule. From the same sort of feeling probably it arises that the clergy have always been those who intermeddled most with the family life of the world, and have sought to bear rule in it. They have endeavoured to press unnatural restrictions on the possibilities of marriage, and they have hung tables of affinity *in terrorem* before the minds of the people. Again, they have interfered with and almost extinguished

the free and frolicsome exercise of life in the games of the country, and made it almost a necessity to conduct matrimonial negotiations in secret; while in the management, or rather mis-management, of children they have taken an active part. I am of opinion that the exercise of priestly power—and as far as this is concerned, “new presbyter is but old priest writ large”—over women, ought to be diminished. This may easily be done by the culture of women, so that they may learn to know that there is no peculiar sanctity in any human priest. Then they would attain to independence.

Our affirmation is that the subjection of women ought to be discontinued in individual, family, social, political and ecclesiastical life. That equality, as far as possible, and justice should be proclaimed, and that the freedom and independence of women should now follow on the freedom of nations, the freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and the freedom of the slave. The emancipation of women is the great want now to a regenerated earth, and genuine home and social life.

L. A. J.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

“The Head of every man is Christ; and the Head of the woman is the man, and the Head of Christ is God;—for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man; neither was the man created for the woman, but the woman for the man.”—*St. Paul*.

A GRAVE question, truly! Is history to be reversed and is nature to be changed; is the mode of life which humanity has led for all the ages of the past, a mistake and a blunder? Have we grown so wise that we can defy facts and set Scripture at nought? “The Subjection of Women” is not only the condition of her happiness, but of the welfare of the world. Equality in value of nature she may be granted to possess, equality of culture she may be entitled to demand, equality of influence she may be encouraged to aspire to, but she must cease to be woman before she can secure such an emancipation as will free her from the need of subjection. The very nature of human life, the very facts of all life, concur in showing that the female must be subject to the male, or the entire system of existence must be altered. Subjection there must be, in order that there may be protection; in order that the fierce rivalry of existence may not interfere with all that is sacred and precious in home and in marriage. Unless sex and the physical organization of the animal frame can be annulled, unless marriage and its duties can be abrogated, and unless family life is to be made of none effect, we do not see how the subjection of women can be discontinued. Being on the side of Nature, therefore, we find the negative to be irrefragable. I do not, of course, know on what principles this question is to be argued; though I have read not a few of the productions of the advocates of the rights of women, I have seen no reason for believing that they have reason on their side. It appears to me that society

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has attained its natural condition in the arrangements which have been made, among all the nations, within the historic period of the subjection, as it is called, of women; that is, that in the matter of home-life, the woman, as mother, sister, daughter, &c., should be cared for and aided, advised and provided for, regulated and considered, by those who occupy the legal guardianship over her; should be a keeper at home and pay regard to the peculiarities of society in such a manner as her sex demands. It is scarcely possible, had this state of things not been natural, that it could have grown up, endured and been endured so long, show itself so widely in all stages of civilization, and commend itself to the ideas, feelings, and requirements both of men and women. Not that I regard the state of woman as really one of subjection. I look upon civilization as a condition of interdependence; and I believe that, if in some things women are subject to men, in others men are subject to women. However, as the condition of woman, as she is, is now known by the takinglly-fallacious epithet which Mr. J. S. Mill has affixed to it, we must, we presume, consider it as the "subjection of women" mentioned and meant in this debate. Mrs. Mill has written eloquently, elaborately, and well on the enfranchisement of women; and Charles Anthony, jun., has published a work on "The Social and Political Dependence of Women," taking the same views and expressing the same opinions. Emily Faithfull and the Victorians have advocated the widening of women's sphere; and not long ago a very creditable statement of the several parts of the question was brought out under the editorship of Mrs. Josephine Butler. Mrs. Fawcett and Lady Amberley are other promoters of women's rights and denouncers of women's wrongs. More recently still, a great hubbub was occasioned on this topic in the University of Edinburgh, in which Professor David Masson, one of the most advanced politicians of our times, took up the cause of women, and said some able and many rash things upon the matter in dispute; only a part of which, however, bore relation to the discussion now before us, which seems to mean, is the *status in quo* defensible, or ought women to be made more independent, socially, politically, and morally, than they are?

Against the argument of "immemorial precedent and universal practice," I am aware that it may be—indeed, has been—said that persecution for religious opinions, slavery, the bondage of the press, &c., have equally had the authority of law and usage affirmed on their behalf. That selfishness, ignorance, and superstition lead men to adopt many things as irrefragably right which, after all, turn out to be preposterously wrong, we shall not seek to deny. But the reader must remark that, however these things may have been, they have not been universal. Slavery justified itself by expediency, but it was never so universal as not to have suggestions of its wrongness patent to the eye and heart. Persecution for religious opinions has prevailed, but even that has been exceptional in the worst of times. The press as a registration of thought

seemed to differ in its perpetuity from speech, and hence was for a time subjected to tyranny; but ever as it came nearer to speech in its forms and transiency, the law relaxed its hold. But there were always influences at work to set literature out of bonds. What the law did in regard to these things was not agreed to by nature. On the contrary, nature opposed them. But in regard to the subjection of women, that has been universal, and nature affirms not only its propriety but its necessity, and in this, nature is an unerring guide.

Women who fulfil the natural functions of their sex are necessarily liable to many variations in health, interruptions of the proper continuity of attention and power of working, which are essential to the orderly arrangements of occupations. The purpose of their being is such as to preclude them from the devoted and continuous pursuit of any fixed and settled employment, the steady day-after-day routine of laborious occupation. Hence it has been found necessary that all the fixed, regulated, and essential business of the world should be done by men; and those occasional, desultory duties which can be taken up and laid down at will or convenience—which can be done, as it were, at any time, have been allotted to women. This involves their relinquishment of all the binding and obligatory duties which require strict and constant attendance, continuous attention and regularity of oversight, from sheer physical necessity. Besides this, however, the business of the world requires to be done in a sort of even-tempered, calm way; and women are not always able in peculiar circumstances, which are, however, strictly normal with them, to perform the duties of employments which demand moral serenity, intellectual balance, and emotional coolness. On this account they are unfitted for taking an independent position in a world of work, thought, competition, and keen encounter. A clear perception of this fact has led to the settlement of the respective spheres of male and female labour, and the arrangement of male and female life, in the manner in which it at present is fixed—namely, that man shall go forth to his labour and do the work of the world, giving fixed, serious, grave, and earnest head to it, as the means of securing the comfort of home and providing for those of his own house, while women shall engage in those pursuits which fit the inconstancy of her physical condition and are adapted to the less reliable state of her frame and emotions. This pairing of the two sexes, and this allocation of general duties and responsibilities, has the guarantee of nature for its propriety, and the common acquiescence in it as right gives great probability to the opinion that it is well-founded. Man is, as a general rule, the wage-earner, the income-producer, the *house-bond*, and husband, and on him and on his efforts reliance is placed, not only by his wife but his neighbors, for the maintaining of a creditable position in the station the family occupies. The subjection of women implied in this is only that which follows everywhere the fact of providence—the provider is the master and fixes the terms; whoever in any case is

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the provider is the master or higher power, and makes terms; and woman, in her own turn, is the governing spirit when she is the provider.

But it will be said, in reply to this, that we have been speaking of those who fulfil their normal function in society; whereas, in consequence of the condition of society at present, a large proportion of women never attain to that state; and that as a fact, even though all women were willing, and all men were compelled, to enter into the relationship of marriage, there would not be a possibility of putting all women in such circumstances as to fulfil their normal function; for women greatly exceed men in number. Besides, many husbands are so worthless, or worse than worthless, that even in actual marriage a large portion of the burden of providing for housekeeping falls to the female, and this makes the balance harder against her. From this it is often argued that, the case being so hard against woman, the subjection to dependency to which she is doomed is an unjust burden and ought to be removed.

I shall admit the fact that women outnumber men, and that marriage, as things are at present, is an impossibility even for all those who are willing to accept of the duties and responsibilities of matronage; but I deny and oppugn the conclusion sought to be drawn from that fact as relevant in the case, and maintain that this is all the more a reason why women should value the subjection which they are now privileged to enjoy, and should fear the ensnaring independence which is held out to them as an alluring boon.

I appeal to the greater life-value of women as a proof that their case is one of less hardship than they themselves suppose or their advocates affirm. This fact appears in every insurance-office table; and even in the provisions made by Government it has been found necessary to act upon the fact; so that "women, because they are usually longer lived than men, must pay more than men." Now this fact proves that, with all their "subjection," they are better off than men; inasmuch as, by being allowed to remain in the quiet havens of life, they have an extended measure of life. In this case "subjection" is proved by statistics to be absolutely beneficial, and that which is beneficial ought by no means to be discontinued; at least, not till something more beneficial has been discovered and can be got in place of it.

The present arrangement of society in which women are "subject," as it is called, necessitates that, as a general rule, the income of a man should be of such an amount as to afford a fair means, according to his station, of being able to marry with fair ability to defray the expense of the minimum of cost implied by that in the station he occupies. Wages are arranged to meet the present state of social life; but suppose we increase the struggle for existence by bringing into the labour market half as much again of a supply as is required, what shall we accomplish by that? We shall increase competition and lower wages; we shall increase competition and lower the life-average of the community of both sexes; for it is

exposure to constant labour and care, accident, trial, and difficulty, that the low life-value of the male is due. Of these, when women come to take part, they would lessen their life-average for the same reasons; but as competition would be heightened and income lowered, the struggle for life would be intensified, and women would be sure to gain a loss. Income would no longer be arranged on the principle of giving wages such as would afford a minimum of ability to achieve wedded life, but would be arranged on the principle of supplying, in return for the requisite labour, only such a sum as would support one life; so that the condition of woman would be most injuriously affected by the abolition of the so-called subjection in which she now lives, inasmuch as labour, which is now the accidental condition of her life, would become the normal, and if she performed any of the functions of her sex, it would be without, as a general rule, any of those amenities and safeguards which now fall to her share. As soon as women enter into competition with men, wages decrease—weaving and agricultural labour prove this—as do also the low salaries of copying-clerks and shopmen, where female competition is possible.

This so-called subjection of women is their safeguard. The desire to preserve them in their sphere of happy assiduity amidst the cares of home, has induced men to exert and over-exert themselves that they might gain the means of preserving their comfort. The wars of Europe, the accidents of mines, the necessities of commerce, the active colonization of the early portion of this century, have thinned the male population and disarranged the balance of the sexes. To restore this balance, a cessation for some time of some portion of the accidentally superfluous femininity of the western nations, is requisite. Such abstention would speedily affect the balance. But women have opposed the restoration in two ways—both bad. Instead of consenting to abstinence, some of them have sought to attain sexual relations without securing conjugal ties, and so have led the way to many males remaining in bachelorhood who would otherwise, in all likelihood, have undertaken the responsibilities of marriage life. Every such person thus becomes a destroyer of the chances of many of her sex from attaining the condition of matronhood. No anti-marriage association could so powerfully affect society to increase the disparity of numbers in regard to marriageability, as that allurements practised by those who proffer certain of the privileges of marriage for hire of a merely temporary and temporal sort. In defence of their own sex, and in deference to their own interests, the female portion of society are deeply interested in arranging that sexuality shall as little as possible be exercised in a manner unguarded by marriage-ties, responsibilities, and providence. I doubt if the advocates for the removal of the subjection of women have noticed the incidence of lust-hiring on the condition of woman question, or have duly considered the likelihood of its greater prevalence if the subjection were abolished.

Besides the evil effects of the competition of the unmarried



## 32 OUGHT THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO BE DISCONTINUED?

against the marriageable, there has arisen the competition of female against male labour, the consequent reduction of income on the part of the male, and a greater inability to marry with any hope of comfort. To this add the real subjection of women to fashion and form, and you have good reason why the marriage-rate is much less than it should be. What is wanted is the maintenance of a moderate marriage condition, in which the husband shall be expected to earn the livelihood of the household, with all its dependencies, and that due and proper means should be taken to make marriage a necessity to man—or abstinence. There ought to be no female blandishments employed to induce men to keep free from marriage ties—that should be regarded as treason to the sex and to society; neither should there be any competition of female against male in the labour-market. The natural normal position of woman ought to be upheld as the best and the most happy. All the measures which society has arranged for the preservation of female purity, peace, safety, home-keeping, and happiness, ought to be not only enjoyed, but valued. The agitation for female freedom, independence, and self-assertion, appears to me like the opposition of the paper-kite to the string which held it to the earth instead of letting it soar up to the clear blue sky above it bent. The string really steadied it and gave it the capacity to catch and profit by the breeze to rise and float; but the silly kite desired the string to be cut; that restraint might cease, and that it might fly higher. The string was snapped; but, instead of nobler fortune, it was bedrabbled and destroyed.

The forms of life which are opposed by the so-called advocates of women's rights under the designation of the "subjection of women," are, in my view of the case, society's best efforts for the protection of women; and I cannot myself see how society would be improved by the introduction of free love and tenure-at-will instead of marriage; by the increase of competition at work, in professions, in commerce, &c., of female with male; of women-voters and women-churchwardens, guardians, jurors, &c. We cannot upset nature by Act of Parliament. If we are to have marriages and homes—if we are to have posterity at all—there must be care of and for them. The mother must be sacred, and the wife freed from every legal responsibility that could interfere with her home-duty. It will be an evil day for society when bothies or common lodging-houses are the supplinters of homes, and when the usages of society are such as to destroy manly independence and womanly love. If we discontinue the subjection of woman, we must make her independent; but independence is incompatible with home life and home duty. We may quite as well advocate the discontinuance of sex and of society as the discontinuance of "the subjection of woman."

T. F. M.

## Religion.

### IS THE GOSPEL ADAPTED TO MODERN LIFE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

By the word "gospel" in the debate now proposed we assume that the Scriptures are meant. There is no *evangel* which is entitled to pre-eminence such as is implied in *the* gospel. But as a general phrase the gospel has become of late a term denoting Holy Scripture, God's word, the Bible. This may have arisen from the use of the word in the canon of the Scriptures in various senses, as (1) "the *gospel* of God, (which He had promised afore by His prophets in the holy scriptures,) concerning His Son Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. i. 1—3); (2) "the *gospel* of Christ—the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth" (Rom. i. 16); (3) "the word of truth, the *gospel* of salvation" (Ephes. i. 13); (4) "the glorious gospel of the blessed God" (1 Tim. i. 11); (5) "the gospel of the grace of God" (Acts xx. 24), &c.

That this is an old and accepted usage of the word we may learn from this saying of Wycliffe's,—"*All truth is contained in Scripture. We should admit of no conclusion not approved there. There is no court besides the court of heaven. Though there were a hundred Popes, and all the friars in the world were turned into cardinals, yet we could learn more from the gospel than from all that vast multitude.*" These quotations, we think, fully justify our intended use of the gospel as a name for the Scriptures.

The word "adapted" ought to give us little trouble. It is not a scriptural word, but it is a common one, and might, for the purpose of this debate, be considered as equivalent to—able to be of any special use in regard to or concerning; more briefly, fit or suitable. The phrase "modern life," again, must signify a state of civilization such as ours,—forms of life and law, social and civic, of the sort now common among us.

On the whole, then, the matter placed before us for consideration appears to be—Are the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, commonly spoken of as the gospel, or the Bible, capable of being of any special or peculiar use or advantage in the state of civilization to which the nations of our day have attained, and in the condition of mankind as it is now in the chief countries in the West? Or, more briefly still, Is Christianity an effete and worn-out system, whose beneficiality has been absorbed, and a form of faith which must pass away and give place to something other, if not nobler and higher? It seems strange that such a question should have arisen, and been put before us for investigation; but the increase

of infidelity, and the various forms of philosophy which are starting up into prominence, most probably form a sufficient reason for submitting the claims of Christianity to a new investigation. We confidently believe that out of this new test there shall issue good proof of its vitality.

We may begin our advocacy of the affirmative position that the gospel is adapted to modern life, by quoting, as a prefatory remark, the opening sentence of the lay sermon published by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, on the Bible as the best guide to political skill and foresight, in "The Statesman's Manual:"—"If our whole knowledge and information concerning the Bible had been confined to the one fact of its immediate derivation from God, we should still presume that it contained rules and assistances for all conditions of men under all circumstances, and therefore for communities no less than for individuals." This book which came forth from God—for "holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost"—has had many amanuenses though only one Author. The prophets and the apostles, to whom we owe the Scriptures, speak—

"As men divinely taught; and better teach  
The solid rules of civil government  
In their majestic, unaffected style,  
Than all the oratory of Greece and Rome.  
In them is plainest taught and easiest learned  
What makes a nation happy and keeps it so—  
What ruins kingdoms and lays cities flat."

Of this book, which contains the wisdom of God, we have it asserted by St. Paul that "whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the scriptures might have hope" (Rom. xv. 4); and on the faith of Him who spoke as one having authority,—

"The first true Gentleman that ever breathed,"

we have it affirmed "Verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled" (Matt. v. 18). Here is evidence of the perpetuity, the ever-abidingness of God's gospel. It can never become obsolete. To use again some words of Coleridge's, "when we reflect how large a part of our present knowledge and civilization is owing, directly or indirectly, to the Bible; when we are compelled to admit, as a fact of history, that the Bible has been the main lever by which the moral and intellectual character of Europe has been raised to its present comparative height, we should be struck, we think, by the marked and prominent difference of this book from the works which it is now the fashion to quote as guides and authorities in morals, politics, and history"—your utilitarian Bentham, positivist Comtes, and necessitarian Buckles. If the future is the product, as these men say, of all the past, then Christianity must be adapted to modern life; for our modern life can be

nothing else than, according to, their theory, the outgrowth of the Christianity which they despise and condemn.

As an indication that "the cycle in which the complicated interests of Christendom are now revolving" has not in our modern life reached its completion, I shall quote an able passage from an author who has only recently passed away from the position he adorned as well as filled:—

"What a wonderful century (eighteenth) was that which we have left immediately behind us! How immense its accumulations of knowledge, skill, and power! How boundless its provisions, if only guided by the spirit of the gospel, for the future triumphs of humanity! Political freedom, studied with a depth and an earnestness, a reduction to first principles, and an intense conviction of its necessity before unknown—a colonization that might diffuse the best thoughts and feelings of Europe through the world—a philanthropy that has ceased to recognise any distinction of race or colour, and that burns to carry the motives and the consolations of religion into the bosom of the slave and the savage on every shore—a productive industry adequate, if well directed, to feed, and clothe, and surround with the comforts of a home the entire population of the globe—art vanquishing all obstacles—science carried by the perfection of its instruments and its calculations into the deepest secrets of the material universe—civilization no longer regarded as the accidental privilege of a nation or a class, but embracing in its aims and its tendencies the collective interests of the race! Such agencies—the enduring effects of the century that is gone—are now in operation around us. If we look for their primary cause and animating principle, we shall find them in the spirit of Christian earnestness and freedom awakened into new life by the Reformation. If we inquire how they are to be conducted to the best results, and guarded against the mischiefs of too sanguine a reliance on the resources of human wisdom, we must equally reply, by Christianity."\*

The civilization of modern times has its force imparted from the heights from which it descends. And even though its streams, like that of the Rhine, divide and dispart, and seem to be cut off from each other and absorbed in the sands it has brought down in its course, it is not released from the impulses, got in the Alps, of its origin. Modern life is full of the influences of Christianity; even the infidelity of the day owes its freedom of speech to the gospel it rejects; even the independence of individual life which so many use to their own undoing is derived from the gospel and the civilization on which the gospel insists. Our laws, our polity, our social customs, our treaties of rights, our moral philosophy, directly or indirectly, receive from Christianity all that makes them best. And sad indeed is the lot of man—

"Unless he feel  
Some source of consolation from above,  
Secret refreshings that repair his strength  
And fainting spirits uphold."

\* J. J. Taylor, B.A.—Lecture on the History of Christianity, pp. 26. 27.

The gospel is adapted to modern life in its *political* relations. The gospel reveals the purpose of God, and the force of the purpose of God endures through all ages. He is the Almighty and the All-wise, and He has taught us in the gospel the first principles of human happiness, and given us the law of human brotherhood. It is the believer in the gospel alone who can properly affirm,—

“I *know* that through the ages one unceasing purpose runs.”

The secret of the continuous current of human affairs, that which speaks to the Christian of—

“One far-off divine event  
To which the whole creation tends,”

is that God has inspired the whole history of man with purpose and progress; and that past, present, and future are alike under His power, and bound to effect His design. “God in history” is the only unriddler of the enigmas of civilization. In the great predeterminations of Deity this is not an orphan age. We are not cut off from the law and effects of causation; we are not, in our times, deprived of the efficacious providence of God. “The history of the World is one of God’s own great poems;” and we may be well assured that He who commenced the magnificent epic of civilization will not leave its concluding stanzas to be written by chance, or driven out by circumstance and the philosophy of positivism.

“Of all the creatures both in sea and land,  
Only to man hast Thou made known Thy ways,  
And put the pen, alone, into his hand,  
And made him secretary of Thy praise.”

It is because man is the instrument and agent of the will of God—a free agent, working out the divine necessity of history that we can say to God,—

“What seemed an idle hymn now speaks of Thee.”

The gospel is adapted to modern life *socially*. Social life is the life of active communion and communication. Its prosperity and happiness lie in the heart. The gospel purifies the heart. The gospel reveals the true end and purpose of life. It informs us that God designs us to be fellow-workers with Him to make men happy, and requires us to do unto others what we would that they should do unto us, in order that we may live at peace with all men, may cease to do evil and learn to do well, to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly before God. It provides a sure and efficacious law for the government of the entire relations of life, a law which, unlike all other laws, is not a law of constraint, but of restraint, a law which does not negatively prohibit the doing of evil, but positively enjoins and efficiently causes us to delight in the doing of good. In this the gospel is pre-eminently adapted to modern

life in its social relations, when the etiquette of the heart is supplanting the etiquette of fashion.

The gospel is adapted to modern life *individually*. The great characteristic of modern life is its individual independence, its reverence for personal freedom. Emancipation has been the order of the day. Slaves have been manumitted, serfs have been made freemen, the liberties of individuals have been extended, and in general the vast polities of the earth have been found to be most safely built on the independence of persons. In this relation of the question there are a few rarely wise words from the lay sermon of Coleridge, which it is surely right to quote:—"In the Bible every agent appears and acts as a self-subsisting individual; each has a life of its own, and yet all are one life. The elements of necessity and free will are reconciled in the higher power of the omnipresent Providence, that predestinates the whole in the moral freedom of the integral parts. Of this the Bible never suffers us to lose sight. The root is never detached from the ground. It is God everywhere, and all creatures conform to His decrees; yet so that morals spring from faith, while faith presupposes knowledge and individual conviction. In this way the sacredness of personal opinion, and the responsibility of each for what he believes to the divine Master, protects in its integrity the individuality of each human being.

The gospel is adapted to modern life *morally*. Moral life is, after all, the most important in a practical point of view. In modern life morality is all-important. It is the foundation of true individual independence, of genuine social happiness and well-being, of commercial prosperity, of civic honour, of political uprightness, and of national greatness. The aim of the gospel is to form the character aright, to make man acquainted with the divine philosophy of life and things, to bring the heart and therefore the actions of man into harmony with the law which rules and regulates the universe alike of matter and of mind. The gospel is given to concentrate the whole of life into one divine unity—love,—going forth upwards in love to God, going round to the utmost circumference of human influence in love to man. The gospel comes to purify man's actions, thoughts, and feelings, to relate him to the eternal law of duty to which he is made subject as a creature. How then can the gospel be, by any possibility, otherwise than adapted to our age, and to every age? Theodore Parker has very truly and beautifully said, "The conceptions we form of God, our notions about man, of the relations between him and God, of the duties which grow out of that relation, may be taken as the exponent of all the man's thoughts, feelings, and life. They are therefore alike the measure and the result of the total development of a man, an age, or a race. If these things are so, then the phenomena of religion, like those of science and art, must vary from land to land and age to age with the varying civilization." But this change of accidental form does not necessarily imply essential difference. The moon changes from rounded orb to crescent wan,

but is still the same. The daily sun performs the circuit of the sky, and annually passes through all the course marked by the signs of the zodiac, but it is the same sun which gives the glimmer of a November day, and pours the blazing radiance of July over the panting earth. Religion, then, may change in its phenomena, and yet retain its essential sameness; nay, it must change; for its very essence is to alter men's characters, and inspire their lives with a new and true life in God. As men endeavour more and more to bring their life into harmony with the laws of God in nature and the will of God in grace, civilization must change, and men must change with it. This, however, brings the adaptation of the gospel nearer to the spirit of man, so that it enters into the very forms of life, and interpenetrates the customs of society. Then it does not exist apart from the life, but becomes part and parcel of it; and it may be we lose sight of it by this very incorporation, which, like the air taken into our bodily frames, is received fresh and suitable, is inhaled almost insensibly, is found fully and finely adapted to our wants and states, at the same time that it becomes corrupt by the corruption we impart to it. The gospel is the divine inbreathing without which modern life could not exist.

The gospel as it appears to us, as it presents itself to us, is the instrument of God for the moral government of the world. "Every scripture inspired by God" (we adopt Dean Alford's revised version of the passage) "is also profitable for doctrine, for conviction, for correction, for discipline which is in righteousness; that the man of God may be complete, thoroughly furnished unto every good work" (2 Tim. iii. 17). Nothing can be plainer than this; so far as modern life aims at completeness and thoroughness, so far as it should be disciplined in righteousness, the gospel is adapted to effect the purpose,—so adapted that nothing else can rival it. It is the inspired book of God, it claims supremacy over man in all ages, under all circumstances, and during all time. It cannot be dispensed with, cannot be superseded; cannot become effete. It is the wisdom of God and the power of God, and how can such a book be otherwise than adapted to the true and perfect development of man throughout the whole duration of this form of the universe? "The word of the Lord abideth for ever. And this is the word which by the gospel is preached unto you" (1 Pet. i. 25). We therefore affirm that the gospel is adapted to modern life. A. A.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THIS is a question of questions for gravity, and the reader has undoubtedly already begun to knit his brows and to ask what terrible infidel he is who is about to venture on maintaining that the gospel is not adapted to modern life. But in this has not the reader been a little too hasty and rash? Has he read the topic for debate with care and intelligence? Has he looked at it as it is,

without having a foregone conclusion in his mind? The subject presented to us in this question is the gospel, and by the gospel we presume the suggester of the debate intended the Bible, in a somewhat loose signification of the term, for Bible and gospel are by no means really synonymous. Bible did originally signify *book*, as Chaucer in the "Chanones Yemanne's Tale," says—

"To tellen all wold passen any *bible*  
That o [any] wher is."

But the term has now come to be almost exclusively applied to the Old and New Testaments by way of excellence, so as to indicate that it is the *Book* which contains the most important communications which can be conveyed to man—the revelation of the dealings and purpose of God with and in regard to man in his creation, preservation, and salvation. But the gospel is a word of less general import, as we may show our readers by the following extract:—

"What the word *εὐαγγέλιον* in Greek, which we render *gospel*, signifies among authors, is ordinarily known, viz., from *εὐ* and *ἀγγέλλω*, good news, or good tidings. Thus the angel speaks of the birth of Christ, *Εὐαγγελίζομαι ὑμῖν χαρὰν μεγάλην*, I bring you tidings of great joy, i.e., very joyful good tidings. Only in this sacred use of it there seems to be a metonymy or figure very ordinary, whereby the word which signifies good news, is set to denote the history of that good news, the birth and life and resurrection of Christ, which all put together is that joyful news or good tidings. . . . And so this word *gospel*, or by euphony *gospel*, in Wycliffe's translation, and ever since, notes these good tidings delivered, as first by an angel, and after that by the apostles by word of mouth; so here in writing by way of history also, and in brief signifies that blessed story of the birth, life, actions, and precepts, promises, death, and resurrection of Christ, which of all other stories in the world we Christians ought to look on with most joy, as an *εὐαγγέλιον*, or good word, i.e., a *gospel*." \*

The gospel in the foregoing passage is clearly defined to be the New Testament revelation of Jesus Christ. There is, however, a unity so great, and a consecutiveness of purpose so remarkable, in the whole Scriptures, that we have no desire to take any advantage which the use of the word in its restricted sense might give us; and we shall suppose, therefore, that the Bible is meant.

The words "adapted to modern life" may perhaps be paraphrased into "able to exert an influence—direct, immediate, and tangible—on the habits, manners, and customs of men in the condition of society now prevalent; capable of being brought into living harmony and effectiveness with the state of civilization to which the nations of Europe have now attained." We do not know, of course, how far the advocates of the affirmative may incline to go in their idea of appropriateness between the Christianity of the

\* Dr. Henry Hammond's Paraphrases and Annotations on the New Testament, Annot. I.



Bible and the practices, theories, methods, and forms of social and civil existence around us, and of the compatibility of the teachings and preachings of the apostles and their Master with the common life of the church and the world. Perhaps the question might have been better debated had it been asked, "Do men's deeds harmonize with their creeds?" Nor is it without reason that such a question as this should arise at the present time. We have the Mormons with a new bible of their own, proclaiming the inadequacy of the Bible; the Roman Catholics eagerly engaged in the endeavour to get the Pope declared to be an infallible dictator on all that concerns life and faith, the church and the world, heaven and hell, that he may supply the felt want of adaptation between our times and the Scriptures; the action of the spiritualists, the free lovers in America, our own Divorce Courts, our recent parliamentary dealings with marriage and with education; and the actual existence among all people of men who are essentially secularists, and recognise no fitness in the Bible to them and their requirements. It is quite evident that there is a field here for debate, and matter very worthy of consideration. Besides all that we have noted above, we have the New Evangel of M. Comte, whose Positive Philosophy is, or is to be, the consummation of all religion, science, letters, life, and worship; and professes to break for modern thinkers the thralldom of delusion and superstitious religiosity, to make free men of the inhabitants of the universe, and to drive away alike the Cross and crosses from the earth by a new faith and feeling—an improved worship and better practices.

In this point of view I note first that "the gospel" is not "adapted to modern society" *ethically*.

*Ethics* is the science of morals, and morals are the manners, modes or customs of life to which men by inclination or habit give themselves up, or by which they regulate themselves. Ethics is a system of duties to which man is bound either by nature, contract, or revelation. Ethics is the governor of human life in regard to duty, in all the relations in which man is placed. It is evident, therefore, that as the relations of men become more intimate, minute, intense, diversified, &c., the code of morals applicable to a state of society simple in its structure, and but little intricate in its relations, must differ greatly from the system of obligations which must be brought to bear upon a state of civilization of a more complex, if not of a higher character. The principle here enunciated is acknowledged in every kind and sort of civilized requirement. The simple rude arithmetic of the literal *calculus*, or small pebble, has been developed and complicated till it has given us the mighty *calculus* of Newton as improved by Airy, Jellet, Boole, Sylvester, &c. The chemistry of dyeing which served for ancient fabrics has been eclipsed by the wondrous resources of modern ingenuity and investigation, so as to enable the dyer to simulate almost all the colours of the "flowers of the field." The machinery of our day has been developed into a much more complicated and difficult

branch of ingenuity than the simple mechanics of ancient times could have been applied to. Political economy has become more extended and refined. Trade has been almost entirely changed, and the social relations of men have been so enlarged as to introduce into all languages words and terms which were quite unnecessary in ancient times. These facts show that the sense of adaptation has been felt in these different forms and modes of effort; and these are only samples of the universality of change which has passed over the face of modern as compared with ancient society. The ethics of the gospel are quite unsuitable to the age in which we live. Its doctrines do not come home directly and efficiently to the heart and conscience of transgressors. They are too general, and fall wide of the mark. They are too indefinite and can be preached about with such an amount of general acquiescence and practical disregard, that those who most constantly and almost overtly disregard the commandments of the gospel are the main supporters of the churches and chapels in which the doctrines are preached, and the proprietors or occupiers of the shops, warehouses, &c., in which the said doctrines are most widely and systematically violated. False weights and measures abound, the tricks of trade are proverbial, the adulteration of foods, beverages, and even medicines, is rife and only thinly disguised—are, in fact, almost legalized under the euphemism of "customs of trade." Were the ethical precepts and doctrines of the gospel adapted to modern society, such things could not be. "It is proved," says the *Pall Mall Gazette*, "beyond question that we habitually consume potato meal, plaster of Paris, alum, and sulphate of copper, in our bread; tallow, suet, soda, and manganese in our butter; water, chalk, and annatto, in our milk; Prussian blue, catechu, and terra japonica in our tea; and chicory, roasted beans, mangel wurzel, bullock's liver, and black-jack in our coffee. We imbibe water, sulphuric acid, turpentine, methylated alcohol, grains of paradise, cocculus indicus, nux vomica, treacle, and salt in our spirits, beer, and porter. And if all this should happen to disagree with us, the jalap, opium, calomel, and scammony to which we resort for relief are in all probability to a great extent fabricated of powdered wood, wheat flour, French chalk, resin, and sand." And according to the same authority, Mr. Philips, the chief chemical officer of the Inland Revenue Office, has great difficulty in keeping, though aided by an able staff of subordinates, pace with the ever-increasing ingenuity of the adulterators of the necessaries and luxuries of life. There can be no doubt in anybody's mind that "giving short weight is not less a crime than picking pockets, and that adulteration is a form of obtaining money under false pretences;" yet men professing Christianity glaze over the criminality of such actions, and practise them, because the ethics of the gospel do not take a firm enough grip of their consciences, and do not directly, in application to them, denounce them as crimes against society as well as against God. Though it is distinctly the precept of the gospel, "As ye

would that others should do unto you, do ye even so to them," yet in ordinary conversation you will find men, professedly Christian men, extolling the duty of looking to yourself, of minding No. 1, and not only asserting but acting upon the principle that "everything is fair in war, in love, and in trade." Nay, so far has the intricacy of the relations of civilized life gone on in this course of "diamond cut diamond" style of transacting business, that men so high in moral character and position, so notable and so knowingly adhering by profession to Christianity, as Mr. Bright, proclaim, even in the Christian Parliament of Christian England, the inapplicability of the morality of the Gospels to modern life, by asserting that adulteration and short weight are only a form of competition; that adulteration was quite legitimate under the pressure of trade necessities, that it did little harm to the purchaser who was ignorant of it; and that when men got sufficiently well educated to detect it, it would become impossible. When such things occur, can it be affirmed that the gospel is suited to modern times?

I remark, in the next place, that the gospel is not adapted to modern life *socially*.

The social conditions of life have altered not less remarkably than those of men's moral relations. The simplicity of pastoral society, the existence of a slave caste, the few laws, but direct bearing of the personal will of superiors, have all passed away. City life was a rare thing in ancient times, the great accumulations of wealth and the exclusive possession of large landed estates, the extreme division of labour, and the consequent excessive complication of society, are all new, and all affect men in such a way as to require new and more detailed laws closely adapted to modern society. The charities of life are now no longer able to be exercised with safety to one's self or benefit to others. Personal almsgiving is a crime against the prosperity of the State, and tax-paying alms is not only grudgingly given, but is received with thanklessness. The relations of life have called into existence the science of selfishness—the philosophy of commerce, political economy, the science of wages, and value, and labour, and unionism—organizing life on principles to which the social laws of the gospel have no adaptation and little applicability. There have also arisen among us the crimes of great cities as well as their sins and their sorrows; and individual Christians, as well as Christian parliaments, believe in the propriety of licensing them. The marriage laws are now, though founded on the gospel, felt to be so little adapted to modern life, that divorce has been simplified and made easy by Act of Parliament and the gospel doctrines concerning marriages of affinity and consanguinity are being gradually repealed. Women, instead of being in subjection to their own husbands, are aiming at equality or supremacy; and husbands, instead of loving their own wives, are getting into the habit of loving other people's wives, or bestowing their love elsewhere. We do not now seek to do justice between man and man, still less between man and woman, but we proclaim

it as a social duty, distinctly taught by economic science, that we should buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. It has been proclaimed that not the law of God given in the Gospels is or ought to be omnipotent over our lives, but that the decisions of a parliamentary majority of a House of Commons, elected—exclusive of bribery or corruption, intimidation or personation, probably even without personal responsibility for the vote given—by the whole body of the people who have houses to live in and can pay poor-rates, ought to be the omnipotent determiner of social duty, civil rights, and individual obligation, thus directly affirming that the gospel is not adapted to modern life. Who, even among professing Christians, now acknowledge the gospel so suited to the present age as to abstain from presenting their cases in the common law courts, “forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man hath a quarrel against any?” (Col. iii. 13; see also 1 Cor. vi. 1). May we not here use the very words of a contributor in the June issue of this Magazine!—“Has every saved person given his coat to the man that took away his cloak? Has every saved person given to every man that asked of him, and sought not again his goods of the man who stole them?” (p. 439).

The way in which Christian church-going people put away these things from them as quite inapplicable to their case, the manner in which the plainest requirements of the gospel, in regard to social life, are set aside, even in our churches, gives good evidence that they who attend them do not think the gospel suitable to our times. Let us apply one individual instance. We read, “My brethren, have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons. For if there come unto your assembly a man with a gold ring, in goodly apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile raiment; and ye have respect to him that weareth the gay clothing, and say unto him, Sit thou here in a good place; and say to the poor, Stand thou there, or, sit here under my footstool: are ye not then partial in yourselves?” (Jas. ii. 1—4). May we not then ask, if this is a plain and explicit duty of the members of the church in their assemblies—and compare what goes on, not merely at our great May meetings, but in our regular congregational assemblies—do not the churches themselves declare that the gospel is not adapted to modern life? Again, it is certain that the Gospels teach that the members of churches were brethren, who held it a right and a duty to exercise discipline over each other in all matters relating to morals or social life, having a co-accountability to each other. In our days law and legislation have nearly superseded all these things, and it is even dangerous now in some cases to exercise moral discipline over church members. The Gospels evidently require home education, and especially home education in religion; but in this matter, too, they are inapplicable to our times. The same remark applies to the relations of master and servant; to manufacturers, and to those employed under them; to police officials and poor-law guardians, to legal agents and to

business generally, the Gospels are not adapted to them. They do not seem to anticipate any such life as ours, and they are unsuitable in their requirements.

We remark, in the third place, that the gospel is not adapted to modern times *politically*.

The nature and the form of government have entirely altered since the days of the Scripture, and we have changed with the changing times. We are no longer subject one to another, either in the fear of the Lord or in the eye of the law. We are all equals, and we are all masters by proxy as well as subjects. We have altered the very tenure of sovereignty, of priesthood, of magistracy, and of citizenship. The Scriptures affirm that it is by God that kings reign and princes decree judgment; we affirm that the voice of the people is the voice of God, and that sovereigns hold their power in reality from an actual or an assumed *plebiscite*. Law is no longer the decalogue, but Acts of Parliament of unnumbered complexity and incomprehensible multiplicity of provisions. We have created for the people an artificial conscience, so that those who satisfy the law, or rather keep clear of its officers' grip, hold themselves to be good, and are gratified at their stainless character. It is undeniable that in many cases legal expedients are employed and sanctioned which are excessively mean and deceptive. In all these ways the gospel has shown that it is not adapted to the spirit of the age—has lost its hold upon the hearts of men, and is gradually being supplanted by philosophical notions and legal fictions which operate from without instead of acting upon the inner spirit of man. I shall only advert in a single sentence to one or two of the social phenomena of the day which go to prove that the gospel is not adapted to modern society. The great spasmodic efforts which are ever and anon being made to excite a revival of Christian enthusiasm—which almost as inevitably as they are begun collapse, and often leave men more regardless than they were. This shows that it is, as it is, effete and ineffective upon the state of the social civilization of these times. The frequency with which books on the evidences of Christianity are published, combined with the steady spread and prevalence, not only of practical but theoretical infidelity, affords ground for fearing that the salt has lost its savour. The popularity of spiritualism, either as a means of bolstering up present beliefs, or as a substitute for them, or as a means of gaining “a more sure word of prophecy,” is a very strong fact suggestive of the impotence of Christianity in our day. To this we must add the frequency of attempts made to bring communistic and socialistic plans of life into practical working. Then there is Mormonism and polygamy,—the former a direct assertion that “the true faith of a Christian” has lost its hold on many hearts, and the latter giving proof that many have ceased to believe that God in the beginning made man male and female as an indication that each man should be the husband of one wife, and that they two, and they only, so long as they both shall live, should be one flesh. The recent advent among us

of the American miracle-worker, Dr. Newton—who, unlike the Newton of a former time, is bent on disestablishing rather than establishing the laws of nature—is another mark in our times that we require something other than the gospel. By the *Saturday Review* we are told that “if the exhibition of credulity at Cambridge Hall [Newman Street, Oxford Street, London] was painful, it was accompanied by examples of family affection *as real* as those which were evoked by the fame of the miracles of the New Testament.” If this is true, how can it be maintained that the gospel is adapted to modern life? This miracle-hunting is a confession, as well as a proof, that it is not, and that the old question may be put, even in our days. “Art thou He that should come, or look we for another?” To the same purpose tends the present agitation for the consent of the Church to the doctrine of papal infallibility. By the adoption of such a dogma it is hoped that the felt want of the gospel, as adapted to the age, would be rectified by decisions, from time to time, bearing definitely upon the peculiarities of each period. Were the gospel adapted to the age, there could be no possible justification of such an attempt; but as this movement is a great fact, and patent to every one, we require only to mention it to prove that the gospel wants harmony with the times.

I am quite aware that it may be attempted to rebut all these arguments and refute all these conclusions by the assertion that it is not the gospel that is not adapted to our age, but our age that is not adapted to the gospel. This will be a damaging retort, not to our side of the question, but to those who rest upon it. For we shall then ask, and with terrible pertinence, Why is the age not adapted to the gospel, and to the life and doctrine it requires? Has not the gospel been given that it should expressly change and influence the lives of men, turning them from earthly and carnal ways to the ways of peace and of pleasantness which they open up to the soul? How can that be adapted to an age which has lost all hold upon those even who profess to be governed most fully by it—which has given way before human influences and institutions, and failed to impress, and act upon, and alter the society of the times in which we live? Wherefore is it that even the most enthusiastic upholders of the efficacy of the Gospels ask for and pray for a fresh outpouring of the Spirit of God, if it is not because they see and feel that the gospel is not affecting the age as it did in the days of old, despite all the new machinery employed to make it effective; if it is not that they know, though they may be slow to acknowledge, that the gospel is not adapted to modern life?

F. F. A.

## Greek Days and Roman Nights.

### No. I.—PLATO'S "PHÆDO."

#### *Analysis of the "Phædo" of Plato.—Argument I.*

THE Prologue having informed us of the scene, the time, and the circumstances of the dialogue, and having excited our interest in the subject, the author proceeds to open the main topic of his intended discourse in a free and natural style, by reporting a remark elicited from Socrates by the special experience of pleasure then felt by him, arising out of his freedom from the bonds by which he had been fettered. "What a singular thing pleasure seems to be, especially in its relation to pain. One can scarcely ever have one without the other following hard after it into our experience. If Æsop had noticed this fact he would have written a fable on it. I felt the chain gall me, but now a glow of delight rushes along my veins; and thus—

"The gods have blessed me  
With a diviner pleasure for the pain  
Man's hatred has inflicted."

"By Jove! Socrates," said Cebes, "you remind me to ask why you employed yourself during your prison-hours in versifying Æsop's fables and composing a hymn to Apollo, when you had not previously attempted the Divine art; many have inquired about this lately, Evenus, the sophist and poet, in particular."

"I had no wish to compete with him, but to see if that were the poetry which certain dreams seemed to suggest to me, that I might have a clear conscience in having tried to fulfil all duty. I had always interpreted philosophy to be the highest music of the mind, but now I fancied that as I was born on Apollo's day, the 6th of Thargelion, and he had interposed to save me thirty days, I should sing a hymn to him whose is the Delian festival; and therefore as the time was too short for me to make fables I put into metre some of those I knew of Æsop's. Tell Evenus this, bid him farewell for me, and say if he is wise he should follow me speedily; I, it seems, depart to-day." Simmias thinks Evenus not likely to relish, or take the advice. "Is not he then a philosopher?" says Socrates. "Yes!" replied Simmias. "Then he will be anxious to follow me; and so will every one who rightly pursues philosophy; though no one may commit violence on himself to do so, as that is wrong," Socrates remarked, and thereupon placed his feet upon the ground and sat so during the ensuing conversation.

"What can you mean, Socrates," said Cebes, "by saying it is wrong to commit suicide; but that a philosopher should be willing to follow another who is about to die?" "What, Cebes, have not you and Simmias heard the Pythagorean of Crotona, Philolaus, on suicide?" "No, nothing definitely." "I only speak from hearsay, as I talk in preference to reading, and I do not scruple to repeat what

I have heard." "Why is suicide wrong?" asked Cebes. "That, you should consider wisely and well, for though to some men it is better to die than to live, yet it is mostly those to whom a self-sought exit is an impious act—they should await another benefactor, Death." Cebes, speaking in his own Boeotian dialect, in his earnestness forgetting the cultured speech of Athens, and smiling, exclaims, "By Jove, 'tis so!"

"Our body resembles a prison, and from it we should not seek to escape by unlawful means," said Socrates; "and besides, we belong to the gods, and have no right to destroy their property, and hence we should wait till necessity compels us, as it does me, to die." "But," Cebes replies, "just on that account you seem to me to advance an absurdity when you say that it is better to die than to live; for if the gods are our masters and we their slaves, and the gods can take better care of us than we can of ourselves, then it becomes a wise man to regret to die, and a foolish one only would rejoice."

Socrates, looking at Phædo, at once jests at and compliments Cebes on his pertinacity and ingenuity. Simmias thinks Cebes presses Socrates hard, and that Socrates will find it difficult to defend his view of the case. "Oh, you want to put me on my trial," remarks Socrates; "well, I hope I shall defend myself before you better than I did before my judges. If I did not expect to go amongst good men, and amongst the gods, who are both wise and good, I should be wrong to rejoice at dying; but I do hope to go amongst good men, and I am sure I shall go among the gods; for I believe that something awaits those who die, and that it will be better for the good than the bad." "Would you go away, carrying this faith, which concerns us also, with you?" persuade us of it, and that will be your best apology," Simmias says.

"That I shall try to do when I have heard what Crito (who has been for some time attempting to speak) has to say." Crito has nothing particular to say, but that the gaoler has told him that the excitement of talking may hinder the due operation of the hemlock to be given, and cause the drug to be repeatedly taken before it produces the effect. Socrates will dare the consequences. He wishes to tell why a philosopher has hope in death, and therefore needs not fear to die. Philosophy is a preparation for Death; it seeks to attain perfect intellectual freedom, and as the body imprisons the soul and impedes it in its aspirations and desires, philosophy endeavours to escape from subserviency to the body, and to give the spirit freedom of wing to soar upward and be free. The senses are the sources of ignorance and evil. Sensationalism and animalism are the foes of idealism. To be in love with life is to be fond of the body, and subject to its affections and imperfections, and from these it is that philosophy strives to unfetter the soul. Philosophy and death therefore offer a similar enfranchisement; the former, while we are in the body, endeavours to keep us as if not of the body, and the latter disperses the dust of the frame and



so imparts the purest liberty and the freest scope. In the body most men embrace but a shadow, not the reality of virtue, for they value things for the pleasure they offer, not for the culture they afford. The philosopher purifies his soul from all worldliness, and pursues wisdom and virtue for their own sakes, not for the advantages they yield. The wise seek to be all soul, and that, death comes to make them. Socrates had so sought to be wise and virtuous, and to be spiritualized, and he did not repine that he was now to be set free from earth, and to be brought into direct intercourse with good masters and noble friends, the great of the past, and the gods who are greater.

But Cebes hesitates a doubt that when the soul is separated it is destroyed, and vanishes like breath or smoke; and it will require a good deal of sound argument to make it appear probable that the soul of one who dies, exists still and possesses intelligence and activity. Socrates expresses his willingness to converse on these points if Cebes and his friends care to engage in it. Cebes would gladly, and Socrates thinks that no one—even though he were a comic poet (like Aristophanes)—would affirm that such talk was unsuitable to his situation. There is an old notion about Metempsychosis (taught by Thales, Pherecydes, Pythagoras, &c.,) which we may recall and examine. Do the souls of the dead exist in Hades, in order that they may be able at the period of transmigration to come hither again? If they come again they must exist after death, for if they did die they could not be the same soul and self. Are not all things generated contraries from contraries? the honourable is known by its contrary the base, just from unjust, great from small, strong from weak, heat from cold, waking from sleeping, and life from death, and *vice versa*. Therefore our souls must exist in Hades, or there could be no revival and no transmigration. Unless the circle of being is a continuous reciprocity between contraries, the Fable of Endymion, the beautiful, ever-sleeping idol of Selene,—

“The very music of whose name has gone into men’s being,”

would be a jest, for all would be asleep as he; and soon the doctrine of Anaxagoras would be realized,—

“All things in one another’s being mingle.”

Besides, if all things died, and did not revive, *all* would soon be dead; hence I think we may conclude that the souls of the departed exist, and that the condition of the good is better, and of the evil worse.

So ends the first great argument on the immortality of the soul, to which Socrates asks the assent of Cebes. Cebes not only acknowledges the force of the cyclical reasoning employed by the “prisoner of hope,” but thinks it may be carried a step farther by taking into account the facts of human cognition—to which attention is next turned.

## Poetic Critique.

"*Miss Vortex*. A charming nosegay. All exotics, I declare.

"*Jessy*. No, madam, neglected wild flowers; I took them from their bed of weeds, bestowed care on their culture, and by transplanting them to a more genial soil, they have flourished with luxuriant strength and beauty.

"*Miss Vortex*. A pretty amusement.

"*Jessy*. And it seemed, madam, to convey this lesson; not to despise the lowly mind, but rather with fostering hand to draw it from its chill obscurity; that, like these humble flowers, it might grow rich in worth and native energy."—*Thomas Morton's "Care for the Heartache."*

THERE are probably few things so difficult as the criticism of poetry, although it is a common opinion that nothing is so easy as being a connoisseur in the article of verse. Poetry as emotion and thought, combined into a single unity by the fusion of one into the other, so as to constitute a perfect amalgam, issues from the poet's mind in hot and molten fluidity, and takes form in the moulds of verse. But the critical reader sees the cold form and not the burning emotional thought; and as he requires to preserve his judgment cool, he must bring a cold mind into contact with the cold forms of the words of the verse, and hence it is that critics are so often accused of making false judgments on poetry.

The ordinary reader has one duty only to perform—to read and enjoy, to take into himself the stir and tremor of the poet's strains. He lays his soul open receptively to take in the whole magic of the melody, the meaning of the emotion, the influence of the imaginings, and the impulse on the intellect; and, with spontaneous acquiescence in the enchantments proposed, delights and gladdens himself in companionship with the poet. But the critical reader must give the poem entrance into his emotional nature through the understanding, slowly, carefully, inquiringly, testing the whole on the one hand by austere judgment, and on the other by the severe philosophy of the moral feelings. In this way we account for the frequent discrepancies between the decisions of the critics and the readers of poetry. Readers can surrender their entire sympathy to the poet, while the critic has continually to urge the query, Why should this move, or how does this excite? When young poets read their verses to their friends, as they sometimes do, they often leave out of account the fact that they know the precise feeling or emotion to which the poem appeals at first hand, whereas it enters into the mind of the friend at best only as suggestion; hence the

coolness of the judgment of friends, and the disappointment which poets feel at finding their cherished emotional thought but slightly—as they interpret it, too often slightly—reciprocated and appreciated. Theirs is direct, the other is reflex emotion, and so much less strong and stirring.

We make these observations not only on our own behalf as critics, not even as an act of justice to the writers of verse, but as a duty towards our readers. We think it not unlikely that some of our contributors may think that the critic is a cold-blooded sort of animal, destitute of emotion, rather oyster-like in the nature of his passions and poetic faculty, and seldom aglow with the divine Promethean fire of imagination. We venture to assure them that critics, as a general rule, are “men of like passions” as others, though culture gives a cunning seeing to their eyes, as to faults and defects, which is not always possessed by others, and this is not without its compensating balance, of often being able to see beauties not readily discernible by uncritical eyes. Were it not so, what would be the worth of criticism? plainly nought. Poems are submitted to the cultured perception of critics just as new inventions are submitted to experts, and cases are brought before judges, that they, looking carefully at both sides, may form an impartial judgment, just on the average, though not necessarily infallible. Criticism, like law, ought to have no passions and no friendliness. In fact, friendly criticism is faulty criticism; but that says nothing at all against appreciative criticism, which is all right. Contributors may wisely bear this in mind, but readers ought also to be told that in these pages the poems selected for publication, for the most part, are subjected to an ordeal to which poetry in other serials is not exposed. They are brought before the mind as the subjects of criticism, and the reader's mind is therefore thrown into a state of artificial coldness towards them which may mar their zest and do them injustice on a first perusal.

In regard to the manner of criticism employed by ourselves, we may say that we read each piece submitted to us for criticism several times with a desire to do justice to the writers and a service to our readers. No single reading of any poem is enough for a critical perusal, because poetry is emotional, and unless our emotions and our intellect are brought or wrought into harmony with the writer's purpose, appreciation is impossible, depreciation is probable. Poetry, to be read thoroughly and enjoyed well, ought to be perused in the mood or humour, with the emotions free to be stirred, and with designed giving of the reins of will into the poet's hands; then, having found and felt the purpose of the writer, the critical reader must observe how this is effected, and whence the effects arise. Afterwards heart and art, being alike livingly and lovingly engaged in the perusal, the poem ought to be read again for the purpose of noting and enjoying the whole combined elements of the thoughts, imaginings, words, music, and suggestings of the verses.

Perhaps no better exercise in composition can be found than the practice of versification. It requires choiceness of phrase, and inspires selectness of diction; it cultivates the sense of harmony, and induces variousness of forms of expression. On this account, perhaps, the better form for verse-culture is that of translation. In a poem by some known writer we are sure to have a poetic thought, and a pattern of melodious phraseology, and the ambition to match the "linked sweetness" of the original in the substitutions of a version in another tongue greatly facilitates the formal if not the formative practice of versification. Here, for instance, we have a few translations which may be gathered together under the general title of "Songs of Spring." The first specimen consists of the four first verses of "Die Vereinigung" (The Union), by Johann Heinrich Voss (1751—1826), one of the most energetic members of the Dichterbund (poetical confederacy) of the genius period of German poetry.

#### A SPRING SONG.

Look up, how fair that lightsome blue  
*Its boundless dome extending!* [High overhead  
 How bright this meadow's vernal hue,  
 With golden kingcups blending!  
 Yon beech tree basks in sunlight clear,  
 Each tender leaf rejoices;  
 What varied notes, to charm the ear,  
 Ring out from countless voices!

On lowly herb, on stately tree,  
 Young buds in crowds are swelling;  
 Where shades refresh, where winds blow free,  
 Love's soul through all is welling.  
 Spirit of life, to thee we bow  
 In nature's glad *awaking*; [forth-breaking  
 Like change our ransomed frames shall know  
 From death's dark slumber *breaking*. [awaking

Our second specimen is from the agreeable and tasteful poet of the Grand Duchy of Baden, Aloys Schreiber, entitled—

#### THE CHILD AND THE FLOWERS.

(From Aloys Schreiber.)

##### The Child.

WELCOME, blossoms, freshly blooming,  
 Now, while gladness crowns the year!  
 Ah, how late ye are in coming!  
 And the summer days are near.

FOURTH CRITIQUE.

Tell me, can my accents reach you,  
Or my glance can ye discern?  
Blossoms, show me, I beseech you,  
Your sweet language how to learn.

Say what flower shall bloom beside me,  
Meet companion, child of May;  
Say who willingly shall guide me  
To the bright home far away.

*The Lily.*

Choose me, for a robe of whiteness  
Gentle nature gave to me; [Mother  
Simple truth, my only brightness,  
Makes me near akin to thee.

*The Violet.*

Choose me, for a wistful feeling [yearning  
Haunts my deep and tender blue,  
Yet the dewdrops, o'er me stealing,  
Cool my cheeks of glowing hue.

*The Rose.*

Choose me, that in holy gladness  
Tender youth may blossom free; [Your sweet  
Kept from stain, and kept from sadness,— [saved  
This fair lesson teach I thee.

*The Rosemary.*

Choose thou me; the maiden binds me,  
Hopeful, in her bridal wreath;  
Choose thou me; the mourner winds me,  
Hopeful, round the bier of death.

*The Child.*

Kind ones, let your beauties blending  
Come to grace my bower of May;  
And through life your counsels lending, [years  
Help to cheer its parting day. [life's

We take next one of Heine's mystical hints of the brotherhood of all nature, which almost translates itself into English verse in its sweet simplicity, the song of the good daughter of the parson of Grönaau, in the Idyl "Luse:"—

## THE PINE AND THE PALM.

A *PINE* tree standeth all lonesome,  
On a dreary northern hill;  
He slumbers, and lo! he dreameth,  
In his shroud so white and still.

*In dreams he beholds* a palm tree, [He dreameth, and lo  
In a far-off southern land;  
Which, on a ridge of the burning waste,  
Silent and lone doth stand. B.

From translated verse we now turn to our MSS. of original poetry. We quote first a few stanzas, whose tone is somewhat Vaughan-like. They possess a pathetic interest, and have in them the true poetic power of touching the emotional nature. The meaning grows by perusal, and the effect increases as they are re-read. Perhaps if the poem had been more compressed it would have been more effective.

## MY BURIED LOVE.

UPON her grave they grow,  
The simple daisy and the fragrant rose,  
*Like as they looked* when last I bended low [E'en  
To watch her in repose. [dust's

It seems so long ago;  
Yet still, as *though* time withered not, they bloom; [if  
Emblems of her who liveth still, I know;—  
A flower within a tomb.

I did not weep nor sigh,  
As "earth to earth and dust to dust" was read:  
I knew that, in the spirit, she was by,  
And not, as they thought, dead.

Close by the *singing* shore [surging  
We laid her, that *the* music she might hear, [sea-  
And think that I was singing, as of yore,  
*Sweet* melodies that cheer. [Those

When twilight's shadows close,  
I hasten to *the* shore, and, lying low, [her grave  
I *kiss* the daisy, *grasp* the budding rose, [press—kiss  
Which o'er her *fondly* grow.

Then up before me springs  
 The vision of *her pure, untiring* love, [my saintly tireless  
 Robed in pure white, and fair with golden wings, [A heaven-descended  
*And aspect like a dove.*

'Tis then she speaks to me, [Then!  
 And bids me wait the *coming* of the day; [dawning—God's  
 I whisper 'tween the murmurs of the sea;  
 Lo! night has passed away.

How swift *the* moments fly [life's  
 When souls converse! Time is the foe of love;  
 Eternity its friend; *its* home the sky; [her  
*Its* life with God above. [her

We grovel here below,  
 Kept down by weights of *growing bitter* ill; [gross and biting  
 And oftentimes *sad*, with weary steps and slow, [faint  
*We mount* perfection's hill. [scale

The morning dawns serene,  
 As o'er the earth *the* mantling light is thrown; morn's  
 But I, in converse with my love unseen,  
*Bask* in her beams alone. [Live—life

*Yet* now her fluttering wings, [E'en  
 Impatient, stretch themselves for heavenward flight;  
 Good-bye once more: I go to earthly things  
 With thee, my love, in sight;

In *hope* that soon the cloud [faith  
 Which comes between two spirits that are one,  
 Shall vanish as the night's deep-fringed shroud  
 Before the morning's sun.

In patience *do* I wait, [shall  
 The years *do* pass away, and bear me on; [must  
 And soon, like one that thought himself too late,  
 I shall be seen,—and gone.

DIAMOND.

Our next quotation is more ambitious in its aim, and takes a higher flight. We cannot say it is so well sustained or so consistent as it might have been. Stanzas two and three might be advantageously rewritten, with closer reference to six and seven, which ought to be the echo of them in a fresh reverberation of the emotional pain and pang.

## THE FUTURE LIFE.

I WONDER what *the* future life will be? [man's  
 Whether the flitting shadows love endears, [shrines  
 Which haunt the ruined *pile* of memory, [this  
 Will throw themselves beyond *the* stretch of years, [nor seem, but *be*  
 And there take beauteous shapes, *and be to me*  
 A source of constant joy, and not of tears.

How often slumbering memory wakes, to weep  
 For hours o'er some unnoticed, transient thing,  
 Which, sudden, roused it from its trance-like sleep,  
 To live a little heaven. How oft we sing  
 The song of other days, when hope did sweep  
*Its sanguine hand across life's firmer string!* [Her

But now the wrecks of *years* lie scattered round, [time  
 Mere nothings which the wind may drive away;  
 Will these be gathered up from off the ground?  
 Be set in forms that never shall decay?  
 Or speak again in tones whose mellow sound [—round  
*Still rings in music which my heart-strings play?* [Whose ringing

The *aspect* of a cloud, or song of bird, [glory  
 Some floating strain of witching melody,  
 The sunset's glow, or softly spoken word, [some  
 The shadows on the brook, the gnarled tree,  
 Or distant hymn at evening faintly heard,  
 Will oft recall *some* holy *love* to me. [old—thoughts

Ah, in the breast fierce passion's smouldering fires  
 Still live, and wait *but* slightest touch to blaze; [by  
 Then make a wreck of holiest desires,  
 And stern resolves to their foundations raze;  
 While in its arms the fairer-blooming life expires,  
 Pierced to the heart by its consuming rays.

Will these deep-buried loves again revive?  
 Will passion's fires be quenched? Will discipline  
 Of faith and virtue in that sphere survive?  
 Will all those objects that *touch* thoughts within, [stir  
 Be ever present to preserve alive  
 The joy that rises up through years of sin?

Fair hopes that budded in the days of youth,  
 The colder blasts of manhood's winter blight;  
 And vows, though daughters of eternal truth,  
 Lay round me dead,—slain in a single night:  
 Will these re-live, untouched by hand of ruth,  
 And shall I *cherish them* with fond delight? [live them o'er



Oh, had I wings! how swiftly would I flee,  
 And linger round that life beyond our ken!  
 So childhood lingers round its youth to be,  
 So youth we spend in longings to be men:  
 O God, reveal to us the mystery; [quickly come  
 "Quickly come, Lord Jesus; even so, Amen." [Lord Jesus,

Far there our utmost thought may wing and sweep  
 Through *yon immensity* of space; thence rise, [vast immensities  
 And from the topmost pinnacle hence leap  
 To higher plains, where wing of seraph plies  
 Untired, yet fail to reach the unbounded deep,  
 Still wondering where the home of Godhead lies. DIAMOND.

The form of verse in which C. S. has chosen to cast his poem is difficult to manage, and requires attention to its recurrences before it can be taken into the mind. The chime is unfamiliar, but when read lovingly it gains upon one. Consistency and condensation might here, too, have been advisably employed, especially in stanzas three and four. The verses must have cost considerable trouble, and no little skill in word-building is noticeable in the "lofty rhyme." We think there are poetic gleams amid the darkness of his spirit which enable us to bid him hope, work, think, and wait.

## AMBITION.

O BECKONING maiden! whose *deep-searching* eyes [heart  
 Have thrilled me to the soul—whose voice has sought  
 So oft to teach me and to make me wise—  
 To fill my mind with true and earnest thought,  
 That thou might'st pluck therefrom pure poesy.  
 O stern ambition! wilt thou ever seek  
 Me thus, and with thy yearnings *haunt* my soul? [daunt  
 And is it doomed that I shall aye be weak?  
 That I shall pant in vain to reach the goal? [Must I still  
 Or shalt thou give me strength, or make me free? [Wilt thou not

Although my years are few, yet thou art old  
 Unto my sight, for in my dreams thy form  
 Hath haunted me since life was joy untold—  
 And aye, when *joy* grows cold thou keep'st *life* warm. [Faith—hope  
 At first thou wert a shadow without name,  
 But as I gazed the life-mist cleared away;  
 Life, love, and light grew strong, and I felt fonder  
 Of thy form, and joyed the more I bore thy away, [felt  
 Then lo! thy hand outstretched, thy voice cried, "Yonder!"  
 I looked, and I beheld the hill of fame. [saw far off

Together towards that hill we walked; and lo!  
 Two spirits flew around us—hope and fear,—  
 One cheered me on and urged me aye to go,  
*The other bade me turn; and filled my ear*  
 With warnings dire of those who'd gone before,  
 At which I felt *sad, sad, that sight was mine,*  
 And wished that thou and hope from me were gone;  
*But thou stood'st forth and took my hand in thine,*  
 While hope, with songs of love, still cheered me on,  
 Though fear *oft* hovered near, and pained me sore.

[but

[That

[This—mine

[full

[friendly grasp

[Then stood'st with

[still

Now I have gained a hillock on the hill,  
 But, as *I look above*, the heights increase,  
 And *other heights* appear, while I am still  
 Led on by thee, and hope, *which* should grant peace,  
 Still makes my soul enthusiast, *though* fear  
 Oft clasps me round the waist, and in despair  
 Shrieks out, and points to distant darkness, seen  
 More plainly as we higher rise. "See, there  
 Is misery;" then hope doth intervene—  
 "The future? Ah! 'tis bright while I am near."

[upward gaze

[loftier peaks

[who

[still

O onward-urging fame! but thou art strong;  
 O hope omnipotent! if thou art kind  
 Still thou art merciless, and ah, how long!  
 Or ah, how long shall I be mortal, blind  
 To joys, for love of immortality?  
 O back-recoiling fear! why art thou fond  
 To crush our aims, and cause us pain, by being  
 The rival unto hope? O! break my bond,  
 Pale-faced ambition! or is there no fleeing  
 From thy stern thrall? Ah, would that I were free!

C. S.

We interpose for variety's sake some verses in a lighter measure, and a simpler theme. These lines are just of the sort to which memory gives interest, because association aids the signification. They have a lilt, caught from the winds of the Mearns.

## WHITE HEATHER.

[Suggested on a plant of white heather being found by an excursion party on Ker-loch Hill, a ridge of the Grampians, in Kincardineshire. It is a somewhat rare plant in a wild state.]

QUEEN of the purple mountain side,  
 The fairest of the fair,  
 The passing stranger turns, and asks  
 "What art thou doing there?"

[Thou

The moon so bright  
 Bathes in her light  
 Thy snowy blossoms rare ;  
 With tenderest ray  
 She seems to say,  
 "What art thou doing there?"

The *cumbering* heather looks around  
 And *stares* thee with a sigh,  
 That *is* thy pure and virgin white  
 Its colours cannot vie :  
*But*, purest maid,  
 Deep in *its* shade,  
 Safe from *the* storms you lie ;  
 And hear the tale,  
 On every gale,  
 "With you we cannot vie!"

[purple  
 eyes  
 with

[Like  
 life's  
 its

Sweet orphan of an alien kind,  
 Pre-doomed to life to cling  
 On Ker-loch's steep and rocky side,  
 Beyond the bubbling spring ;  
 But, virgin fair,  
 To maiden's care  
 Thy every danger fling ;  
 A foundling friend  
 She'll ever tend  
 With water from the spring.

[Thee

Now fair and sweet in cultured ground,  
 With Mary's care to cheer,  
 No more a smiling nymph shall say,  
 "What art thou doing here?"  
 And in the calm  
 Of evening's balm,  
 No mountain storms to fear,  
 You'll smiling live,  
 Love's tribute give  
 To *them* who brought you here.

[those  
 DUN-LORA.

We like the spirit and admire the heartiness of W. D. in the piece which follows, and gladly give place to his good wishes :—

#### GOD BLESS OUR WORKING MEN.

God bless our noble working men,  
 Who *work* on rail or road ;  
 O smile upon their families,  
 And on each one's abode !

[toil

O bless their wives and children  
 With *blessings* rich and rare,  
 That in their daily *toll* they may  
 Themselves for Thee prepare.

[bounties  
 lives]

O *guide* them, when before Thy throne  
 They kneel in *weakness* there ;  
 Be Thou their Guide, their Comforter  
 In trouble, *trial*, or care.  
 They need *Thy* *sure* protecting arm  
 To guard them whilst at work,  
 For unknown dangers, snares unseen,  
 Around them daily lurk.

[teach  
 humble prayer  
 grief  
 Thine all]

God bless our WORKING MEN, for they  
 Are England's noble band ;  
 Then let us *meet* them as we ought,  
 With frank and open hand.  
 For they have cares and sorrows here,  
 And wounded hearts to bind ;  
 It needs a gentle voice to *quell*  
 The conflicts of the mind.

[greet]

[calm]

We ALL can do our part to help,  
 Then let us strive to be  
 Within the foremost rank of those,  
 The noble and the free !  
 THOU, in whose sight all *flesh's* the same,  
 And by whose word we live ;  
 To THEE we would all praise ascribe,  
 And adoration give.

[each]

[Who noble are and  
 flesh is grass  
 Yet  
 heartfelt]

W. D.

We quote next a good many stanzas which might have been much better expressed if they had been diligently compressed, and had the author kept one idea more persistently before him. The topic, and the spirit in which the verses are conceived, commend themselves to our sympathies; and we would gladly have given a higher opinion had we been honestly able. Religious poetry above all others should be intense, compact, clear, and telling. In it anything more is vain. The stanzas enclosed in brackets appear to us to break the continuity of the poem, and the capital point made in the opening of the fourth verse is not effectively sustained. Ought not the tenth verse to have been transformed somewhat thus?—

"Shrink not from life's cup of scorn,  
 The cup of joy shall be thy prize;  
 Soon he who sorrow so has borne  
 To unfathomed bliss shall rise."

## HAST THOU DEIGNED TO CALL ME BROTHER ?

"For both He that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one ;  
for which cause He is not ashamed to call them brethren."—HEB. ii. 11.

HAST Thou deigned to call me brother ?  
Art Thou linked to one so vile ?  
One who grieved Thee as none other,—  
One unworthy of Thy smile !

O the grace, the love that brought thee  
Where a *sinning sinner* lay,  
Too *enamoured* to have sought Thee,  
Wearing out an evil day.

[an erring  
[far wandered  
[his's

Made him brother ! Well may wonder  
Flood the *archives* of the sky—  
Fill the earth and regions under  
At the kinship by and by.

[stretches  
[our

Didst thou see—— ? Alas ! vain question,  
I had said some kindred claim,  
Something that the soul could rest on,  
Some faint title to the name ;

[Christ's

Some fair lineament untarnished,  
Drawn betimes from out the scene,  
And with human favours garnished  
Like to what it *once* had been.

[should

[Ah, poor mortal, thus relying,  
Read the preface to the ban :  
*In transgression DEAD—not dying—*  
Every child of fallen man.

Not one link remained unbroken,  
Not one gleam of glory stayed,—  
All thine efforts now betoken  
What a ruin thou art made.]

Nay, this union—high and holy—  
Far transcending nature's claim,  
In its wondrous bearing solely  
Out of dire destruction came.

[Yet

Favoured of this fair creation—  
 Object of eterne design—  
 Covet not earth's highest station,  
 Monarchs soon shall envy thine;

[Favourite]

Shrink not from the cup of scorn,  
 Soon a cup of joy thou'lt drink,  
 Soon the sorrow thou hast borne  
 In unfathomed bliss shall sink.

Even now in mystic story  
 'Mid the dome of heaven rings,  
 Brother of the Lord of glory—  
 Brother of the King of kings!

R. P. M.

Since W. L.'s former appearance in our pages he has made great progress. Although we do not think the topic peculiarly suitable for a young poet, the conception is clear, and the treatment chaste, the diction well chosen, and the rhythm well managed. It is a hopeful and promising sign that he has striven to profit by our former hints—and has profited. We think we may safely say that we have seen nothing better on the subject of late, except some verses of Mrs. Webster, and an idyl of Robert Buchanan's, both of whom are acknowledged occupants of a place among modern poets. We shall be glad to find W. L., by toil of brain and diligence of art, doing better and better still,—for, notwithstanding what we have said, that is possible.

## WITHOUT.

"One more unfortunate,  
 Weary of breath."—"Bridge of Sighs."

TO-NIGHT I am alone, and while apart  
 I stand and watch the people pass, I try  
 To still the brain-born thoughts that fill my heart  
 With fears, though it seems vain, alas! for I  
 Can think of nought but that which I would quell.  
 Men mock and jeer me when I pass, and call [they  
 Me names, far worse than those wild words which fell  
 From out my lips on him that wrought my fall. [Wrung from

Men!—well, forgive me if I call them men,  
 For they are all the sort that cross my path,  
 Though I for vengeance tempt them now and then,  
 And teach them they can fall—it cools my wrath:  
 Yet, for the sake of him who loved my birth,  
 My love for him is pure as summer morn; [whom  
 I call man, man; it cheers my way on earth:  
 Away, ye dreams! away! ye shall not scorn

O women! what can I, since I have done  
 The all, perchance, that He above forgives?  
 For though my race of life is almost run,  
 My heart with pain so sore, my soul yet lives,  
 And yet will live, O awful thought! till time,  
 With its great conquering rival, runs apace,  
 When hell will claim, with hideous welcome, crime,  
 And many then shall lose the path to grace.  
 O sisters dear, unveil your hearts, and stand [pure  
 Forth in your *gloriousness*, for ye alone can save; [chasteness  
 O come with steady step, and grasp my hand,  
 And yield me comfort ere I *seek* the grave: [reach  
 Ay, use the power which God hath given to you,  
 To win sad souls like mine from *courts* unclean, [course  
 And bid me once again feel good and true,  
 For Christ himself, your Lord, loved Magdalene.

Ah me! what *time* is that which floats from far, [tone  
 As if from heaven, and brings me back those days  
 When life was sweet, without *this* weary war? [woe's  
 For then I knew what 'twas a God to praise;  
 Yea, sounds like those which from yon church floats out,  
 I've sung ere now upon our hearth at home.  
 For once 'twas *ours*, though now 'tis *theirs*; they sit about,  
 They are within, but I am left to roam.  
 O tears, why will you flow? Why melts my soul?  
 Is there a *hope* that yet on earth I stay [chance  
 Without this load of pain and sin's control,  
 That hastes me far and farther from the day?  
 O come, high Hope, and stay my throbbing brain;  
 O come, and *breathe* into my burning breast; [breathe balm  
 I yet may *be* within, and hear that strain, [stand  
 Or, can it be?—in heaven I may find rest. W. L.

(To be continued.)

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ALL legislation implies change, and the instruments of legislation will vary according as the motive power of change resides in one set of persons or in another. The Lords may possibly represent some classes in England, but they do not represent the classes in which the motive power of change resides. They are thus necessarily cut out of the sphere of legislation, and every day their exclusion becomes more complete.—*Saturday Review*.

## The Reviewer.

*Two Addresses:—I. Systematic Policy. II. Education.* By RICHARD CONGREVE, M.A., &c. London: Trübner and Co.

RICHARD CONGREVE is, in many ways, a man of mark, whose utterances on such topics as he here discourses upon ought to receive attention. Born in 1818, and educated at Rugby under the care of Dr. Arnold in his very prime and energy, he entered Wadham College, Oxford, in 1836, and at the Michaelmas term in 1840 graduated B.A.—taking a first-class degree along with Rev. John Hannah, Warden of Glenalmond College, Perth, who recently refused an English deanery; Ralph B. W. Lingen, chief secretary of the Privy Council Committee on Education; and three others, “in literis humanioribus;” while Edward Warner, formerly M.P. for Norwich, from the same college, took a first-class in mathematics and physics. Richard Congreve graduated M.A. in 1844, and took priest’s orders. He was chosen Fellow of his college, and subsequently Tutor and Lecturer in Humanity. In 1855 he had acquired a reputation such as to secure for him a call to lecture before the Philosophical Institution, Edinburgh. His lectures, under the title of “The Roman Empire in the West,” were almost immediately published, and in the same year his translation of “The Politics of Aristotle” appeared with notes, in which his adhesion to the views of Auguste Comte was abundantly apparent. In 1858 he translated Comte’s “Catechism of Positive Religion.” He again lectured in the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution in 1862 on “Elizabeth of England;” these two lectures have been published. He has also issued a lecture on “Gibraltar; or, the Foreign Policy of England,” and pamphlets on “India,” “Ireland,” “Italy and the Western Powers,” “The Labour Question,” &c., all more or less expository of the political philosophy of positivism. More directly and officially as the High Priest of the British Centre of the Universal Church of believers in the Religion of Humanity, he has laid his views before the public on “The Attitude of the New Religion towards the Old,” “The Propagation of the Religion of Humanity,” &c. His latest productions in this connection are the two addresses now before us for notice, which were “delivered on the Festival of Humanity in the years 81 and 82 since the opening of the French Revolution,—Jan. 1st, 1869; Jan. 1st, 1870,” to the members of the London Organization of Comtists meeting in Bouverie Street. We unhesitatingly commend them to the perusal, not only of those of our readers who have been led to interest themselves in the new phases of faith presented to us in the Religion of Comte by the papers which recently appeared (1868) in this serial on “Positivism and its Founder,” but to that of all those who care for vigorous original thought well



expressed, even though they doubt—as we do—the tenets of the new religion, and feel no sympathy with the cold abstraction which it calls on us to substitute for the living Christ of the creed of Christendom.

Without attempting an analysis of these addresses, which might lessen the interest of our readers in their perusal, we may whet their appetites, and illustrate their worth and suggestiveness by the following quotations:—

“Christianity was the first great conscious innovation on the earlier religious experience of mankind, which had previously moved on without any sense of a break, developing itself spontaneously to meet the wants of man as they made themselves felt, and in each successive stage animated by no hostility to what had gone before.”

“They who at the opening of a new era, at the beginning of a great change, are not in opposition to it, but, to the best of their ability, promoting it, have usually a more vivid conviction of its necessity and its promise, and have the greater vigour such conviction gives. The contrast of the old and the new, of the remnants of the past with the construction rising from among them, the sense of opposition, and the assurance of triumph, all aid them in presenting more definitely to themselves the object of their efforts.”

“Great intellects and great characters are a costly production, and the generations are to blame which stand by and see such inestimable value wasted.”

“Peace on earth, which for centuries was the prayer of Christendom, whilst the constant existence of war was a glaring contradiction to its aspiration, and a testimony to the insufficiency of its doctrines, is still, as ever, the wish of all good men, and, under the action of the purely human movement which we call industry, is on the eve of becoming more and more a reality.”

“West of us the world is sown with republics. Under such conditions we may be sure that at a period not to be fixed, but certain to come, England will resume her noblest tradition—re-enter the path indicated by Cromwell, by Milton and the younger Sidney, join her co-partners of the Western world, and place herself as a republic, or a union of republics, on a level with and in sympathy with them. Nor will Germany fail to share in the movement.”

“We accept, in principle, the present division of the industrial class into employer and employed. We accept it not with mere acquiescence, but as a precious acquisition of the race, to be carefully guarded and acted upon. We are opposed to the co-operative system, or the system of collective capitalists, as tending to remove responsibility from the master, and confer no real boon on the workman.”

“Universities, colleges and schools, endowments and scholarships and prizes, all the whole machinery of corruption which has gradually accumulated, and which is vitiating at its spring the national life, and destroying the first element of all sound social union, the right constitution and legitimate influence of the family, all cease to retain their hold on our reason, and we see them in their true light, as having done a work in the absence of better agencies, but destined to give place, however slowly, to those better agencies when they can be brought to bear upon society.”

The preceding quotations are taken from the address on "Systematic Policy; the succeeding ones are from that on "Education." We presume that the first two will be interesting to those who have been considering the debate as between the "Union" and the "League," and we think the latter contains a wise and judicious word to Young Men's Improvement Societies, Mechanics' Institutes, and similar institutions.

"The true object of human society is the production of men, not human animals as the implements of material production, but of men in the true proper sense, formed and fashioned and disciplined agents, men adequately equipped for the right conduct and true enjoyment of life."

Compulsory education is objectionable, he says, because,—

"(1) It is unnecessary; a wise action on public opinion will be adequate to secure the result aimed at.

"(2) It involves the introduction of a machinery for which we shall pay dearly in the sequel.

"(3) It has in it something of an insulting character, as implying that, if wisely offered to them, the poor will reject knowledge. Neither for our own, any more than the poor of other countries, do I believe this.

"(4) It rests on an exaggeration of the value of that which it offers,—instruction in the mere elements of intellectual knowledge. With the food you offer at present for the power you would give, this is a consideration of great force.

"(5) The more natural, simple means have not yet been fully tried; good instruction has not yet been freely offered to all.

"(6) It is a class regulation. I heard that 'no board would venture to interfere with any one who was called respectable.' It is, then, solely to press on the poor the power you would have given, and not on what are called the respectable classes. I hope the poor will take note of this, and whilst firmly claiming the means of instruction, insist that in their use of them they shall be free as others.

"Lastly, I deprecate *in toto* the intrusion of the State into this question beyond the limit which is proved absolutely necessary."

"I think nothing is so wasted at present as the lecturing system. There is no attention to the choice of subjects, and one follows another in a way that is fatal to mental improvement; and there is constantly a disposition to give single lectures and not courses. Both for the teacher and learner it is essential, mentally, that this loose, crude lecture system should be scouted. It is, I believe, an unmixed evil. And in its place, it is for us who are disposed to do our best in the lecturing way, to do it seriously and consecutively, not as the idle amusement of an idle hour, but as a real mental exercise for ourselves and our hearers,—a mental exercise, with the object of imparting and gaining a consecutive knowledge of the subject we have chosen. And we should be rigid in our choice, as rigid as possible. If hearers will not come, that is not for us to care for, but no mere attractiveness of a subject should induce us to choose it; rather in choosing we should be guided by some rational view of the place our subject holds in reference to other knowledge, and of its social utility."

*The Signs of the Times.* An Address dedicated to the Preachers of to-day. By S. B. BROWN, B.A. London: Elliot Stock.

"This address was delivered before the ministers and delegates of an association of churches in the south of England," and is intended to enforce "the very great importance of adapting, in a special degree, the preaching of to-day to the great need of the times." It is a very able address, on a most important matter; and deserves the perusal not only of those who preach, but of those who are preached to. This would make preaching more than it is a co-operative process—one in which the pastor suggests thoughts, and the people consider and apply them, and in which the wants of the people suggest thoughts which it is the duty of the pastor to apply. We quote one or two passages of interest:—

"Society has changed its modes of working and its institutions; new powers have sprung into existence; altogether new ideas have been developed. Our Christianity, if it be what it professes to be, must be able to deal with all these in the spirit of Christ, and it must not show itself unable to advance and grow with the progress of society. It must not retreat to the wilderness, or even to the quiet house of prayer, and be altogether a contemplative spirit. It must come out of solitude, like John the Baptist, and cope with the evils of the age; and, like Christ, be a spirit of life in a society that will otherwise grow corrupt, and pass away into nothingness, and worse. Instead of the Church being in the rear of the progress of society, it ought to lead, and guide, and modify the movements of humanity.

" . . . . I cannot help noticing one other feature out of many. A great part of our present Christianity is of an ignorantly selfish type. It is an over-anxiety for the salvation and comfort of self. It is scarcely any wonder that the selfishness of the world, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life, should creep into the Church; but it is, nevertheless, a selfishness to be utterly abhorred. We recommend Christianity and Christ too much for what they can do towards comfort and everlasting painlessness.

" . . . . That will be a glorious day when the Church fulfils her splendid mission, when she enters fully upon the career partially sketched in an address lately delivered (before the Young Students' Christian Association connected with the London University College); and goes far beyond it, as she may well do, when 'in every country she becomes a standing arbiter between the rich and poor, the privileged and unprivileged, a tribune interceding for the plebeian—a perpetual incorruptible critic upon all social proceedings, bringing all the lights of science and learning to bear upon human life—when she probes everything and tries it by her own high principles, and perpetually brings institutions and usages before the judgment-seat of Christ. And when any revolution breaks out in a Christian country, any irremediable discord between class and class, or if any class remain unenlightened, uneducated, barbarous, will reckon it her own sin.'"

## Our Collegiate Course.

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### THE PROGRESS OF POESY.

A FINDARIO ODE.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

[The might of harmonious numbers over the graces of the motions of the body.]

#### EPODE I.

25

Thee the Voice, the Dance obey,  
Tempered to thy warbled lay,  
O'er Idalia's velvet green

The harmonies of sound and motion—attuned to thine ecstatic tones, yield homage to thee. Wearing garlands of roses, the Loves may be be-

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(25) "In the 'Progress of Poesy' there is scarcely a line that does not contain an abuse of that poetic licence [personification] which renders the style animated if sparingly exercised, frigid if lavishly indulged. We could readily picture to ourselves the rosy-crowned Loves, even antic Sports and blue-eyed Pleasures, if we were not overtaken by being also called upon to believe in the actual incarnation of the 'shell' [line 15]; who again is parent of 'Airs' [line 14], and whom 'the Voice and Dance obey.' Thus are confused together those ideas which naturally represent persons, such as the Loves and Idalia, and those ideas—such as an instrument of music—to which no personification can ever be attached."—*Lord Lytton's "Miscellaneous Prose Works,"* vol. i.; *Gray's Works*, p. 148.

(27) The grove of Idalum, with the town of the same name, at the foot of Mount Idalus, in the island of Cyprus, was sacred to Venus, the goddess of love and beauty; who on that account bore the name Idalia, which here is equivalent to Cyprian, or "of Cyprus."

The fancy of the poets and artists gave birth to Eros, the son and companion of Aphrodite. The number of Loves was speedily augmented, and each had some peculiar task to perform in affairs of the heart. The Loves are only a portion of—

"All the shadowy tribes of mind,  
In braided dance their murmurs joined,  
And all the bright uncounted powers  
Who fed on heaven's ambrosial flowers."  
*Collins's "Ode on the Poetical Character."*

The rosy-crownèd Loves are seen,  
 On Cytherea's day,  
 With antic Sports and blue-eyed Pleasures, 30  
 Frisking light in frolic measures ;  
 Now pursuing, now retreating.  
 Now in circling troops they meet ;  
 To brisk notes in cadence beating,

held on the soft sward of Idalia, on the festival of Venus, frolicking  
 gladsomely in merry mazes, flirting with the romping children of Fun,  
 and the bright-glaring Joys alternately advancing and retiring, and then  
 drawn into a gathered crowd, keeping time as they move to the lively notes

(29) The island of Cythera (Cerigo) being a chosen resort of Aphrodite (Venus), she was thence called *Cytherea* ; and the month of April being, according to one derivation, named after Aphrodite, is called (*mensis Cythereus*) the month of Love. In it the *Aphrodisia*, or festival of Love, was celebrated with great pomp and luxury in the cities of Greece and in Cyprus. Horace says (*Carm.*, iv., 11, 14—16),—

"Idus tibi sunt agendæ,  
 Qui dies mensem Veneris marinæ  
 Findit Aprilem."

("Come, celebrate the ides of April,  
 The day which parts the month of Venus,  
 Our sea-born patron."—*F. W. Newman*.)

The ides of April fell on the 13th.  
 Also in his "Spring Song" Horace says,—

"Jam Cytherea choros ducit Venus imminente luna  
 Junctæque Nymphis Gratia decantes  
 Alterno terram quatiant pede."—*Odes*, I., iv., 5—7.

("Now Cytherean Venus leads the dance,  
 Under the gaze of the o'erhanging moon ;  
 The comely Graces with the Nymphs advance,  
 And then retreat, swift-stepping to the tune.")

Akenside has also thus noticed and characterized the Graces :—

"The powers of Fancy, her delighted sons,  
 To three illustrious orders have referred,  
 Three sister *Graces*, whom the painter's hand,  
 The poet's tongue, confesses,—the *sublime*,  
 The *wonderful*, the *fair*."—"*Pleasures of Imagination*," i., 142—146.

Glance their many-twinkling feet. 35  
 Slow-melting strains their queen's approach declare;  
 Where'er she turns the Graces homage pay;  
 With arms sublime, that float upon the air,

of dance-music, their intermixed steps causing a glitter of grace. Lengthy delicious measures herald the advent of their lady. The Graces show the utmost devotion in whatever way she moves; with arms raised aloft they skim along the clouds.

(35) Johnson objected to Gray's words arbitrarily compounded, and especially censures "many-twinkling," because though we may say "many-spotted," we cannot say "*many-spotting*:" but here the great lexicographer appears to be wrong in his analogy, for *spot* is a transitive, *twinkle* an intransitive verb. Keble has justified Gray against his censor, by using—

"The many-twinkling smile of ocean."

(37) Charites, the Graces, the daughters of Jupiter and Eurynome,—*Aglais*, splendour; Euphrosyne, gaiety; and Thalia, bloom: as in Pindar,—

"Genius, and beauty, and immortal fame  
 Are yours; without the soft majestic Graces,  
 Not e'en the gods, in their celestial places,  
 Or feast or dance proclaim. . . .  
 August Aglais, blithe Euphrosyne,  
 Daughter of heaven's resistless king,  
 And thou that lov'st the liquid lay,  
 Thalia, hear my call," &c.

"*Olympic Odes*," xvi., *Abraham Moore's Version*.

(38) "The gorgeous and justly celebrated description of Cytherea herself is greatly injured by this impertinence [of personification]. We go with the poet while he tells us,—

'Where'er she turns, the Graces homage pay;'

we see the dream of Praxiteles embodied when we are told how—

'With arms sublime, that float upon the air,  
 In gliding state she wins her easy way;'

but the picture is suddenly lost, the vitality of the creation fades away, and we find but a show of words before us, when we are told that—

'O'er her warm cheek and rising bosom move  
 The bloom of young Desire and purple light of Love.'

Here, desire and love being also personified, merely to express the goddess's complexion, the unity of the main personification of the goddess herself is destroyed. What we took for the true Florimel changes into the false one, and the glow and motion of life melt into the shap of snow."—*Lord Lytton's "Miscellaneous Works*," vol. i.; *Gray's Works*, p. 148.

In gliding state she wins her easy way ;  
 O'er her warm cheek and rising bosom move 40  
 The bloom of young Desire, and purple light of Love.

She gracefully moving in majesty passes readily along ; while her countenance is suffused with the rosy tint of expectancy, and the glowing gleam of blushing affection quickens the pulses of her heart.

(40) "The morning tinge, the rose, the lily flower,  
 In ever-running race on her did paint their power."  
*Chatterton's "English Metamorphoses."*

(41) It is extremely difficult to conceive what the ancients precisely meant by the word *purpureus*. They seem to have designed by it anything BRIGHT and BEAUTIFUL. A classical friend has furnished me with numerous significations of this word which are very contradictory. Albinovanus, in his elegy on Livia, mentions *nivem purpuream* ; Catullus, *quercus ramos purpureos* ; Horace, *purpureo bibet nectar*, and somewhere mentions *olores purpureos*. Virgil has *purpuream vomit ille animam* ; and Homer calls the sea *purple*, and gives it in some other book the same epithet when in a storm.

The general idea, however, has been fondly adopted by the finest writers in Europe. The PURPLE of the ancients is not known to us. What idea, therefore, have the moderns fixed to it ? Addison, in his vision of the temple of Fame, describes the country as "being covered with a kind of PURPLE LIGHT." Gray's beautiful line is well known,—

"The bloom of young Desire and *purple light* of Love."

And Tasso, in describing his hero Godfrey, says Heaven —

"Gli empie d'onor la faccia, e vi riduce  
 Di Giovinezza, *il bell purpureo lume*."

Both Gray and Tasso copied Virgil, where Venus gives to her son *Æneas*—

"Lumenque juventæ,  
 Purpureum." (*Æneid*, I., 591.)

Dryden has omitted the *purple light* in his version, nor is it given by Pitt ; but Dryden expresses the general idea by—

"With hands divine  
 Had formed his curling locks, and *made his temples shine*,  
 And given his rolling eyes a *sparkling grace*."

It is probable that Milton has given us his idea of what was meant by this *purple light*, when applied to the human countenance, in the felicitous expression of—

"Celestial rosy red."  
*Disraeli's "Curiosities of Literature,"* p. 216.

## The Inquirer.

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### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

895. Would any of your subscribers kindly answer through the "Inquirer" the three following questions? viz. :—(1.) What constitutes a *good* song? Cite one, and point out that which distinguishes its value. Of course the music to which it is set is *not* to be taken into account. (2.) Is *alliteration* considered to be a point of merit in *prose*, or especially *POETRY*? (3.) Is there such a thing published as a Dictionary of Phrases? If so, at what price and by whom?—REVILLO.

896. In Dr. C. M. Ingleby's "Introduction to Metaphysic," 1869, page 243, five objections are brought against certain deductions from statistical tables. The second is, that "the averages are (notoriously to mathematicians) erroneously calculated." May I ask in what consists the error, if any, of striking averages in the usual way?—G. C.

897. In his essay on "Hampden and his Times," *Georgius* states that this eminent patriot, in company with Cromwell and others, resolved to seek a home in America, and that Hampden and Cromwell had embarked on board a ship which was about to sail, when Charles I., by an Order of Council, prohibited the departure of the vessel. Robertson in his *History* makes the same statement as *Georgius*. But we remember having read a few years since that a lady historian—we forget now who she was—had discovered that this statement of Robertson's was not correct. Will some gentleman kindly

inform us if it be ascertainable whether the statement made by Robertson and followed by *Georgius* is accurate or not, or on which side the evidence preponderates? If what Robertson and *Georgius* state be correct, it is a very striking display of God's overruling providence that Charles should himself be the instrument of preventing a man going to America who was afterwards one of the means of bringing him to the scaffold. If the statement be accurate, it is a very interesting point in our national history, and we should like to see it cleared up. Should the readers of the *British Controversialist* feel sufficiently interested in it to wish to see it debated, and give expression to their wish, probably our kind editors would listen to their request, and allow it to be discussed in the pages of the magazine which they conduct.—S. S.

898. Could you, or any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* furnish me (a young man whose education has not been so complete as desirable) with a good and cheap course of studies applicable for self-instruction, and including Latin, with which I am almost unacquainted? By also stating the price of each work and the publisher's name I shall feel additionally favoured.—T. T.

899. I should feel greatly obliged if you would kindly inform me if there is in existence, to your knowledge, such an aid to the students of the French and German languages as a manuscript magazine for the reception of translations or attempts



at original composition. I think such a means would be highly advantageous, and especially so to "those who are learning without the aid of a master"—mutual assistance and corrections being one advantage of importance. Probably the readers of the *British Controversialist* have such a thing in operation; if so, can they admit other learners to share their privilege?—J. P.

900. Would you be so kind as to supply a few Bible students in a district somewhat remote from books a few references to works on the natural immortality of the soul, and the future condition of the wicked? We have read with interest the debate recently held in your columns, but we desire the means of thinking out the question; and as we believe that many others, like ourselves, desire to know more than we yet do on these subjects, you will perhaps be so good as procure us the information we desire. We remember in 1866 some reviews appeared on books relating to the question. One of these was a report of a debate between Roberts and Nightingale at Birmingham. We have asked our bookseller to get it for us, but he cannot procure it. Where is it to be had?—E. F. AND OTHERS.

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

900. The eternity of future punishment is a topic which has of late evoked quite a literature. Almost every religious newspaper or magazine has had its columns occupied with contributions on this question, and not only have an army of pamphlets and a host of articles been issued on this topic, but a goodly array of books have been published upon it. For upwards of a century the question has been growing in importance, until it may now truly be said that of the more important "among the many theological ques-

tions which stir the public mind one is the endless duration of evil and of the torments of the wicked." The subject has been launched upon the sea of conflict and of controversy, and men are now beginning to form themselves into opposing parties on the question. The *English Independent* and the *Christian World*, the *Nonconformist* and the *Spectator* have recently ventilated the subject. The *Rainbow* and the *Record*, the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, the *Church, Forward*, and a host of other periodicals, have taken up the question. Nay, so very exciting has the contest become that it has occasioned a *schism* in The Evangelical Alliance—a large and influential section of the adherents of that attempt at an *Eirenicon*, based on formal creeds and vaguely worded articles of faith and practices, having, with Dr. Candlish at their head, withdrawn publicly from that body, because it refuses to excommunicate Rev. J. T. Birks for his work on "The Victory of the Divine Goodness," in which he favours what is called the restoration theory. It is not a question that is able to be settled in an hour, or to be pooh-poohed out of the arena of controversy. Nor is it so simple and one-like as many people would imagine it to be. Indeed there are four if not five varieties of opinion held upon non-eternal punishments.

1. *Universalism*, which regards punishment as terminable at the pleasure of God, and that a restoration of all things, of men and even of devils, to the service and love of Jehovah, through Christ, is necessary, inevitable.

2. *Annihilationism*, which maintains that sin and the sinful will, by the purging of fire, be gradually eliminated from the universe of God, and only the pure shall live in God's sight.

3. *Mortalism*, which affirms that man is not naturally immortal, but receives immortality as a gift from Christ—a gift which is only conferred on the faithful.

4. *Optimism*, which advocates the sleep of the soul in death till the resurrection; that then the sinful and the holy shall be brought to life and see the salvation which God has provided for His people, and that then the wicked shall be blotted out of the book of life.

5. *Spiritualism*, which suggests that as the *body* dies, so may the *soul* also die, while only the *spirit*, which is renewed and holy, shall survive. The soul in this view being the bright consummate flower of bodily life, the spirit being the ripened fruit of a wholesome and healthy soul.

6. *Eternism*, or the old so-called orthodox opinion that the soul will exist for ever in an inexorable misery as a punishment for the deeds done in the body, unless grace prevents.

I do not pretend to a full knowledge of what has been written on the subject, but I have some acquaintance with a few of the tracts, treatises, and books which deal with the question, and so far as my limited power goes I shall be glad to detail it for the behoof of those who seek information on the matter. I may mention that my attention was first attracted to the reflections which such a topic brings up by a paper or papers in the *Truth Seeker*, a serial issued under the superintendence of Frederic R. Lees, Ph.D., 1845—1856. To these I am sorry I cannot more particularly refer. The works of Thomas De Quincey and of Professor F. D. Maurice maintain Universalist opinions. In regard to the latter we may especially refer to his "Theological Essays," particularly those on "Sin," "The Atonement," and "Eternal Life and

Eternal Death"—this last has been re-issued separately, and another pamphlet in defence of it has been published by the author, entitled "The Word *Eternal* and the Punishment of the Wicked." In his "Christmas Day and other Sermons," two important ones occur on "The Resurrection of the Body" and on "The Resurrection of the Spirit." A very important work on this topic is "The Nature of the Atonement and its Relation to the Remission of Sins and Eternal Life," by John McLeod Campbell; the same author's "Thoughts on Revelation" also contain much interesting matter. One of the most noted writers on that side was David Thom, D.D., of Liverpool, who was an advocate of a view called by himself "Modified Universalism." The opinions of the recently deceased Thomas Erskine, of Linlathen, Carlyle's friend, who had such an influence in regard to the "Row Controversy" and on the mind of Edward Irving, tended to the same idea of restoration, as may be seen in his "Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel," 1828, and "The Brazen Serpent, or Life through Death," 1831. "Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourses," by Rev. Edward Irving, issued in 1828, show many thoughts in common. Similar ideas were entertained by Alex. J. Scott, who was, like Irving and McLeod Campbell, expelled from the Scottish Church for his abhorrence of the *terrible decretum* of Calvinism, the eternal reprobation of the wicked. This may be seen partially in his essay "On Acquaintance with God." Though, as we have said, the question was brought into prominence about a century ago, *e.g.*, in a work written by "A Searcher after Truth," in 1754, entitled "The Great Love and Tenderness of God to his Creatures; or the Scriptural Doctrine of

Redemption, Conversion and Redemption of all Mankind," a work on "The Restoration of all Things," 1772, by Jeremy White, who had been chaplain to Oliver Cromwell; Soame Jenyns on "The Origin of Evil," 1757, &c., yet the great importance of the subject seems to have risen into fulness of vision and feeling shortly after the discussions which ended in the excommunications above-mentioned, and to have increased till another public occasion arose for their consideration in the conversion of Joseph Blanco White, through Whatelyism to Thomism. I say Whatelyism in reference to some of the boldest yet most temperate writings of that blunt, honest, and thoughtful episcopal logician, as, "View of the Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State," 1829; "Lectures on the Scripture Revelations respecting Good and Evil Angels," 1851. Perhaps the next works in importance to those mentioned are Rev. H. H. Dobney's "Lectures on Future Punishment," 1845, enlarged into "The Scripture Doctrine of Future Punishment;" "Life in Christ," by Edward White; six sermons on "Are the Wicked Immortal?" by George Storrs. These called out the "Athanasia; or the Natural Immortality of Man," by Rev. John

Howard Hinton, M.A., re-issued in vol. iii. of Hinton's collected works, with many additions. Dr. Richard Winter Hamilton's work on "Rewards and Punishments" owes its origin to the same controversy. The present notice has grown in the hands of the writer till he feels that it has outrun all fair demands on the space of the "Inquirer." As the columns of that portion of the magazine are not primarily intended for controversy, but for information, it may be as well for the writer to intimate that he has no intention of expressing his own opinion in these columns, though he intends, if permitted by the editors, to conclude this reply on another occasion by a classified notice of all the tracts, papers, &c., known to him on the question, so that those who choose to pursue the subject may do so; in the meantime it may help to clarify the controversy to give an abstract of the main arguments on either side as impartially as possible. If the question be put in this form,—Is the punishment for sin, decreed by God against the unrepentant and the ungodly, to be eternal or non-eternal? the following may be regarded as a synopsis of the chief arguments on each side of the subject arranged at one view for handy comparison:—

"What shall *the end* be of them that obey not the gospel?" (1 Pet. iv. 17).

#### NON-ETERNAL.

1. It is a *possible* thing for God to bring all men ultimately to salvation through grace; for "with God all things are possible;" and "He retaineth not His anger for ever, because He delighteth in mercy" (Micah vii. 18).

2. It is *probable* that God will yet save all; "for His mercy endureth for ever." He has no pleasure in the death of the wicked, and

#### ETERNAL.

1. "It is *impossible* for God to lie;" He has assured us that the wicked "shall go away into everlasting punishment." "There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked" (Isa. lvii. 21;) for them "the mist of darkness is reserved for ever" (2 Pet. ii. 17).

2. It is *improbable*, because God has said, "My Spirit *shall not* always strive with man." *Now* is the time of promise and the time of reforma-

## NON-ETERNAL.

it is only the pleasure of the Lord that *shall* prosper.

3. The appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light in the gospel (2 Tim. i. 10); for as in Adam *all* die, even so in Christ shall *all* be made alive (1 Cor. xv. 22).

4. Eternal death is disproportioned to an offence committed in time, and does not accord with God's justice, which is everlasting; and is moreover, by His sacred promise, always to be tempered with mercy; shall not the God of all the earth do right? (Gen. xviii. 25). Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Thy kingdom (Heb. i. 8).

5. St. Paul expressly states that the good pleasure which God hath purposed in Himself was, that in the dispensation of the fulness of times He might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in Him (Ephes. i. 10).

6. It is a terrible libel on God to affirm that he could have made creatures who, according to His foreknowledge and by His foreordination, would be exposed to endless punishment; and this he must affirm who asserts that the soul of the sinner shall live for ever in a state of punishment.

7. Though it is said that the wages of sin is death, and the death spoken of is defined as suffering the vengeance of eternal fire (Jude 7), yet God has arranged a time for "the restitution of all things," and to bring them all under the dominion of Christ.

8. God has already, in consistency with His divine attributes, shown

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tion; godliness alone has "promise of this life, and of that which is to come" (2 Tim. iv. 8).

3. Christ has *brought* life and immortality *to light*; they were seen darkly before; now we see them plainly, and have been shown how they are to be obtained, viz., by repentance, love, and new obedience; thus it is that Christ makes us alive.

4. "Ye shall not surely die" was one of the delusions of the tempter; yet Eve did die; man cannot measure justice with God's measuring rod, unless he takes it as God has given it, and said He will use it. The soul that sinneth, it shall die, unless repentance be shown. If Abraham was right in saying, "That the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from Thee," the converse is also right.

5. What then is meant by the words of the Psalm cx. 1, which is quoted with approbation by St. Paul (Heb. i. 13)? "The Lord said unto My Lord, Sit thou at My right hand until I make Thine enemies Thy footstool," for to be made the footstool of a conqueror is not to be advanced to glory, honour, and immortality, eternal life.

6. It is quite as great a libel—that is, none at all—to affirm, what nobody doubts, that God has made His law, like Himself, unchangeable everywhere and under all circumstances, though the breaking of it anywhere and at any time entails incalculable suffering, not only on the transgressor but on many others.

7. If we are unable to trust the *threatenings* of God, how can we trust His *promises*? If all our faith is to be reposed on God's infinite mercy, there can be none left for His infinite justice; this would result in a confusion, not a restitution of all things.

8. "There remaineth no more sacrifice for sin." He that despise

## NON-ETERNAL.

Himself "able to be just, and yet the justifier of the ungodly." "Man's extremity is God's opportunity," and the Lord's hand is not shortened that it cannot save. He is able to save to the uttermost, and His mercy is everlasting. Is His mercy clean gone for ever? doth His promise fail for evermore? (Psa. lxxix. 8). Is He more vindictive than His creatures, who punish to reform, not to revenge?

9. Man's life is too short and too uncertain to permit us to think that any sin He could commit in time will be punished through all eternity.

10. The saved could not be happy in heaven if they saw their nearest and dearest absent, and knew that they were in perdition to all eternity, and the parable of the rich man and Lazarus shows us that feelings survive decess. Unless, therefore, God deadens all the interests of love in the hearts of the redeemed in heaven, the eternal punishment of the wicked would be an eternal grief to the saints.

11. Jesus Christ through death has destroyed the power of death and freed mankind from the curse of the law. Those who are held captive by a lie here, will know the truth through the judgments of God, and be brought into the ministry of life and reconciliation.

12. "God, in revelation of Himself, Singles out love from all His attributes,

As that by which He glories to be known."

He retaineth not His anger for ever, because He delighteth in mercy (Micah vii. 18). Therefore—

"It is unjust

Alike to made and Maker to believe  
The Eternal should a creatural soul  
invest

## ETERNAL.

Moses' law died without mercy; of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace? For we know Him that hath said, Vengeance is Mine, I will repay (Heb. x. 81). It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.

9. But if the salt have lost its savour, wherewith will it be salted? and such are all those "who are reprobate as concerning the faith."

10. True, but neither did the rich man indulge a hope, nor did Abraham suggest a possibility, of future salvation; and Abraham affirmed that if they believed not Moses and his writings, neither would they believe though one rose from the dead. If this was true of the old dispensation, how much more must it be of those who now reject Christ! They are verily guilty of crucifying the Lord afresh, and putting Him to an open shame.

11. This would change the truth of God into a lie, for *now* is the accepted time; it would necessitate a purgatory, and it would induce men to put off repentance till the day of grace was past. We ought not to trust our soul's salvation to a *may be*.

12. This argument begs the question; man was not formed and framed immortal only to suffer pain. Facts abundantly show that pleasure has been so abundantly bestowed that men find pleasure even in sin, so they become lovers of pleasure more than lovers of God, and unfit themselves for the holy life of heaven. We must either deny the immortality of the soul, or the responsibility of man, or the justice and trustworthiness of God, or believe that man, hav-

## NON-ETERNAL.

With deathlessness to suffer pain alone."

"It seems," as the great Christian philosopher, John Locke, said, "a strange way of understanding a law which requires the plainest and directest words that by *death* should be meant 'eternal life in misery.'" Archbishop Whately says that perdition, death, destruction, which are employed to express the doom of the condemned, mean that they are to be really and literally destroyed, and cease to exist, not that they are to exist for ever in a state of wretchedness."

13. The Cross of Christ is the appropriate type of Christianity. It is endeared to men's hearts, and consecrated as an emblem of love, patience, and self-sacrifice—of universal love. Christ is long-suffering to usward; not willing that any should perish, but that *all* should come to repentance" (2 Pet. iii. 9). Thus the Redeemer has glory in the redemption, in His life we have hope, and we feel that death will restore or raise us to Him, to whom all is to be made subject, that all may glory, because glorified in Him.

14. God has declared that "*all* flesh shall see the salvation of God" (Luke iii. 6). He knows this, and His word is true, and all the promises of God are yea and amen in Christ Jesus. Besides, Christ died for all; and who can pluck any of those for whom He died out of His hand? He was the propitiation for the sins of men; so that "every knee should bow, and every tongue confess to God."

## ETERNAL.

ing sinned and been impenitent, must suffer the irremediable misery to which he has himself been brought by his love of sin, a misery which is indicated by Jesus as being passed "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched" (Mark ix. 44, 46, 48), and this is thrice repeated. God is not a man, that He should lie; neither the son of man, that He should repent; hath He said, and shall He not do it? or hath He spoken, and shall He not make it good? (Numb. xxiii. 19). Without holiness none can see the Lord and live.

13. In the parable, the husbandmen (Mark xii. 1—9) who did not reverence the son of the lord of the vineyard, the last of the means of obtaining the fruit of the vineyard, were destroyed. God "limiteth a certain day" for repentance (Heb. iv. 7). Then the latter end is worse than the beginning. It would have been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness (2 Pet. ii. 21.) They shall drink the wine of God's wrath without mixture (Rev. xiv. 9), and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever (Rev. xiv. 11), whosoever receiveth the mark of the beast.

14. To *see* is not to *partake* of salvation. The sacrifice of Christ would be of none effect if there were no ultimate difference between the future of believers and of unbelievers. It was to save those who believe in Him that Christ died. He that believeth not, He affirms, shall be condemned. We dare not gainsay Jesus, who affirmed that the wicked shall depart into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.

Y. A. G.

## The Societies' Section.

### THE FUTURE OF MECHANICS' INSTITUTES.

THE 33rd annual conference of delegates from institutions connected with the Yorkshire Union was held on 8th June, at Selby, under the presidency of Mr. Baines, M.P. The chairman congratulated the delegates on the advance made since the union met in that town twelve years ago, not merely in number of members, but on the fact that the teaching was of a higher character, and aimed, through instruction in science and art, to meet the want experienced in regard to technical knowledge. These institutions, if they were to continue successful, must endeavour to promote, in a still greater degree, class work, and encourage lectures of a systematic rather than of a desultory character.

Mr. James Kitson, jun., read a paper on "The Future Work of Mechanics' Institutes." It may fairly be assumed that a general system of primary education will be passed by Parliament, and we may proceed to the consideration of what will be required of mechanics' institutions under the new state of things. When the new schools are universally established and in full operation, the addition to the numbers of those who will be able and ready to make use of the means for instruction afforded by mechanics' institutions will be very large, and it will also call for a great change in the character and constitution of those institutions. The pupils of the primary schools leaving at the age of thirteen or fourteen will come out, with six or seven years' training, at the time when their minds

are prepared by a systematic course of teaching to acquire without great difficulty a higher instruction, and much of what they have previously learned will be of small value if their education is not continued. Good secondary schools must be provided, and here, I think, will be found a great work for mechanics' institutes—a work for which they may be found well adapted. A systematic course of evening classes should be provided to continue to manhood the education begun in the national schools. The numbers of those who will be anxious to avail themselves of this course will doubtless be very great; but if the principle of compulsion is a sound and good one, and for the advantage of the individual and the community—and I am of opinion that it is—it should be carried out to the fullest extent. I should then see nothing but good in applying it to secure the benefits that would arise from a prolonged systematic course of teaching. In a great part of Germany, amongst the obligations of apprenticeship, attendance at lessons, which are given in the evening and on Sunday, are required. At Carlsruhe there are morning lessons given before the commencement of the hours of labour; these are obligatory to the age of seventeen. Prussian regulations forbid the employment of young persons under the age of sixteen, until they can read and write. Now that the law has prescribed the time during which a young person may be employed, it has shortened the hours

of labour and extended the hours of leisure. Consequently, great care should be taken for the sake of the individual that the liberty granted does not degenerate into licence, and, instead of being a blessing, prove rather an injury. It would be no serious restraint, say, to order youths from fourteen to sixteen years of age to attend and receive instruction for two hours a night, four or five times in the week. Much might be acquired in this time by a systematic course given to those who had received a good primary education. State assistance should be given to night classes in mechanics' and other institutions, payable on results, to enable them to make this needed provision. I think some steps should be taken by the union to ascertain to what extent the minister of education would be prepared to grant assistance to night schools. To mechanics' institutes in many small towns and villages the passing of an education bill should bring direct pecuniary advantages, which will place valuable resources at their command for further work. The school boards in various districts will require school buildings, which it will be in the power of mechanics' institutes to offer; the rent thus obtainable will add materially to the resources of the institution, and managers should be ready to seek for this employment of their buildings. It may also be observed that as the friends of education will compose the school boards, and be always the friends of mechanics' institutes, if not frequently the managers also, an opportunity will be afforded of arranging a complete continuous system of education, from which great benefits may be anticipated. The more we succeed in inducing Government to do for us, the more should we endeavour to do for ourselves, particularly as we

shall be stimulated in the future to greater exertions, by the knowledge that our work will yield greater results. Much is to be accomplished by voluntary work, and much may be got out of it if it is well directed. In our manufacturing towns, far from the seats of learning, we are often at a loss for disciplined leaders, and I believe that one trained educator sent into towns or districts of 50,000 or 60,000 inhabitants, to organize educational movements and direct their operations in co-operation with the friends of education, would do an amount of good, and secure results far beyond anything that could be anticipated. Many of us want to give a good education to the adults seeking for it, but we do not know how it should be given and of what it should consist. Mechanics' institutions should give instruction in art and science to youths and adults in evening classes. Instead of the present primary instruction, I should like to see all in some way doing like the Working Men's Union in Berlin, which is composed of about 3,000 members, to whom instruction is given every evening in such subjects as geometry, algebra, drawing, accounts, chemistry, natural history, French and English languages, &c. To these lessons are joined general meetings for discussions and lectures on various subjects. For such work as this mechanics' institutes were designed; to it they should devote themselves.

Discussion followed on lectures and on class-work; and in the evening Mr. E. Chadwick, C.B., presided at a public meeting, which was addressed by Mr. Baines, Mr. Kitson, Alderman Law, Mr. Huth, Mr. Taylor, and Mr. Allison, the president of the Selby Institute (formerly of Leeds). The next meeting of the union will be held at Keighley.



## Literary Notes.

REV. HENRY WARD BEECHER has been for some time engaged upon a "Life of Christ."

Mark Lemon—as a pure Sir John Falstaff of the nineteenth century—"not only witty himself, but the cause of wit in others," editor of *Punch*, and author of several novels and tales, died 23rd May, aged 61.

The closing portion of the life of the celebrated Scottish bard is elucidated in a work by Mr. McDowall, "Burns in Dumfriesshire."

An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy by John Grote, B.D., is to be issued shortly, edited by J. B. Mayor, M.A. This, judging from the same author's "Exploratio," will, though posthumous, be a work of great value.

The *Clarendon Press* edition of "The Works of Bishop Berkeley," in four vols., edited by Prof. A. C. Fraser, is promised "before Christmas."

"Gleanings of the Gloamin'" is to be the title of a collection of poems by John Ramsay, a poet born some seventy years ago in the town in which Robert Burns's first edition was printed—Kilmarnock, where Ramsay was originally a carpet weaver.

Mr. W. R. Shedden-Ralston, only son of Mr. Shedden, claimant of Roughwood Estate, in the parish of Beith, whose sister pleaded her father's cause in the Courts, has gone to Russia, to collect materials for a work on "Muscovite Folk-lore."

T. H. Huxley's Lectures have been reissued in America with a title used previously by Coleridge and Hogg, "Lay Sermons."

Letters by Charlotte Brontë are to appear in an American magazine, *Hours at Home*.

Charles Dickens—beloved "Boz"—died 9th June, aged 58.

Mary Pyper, a poetess in humble life, author of "Sacred Poems," born 1795, died 25th May.

Rev. Thomas Binney, of Weigh House Chapel, is likely soon to present us with a collected edition of his varied and interesting writings.

Dr. Newman (of Washington, U.S.) has accepted a challenge from Brigham Young to discuss with him on logical and scriptural grounds the moral legitimacy of polygamy, at Salt Lake City.

A People's Edition (2s. 6d.) of Charles O. Hennell's "Inquiry concerning the Origin of Christianity," and "Christian Theism," has been issued in one vol.

The Congregational Lectures are about to be resumed. Dr. Reynolds, of Cheshunt College, Dr. Henry Rogers, Dr. Ralsigh, Dr. Pulsford, and Rev. R. W. Dale, are spoken of as likely to contribute to the series.

The English Dialect Society, an association of philologists, has just been inaugurated.

An edition of the works of Thomas Carlyle's early friend—Thomas Erskine, of Linlathen—is announced.

Cyrus Redding has left among his MSS. a Life of William IV., and a Wine Book of Europe.

Dr. Christlieb, Professor of Theology in the University of Bonn, formerly pastor of the German Church, Islington, has just issued an important work on "Modern Doubts concerning the Christian Faith." It treats of the divorce of science and faith, reason and revelation. Ideas of God—(1) Atheism, Deism, Pantheism, Materialism, and Rationalism; (2) Theism and Trinitarianism, miracles, modern lives of Jesus, their merits and failures, the critical Christianity of Tübingen, its deserts and defects.

## Modern Metaphysicians.

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JOSEPH HENRY GREEN, F.R.S., D.C.L.:—

*The Coleridgean ; Author of " Vital Dynamics," " Mental Dynamics," " Spiritual Philosophy," &c.*

"A TRUE thinker," says John Stuart Mill, "can only be justly estimated when his thoughts have worked their way into minds formed in a different school; have been wrought and moulded into consistency, with all other true and relevant thoughts, when the noisy conflict of half-truths, angrily denying one another, has subsided, and ideas, which seemed mutually incompatible, have been found only to require mutual limitations."\*

The proper time for this just appraising and accurate discrimination of the character of Coleridge as a philosophical thinker, at the period when he so wrote, 1840,—had not, in Mr. Mill's opinion, "yet come." For this there were then two good reasons:—Coleridge had but too recently passed away; and, it was generally understood that valuable, and, in fact, indispensable materials for forming a correct judgment were under proper and authorized editorship, to be given to the world in selections from his posthumous writings, papers, notes, and outlines of his thoughts. Among the expectations of the public the following may be noted:—"(1) A complete constructive Philosophy of the Universe, to be called 'Logosophia,' said to be the great work of his life; (2) a treatise on Logic, in three books; and (3) a treatise on the ideal basis of Christianity, to be called 'The Assertion of Religion;' (4) a Course of Lectures on 'The History of Philosophy,' from Pythagoras to Locke and Condillac; (5) 'Letters on the Old and New Testament;' (6) a collection of notes, chiefly connected with religion, collected in a book and bearing the quaint and modest name of 'Fly catchers;' besides (7) almost innumerable 'Marginalia.'" Thirty years have now elapsed since Mr. Mill's plea for reservation of judgment, and in regard to the unpublished writings of Coleridge we are little further advanced. It is true that since then, "by dint of editing and commenting, by virtue of preliminary dissertations, introductions, appendices, and treatises, by Coleridge's nephew and daughter, and by Messrs. Green and Marsh, the works of Coleridge (exclusive of the four volumes of the 'Literary Remains,' and the two volumes of 'Letters,' &c.) have been made to extend to about twenty

\* "Dissertations and Discussions," article Coleridge, vol. i., p. 398. 1870.

volumes in duodecimo, which, with two or three exceptions, were published by the late Mr. Pickering." But the great gifts in store for English literature, and the good things said to have been prepared by Coleridge for philosophical thinkers, on which his "hopes of extensive and permanent utility, of fame in the noblest sense of the word," mainly rested, have not been yet forthcoming from the grasp of collectors (if they exist), or from the archives of his literary executor, the late Joseph Henry Green, F.R.S., D.C.L., &c.

Coleridge died 25th July, 1834. By his will, dated 1829, Green was appointed trustee for his children, and executor in regard to his posthumous works, to publish, at his discretion, any manuscripts or writings, and permitting him, as such, to purchase, at any sum he might himself determine, any of these books which were likely to be serviceable to him in bringing these books or manuscripts of his to the best use or market. It was understood that, by private arrangement, Dr. Green was to systematize, develop, and establish from the matter thus left, as much as possible of the philosophy of Coleridge, acting generally as his expositor and defender. Under this arrangement there were issued four volumes of his "*Literary Remains*," collected and edited by Henry Nelson Coleridge, 1836-9; and "*The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*,"—to the second edition of which, 1849, Green prefixed a preface of 38 pages, in which he defended Coleridge against a charge of plagiarism, from Lessing. Dr. Seth B. Watson edited for Mr. Churchill "*The Theory of Life*," which Coleridge had dictated to him, and H. N. Coleridge, who had Boswellized a little during the latter part of his great uncle's lifetime, produced two volumes of "*Specimens of the Table-Talk*" of S. T. Coleridge; a "*Treatise on Method*," in embryo, contained in "*The Friend*," was republished as the introductory volume of the second edition of "*The Encyclopedia Metropolitana*."

The intellectual and moral relationship between Coleridge and Green was very intimate. Coleridge calls him "my friend and enlightened pupil;" Mr. Alsop characterizes him as "the worthy and excellent friend," who is "the most constant and the most assiduous" of Coleridge's disciples. "Invariably he spent with Coleridge—they two alone at their work—many hours of every week, in talk of pupil and master; and so;"—we are speaking on Dr. Simon's authority—"year after year he sat at the feet of his Gamaliel, getting more and more insight of his teacher's beliefs and aspirations." He was at last looked upon as the beloved disciple, and there was "imposed on Mr. Green what he accepted as an obligation, to devote, so far as necessary, the whole remaining strength and earnestness of his life to the one task of systematizing, developing, and establishing the principles of the Coleridgean philosophy." He withdrew from private practice, and passed nearly twenty-eight years "of devoted studentship in fulfilment of his adopted duty;" and "he," it is said, "with his indefatigable industry, guided by a unique knowledge of Coleridge's conceptions and purposes, set to

work to systematize the Coleridgean doctrines out of the *digesta membra* of his published writings, his verbal hints, his conversational communications, a few notes and bare outlines, and thence to provide the world with the soul of Coleridge. Of this mighty task the "Spiritual Philosophy" of Joseph Henry Green is the ripest product and outcome.

Dr. C. M. Ingleby, in his paper "On the Unpublished Manuscripts of Samuel Taylor Coleridge," read before the Royal Society of Literature, 12th June, 1867, expresses no very high opinion of this book :—

"Dead as Gillman's book is, Green's 'Spiritual Philosophy' (2 vols., 1866) is, in De Quincey's phrase, *deader*; that is, dead in a far profounder sense. As Coleridge used to say of other works, the parts cohere by *synartesis* [stitchment], not by *synthesis* [coherence]; in fact, Green's book mainly consists of extracts from other men's writings, tacked together by a few flimsy notes. It is no more a spiritual philosophy than the fragments of an ichthyosaurus cemented together is an animal; nay, it is less so, for Green's book has not even the evidences of a past vitality. . . . They who would master the philosophy of Coleridge will do wisely to study it in Coleridge's works, and not in the digest of his disciple. . . . Green's 'Spiritual Philosophy' was in every sense stillborn. It was a stillbirth of his brain, and it was a stillbirth of Messrs. Macmillan's press. . . . We now know how stupendous was the mistake he committed; and in comparison with the veriest fragment of Coleridge's, how barren is that creation for which he allowed some of his great master's manuscripts to remain unedited!"

While we regret, with Dr. Ingleby, the form of executorship to which Dr. Green adstricted himself, the neglect of the author of "Spiritual Philosophy" to advise the public of the true state of the materials in his possession, and the cast which has been given to the Coleridgean metaphysic, we are not, on the whole, inclined to endorse the severe judgment of worthlessness, real and relative, which he has pronounced upon it. We receive the book as one containing a considerable amount of Coleridgean thought;—an opinion in which Dr. Ingleby seems to concur with the Rev. Derwent Coleridge—from whom the philosophic public has long been expecting a complete biography, and a thorough survey of the labours of his father—when he says, "that Mr. Green may have used, as raw material, a good deal of the work dictated to him by Coleridge, which was in his possession, in the text of his 'Spiritual Philosophy.'" Besides this, however, it may be suggested that a system of philosophy is peculiarly which, to prove its applicability to solve, for man, the problems of experience, purpose, and imagination; correlativity, duty and existence; thought, will, and deity—must make itself intelligible to that class of thinkers, at least, who feel concerned in such topics; for a philosophy which is so unique as to be comprehensible only to its author is, by that very fact, proclaimed to be a failure. It seems to me a distinct gain to philo-

sophical literature to have had the systematibility, intelligibility, and exponibility of Coleridge's metaphysic tested; to know the form it assumed in the mind of a disciple avouched and avowed, of one who was recognised by the master, and acknowledged by himself, to be a disciple, and nothing more; and to have an authoritative digest drawn up, with which we can compare and contrast our own conceptions of the doctrines of Coleridge, their relevancy and their accuracy. Not that we, for a moment, suppose, suggest, or affirm, that such a book could in any wise be accepted in lieu of or as a substitute for the merest shreds and patches of the author; for they would have in them an original, this only a representative value. Considering, besides, the far-scattered formlessness and expensive mode of issue of the original works, we think that a bird's-eye view of Coleridge's system—if it could be had—would be a boon to the student. We cannot accept Dr. Green as the author of an original treatise, nor can we recognise him as a mere expositor, but we can regard him as a reporter of Coleridgean thought, as it appeared to him after close study and confidential communion,—as a copy made by the pupil of a great master after a design which he had special facilities for knowing, though the first model was never completed by the artist in chief.

The great and signal service which is usually affirmed to have been performed by Coleridge in regard to English thought was this,—that in an age of materialistic psychology, whose watchword and creed was sensation, he reinstated in the interests of men's spirits that which is most difficult and most elevated in all philosophy—metaphysics; and by the rare logic of his idealism men saw their most familiar experiences and the most palpable sensational facts readily and marvellously transformed and—

“disciplined—

From shadowy types to truth; from flesh to spirit.”

The writings of Coleridge, it is said, “open a sphere of metaphysical thinking well adapted to counteract the objective tendency of our national philosophy, and to direct the mind to those lofty views respecting human nature and human destiny which, in the turmoil of our practical life, and in the want of a more spiritual system, we are so inclined to forget. . . . His works form just the turning-point in the philosophical history of our country, in which the advancement of sensationalism came to a stand and the tide of spiritualism began to return.”\* “The existence of Coleridge will show itself by no slight or ambiguous traces in the coming history of our country; for no one has contributed more to shape the opinions of those among its younger men who can be said to have any opinions at all. . . . He has been the great awakener, in this country, of the spirit of philosophy within the bounds of traditional opinions.”† It was his avowed aim—

\* J. D. Morell's “Modern Philosophy,” vol. ii., p. 350.

† J. S. Mill's “Dissertations and Discussions,” vol. i., p. 293.

"To say what ought to be in human wills,  
 And measure morals sternly; to explore  
 The bearings of man's duties and desires;  
 To note the nature and the laws of mind;  
 To balance good with evil, and compare  
 The nature and necessity of each;  
 To long to see the ends—and end of all things;  
 Or—if no end there be—the endless there,—  
 As suns look into space."

It cannot be doubted that he gave a new impulse to English thought on the grounds and bases of faith, duty, morals, destiny, and the conditions of the life proper to man as at once a religious and a rational being; and that he gave fresh interest to "the study of ultimate principles of belief and of thought, and of the ultimate grounds of voluntary action, commonly called metaphysics and ethics." He re-connected philosophy in modern times with the Christianized Platonism of More and Cudworth, and brought back Cambridge, at least, from its acquiescence in Locke and its tolerance of Paley to a reconsideration of the problems of existence and thought in a higher light than that of the sensationalism of the school which, through Hartley, James Mill, &c., had been developed out of Locke's Essay.

The express and absolute originality of the contributions Coleridge has made to the sum of English thought on the fundamental principles of human knowledge has been of late severely criticised. Ferrier, Hamilton, De Quincey, J. H. Green, Sara Coleridge, Hare, &c., have taken part in the controversy on this topic which has materially altered the form of "Coleridge's claim to be regarded as the founder of a philosophy" by proving his indebtedness to Kant, Schelling, Maass, Lessing, &c., for the main elements of his extant works. The subject has been recently re-investigated by Dr. C. M. Ingleby with considerable fulness and much acuteness, in two contributions to the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature—one on "The Unpublished MSS. of Samuel Taylor Coleridge," 12th June, 1867, and the other "On the Philosophy of Coleridge," April 28th, 1869; as well as in different parts of his "Introduction to Metaphysic." The result of this explorer's researches is given in this outcome:—"In all these works" [of Coleridge] "compacted, there can be extracted nothing that can, without gross inaccuracy, be described as a *system of philosophy*. There is nothing in the whole series but certain discrete and unconnected fragments of a philosophical character."

Though, however, it may be held as proved that, so far as philosophy goes, he was not an original thinker; it need not be held as affirmable that his was not an influential mind. Indeed, few facts can be better authenticated than the effectiveness of Coleridge as a simulator of minds—as a discipliner of reflective thought. That he exercised witchery over the intellects of men almost as marvellous as the power of fascination over the physical frame by "the glitter-

ing eye" of the "Ancient Mariner," no one can doubt who has any acquaintance with modern biography or literature. In the former we learn how, when he spoke, such men as Wordsworth, Southey, De Quincey, Wedgewood, Sterling, Hare, Maurice, Edward Irving, Wm. Hazlitt, Arnold, Carlyle, &c., listened in rapt astonishment as he threw forth from his emotioned mind such ideas as are—

"Like rays of stars that meet in space,  
And mingle in a bright embrace;"

while in the latter we have Coleridgean influences running through the writings of Wilson, Keble, Coplestone, Whewell, A. J. Scott, W. A. Butler, Archbishop Thomson, T. S. Baynes, John Veitch, &c., in this country, as well as in those of Alcott, Channing, Emerson, Tappan, &c., in America—though it is, to an English reader, not a little remarkable to find that Coleridge seems to be almost unknown in France, and is very little valued in Germany. To have gathered up for us and put into form some of the most potent and potent of Coleridge's thoughts, Green professes to; he translates the invisible writing of Coleridge jotted down in his own mind, and reads off for us—not, perhaps, always accurately or pointedly—the interpretation of the marginalia of memory made by Coleridge in the mind of Green.

The book in which this brief abstract of Coleridgeanism appears is issued posthumously at the request of Mrs. Green, the author's widow. It was substantially prepared for the press, all the matter having been revised for publication except one chapter which was to be condensed from two other productions; and though, while it was passing through the press, he intended to write recapitulatory sections, and probably a chapter summing up the entire contents, yet the work, so far as the philosophical interest of it goes, is complete. The editor has only made clerical alterations, and has only added the brief Memoir of his "dear friend and master," extending to about sixty pages, to which, assisted by a few side lights, we owe the main details of the biographic sketch which we shall place before the reader. The editor, Dr. John Simon, was born in 1810, took classes in King's College under Dr. Green's professoriate in 1832, and was apprenticed as a surgeon to his professor in 1833, passed in 1841 his LL.B. examinations at London University, in 1844 was elected Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons, and subsequently became Surgeon to St. Thomas's Hospital, where also he is Lecturer in Pathology, on the doctrine of morbid action. He is besides medical officer of Her Majesty's Privy Council, and author of many important communications on the sanitary condition of England. The book displays appreciation of Green's character, but does not approve his philosophical position.

In this present paper we propose to present our readers—after these explanatory preliminaries—with an epitome of the first volume of "The Spiritual Philosophy" founded on the teaching of late Samuel Taylor Coleridge, as interpreted, systematized,

and extended, where to him it seemed necessary, by Dr. Joseph H. Green.

In our second paper we shall give an outline of the career and labours of the Coleridgean executor, a notice of the main contents of the second volume, and a criticism of the whole matter of Coleridgeanism as expounded by his most eminent disciple. In this way we hope to make both papers interesting and instructive to those who wish to know somewhat of the results of the most popular attempt made in the beginning of this century to construct, out of the chaos of sense and self, a cosmos of wisdom and willingness; to satisfy the holy hunger of the heart for a systematic knowledge of truth as thought, and to find a means of bringing into one diamond-like essence of light, an entire conglobed unity of unstained radiancy, the truth of being, duty, and deity. But yet one proof more that in this mere mortal state philosophy must ever be, like—

“Eos and Hesperus—one with twofold light,  
Bringer of day, and herald of the night.”

“A system of philosophy does not deserve its name, unless it virtually include the law and explanation of all being, conscious and unconscious, and of all correlativity and duty, and be applicable, directly or by deduction, to whatsoever the human mind can contemplate—sensual or supersensual—of experience, purpose, or imagination.

“1. The aim and object of all philosophy is to attain to the insight of *first principles* or *ideas*—yea, to the insight of the absolute first principle, from which whatever is must be derived, and in which whatever is must have its intelligible ground of its being.

“2. There exists in man, as the essential characteristic of his humanity, a power or faculty of intelligence, best named the *reason*, which discloses to him the need, and enables him to fulfil the inherent desire of contemplating his manifold knowledges in their *absolute integrity*.

“3. The contemplation of such absolute integrity will have been obtained by the conscious possession and insight of an idea:—that is, of a *causative principle*, containing, predetermining, and producing its actual results in all their manifold relations in reference to a final purpose; and realized in a whole of parts, in which the idea, as the constitutive energy, is evolved and set forth in its unity, totality, finality, permanent efficiency, and integrity of being.

“4. The requisite insight of such causative principles is derived from the idea of *the will*, as revealed in human self-consciousness.

“5. The distinction, in the will of intelligence and causative power, implies also the distinction of the *speculative* and *practical reason*. The speculative reason is intelligence, considered abstractedly from the agency of the will. . . . The *practical reason*, on the other hand, is the *intelligence*, which, in union with power, is necessary to inform the will and to direct and guide its operation in the light of a definite aim and purpose. In other words, it is the enlightened will; and so reason is the constituent without which will is inconceivable, as the causative of reality in the integrity of being. It might be said that life is the perpetual process of the realization of the will in and by the light of reason, and that reason is the light of life. . . .



"6. The *reason*, considered as pure intelligence, or as the *speculative intellect*, is the appropriate *organ of philosophy*. . . . By means of reason, and by it alone, the human mind may become a conscious mirror, in which is imaged an epitome of the universe, physical and moral, as the work of God—yea, in which is revealed the spiritual image of the Divine Author himself. . . .

"7. It is necessary to distinguish from the speculative reason that form of intelligence which may most conveniently be designated the *understanding*. It is the *faculty of experience*, sensible and psychical. . . . The reason (here the speculative reason) supplies the universal and necessary forms of *conciency*, otherwise known as the categories or moulds of the understanding, namely:—1. *Cause and effect*; 2. Subject and attribute, sometimes called substance and accident; and 3. The whole and its parts. . . .

"8. Truths of reason vindicate their distinctive stamp and character by the fact that they are demonstrable, apoeictic, and self-authoritative, by reason of their *evidentness*.

"*Truths of the understanding* must be authenticated by facts of sensible or psychical experience." . . . The universal forms of *conciency*, or so-called categories, are the indispensable aids to the acquirement of experience or of scientific knowledge. . . . Whatever requires a satisfactory explanation of its production, its occurrence or recurrence, requires for its explanation the assignment of an *antecedent condition*, which under the name of 'cause,' is adequate to account for or render intelligible the product, consequent, or 'effect.' . . . The conception of 'Power,' as antecedent condition in the order of thought, is derived not from sensible experience, whose limits of cognition it transcends, but from the self-consciousness of will. . . . Without the assignment of a principle, upon whose operance any whole of phenomenal facts, simultaneous or successive, may be shown to *depend* for their occurrence and recurrence, our knowledge could be neither certain nor predictive. . . . The originant power is what is properly called 'cause;' and the pre-determined form of its agency is named 'law.' . . . In forming a conception of an object of sensible or psychical experience, a distinction is necessarily made" "between an *idem*, which constitutes the identity of a thing, amid the changing and exponential *alter* of its sensible manifestations. . . . The term 'substance' may be used not merely in the sense of an assumed or unknown supporter of phenomena, but may be employed as significant of actual being; as realized in a specific and characteristic form of being, which may be fitly called a type. . . . All generalization and classification for scientific purposes implies the recognition of *likeness* with *differenc*e; and the empirical faculty would be powerless without adopting the conception of a permanent *type*, of the modifications of which experience takes cognizance in the forms of actual existence. . . . The *conciency* or category of substance and accident would be justly deemed incomplete without adverting to the sub-categories of quality and quantity. . . . By 'quality' we mean any sort or kind of impression which any object is calculated to produce, or any specific and constant mode of operance by which any object, agent, or agency may, or does, affect a percipient. . . . 'Quantity' has been defined as that attribute of objects, or things, under which they may be conceived as subject to increase or diminution. But we distinguish two kinds of quantity,

namely, the continuous and the discrete. . . . We cannot form an intelligible conception of any *whole* in the physical or moral world, except as an *unity of independent parts*. . . . This unity is not a mere sum-total or aggregate of the parts, but includes the superadded insight of the interdependency of the constituents, as reciprocally needing and implying each other, and of their conspiration to the accomplishment of the one constructive aim which the organic whole presents.

. . . . These mental materials, which are to be wrought into thoughts, may be described as *impressions*, which adequately excite the conscious attention. They are of two kinds, viz.,—1. Those that affect the *inner sense*, such as emotions, feelings, volitions, or any psychical change of state :—2. Those which affect the *outer sense*, and consist in the affections of the several senses. . . . But the sense, both inner and outer, is exercised only under the inherent 'conditions' which are designated as *space* and *time*.

. . . . *space* is the form of universal objectivity; *time* is the form of universal subjectivity. . . . By *generalization* is meant the mental process of bringing the notices of the sense, or the facts and phenomena by which we have been consciously impressed, severally under their appropriate kinds or 'genera,' each genus being distinguished by a name or descriptive designation. . . . Abstraction designates the process by which, in contemplating any object, our thoughts are directed to some one part or property exclusively, withdrawing our attention from the rest. .

. . . By noticing the different in the like, and the like in the different, these elementary factors of thought, *abstraction* and *generalization*, are the indispensable aids to the naming, sorting, and classing of all the materials of which sensible and conscious experience are composed. . . . a distinction should be made between associative thoughts and logical thoughts or conceptions. An associative thought is one which recalls a resemblance; a logical thought or conception is one which requires a definition, or such a description as would justify generic inclusion. . . . Every generic conception may be designated by an appropriate *term*, which includes, and is significant of, all the objects to which the term is applicable in its generic sense. . . . It is then an act of judgment, when we affirm or deny that any object or appearance is included in any generic conception or designation. Now the expression of such an act of logical judgment in terms is called a proposition. . . . Not an unimportant question connected with the nature of a judgment, as expressed in a proposition, is that of the nature of the *relation between subject and predicate*. . . . The word 'is,' which is the copula between subject and predicate, may be used in several senses. Thus it may mean simply 'is like'—*e. g.*, 'a whale is (*sc.*, like) a fish; '—or it may stand for 'is designated by the term,'—*e. g.*, 'the appropriation of what belongs to another man is (*sc.*, designated by the term) theft; '—or it may be equivalent to 'is recognised by the property,'—*e. g.*, 'vinegar is (*sc.*, recognised by the property) of acid taste; '—or its meaning may be 'is described as,'—*e. g.*, 'a bird is (*sc.*, described as) that which has aptitude for flight; '—or its power may be 'is defined as,'—*e. g.*, 'man is (*sc.*, defined as) a rational being; '—or, according to some logicians, it answers to 'agreement; ' that is, expresses that the subject agrees with the predicate, or *vice versa*,—*e. g.*, 'the temperature of 100° F. is (*sc.*, agrees with the description) hot; '—or, again, the explanation of the word 'is' may be 'is equivalent or equal to,'—*e. g.*, 'an excuse is (*sc.*, equivalent to) an admission or confession of the fault charged; '—or, lastly, the value of the

'is' may be *included or contained in*,—e. g., 'the tiger is (i. e., included in the generic term) predacious.' But if we examine each of these several meanings, it will be found that in each the expression used may be changed to the affirmation that the subject of the proposition is included in or contained under the predicate as the inclusive generic designation. . . . In the use of the preposition to express the relation of subject and predicate we may distinguish attribution and inclusion. . . . The terms of a proposition are the subject and predicate; they are the words which limit and express the meaning of the proposition. . . . 'Definition.' (The adequate conception of a thing fully determined in the fewest terms). . . . The test of a sound definition is that the terms should be convertible. . . . Reasoning, discourse of reason, or logic, consists essentially in inference. . . . The most felicitous contrivance for this purpose is what is denominated the *Aristotelian syllogism*, for it enables the reasoner to know by the *form itself* whether the reasoning be correct. . . . The model of syllogistic reasoning is the categorical syllogism. . . . The validity of any inference depends upon the principle that a predicate or logical term, which rightly designates or which includes a class, rightly designates or includes whatever that class contains. Or a logical term which excludes a whole class excludes whatever the class contains. . . . All *logical reasoning* is *mediate*, that is, consists in the position that a proposition being true, or admitted to be true, another proposition may be legitimately inferred from it. . . . The inviolable rule is that if the major term includes the middle, it includes all that is included in the middle term, *but no more*. . . . 'Three acts are indispensable to an argument—namely, exclusion, inclusion, and conclusion.' Formal logic consists in *generalization*; that is, the logical process of bringing the facts and phenomena of experience under their appropriate kinds or genera, and in all cases generalization is a *logical process*, implying syllogism.

"We ought ever to be on our guard against the fallacies in reasoning, the danger of which continually besets us, and which may easily escape detection without constant vigilance. . . . Let it be remembered that formal logic can do no more than give the rules for drawing a valid conclusion, assuming the premises; but that the premises may be right or wrong, and that they require, for determining their truth, the sound judgment which belongs to an understanding enlightened by reason. . . . The only major premise, which does not and cannot require proof, is a proposition containing the statement of a self-evident truth, and to suppose the contradiction of which would be self-contradictory. . . . Our first attempts at *classification* of the products of nature—and the same holds good with respect also to the classification of mental objects and psychical phenomena—have the same origin as all our *thoughts* of things, and depends upon a comparison by which we note the resemblances and differences of the objects offered to our attention. This is "the method of artificial classification." . . . To give such attempts the character of science, we are under the necessity of giving definitions or adequate descriptions of the meaning of the generic conceptions and terms employed, and of proceeding according to the rules of technical logic. . . . But if we are to go beyond the merely logical or artificial method of classification, . . . we have to discover principles which, though not superseding the use of logic, transcend the boundaries of empirical knowledge. . . . The more numerous the resemblances and coincidences in character, habits,

properties, organisation, functions, and agencies of groups and components of groups, the safer will be the inference of their natural affinity, and the greater the surety of the identification of the idea or generic type out of which they have proceeded, and consequently the more secure the ground upon which to found a natural method of classification. . . . A class founded on a generic conception is an empirical abstract, whereas a class founded on a *type or idea* is a *causative principle*. . . . 'Induction' does not mean merely the record of the results of experience; but the process of inferring, of inducing upon our empirical knowledge the apprehension and insight of the causes and laws which govern the universe, moral and physical. . . . In all cases of inductive reasoning the argument may be thrown into, and virtually consists of, a syllogism; of which the major premiss states the condition or rule under which the conclusion may be valid; of which the minor premiss is the statement of the particular fact or facts under consideration; and of which the conclusion is the proposition which raises the particulars into the generality or universal law, contemplated in the problem at issue. . . . The process of gathering empirical knowledge, and of constituting thereby our experience, is both inductive and deductive. . . . It is by means of the universal light of reason that we are enabled to raise up axioms of experience, and to show that experience is built upon the foundation of truths of reason which attest their derivation by their self-evident nature. . . . The rational mind cannot be satisfied with less than that the facts, phenomena, and changes which form the sphere of our sensible and psychical experience shall be rendered intelligible to, and rationally accounted for by, our mind. . . . Hypothesis is a preconception premised to account for a particular change or event in the course of nature, . . . but it is only prospective, anticipative, and substitutive till tested and verified. . . . Hypothesis may be, and probably often is, the precursor of a theory. . . . Theory ought to be distinguished from 'law'. . . . A perfect theory . . . might be regarded as a law contemplated subjectively, that is, as a product of the human mind, and satisfying the conditions of human intelligence. . . . The discovery of any great law of nature has uniformly the character of felicity, and of a revelation, as by a flash of divine light, of the legislative wisdom of the Creator; . . . the down-shine of a light from above, which is the power of living truth; and which, in irradiating and actuating the human mind, becomes for it (reveals itself as) reason; yea, which is the revelation of those divine acts, at once causative and intelligential, which man recognises as first principles or ultimate truths, ideas for the human mind, and constitutive laws in nature.

"Science can be predicated only of any scheme of knowledge connected as a chain of necessarily dependent truths; so that, any link of the chain being given, any other may be deduced as a necessary consequence of the principle which determines the relations of all, and which gives to its possessor the power of anticipating and predicting its results in any given case. . . . Principles are the postulates of science and the problems of philosophy. . . . Philosophy in its eminent sense and highest significance is the discovery and establishment of *first principles or ideas*. . . . If the reason be contemplated merely as 'speculative,' that is, merely in its intelligential functions, and as the organ of philosophy in-dicatively of science, then it is the light, but the light only, by which man

apprehends and comprehends divine and eternal truths. But if, as the cause of truth urges us to do, we are to regard the reason, not only as light, but as life; not only as speculative intelligence, but as a living and inexhaustible source of reality, we must search . . . for some principle which shall at once enliven and enlighten . . . that ultimate principle of our being which we call will.

"Adopting as the final aim and object of spiritual philosophy the discovery of a principle which shall secure to it the reality of living truth; and accepting as the *postulate* (afterwards to be vindicated) that the required principle of the unity of the manifold of the universe, physical and moral, shall be *OWN*, of all reality the absolute cause, which, affirming and realizing itself as its own abiding and self-sufficing ground, utters and reveals itself in the infinite manifold of being, entire in all and entire in each; adopting, I say, this as the indispensable postulate of philosophy when contemplated in its utmost height, breadth, and depth, I venture to affirm, with the fullest confidence of establishing its evidence, that the principle sought for is *WILL*. . . . No sooner will the self-investigator have thus distinguished the thinking mind from the thought which is the object of the mind's thinking, than he unavoidably identifies, and becomes aware that they are but relations of a somewhat which he is conscious is the self. . . . In order to constitute it an act of self-consciousness, of subjective apprehension, I must be also distinctly conscious that it is I who am the subject. I must know that it is I, thinking, willing, feeling. . . . By 'will' we mean, as we cannot but do, a self-determinant agency and the only source of originative power. . . . The actuation of the individual will not only does not exclude self-determination, but implies it—implies that, though actuated, but actuated only because already self-operant, it is not compelled or acting under a law of outward causation. . . . If we have no cognizance of a self, other than in the changes which the self undergoes, we can have no knowledge of the operative cause of those changes, and the will ceases to be a fact for us. . . . The individual will cannot be other than *self-ponent*; . . . and, as all will implies self-ponency, so will is inconceivable as a reality, except as a self-ponent causer; . . . except as an individual, personal, and self-conscious agent, self-constitutive by the perpetual act by which it secures its identity of being in its manifold change of agency. . . . I know that I think, feel, will; but more than this, I can abstract from these thoughts, feelings, and volitions, myself as the subject: I know myself; and meanwhile under the sense of power which arises simultaneously out of the depth of his inward being, 'man' invests nature with life, action, causality, spontaneity. . . . Whatever becomes other than it was before, and acquires a change of attributes, or whatever must be contemplated as, or traced to, a beginning *de novo*, cannot but imply the productive efficient by which the change is wrought and rendered intelligible; namely, the causative power, which is recognised in and by the constant and unvarying character of its effects. . . . *Reason*, considered as speculative intellect or philosophy, in its search for absolute truth, combines three distinct forms of operation. . . . I. *Cause*, or that which satisfactorily accounts for any observed change. . . . II. That which in any and every object, or collective manifold, amid every variety and change of attributes, properties, and accidents, amid all mutations or transformations of phenomenal existence, is itself permanent and abiding; that which may

be accepted as the reality in contradistinction to the appearances of things, and constitutes their individual being; that which is the ground of the distinction between what a thing *is* and what it *has*. It is obvious that the distinction here intended is that recognised as subject and attribute, substance and accident. . . . III. The irrepressible desire and striving after unity, by the habitual effort to bring whatever may be the object or objects of knowledge or inquiry into the relation of a whole and its parts;

. . . . derived from an antecedent and causative energy, which, as intelligent power, having produced a whole of parts, remains as its conservative principle. . . . Those three forms, in relation to the real and effective unity which is required, cannot but be regarded as the correlative elements and exponents of the unity. . . . Reason in man, regarded abstractedly as speculative, prompts him to search unceasingly for the unity, insight of which the reason supplies for the comprehension of his manifold knowledges; and that, wherever this is attainable by the discovery of a principle adequate to account for the many as a totality proceeding from a one, and exhibited in a unity of interdependent parts, the human mind attains to the possession of an 'idea.' . . . And thus the functions of speculative reason in forming ideas is *integration*; and that every idea may be expressed as the integral, 'of which all the forms within our experience are but approximations.' . . . The unity of the manifold of the universe physical, must (I said) be ONE, of all reality the absolute cause, which, affirming and realizing itself as its own abiding and self-sufficing ground, utters and reveals itself in the infinite manifold of being, entire in all and entire in each. . . . The principle sought for is will. . . . To what principle, other than that of will, dare we attribute rational intelligence, pre-determining and achieving actual results in the antecedent unity of a final aim and purpose? or how otherwise shall we conceive such will than as a personal agent? . . . The advocates of the spiritual philosophy affirm, and rightly affirm, that, in order to any real and effectual unity, the conceptions of causative power and will are not only indispensable to the fulfilment of the conditions under which the human mind can only contemplate a real unity or organic whole, but are securely attainable within the limits of human consciousness. . . . Will, as causative of reality, cannot be conceived or contemplated in its integrity, or inherent tendency thereto, except under such conditions of integration; . . . we submit the following as the axioms of rational or spiritual integration. . . .

"Axiom 1st. Will, as the principle which is absolutely causative of reality, and by which alone all causality is rendered intelligible.

"Axiom 2nd. All will must primarily will itself; that is, assert itself to be a will, or to have being as a will.

"Axiom 3rd. The will . . . is guided and governed by a purpose, or final aim, which, as antecedent unity, contains prospectively and potentially the realization of what it proposes.

"Axiom 4th. . . . Whatever is willed cannot but be willed in its fullest integrity.

. . . . "Axiom 5th. Every will tends to be absolute, or aims at absolute ponency, in the act of willing. . . .

"Axiom 6th. The will is ideally a principle of absolute freedom. . . . But reason, regarded as distinct from will, is the essential principle of necessity. Hence, in order to a true conception of will enlightened by

reason, it is incumbent on us to provide for the conciliation of the opposite conditions of spontaneity and necessity.

“Axiom 7th. The will in its ideal integrity cannot but will what is universal; that is, what may and ought to be the will of all wills. . . .

“Axiom 8th. The will in its ideal integrity cannot but will that which ever remains the same under all change and diversity. A will, constituted according to its idea, cannot but will that which is eternal. . . . Thus ever ‘idem gignitur alter,’ and the same will, which appears differenced into forms, is recognised as the same abiding substance under all change.

“The formulae of polar logic . . . is an adequate description of the relations, or elementary factors, required in order to the conciliation of the opposites, . . . viz.,—identity, thesis, indifference, antithesis, synthesis. . . . In the ideal construction, which exhibits the genetic development of a principle, every new distinction may call forth a new opposite, and therefore that which was primarily a unipolarity is calculated to be a multipolarity, or system of correlatives. . . . Dialectic, or a conflict of positions, is inevitable. . . . Truth, in its integrity, embraces two sides, or relations. . . . We might designate the sort of logic now under consideration, the logic of reason. It is the process for disentangling the mind from the inevitable dialectic imposed upon it by the forms and mechanism of the understanding, which, as the faculty of reasoning by means of ‘conception,’ is opposed to reason, as the faculty of reasoning by means of ‘ideas.’ . . . The reason, as the organ of spiritual truths, is the opposite, or countervailing power, to the understanding, and by its inherent tendency to ideal integration, turns at once from the merely empirical to those truths which transcend all experience, sensible and psychical. . . . The reason strives to express, or to obtain the exponent of an idea; but the understanding, or logical faculty, can supply only conceptual forms; and the reason, in order to obtain the exponent it needs, uses conceptions which, in contradicting each other, suggest the ideal truth aimed at. . . . The categories, or concipiences, so often adverted to, are used in a twofold sense, as moulds of the understanding, and as forms of reason, viz.:—1st, in the service, and with the meaning of sensible and psychical experience; and 2nd, in the service and with the meaning of ideal or spiritual experience; that is, by uniting conceptions representative of the intellectual *forma formantes*, which are inherent, and *a priori* in the speculative reason as a constituent of the human mind. . . . The idea, which the concipience of *substantiality* discloses, when interpreted in its spiritual sense and significance, is that of the will contemplated as the absolute ground of all well-being; that the idea contained in the concipience of *causality*, interpreted in like manner, is that of the will as absolute causality—that the idea, in which the concipience of *totality*, or of a whole and its parts, is grounded, is that of the will as the realization of absolute unity and exhaustless distinction. . . . There is but one ultimate ground, namely, the WILL, as the absolute idea, and the sole and fountal principle of speculative philosophy.

“Man can only occupy a sphere, of which the limits are predetermined. And hence . . . we have to assign to his will, in its self-pendency and agency, at least these,—that on one hand, it requires solicitation from without, and on the other impulse from within. . . . The soul is a will, self-affirmed, and self-potent in its individual sphere of agency . . .

and hence in principle always, and in practice ever more or less, at variance with and in opposition to the divine will. . . . Man, by nature, has a tendency and radical impulse to assert and realize his self-will with all the unhallowed desires of its selfishness. . . . Whenever man makes his own mere self-will the sole arbiter of his conduct, and thereby assumes the power and privilege of gratifying his selfish lusts, he throws off all moral restraint, and gives loose to his natural perversity. . . . But I do not wish to go farther into the question here mooted than to insist on the distinction between the natural and spiritual man,—on the one hand, the tendency of the will to assert its own particularity as absolute; and on the other, the tendency to spiritual integrity, as the disposition of the human will, when enlightened and enlivened thereto, to conform its selfish particularity to the absolute and universal Will of the supreme moral Governor of the world. . . . And (as the next part of this work will show) I do not despair of placing before the reader a series of propositions, in which the main truths of ideal integration are exhibited by the light of their own evidence, and by means of which the unavoidable demands of the speculative intellect and of the rational mind may be satisfactorily fulfilled and gratified."

## Epic Men.

### THOMAS HOBBES, OF MALMESBURY.

(Continued from page 21.)

WE continue our analysis of the important work in which Hobbes incorporated all the elements of a great and general system of philosophy, "Leviathan,"—of which we now supply an outline of Part III., "Of a Christian Commonwealth," which is the subject of Chapters. xxxii.—xliv.

"XXXII. Of the Principles of Christian Politics. I have derived the rights of sovereign power, and the duty of subjects, hitherto from the principles of nature only, . . . that is to say, from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from definitions of such words as are essential to all political reasoning, universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle the nature and rights of a Christian commonwealth, . . . the ground of my discourse must be not only the natural word of God, but also the prophetic. Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses and experience, nor that which is the undoubted word of God, our natural reason. They are the talents, . . . not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in God's word above reason, . . . yet there is nothing contrary to it. . . . Sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; . . . and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will of them. . . . Though God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration; yet He obliges no man to believe He hath done so to him that pretends it; who, being a



man, may err, and which is more, may lie. . . . The teaching of the religion which God hath established, and the showing of a present miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true prophet, that is to say, immediate revelation, to be acknowledged; neither of them being simply sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith. . . . The Holy Scriptures, since the time of our Saviour, supply the place, and sufficiently recompense the want, of all other prophecy; and from which, by wise and learned interpretation and careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm or supernatural inspiration, may easily be deduced."

"XXXIII. discusses with fulness and acuteness the several topics stated, "Of the number, antiquity, scope, authority, and interpreters of the books of Holy Scripture. Seeing that sovereigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators, those books only are canonical, that is, law in every nation, which are established for such by the sovereign authority. I can acknowledge no other books of the Old Testament to be Holy Scripture but those which have been commanded to be acknowledged for such by the authority of the Church of England. . . . As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for canon by all Christian churches, and by all sects of Christians, that admit any books at all for canonical. . . . It is manifest enough that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament was set forth in the form we have it, after the return of the Jews from their captivity in Babylon, and before the time of Ptolomæus Philadelphus, that caused it to be translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of Judea for that purpose. . . . The writers of the New Testament lived all in less than an age after Christ's ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been His disciples, except St. Luke and St. Paul; and consequently whatsoever was written by them is as ancient as the time of the apostles. . . . I see not, therefore, any reason to doubt but that the Old and New Testament, as we have them now, are the true registers of those things which were done and said by the prophets and apostles. . . . The Book of Genesis deriveth the genealogy of God's people from the creation of the world to the going into Egypt; the other four books of Moses contain the election of God for their king, and the laws which He prescribed for their government; the Books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe the acts of God's people till the time they cast off God's yoke, and called for a king, after the manner of their neighbour nations. The rest of the history of the Old Testament derives the succession of the line of David to the captivity, out of which line was to spring the restorer of the kingdom of God, even our blessed Saviour, God the Son, whose coming was foretold in the books of the prophets, after whom the evangelists write His life and actions, and His claim to the kingdom, whilst He lived on earth; and lastly, the acts and epistles of the apostles, declare the coming of God the Holy Ghost, and the authority He left with them and their successors for the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles. . . .

"XXXIV. Of the signification of Spirit, Angel, and Inspiration in the books of Holy Scripture. The word body, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which filleth, or occupieth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the *universe*. . . . The proper signification of *spirit* in common

speech, is either a subtle, fluid, and invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasm of the imagination. . . . The Spirit of God is taken in the Scripture sometimes, first, for a wind or breath; . . . second, for extraordinary gifts of the understanding; . . . third, for extraordinary affections; . . . fourth, for the gift of prediction by dreams and visions; . . . fifth, for life; . . . sixth, for a subordination to authority; . . . seventh, for aërial bodies, . . . namely, a thin substance invisible, but that hath the same dimensions that are in grosser bodies. By the name of angel is signified generally a messenger; and most often a messenger of God;—anything that makes known His extraordinary presence. . . . On the signification of the word spirit dependeth that of the word inspiration. . . . That word, therefore, is used in the Scripture metaphorically only.

“XXXV. Of the signification in Scripture of Kingdom of God, of holy, sacred, and sacrament. I find the kingdom of God to signify, in most places of Scripture, a kingdom properly so named, constituted by the votes of the people of Israel in a peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for their king by covenant made with him. . . . Holy is a word which, in God's kingdom, answereth to that, which men in their kingdoms use to call public, or the king's. . . . The word profane is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with common. . . . That which is made holy by the dedication of men, and given to God, so as to be used only in His public service, is called also sacred. . . . A sacrament is a separation of some visible thing from common use, and a consecration of it to God's service, for a sign either of our admission into the kingdom of God, to be of the number of His peculiar people; or for a commemoration of the same. . . . There were no other sacraments in the Old Testament but circumcision and the passover; nor are there any other in the New Testament but baptism and the Lord's Supper.

“XXXVI. Of the word of God and of Prophets. The word of God, or of man, doth not signify a part of speech. . . . but a perfect speech or discourse, whereby the speaker affirmeth, denieth, commandeth, promiseth, threateneth, wisheth, or interrogateth. . . . The words spoken by God, and concerning God, both are called God's word in Scripture. . . . First, The word of God as it is taken for that which He hath spoken, is understood sometimes properly, sometimes metaphorically. Properly, as the words He hath spoken to His prophets; metaphorically, for His wisdom, power, and eternal decree. . . . Second, For the effect of His word. . . . Third, For the works of reason and equity. . . . The name of prophet signifieth in Scripture sometimes prolocutor; that is, he that speaketh from God to man, or from man to God; and sometimes predictor, or a foreteller of things to come; and sometimes one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. . . . Yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him to whom God speaketh immediately that which the prophet is to say from Him to some other man, or to the people. . . . To the extraordinary prophets of the Old Testament, He spake by dreams or visions. . . . To prophets of perpetual calling, and supreme, God spake in the Old Testament from the mercy seat, in a manner not expressed in the Scripture. . . . To prophets of perpetual calling, but subordinate, God spake by the spirit. . . . God sometimes also spake by lots. . . . Men had need to be very circumspect and wary in obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a prophet, requires us to obey God in that way, which he, in

God's name; telleth us to be the way to happiness. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule and reign over them; which is a thing that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture; and consequently ought to be examined and tried by every man, before he yield them obedience. . . . Every man is bound to make use of his natural reason; to apply to all prophecy those rules which God hath given us to discern the true from false. . . . When Christian men, take not their Christian sovereign for God's prophet, they must either take their own dreams for the prophecy they mean to be governed by; and the tremor of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must suffer themselves to be led by some strange prince or by some of their fellow-subjects that can bewitch them by slander of the government into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their calling than sometimes an extraordinary success and impunity; and by this means destroying all laws, both divine and human, reduce all order, government, and society, to the first chaos of violence and civil war.

"XXXVII. Of Miracles and their use. By miracles are signified the admirable works of God: and therefore they are also called wonders; 'showing and foreshewing that which the Almighty is about to bring to pass.' . . . There be but two things which make men wonder at any event, the one is if it be strange . . . the other is, if when it is produced we cannot imagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the immediate hand of God. . . . The same thing may be a miracle to one, and not to another. . . . It belongeth to the nature of a miracle, that it be wrought for the procuring of credit to God's messengers, ministers, and prophets, that thereby men may know they are called, sent, and employed by God, and thereby be the better inclined to obey them. . . . A miracle is a work of God (besides His operation by the way of nature, ordained in the creation), done, for the making manifest to His elect the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation. . . . Men are apt to be deceived by false miracles, and therefore require cautions against imposture.

"XXXVIII. Of the Signification in Scripture of Eternal Life, Hell, Salvation, the World to Come, and Redemption. The maintenance of civil society depending on justice; and justice on the power of life and death, and other less rewards and punishments, residing in them that have the sovereignty of the commonwealth. . . . The place of Adam's eternity, if he had not sinned, had been the terrestrial paradise. . . . Texts concerning the place of life eternal for believers, are quoted to shew that all men shall be made to live on earth, and that it does not signify ascension into heaven. The place after judgment of those who were never in the kingdom of God, or having been in are cast out, is usually called in Scripture by words that signify underground. . . . But for the place of the damned after the resurrection; it is not determined, neither in the Old nor New Testament, by any note of situation, but only by the company, and called Tartarus, The congregation of giants, The lake of fire, Utter darkness, Gehenna and Tophet. . . . It followeth methinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning hell fire is spoken metaphorically. . . . Satan, devil, are not proper names, but appellatives, which set not forth to us any individual person, as proper names use to do; but only an office, or quality. . . . By Satan is meant any earthly enemy of the

Church, . . . . and the torments of hell design metaphorically a *grief* and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others which they themselves, through their own incredulity and disobedience, have lost. . . . There is to be a second death of every one that shall be condemned at the day of judgment, after which he shall die no more. The joys of life eternal are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of salvation, or being saved. To be saved from sin is to be saved from all the evil and calamities that sin hath brought upon us. But concerning the general salvation, because it must be in the kingdom of heaven there is great difficulty concerning the place. I have not found any text that can probably be drawn to prove any ascension of the saints into heaven; that is to say, into any *cælum empyreum*, or other æthærial region; saving that it is called the kingdom of Heaven. . . . There are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the old world, the present world, and the world to come. . . . Of the world to come St. Peter speaks (2 Pet. iii. 13), 'Nevertheless, we, according to His promise, look for new heavens and a new earth.' This is that world wherein Christ . . . shall reign, under His Father, everlastingly. Salvation of a sinner supposeth a precedent redemption, for he that is once guilty of sin is obnoxious to the penalty of the same, and must pay, or some other for him, such ransom as he that is offended, and has him in his power, shall require. . . . But sins may be pardoned to the repentant either *gratis*, or upon such penalty as God is pleased to accept. . . . Our Saviour Christ, therefore, to redeem us, did not, in that sense, satisfy for the sins of men, as that His death, of its own virtue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with eternal death; but did make that sacrifice and oblation of himself, at His first coming, which God was pleased to require for the salvation at His second coming, of such as in the meantime should repent and believe in Him.

"XXXIX. Of the signification in Scripture of the word Church. The word church (*ecclēsia*) signifieth, in the books of Holy Scripture, divers things. Sometimes, though not often, it is taken for God's house. The Greek Fathers called it *Kuriakē*, the Lord's house, and thence in our language it came to be called *kirk* or *church*. . . . Church, when not taken for a house, signifieth the same that *ecclēsia* signifieth in the Grecian commonwealth, that is to say, a congregation or an assembly. . . . It is taken also sometimes for the men that have a right to be of the congregation, though not actually assembled, that is to say, for the whole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed. . . . And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken for one person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to do any other action whatsoever. . . . I define Church to be a company of men professing Christian religion, united in the person of one sovereign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble. And because, in all commonwealths, that assembly which is without warrant from the civil sovereign is unlawful; that Church also which is assembled in any commonwealth that hath forbidden them to assemble is an unlawful assembly. . . . Temporal and spiritual government are but two words brought into the world to make men see double, and mistake their lawful sovereign."

In chapter XL. he speaks at length of the rights of the kingdom of God, in Abraham, Moses, the high priests, and the Kings of Judah; and

after ably reviewing the history of the Jews, concludes that “. . . so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we may conclude that whosoever had the sovereignty of the commonwealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the supreme authority in matter of God's external worship.

“XLI. Of the Office of our Blessed Saviour. We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the office of the Messiah; the first of a Redeemer or Saviour; the second of a pastor, counsellor, or teacher, that is, of a prophet sent from God to convert such as God hath elected to Salvation; the third of a king, an eternal king. . . . And to these three parts are correspondent three times. For our redemption He wrought at His first coming, by the sacrifice wherein He offered up himself for our sins upon the cross; our conversion He wrought partly then in His own person, and partly worketh now by His ministers, and will continue to work till His coming again. And after His coming again, shall begin that His glorious reign over His elect, which is to last eternally.

“XLII. Of Power Ecclesiastical. For the understanding of power ecclesiastical, what and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the ascension of our Saviour into two parts; one before the conversion of kings, and men endued with sovereign civil power; the other after their conversion. For it was long after the ascension before any king or civil sovereign embraced and publicly allowed the teaching of the Christian religion. . . . Seeing then in every Christian commonwealth the civil sovereign is the supreme pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is committed, and consequently that it is by his authority that all other pastors are made, and have power to teach, and perform all other pastoral offices; it followeth also, that it is from the civil sovereign that all other pastors derive their right of teaching, preaching, and other functions pertaining to that office, and that they are but his ministers; in the same manner as the magistrates of towns, judges in courts of justice, and commanders of armies, are all but ministers of him that is the magistrate of the whole commonwealth, judge of all causes, and commander of the whole militia, which is always the civil sovereign; and the reason hereof is not because they that teach, but because they that are to learn, are his subjects. . . . The pastoral authority of sovereigns only is *jure divino*; that of other pastors is *jure civili*. . . . The king, and every other sovereign, executeth his office of supreme pastor by immediate authority from God, that is to say, in God's right, or *jure divino*. ‘Christian kings have power to execute all manner of pastoral functions. The civil sovereign, if a Christian, is head of the Church in his own dominions.’ Cardinal Bellarmine's book, *De Summo Pontifice*, is then considered with controversial acuteness, and much pertinence of remark, regarding the work of this ‘champion of the Papacy against all other Christian princes and states.’

“XLIII. Of what is necessary for a man's reception into the kingdom of heaven. All that is necessary to salvation is contained in two virtues, faith in Christ and obedience to laws. . . . The obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our actions the will for the deed, is a serious endeavour to obey Him; and is called also by all such names as signify that endeavour. . . . I pretend not to advance any position of my own, but only to show what are the consequences that seem to me deducible from the principles of Christian politics (which are the Holy Scriptures) in confirmation of the power of civil sovereigns and the duty of their subjects.”

## Social Economy.

### OUGHT THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO BE DISCONTINUED?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"THE enfranchisement of women" is one of the most pressing of human requirements. It is essential to the progress of society that the old unjust forms of oppression to which women have been exposed should be abolished, removed, and quite obliterated from the catalogue of existing customs or possibly recurring modes of life. It is not good for any one—least of all for any class—to suffer injustice patiently, and let it continue to harden and petrify into an irresistible impediment to present improvement and future progress; nor is it good for any one, or any class, to perpetrate injustice until it gains such a mastery over life and habit that things unjust seem to be desirable and just. The most reprehensible of injustices is that which the strong perpetrate on the weak, and the most villainous of all the advantages which can be taken are those which are taken over the unprotected and the defenceless. In equal fight, with equal might, there is courage, and out of it may spring glory; but to arm the entire laws, customs, forms of life, and usages of society against woman, and then oppress her into weakness and subjection, is cowardly, mischievous, and unlike what ought to be manly, what *is* honest, what should be considered as fair-play and equity.

A just equality must now be substituted for the government of the strongest. It has become almost a maxim of our times that the weak, just on account of their weakness, have a just demand on the care of the legislator. We have laws against cruelty to animals which are more stringent and more stringently enforced, than those against cruelty to woman. If, now, the burdens of sex be so heavy on women, it seems but fair that the burdens of society ought to be lighter: and that as man is in reality deeply interested in the proper state and status of woman, he should release her from subjection, and not over-dominate the sex already over-weighted. Justice, charity, good feeling, and religious sentiment, ought all to concur in the enfranchisement of women.

Why should woman be regarded as among the waste products of nature, and be kept, even against her own will, as a non-producing consumer? Is it reasonable to retain her in involuntary pauperism—an unwilling burden on the wealth of the country, and an unwilling, workless creature in a world of work? Why could

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she be compelled to dependence, and have enforced upon her, as a condition of comfort, marriage relations? Why should her capacities for usefulness be confiscated and made non-availing—either in her own behalf or for behoof of others? Is it not monstrous that we should proscribe industry to one half of society, and prescribe it to the other! What good right can society have to enforce upon women the tying up of their talent in a napkin and burying it in the earth; why should it compel uselessness and unprofitability on women, and give them only the choice of marriage or mischief? On what ground of reason or religion can it be maintained that woman should lose all power over herself—in soul, body, or estate—because she is a woman? If reason can show a cause, or religion a cause, let them proclaim it; but reason professes to be the safeguard of freedom, and religion proclaims liberty to the captive, pronounces for every one personal responsibility and dutifulness.

Jeremy Bentham has said that "if a man, who calls for the right of suffrage to be given to any one human being, calls for its being refused to any other human being, it lies upon him to give a particular reason for such refusal." This principle might be greatly extended; it might fairly be said that if men claim independence for themselves, and revolt against subjection on the ground that they are human beings, it is incumbent on them to deny that women are human beings, or to release them from subjection,—unless there be good reason that, although human beings, they alone should be subject, and tyranny should be triumphant over *them*.

T. M. F. takes, of course, the man's, not the manly, view of this question. He labours under the old fancy that ridicule is the test of truth. I think he will find that more truth than error has been laughed out of the world. "All that is sacred and precious in home and in marriage" are fine words; but fine words butter no parsnips, and do not very materially advance the settlement of grave questions, which T. M. F. admits this is; but he gives it the gravity of the jester. Women have no desire to upset the decision of nature. *That* is fixed, and they must confess themselves to be women with women's duties, but also, as they maintain, with women's rights. They believe that God did not perpetrate the injustice of giving them the burden of the world's renewal to bear, without providing an equivalent of happiness, and endowing them with rights equal to men's in their own sphere. They do not believe that "the female must be subject to the male." They believe that there is ample room for the full development and exercise of all human powers and abilities in the universe of God; and if they admit with the poet that,—

**"Man's inhumanity to man  
Makes countless thousands mourn,"—**

they believe that history will corroborate the assertion, and daily experience will ratify the accusation, that man's inhumanity to women has been far more productive of woe and sorrow.

It is all very well for T. M. F. to talk of "not only the propriety but the necessity of the subjection of women being the dictate and behest of nature" (p. 29). But this is begging the whole question. The affirmation made by women is that nature is falsely accused of this favouritism, and is unjustly maligned. They affirm that the sexes are equal in degree though there be difference in the accidents of their capacity. They assert that in their own sphere they are as able and as willing to work, and to maintain themselves by the results of their work, as men are; and they especially object to men's monopolizing all the remunerative employments as to starve the majority of women into surrender to men and their purposes. They aver that the selfishness of men, not "the imperative necessities of nature," is the cause of the subjection in which they are held.

T. M. F. attempts to be the Job's comforter by assuring women that they have a longer life in their present state of subjection than they would or could have under the self-determined life which the enfranchisement of woman would put in her power; but this does not follow. The longer life of woman really depends on her greater temperance, freedom from self-indulgence, and general care, than from her immunity from toil or care, trouble or labour.

Besides, even were it true it is irrelevant; for length is no test or measure of worth of life. "Better half a year of Europe than a cycle of Gathay" says the Laureate, and there can be no hesitation in affirming that the activity, energy, and interest of life are natural elements in the estimate of its value. It is what sensation, thought, efficacy, result, and advantage have been taken or given in exchange for life that marks it and makes it worth. As a certain one also of your own poets hath said, "We live in deeds, not years; in thoughts, not breaths; in faith, and not in figures on a dial."

So that we cannot accept the miserable quiescence of do-nothingism as an equivalent for the satisfactory life of a true human being.

The political economy of T. M. F. is—he will flatter himself by saying "of course"—quite incomprehensible to me. I understand that work is the exertion of thought, labour, and perseverance in the effecting of some purpose by which the exchangeability of an article is promoted, and that price depends on the exchangeable value given to the article by the thought, labour, ingenuity, and exertions of those who could alter, change, and adapt commodities. Now, if woman can do this, she will earn wages, and she will be able either to remain a wage-earner, or cease to be so if a woman's career is opened up to her suitably and providentially.

It ought no more to be a necessity of a woman's life to look on marriage as an investment, or on wifehood as a business, than it ought to be that of a man. That should be a spontaneous, not an enforced undertaking of a duly considered responsibility. If marriage was not made a woman's chief if not only means of securing a livelihood, there would be greater care in marriage, and more domestic harmony and peace; there would be less trickery on the



one side, and less tyranny on the other. Marriage should be a contract of equality, not a mere matter of barter of independent being for mere temporal support. Were the subjection of woman to be discontinued, men would be more chary of breaches of morals and propriety, women would be less liable to the sneers and jeers of T. M. F.; for the former would know that he was risking the wreck of his good name, and the latter would be less tempted to look on husbands as valuables to be angled for. Indeed, it seems to me that the purity of society depends on the enfranchisement of women; and hence I look upon it as a universal question, In what way may the principles of justice be best promoted in the relations of man and woman in social life?

In a recent issue of the *Athenæum* (July 9th), it is stated that "Lawyers admit that the marriage laws of the United Kingdom are eminently unsatisfactory, legislators deplore the defects of the system, the public wonders at the injustices, inconsistencies, and absurdities which are brought to light by successive *causes célèbres*." And it is as an exchange for the privileges, as they are called, bestowed on woman by the law of marriage, that she is made subject to man. To make this a fair transaction, not to speak of making it a manly one, there ought surely to be three things included in one provided by the law. (1) The law itself ought to be fair, and fairly carried out. The contract contained in the matter ought to be implemented by the contracting parties, and enforced unsparingly by the law, so that woman, by her subjection, may receive her equivalent. (2) If society enforces subjection on all women because of the laws of marriage, it ought to make marriage possible to all, or give compensation for the yielding of her rights to society, which has not, in the case of the unmarried, fulfilled the implications of the contract; or (3) Legislation should recognise the equality and independence of all persons as persons, and then fix the contract of marriage so as to bring or take into subjection those who enter into that contract.

Then what have the advocates of the subjection of women to say in defence of "the iniquitous provision of the law of England which denies to a married woman the right to keep her own earnings?" Of course it is one of the fictions—subterfuges rather—of that law that women do not work, and therefore have no earnings; and it is another fiction of that law that the husband works, and that by his earnings his wife is supported. But it is well known that these things are fictions—that many husbands do not work, nay, that they sometimes actually compel their wives to doings at which humanity shudders to gain for them ease, indulgence, pocket-money, and sensual gratifications; and that many wives do work, and by their earnings frequently supply the wants of their family, until a spendthrift and unprincipled husband, enforcing the subjection of woman, takes her earnings to spend on himself. And such doings as these are to be continued because, forsooth, it is advantageous to society that the subjection of woman should be continued!

Why should theft by force from a woman cease to be a crime because it is committed by the very person in all the world who has pledged himself to "love her, comfort her, honour and keep her in sickness and in health"? Oh, is it not a mockery of justice and humanity to give a husband immunity who robs his wife of her earnings, and thus give a licence to pillage?

It cannot but be the right of every human being whom God has made responsible to Himself, as the Great Sovereign, to make the most of, and do to the best with, that nature within the measure of its capabilities, and considering the circumstances in which it is placed in so far as these circumstances are inevitable.

It is a woman's right to be a woman, but that certainly does not imply that she should be denuded of her rights as a human creature, which she essentially is, and only by an inseparable accident a woman. Has she not a right to a share of all human rights, as well as a right to all the consideration arising from her accidental disparity? Why should she be condemned to impersonality and impecuniosity because she is a woman? Has she not her nature to develop, her ability to put to usury, her own way to make towards whatsoever of perfectibility lies in her; and has she not a right to protection against the false and forced dependence, to which, by man-made law, she is subdued? On what principle can it be that men claim the inheritance of the whole earth as theirs by entails and Salic laws, keep the entire means of gaining a livelihood as a fund divisible among themselves, to which one half of the human race—and that one not less needful of food, raiment, and home—shall have no access or claim except as paupers, that is, dependents—for those who perforce must accept of the benevolence of others, in whatever capacity it may be received, are in reality nothing else than paupers—or pets, both terms and things equally hateful to a free mind and an independent nature.

And is not everything done by man against woman in the most tyrannous manner? A mother is not allowed the guardianship of her own child—unless it is inconvenient for the father to support it, and then it is thrown as a burden upon her; or unless it will gratify his evil nature to force her to maintain it, and then he will pay, if compelled by law, the smallest amount of money on which the life of the child can be supported for its keep—the mother being compelled to act as nurse and guardian without fee or reward. A wife is not mistress either of her own person, property, or prospects—unless the law has been previously invoked to tie up the hands of her husband. Her daily life must be bounded and regulated by his desires, her nature must be narrowed down to his, her prospects must have no provision: for all that she may hope, wish, or desire, may be perilled by her husband's cruelty, desertion, criminality, folly, thoughtlessness—of all the consequences of which she must have her full share, and bear it without grumble or complaint.

ADRIANA.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

In all stages of civilization there has been a control exercised by men over women which is tyrannous, unjust, and unscriptural. Yet there is a subjection of women which is scriptural, natural, and reasonable. The affirmative article by L. A. J. is headed by an extract from J. S. Mill, in which that writer asserts that the legal subordination of one sex to the other is wrong in itself; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on one side nor disability on the other. If this extract be compared with the scriptures which we shall presently adduce, it will be seen at a glance that the teachings of J. S. Mill and those of the Bible on the subjection of women are perfectly opposite to each other. By all, therefore, who admit that the Scriptures are a rule of faith and practice, the dictum of J. S. Mill must be acknowledged to be heterodox.

We are equally desirous with L. A. J. that in the solemnization of matrimony there should be no requirement from the woman of a promise to serve or obey. Also we should be glad to see all seducers more heavily punished for the crime of seduction. Moreover, we should not object to see the personal property of a wife placed at her own disposal, and made to be not usable by the husband irrespective of her wishes. We should also fully approve of a law which should make the husband liable to divorce on the proof of adultery, in a single case, on his part. Yet, after allowing all this, we maintain that the subjection of women ought not to be discontinued.

An appeal to the Bible on the question now being debated is all that is really requisite to determine whether the affirmative or negative thereof be the truth; and its teachings on the subject are so definite and explicit that their purport and tendency can hardly be disputed. To them we shall first appeal.

When the penalty of disobedience was pronounced upon Eve she was told by her Maker that her husband should rule over her (Gen. iii. 16). We here see that the subjection of woman is a divine appointment, as may be further seen from 1 Cor. ii. 3, 8, 9. "The head of the woman is the man," is the express declaration of Scripture. The man was first formed, then the woman was made from him, and for him, and not the man for the woman, to be subservient to her, for she was not in being when he was created. How far these teachings of Scripture accord with the doctrines advanced by J. S. Mill, that the subordination of one sex to the other is wrong in itself, and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality admitting no power or privilege on one side nor disability on the other, we shall leave with the readers of the *British Controversialist* to determine for themselves. In Ephes. v. 22; 23, 24; 1 Tim. ii. 11, 12, 13; Titus ii. 5; and 1 Pet. iii. 1, we have directions and precepts given to Christian women, in which obedience to

their husbands is enjoined upon them. These scriptures, therefore, yet further establish our argument.

The subjection of women for which we contend is *natural* as well as scriptural. We have the highest authority for asserting that woman is the weaker vessel, and therefore needing protection from men; which protection, on the part of man, does of itself necessitate a measure of subjection on the part of woman, and, indeed, is in itself a species of subjection. And, doubtless, married women will still claim to be provided for by their husbands. And is not this their position one of dependence or subjection? Let a man live continually under the protection of, and on the provision made by, some other man, and see whether or not his position be one of subjection. If women protected and provided for men would they admit that men ought to have an equality in all respects with themselves? We trow not. As to women voting for public officers, or being elected to fill public offices, such as those of guardians of the poor, town councillors, &c., we maintain that it being the place of women to manage the family and superintend the affairs of the household, their time, strength, and talents may find ample scope in attention to their own proper duties, for which they are much better capacitated than men. This will also apply to the question of filling with women many other occupations which have been usually attended to by men. Cases are now common in which even married women are employed in factories, in which cases the family and home are neglected, and a complete upsetting of the comforts and happiness of home takes place, many men being driven into evil by the lack of a comfortable home. In many instances no real gain accrues from the wages earned by the women; those wages being quite or more than counterbalanced by the waste effected by small children in the absence of the woman from her home. In all grades there are married females who have no qualifications for the position of a housewife. This is a well-known fact. What is greatly needed at the present time is a training of young females in the performance or superintendence of various domestic offices, that they may be qualified to become housekeepers, whereas the opening of so many situations to women tempts both those who should teach and those who need to be taught to neglect the duties of their own proper sphere and to enter one that should be occupied by men. Besides, a line must doubtless be drawn somewhere. If women are to be electors, guardians of the poor, and town councillors, are they also to be members of either or both Houses of Parliament? And if not, then inequality and subjection are at once introduced as the lot of women, as must necessarily be the case if women be excluded from any office or position whatever on account of sex.

The raising of women to a perfect equality with men is totally impracticable. Take any instance of a married couple. Differences of opinion, of taste, and of wishes will be sure to exist. The husband cannot convince his wife—the wife cannot convince her hus-

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band. It is the desire of the wife that the children should be vaccinated, it is the wish of the husband that they should not. The wife wishes to remove to a home that is more congenial to her taste than the one she now occupies, the husband wishes to remain where he is. The wife desires her husband to make his will in one mode, the husband wishes to make it in another. In such circumstances as these, which are of frequent occurrence, and in which it is impossible for both parties to attain their desire, which is to submit to the wishes of the other? If the husband to the wife, then there is not equality of the wife with the husband, but the wife's supremacy. If the wife submit to the husband, then there is the subjection of the wife. And if it be admitted that in such cases it is just and reasonable for women to submit to their husbands, to what purpose is it to argue that the subjection of women should be discontinued?

To take another view of the perfect equality of women with men. Will those who contend for this maintain that the husband should not be responsible for the support of his wife, his children, and his household? Are they willing that this responsibility should be shifted from the husband to the wife? Or do they desire that the responsibility should be shared by the husband and wife equally? If so, would not great inconvenience be caused to creditors by not holding one of the parties alone liable? If the husband be applied to for payment of a debt, and his responsibility be shared by the wife, he may direct application to be made to her. When application is made to her, she may refer the creditor back to her husband, and thus he may be tossed about between the parties, and be unable to obtain his just demand from either. The evils attending such a divided responsibility are self-evident. On the other hand, as long as the husband is solely liable, the perfect equality of women with men is an impossibility, and whatever alterations may be made in the law of responsibility for debt, will, we believe, be found to remain perfectly impracticable. Again, it will be found to be quite impossible, in various occupations, for women to fully compete with men, a multitude of occupations being totally unfit for women, and they being liable to various incidents to which men are not subject. Every society must be in a state of disorder without a head, whether it be a nation, a church, or a family. There cannot be perfect equality without disorder, and if the man be not the head of the woman to govern, neither is he the head to provide and protect. If his headship be abolished in the first respect, it is at the same time abolished in the others also.

We believe, therefore, that the subjection of women neither ought to be, nor can be, by any means whatever, discontinued. S. S.

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## Religion.

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### IS THE GOSPEL ADAPTED TO MODERN LIFE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE question here propounded for debate reads like an admission that the gospel was adapted to the times in which it was first given. But is it adapted to modern times? It is true that particular features distinguish modern from either mediæval or ancient life. But are the special characteristics of modern life such as cause the gospel to be less or not at all adapted thereto? With the view of answering this question, let us briefly notice some of the more prominent features of modern life.

We nineteenth century personages are living in a state of high civilization. We have amongst us the life of large towns and great cities, with their special sorrows, temptations, and crimes. Ours is a highly commercial age. In most trades a great number of individuals are engaged, all of them earnestly striving for a livelihood. Hence there arises a very close competition in business, this sharp competition leading to a disregard in a very great degree of the interests of others, and presenting temptations to the adulterating of goods, as well as to the practice of short weight and deficient measure. Modern life is also characterized by the extreme wealth of some and the extreme poverty of others, by the possession of large landed estates by a section of the community, while numbers have not even the tenancy of an inch of ground. We also have free trade with extensive and rapid national and international intercommunication, and by these various qualities of modern life the relations of society are much more complicated than in the olden time. Now what is there in modern life to cause the gospel to be not adapted to it?

We differ from our coadjutor A. A. respecting his assumption that by the word gospel in this debate the Scriptures are meant. Our opponent, F. F. A., is on this point more accurate than A. A. All Scripture is not gospel. The Decalogue, or law of the ten commandments, is a part of Scripture, yet it contains not a particle of gospel, and a great part of Scripture is history. *Definitely*, the gospel is that part of the word of God which reveals salvation by Jesus Christ, and contains various invitations, encouragements, and promises for those who believe on Him, while it also addresses to the same persons a variety of precepts or commandments. From the fact that many of those who attend the preaching of the gospel disregard its commands, F. F. A. draws the conclusion that the gospel is not adapted to modern life. But the practice by m

who profess the gospel of adulterating goods, and of giving short weight and measure, the custom of women aiming at supremacy, or of husbands not loving their wives, or the practice of any other thing that is contrary to gospel precept, is no proof that the gospel is not adapted to modern life. On the contrary, the existence of these practices shows that the gospel is exactly adapted to modern life, as a counteractive of customs that are vicious, and that it is the very gospel which is now needed. This position we shall attempt to prove. The gospel being a divine revelation, and its divine author not intending to reveal any other—the canon of Scripture being closed—it is *necessarily* adapted to *all times*, and therefore to modern times. The author of the gospel has not acted with such want of wisdom as to give a revelation for all time that is not adapted to some particular period. This fact is sufficient to prove the adaptation of the gospel to modern life, and we might close our argument here without fear of confutation.

But we shall come a little more to particulars. It appears to us that, so far as the gospel from not being adapted to modern life, that it bears an especial fitness thereto. Its doctrines are specially adapted to modern times. Besides those features of modern life which we have already noted, we may observe these:—an ungrounded conceit of man's capacities, a pride of reason, a belief in the capability of men to understand spiritual things without the special teaching of God, a pouring of ridicule on the belief in the reality and necessity of any divine revelation to be now made from God to men, as well as on the belief in the necessity of a supernatural religion, together with a setting of the discoveries of science above the teachings of Scripture, and where these clash with each other, a determination to make Scripture bend to science.

Now to these characteristics of modern life the gospel is peculiarly adapted, for it presents to them a decided opposition, teaching us in a very unequivocal manner the profound darkness of men by nature, and their complete incapacity to know God and spiritual things without the teaching of the Holy Spirit, and not only thus implying the absolute necessity of that teaching, but declaring in express words the indispensableness thereof to make men wise unto salvation. There being, then, in the gospel nothing to foster, but much to counteract that pride and conceit which are so specially ripe and rampant at the present time, it is eminently adapted to this time.

Not merely the doctrines of the gospel, but its precepts also, are exactly suited to modern life. Let us examine a few of these precepts. In Matt. vii. 12 we find inculcated upon Christians the practice towards others of all things which they would that others should practise towards them. And is not this gospel precept adapted to modern life? If men were ruled by it, would they not abstain from the practice of enriching themselves by any dishonest means? Wishing themselves not to be in any way defrauded, would they not abstain from defrauding others? If ever there

were a period to which this precept is adapted, it surely is so to this cozening age, in which such gigantic frauds have been perpetrated, and perpetrated too by men moving in the most apparently respectable positions. Is not this precept peculiarly adapted to this age of great appearances, in which a gilded exterior is maintained by thousands at the expense of others, and when good faith and common honesty are evidently such scarce commodities? Again, to put the mildest interpretation possible on Matt. vi. 19, is not this portion of the gospel a gentle hint against that vehement thirst for riches which is such a characteristic feature of modern life—so much so that with some the body, with others the mind, and with others both, are starved for the sake of amassing material wealth? Is not John xiii. 14 a suitable, and at this time a needful, injunction to Christians to practise towards each other acts of condescension and kindness? And—not to particularise further—are not the commands of the gospel enjoining self-denial, the recompensing of evil with good, the practice of mercy, as also the avoidance of display and of seeking fame in almsdeeds, commands adapted to modern life? And if we view the epistles as a continuation of the gospel—which they certainly are—are not the precepts and exhortations with which they abound strictly adapted to modern life? Do not the epistles enjoin sincerity, liberality, honesty, temperance, chastity, and every good thing? Do they not enjoin on wives obedience to their husbands, and on husbands kindness to their wives? Do they not urge children to honour their parents, and parents to seek the welfare of their children? Do they not prescribe to servants obedience to their masters, and to masters fairness and justice of dealing with their servants? And are not such injunctions adapted to all times? And if so, they are adapted to modern life. And do not the epistles reprove and denounce deceit, hypocrisy, drunkenness, fornication, adultery, extortion, malice, and all villeness? And is modern life so free from these iniquities that those who are now living have no need to be reminded of their evil nature, or to be admonished against them? The very maintenance of the principle that the gospel is not adapted to modern life occasions a suspicion that it is an indisposition to conform to so stringent a code as the gospel which is the cause of such an opinion being entertained. That the gospel is not in conformity with the taste of the majority of living persons, or that the practices of many who profess it do not correspond with its precepts, is no evidence that it is not adapted to modern life. A sick man may be strenuously opposed to the use of a dietary prescribed by a skilful physician, yet that to which he is so opposed may be just that which is most suited to his case. Crimes of all kinds abound. The gospel denounces them. Which is more adapted to modern life: a gospel that tolerates cheating, lying, stealing, murder, and uncleanness, or a gospel that rebukes those crimes?

Indeed, as the gospel denounces all vices and inculcates all virtues, it cannot be otherwise than adapted both to these and to all



times; and to say that the gospel is not adapted to modern life is a libel on Him from whom it emanated, and to lead us to whom it was given. S. S.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It ought to be recollected that the gospel has had more or less to do with the educating of man since the world began; it should be remembered particularly that Christianity has, in one form or another, been an established fact for more than a thousand years; and that it has had, in many countries, everything its own way for the greater part of that time. No competitor has been permitted to rise up against it, and even different opinions concerning it were for a long time abhorrent to most minds. This lengthened period of power has given full opportunity of testing the efficacy of the gospel as an agent in reforming mankind, and we fear that those who speak truth must make the humiliating confession that it has not had a success at all commensurate with the just expectations of men.

How little of gospel life is infused into the masses of France, Prussia, Spain, Austria, England or America! In philosophy, politics, commerce, literature, legislation, how small an amount of Christianity has been effectively exerted! Do not the churches mourn and communities complain about the defective state of Christian feeling in their members? It is a very proper thing, therefore, to inquire whether the gospel is adapted to the life of modern times or not. In looking at the question we have been compelled to form the opinion that the reply should be in the negative; and we proceed, without further preface, to present some reasons for our opinion.

This is an age of *reasoning*, while the gospel demands *faith*. The reader will please observe that I have not said "an age of reason," but of reasoning. I do not look upon the age as even reasonable; but it is critical, inquiring, controversial, and hesitating. Strauss and the Tübingen school; Renan and the French *Illuminati*; and the Unitarian theologians, may be mentioned as proofs that criticism is more active than faith. Faith is the highest virtue of the Christian life. On faith, in fact, the being or not being a Christian depends. Criticism and Christianity are thus antagonists. We hear everywhere from our pulpits and in the religious press that criticism is waging a destructive warfare against the true faith. Science denies the moral government of God, the possibility of miracles, the accuracy of the accounts the gospel gives of creation; and expresses an unequivocal denial of the likelihood of many of the incidents in the lives of the prophets and the history of the chosen people. Positivism wages war with the gospel on the ground that it is superstitious to believe in its records, and that it is unintellectual to submit one's mind to the dominion of opinions such as it requires men to submit to.

This is an age of extreme civilization—of civilization, too, quite opposed to the principles of the gospel. Our laws are alien to the spirit of the gospel in many points, especially in their favour for the rich rather than the poor; for the poor, being the weaker, are those who need the help of the strong hand of the law. There is a harsh, unforgiving, revengeful, and unfeeling spirit in our law towards the poor. The rich man can have almost any crime he may commit commuted into a money fine; imprisonment—sometimes most unscrupulously inflicted—is the only tender mercy for the poor. Charity has by the law been chilled down to a poor's-rate, and our political economy opposes charity as inexpedient, while it coldly affirms the wrongfulness of obeying "nature's great law" of love, and life, and loving life by the icy Malthusianism of its doctrines. The selfishness of the age in maintaining the rich in their sumptuousness and the poor in their poverty; in preaching and enforcing Malthusianism to such an extent as to bring almost all men into one of the categories of those whom Heaven has declared, in the gospel, shall not inherit eternal life, most palpably pronounces against the adaptation of the gospel to the age. Had the gospel penetrated into the spirit of the age, the sects would not have quarrelled for half a century over the education of the people—they would have gone and done it; having agitated against sins of sex, they would have been reduced to a *minimum*; neither would we have been discussing now the questions concerning land tenure, emigration, church establishments, compulsory education, and war, which have been keeping society in a ferment. In fact, the age is departing more and more from the spirit of the gospel, and is riveting upon men a new law of commandments, which is superseding the gospel in anything but an advantageous way. I do not choose to do more than allude to the absolutely ungodly legislation of several Contagious Diseases Acts; and to Acts that are as hostile to godliness in regard to marriage, seduction, adulteration of goods, honesty of measures and weights, licensing laws in connection with drinks, dramatic performances, games, gaming, &c. This exhibits no symptoms of applying the gospel to the times. The law itself, with all its trickeries and intricacies, its enforceability on the poor and its permissibility to the rich, is an evidence against the adaptation of the gospel to the age; for (1) were the gospel adapted to the age, law would be unnecessary, or (2) if necessary, would be in conformity with the gospel in its aims and in its forms. Law is the essence of civilization, but our civilization is not a civilization of love, such as the gospel, advocates and enforces; it is a civilization of selfishness; of antagonistic interests adroitly balanced so as to give the rich, the powerful, the possessory classes the firmest hold on the goods of society and the pleasures of life. But the gospel civilization is that of self-sacrifice, and its principle is—"Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you."

This is an age of excessive competition—competition of sects, nations, trades, grades, individuals, and even sexes. Every effort  
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is made to acquire and keep something for ourselves of which another cannot get the benefit. Sects fight for privileges and powers; nations contend for pre-eminence and glory; trades have constant warfare of masters against men, and men against masters, and their unions are not communions, but associations for mutual defiance and defence; class clamours against class, and arms and agitates for the protection of the rights of the one and the destruction of the privileges of another; persons compete one with another with pertinacity sharpened by the knowledge that only so can life be maintained, however little it may be enjoyed; and, as we have said, even the sexes now enter into competition, and are engaged in a warfare indicated in the discussion taking place elsewhere in these pages on the topic, "Ought the subjection of women to be continued?" That such a subject should be discussed is, perhaps, as clear a proof as any that the gospel is not adapted for the age; for it is an express declaration of the Scriptures that "the woman was made for the man, and not the man for the woman." The above paragraph contains sorely grievous proof that the gospel is not adapted to the age; for the gospel advocates community of feeling, endeavour, life, worship, and intercourse, and commands men to dwell together in love.

That the gospel is not adapted to modern life is made most evident by the churches themselves. They do not accept the gospel as their standard, but proceed to adapt it by creeds, confessions, articles, expositions, catechisms, &c., to the age and circumstances. If the gospel, pure and simple, was adapted to this age or any age, it would not require the manipulation it has got from the various sects to shape it into congruency with the modes of thinking prevalent among men in different ages. Moreover, the constant sermonizings, disquisitions, expositions, apologies, &c., which are brought before the public show that there is a want of adaptation in the gospel to the necessities of the case. What do our Bampton Lectures, Boyle Lectures, Hulsean Essays, Congregational Lectures, Burnet Prizes, Bridgewater Treatises prove? what do all the endeavours at persuasion and conviction made by the writers on "The Evidences of Christianity," from William Paley to Thomas Ragg mean, but that the gospel requires to be brought into harmony with the mind of the age? The gospel is so overlaid with comment and remark, enforcement and argument, that it seems as if those who were most officially entrusted with the ministration of its comforts were those who most doubted its efficacy in itself, unless it had first been moulded into some adaptation or other to the persons addressed and the opinions expressed. This shows that they do not think it adapted to the age, or why do they act as they do?

Another great proof of the want of adaptation to the age in the gospel is the prevalence of sectarianism. The gospel has not impressed the age with a divine unity of Christian faith, far less with a divine unity of Christian practice; though it has brought about a

grievous multiplication of Christian profession. If powerlessness is any evidence of want of adaptation, then that evidence is plentifully forthcoming to convince any one that the gospel is not adapted to modern life. In regard to believers all being one, as Christ and God are one, we see nothing of it. We find, on the contrary, that wars and fightings exist among the body of professing Christians on matters of faith and practice, and that frequently greater stress is laid on shibboleths of sects than sabbatic sanctity of soul. If the gospel were adapted to the age, these divisions would cease, and Christian profession would imply Christian practice. The effects of the gospel would be felt and shown and known in change of life, purity of social intercourse, honesty of relations, commercial and otherwise. But to affirm that the gospel of the Prince of Peace, of the all-powerful heavenly Father, and of the all-prevailing Spirit of comfort is adapted and effective in this age of sectarian contention, cant, hypocrisy, and discord, is to fly in the face of facts, and is quite sufficient to show that the spirit of truth is not in him who utters it. The gospel, therefore, we assert, has signally failed in adaptation to modern life.

Those who have followed us thus far in our remarks will see that we do not admit what A. A. affirms, that the gospel is adapted to modern life *politically* (p. 36); for we affirm that law is as opposed to the gospel now as it was in the days of the Saviour; and we contend that politics are little more than a competition of classes, interests, and sects. We equally earnestly deny the social adaptation of the gospel which he asserts (p. 36). Sociality is loving alliance, but competition is the very opposite, and competition is the custom and form of modern life. A. A. also, at p. 37, says that "the gospel is adapted to modern life *individually*;" but surely every one can see that individuality can scarcely be said to exist in such a state of competitive excitement and submission to law as modern life demands. Competition and legislation are enslavers, and do not at all tend to freedom. A. A.'s assertion about the moral adaptation of the gospel to the present age is equally erroneous. We see that the habits, manners, customs, requirements, and tendencies of modern life are opposed to those of the gospel; that men are drifting away more and more from the morality of the gospel. Were the gospel adapted to the age, it would restrain these tendencies, and quicken men to the new life which they require to live; but we know that, even among professing Christians, there is little of the pure morality of the gospel, and much conformity to the world. The gospel has lost its hold on the age, and this proves that it is not adapted to modern life.

A. F. F.

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## OUGHT THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES TO BE REVISED BY A ROYAL COM- MISSION?

### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"An erroneous rendering of a Scripture phrase may have been so well put into words, may carry a sound so terse and epigrammatic, as to have sunk deep into the mind of a nation, and to have become one of its household sayings. But who would accept the excuse of beauty or aptness in the case of anything else wrongly come by? It is strange that in this case only has any such argument been used and allowed."—*Dean Alford on "Revision."*

"And here let it never be forgotten, that though we believe Scripture to be a thing divine, a version, every version of Scripture, must of necessity be a thing human; must be liable to imperfection and error, and capable of correction and improvement."—*Ibid.*

THE question as above stated involves the consideration of two separate inquiries: first, Ought the Authorized Version to be revised? and second, Should the revision be conducted under the auspices of a Royal Commission? and it will therefore be as well to look at the subject in that order.

The reasons that there should now be a revision are numerous, and appear to be unanswerable.

I start with a proposition which has been very well put by a writer on this subject thus:—"Biblical criticism in general is as far in advance of what it was when that (the Authorized) version was made, as our modes of travelling at the present day are superior to those of the seventeenth century."

Not only has Biblical criticism thus advanced, but the bases upon which all Biblical criticism must proceed have also advanced to a similar extent. In the first place, all language is a science, and the original languages of the Bible individually are as much better known now than they were at the time the Authorized Version was made, as are the various natural sciences; and as a correct version must depend upon the knowledge of the translators in this respect, this fact, which must be, and indeed is, admitted on all hands, is of itself highly important.

But as the knowledge necessary for a translation of the Scriptures must be derived, in a great degree, from ancient manuscripts, it is evident that it is in the highest degree necessary that the version of the Scriptures should be derived from the most ancient and most valuable and reliable manuscripts. And if this proposition be a sound one, what answer can be made to the fact that the most valuable manuscripts of the New Testament have been discovered since the present Authorized Version was made?

The present version was founded upon what is known as the

*Textus Receptus*, compiled by Erasmus and his followers, who had but a very few manuscripts to work upon. No doubt they did the best they could with the materials within their reach, but the result of their labours—this *Textus Receptus*, which was the basis of the present version—is now, from the much superior materials within reach of the Biblical scholars of the present day, altogether rejected by them. Let us contrast for a moment the materials upon which Erasmus had to work, with those upon which a revision could now be much more safely founded. Erasmus had only one manuscript of the Book of the Revelation, and that an incomplete one, so that to make his text complete he was driven to translate what is known as the Latin Vulgate into the Greek, and the consequence was that portions of that book were inserted admittedly upon conjecture only.

At the present time there are five manuscripts, of the existence of which the translators of the Authorized Version were entirely ignorant. These five manuscripts are—(1) The Alexandrian manuscript (now in the British Museum), presented to Charles I. in the year 1628, by Cyril, of Constantinople. This manuscript belongs to about the middle of the fifth century, viz., about 460 A.D. (2) The Vatican manuscript (now in the Vatican at Rome), about one hundred years older than the Alexandrian, which would make its date about the middle of the fourth century. (3) The “Codex Ephræmi,” now in the Bibliothèque Impériale, at Paris. Owing to the scarcity of parchment at the time this manuscript was written, the material on which the sacred text was inscribed was afterwards used for the purpose of writing on it some of the poems of Ephræm, a Syrian theologian. This manuscript dates from the early part of the fifth century. We should be thankful that this very valuable addition to our Biblical literature has not been rendered useless by the subsequent inscription on it of the writings mentioned. This writing of one work over another was customary at the period referred to. (4) The “Codex Bezae,” now in the possession of the University of Cambridge, to which body it was presented by the reformer Beza, in the year 1581. This contains only the Gospels and the Acts, and it is believed that it was written about the beginning of the sixth century. (5) The “Codex Sinaiticus,” recently discovered by Tischendorf in a monastery on Mount Sinai, and the date of which he places at about the middle of the third century. This manuscript possesses a great advantage over all others from the fact that it alone is complete. The reader will obtain very interesting information as to this manuscript by referring to “The New Testament: the Authorized English Version, with introduction and various readings from the three most celebrated manuscripts of the original Greek text, by Constantine Tischendorf,” which may be had for the sum of two shillings.

But besides these more important manuscripts, a host of others of later date have been discovered since the issue of our Authorized Version.

Although the facts just narrated form of themselves a strong argument in favour of revision, yet I am prepared to carry the matter further by showing that the numerous and serious omissions, defects, and mistranslations in the present version render it in the highest degree essential, to the complete comprehension of the Word, that a revision should be made. The opponents of revision must not think that by this it is in any way sought to disparage the present version—admirable in every respect—or the labours of those by whom it was made; but while entertaining a genuine admiration for it, the last thing we should do would be to shut our eyes to its admitted errors; and so far from doing so, it is, as I think, a duty incumbent upon us to insist on the correction of these wherever they can be found.

Take Tischendorf's publication, already referred to, and it will be seen that there is not a single page of the New Testament in which our version does not differ from one or more of the most ancient manuscripts. "And since God has been graciously pleased, in these later times, to furnish us with means which men of former days did not possess, of making a closer approach to the *ipsissima verba* of inspiration, it must argue an undutiful and ungrateful spirit if we should neglect to employ them. Shall we not, with reverent hand, do what we can to remove the dust which, in the course of ages, has settled down on the precious jewel of sacred truth? Shall we not rejoice to restore to it, as far as lies in our power, its original resplendence? Or will any one say that no effort should be put forth with this end in view, because, forsooth, the beauty of the gem can still be perceived, and because its substantial value would not be affected by any changes in its aspect that might be made?"

This last inquiry is really the proper method of stating the question. I find that a great many persons have a repugnance to revision because they fancy that the words of the present version are the exact words as they fall—to use a figure of speech—from the lips of the Almighty. This view is impressed on their congregations by the ministers of some Dissenting bodies, and I dare say in the Establishment also, not only in small chapels and by comparatively ignorant ministers—which would make it, to some extent, pardonable,—but by the ministers of large congregations; and the latter too readily receive the words of their pastors as next to infallible.

I proceed now to show a few of the numerous omissions, defects, and mistranslations in our version. Take first 1 John v. 7: "For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one." This verse is a pure invention. It is not to be found in any of the ancient manuscripts, none of the patriarchs of the Christian Church allude to it, and Erasmus did not give it in his first and second editions. But, being much pressed on the subject, he promised to insert it if a single Greek manuscript could be found containing it. An unim-

portant manuscript now in Trinity College, Dublin, called the "Codex Montfatianus," containing the passage, was thereupon raked up and produced, and Erasmus unwillingly included it in his later editions, from which it was, without any better authority, and in fact against all authority, transferred to our version. But it is an utter interpolation, and all scholars are agreed that it ought to be erased from the Scriptures, Tischendorf, in his foot-note to this chapter, agreeing with them. A writer on this subject has recently said, "Truth in everything must at last prevail; and as surely as the first verse of St. John's Gospel, which contains such an illustrious testimony to our Saviour's deity, is genuine, so surely is this verse a forgery, and ought never to be quoted or referred to as possessed of the authority of the word of God." The seventh chapter of the Acts narrates the circumstance of the conversion of the eunuch by Philip; and the 37th verse says, "And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." This passage cannot be found in any of the ancient manuscripts. In John v., 3rd and 4th verses, are these words,—"In these lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, *waiting for the moving of the water. For an angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water: whosoever then first, after the troubling of the water, stepped in, was made whole, of whatsoever disease he had.*" The words commencing with "waiting," to the end of the passage are entirely omitted from four of the manuscripts above referred to, viz., those numbered 2, 3, 4, and 5, and the authorities are now almost unanimous in entirely rejecting them.

A multitude of other similar instances might be given, and one has only to consult Tischendorf's edition of the English New Testament, to see how almost innumerable they would be; but it is unnecessary to multiply examples, and I must therefore content myself with only a few more of the same character.

Referring to 1 John ii. 23, the following words will be found:—"Whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father: [*but*] *he that acknowledgeth the Son hath the Father also.*" The words here put in italics are also italicized in our version, thereby conveying the belief of the translators that there was not sufficient authority for the admission of the words as a portion of the inspired writing. But, strangely enough, all the ancient manuscripts contain this passage, and there is not the least doubt as to their authenticity. Very numerous and desirable alterations in the present reading of the Scriptures would be made by a revision; e.g., in Ephes. vi. 9, instead of "knowing that your Master also is in heaven," we should have that which is sanctioned by the oldest manuscripts, viz., "knowing that both their Master and yours is in heaven." These alterations would accomplish very necessary changes in the meaning of many passages; thus, instead of reading in Jude 1, "To them that are *sanctified* by God the Father,"



should, on the authority of all the old manuscripts, read, "To them that are *beloved* by God the Father;" and in 1 Pet. iii. 8, instead of the injunction "Be courteous," we should read "Be humble."

There are, of course, many disputed readings, as to the correctness of one or other of which no argument need here be entered into, but the fact that some readings are disputed is, I venture to think, one good reason for a revision, on which a body of competent men could, no doubt, conclude from the best evidences which of the readings should be adopted, and could, if necessary, give the other readings in a foot or marginal note.

We ought to give many thanks to the Jews for the admirable zeal they have shown in the preservation of that part of the Bible which we call the "Old Testament," but even in this portion of the Authorized Version there are numerous defects which should be remedied, and numerous mistranslations which must be corrected. One thing also strikes a reader of the Hebrew portion of the Scriptures, viz., the rejection by our translators of the old poetic form in which a large portion of them was originally written, by which much of the beauty and force of the original has been lost, an instance of which will be presently supplied.

In Gen. iv. 8 are these words:—"And Cain talked with Abel his brother; and it came to pass when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him."

Notwithstanding that the verse reads tolerably well, there is evidently an omission, because nothing has been said in this chapter to lead to the conclusion that Cain and Abel were in a field. The Septuagint version, compiled some hundreds of years before the birth of Christ, happily enables us to supply this omission. But besides this omission there is a mistranslation, for the Hebrew word here translated "talked" is, as we are assured by competent authorities, used some thousands of times in the Old Testament, and in every other instance is properly rendered "said." Taking, then, the materials supplied by the Greek version, which coincides with that known as the Samaritan version, and using the word "said," we have the complete verse thus,—"*And Cain said to Abel his brother, Let us go into the field; and it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him.*"

The chronology, in many instances, requires revising; many of the books require rearranging and re-chaptering, if the phrase may be used, in order to rescue them from their present confused state.

By correcting the mistranslations in our version of both Testaments, we should certainly deprive infidelity of some of the weapons with which, through the errors in our translation, it now attacks what it imagines to be the immorality of the principles inculcated. A few instances of this kind will suffice, but it should be stated that mistranslations of this kind abound. In some places the proper translation entirely alters the sense; e. g., our version has

translated a Hebrew word by the English word "borrow," which latter word, of course, conveys an obligation to repay. But when we come to look at the original we find that it means simply to "ask" or "demand," which implies no such obligation. The very great error in Exodus xxxiv. 33 is, I believe, well known, and universally admitted. In our version we have, "And *still* Moses had done speaking with them, he put a veil on his face:" the correct rendering being, "And *when* Moses had done speaking, &c." The context itself shows that this latter is the correct version.

The most poetical and sublime of all the books of the Old Testament is perhaps the Book of Job, and this book, which demands the most correct rendering, is perhaps the worst handled and the most unintelligible of all the books of the Bible, from the simple fact of the numerous errors in its translation, and its want of arrangement. Will any kind friend, who espouses the opposite side of this question, inform me, without reference to the original, what is meant by this passage in chap. xxxvi. 33?—"The noise thereof sheweth concerning it, the cattle also concerning the vapour." It certainly is not English, and is quite beyond the comprehension of even the most subtle theologian. Again, "Fair weather cometh out of the north; with God is terrible majesty." Is there any and what connection between the latter clause of this sentence and the former?

I now give an extract from a recent article on this subject, and will contrast with the translation there quoted that which is given in the Authorized Version, leaving the reader to judge which is the better and more easily understood.

"The whole concluding part of Elihu's speech is indeed grievously bungled in our version. There is completely hidden from an ordinary reader the fact that it contains, probably, the earliest description of a thunderstorm to be found in all literature. As he speaks Elihu perceives those clouds gathering, from the depths of which the voice of Jehovah is soon to be heard; and in that portion of his speech which extends from chap. xxxvi. 29 to chap. xxxvii. 5, he expresses the feelings which that spectacle excited within him, as follows:—

'Who again can understand the outspreading of the clouds,  
And the fearful thunderings in His pavilion?  
Behold! He flashes His lightnings over it,  
And covereth the depths of the sea.  
For by these [agencies] He executeth judgment to the people;  
By these also He provideth food in abundance.  
With His hands He covereth the lightning,  
And commandeth it where to strike:  
He pointeth out to it His friends,  
His wrath collects over the wicked.  
At this also my heart palpitates,  
And is moved out of its place.  
Hear, O hear, the thunder of His voice,  
The muttering thunder that goes forth from His mouth!

He directeth it under the whole heaven,  
 He [scattereth] the lightnings to the ends of the earth,  
 After it a voice roareth;  
 He thundereth with the voice of His glory;  
 He will not restrain the tempest when that voice is heard.  
 God thundereth marvellously with His voice;  
 He doeth wonders which we cannot comprehend.'

"And now the Almighty draws nearer and nearer in that dark pavilion, lighted up from time to time with the most brilliant flashes, about to interpose and put an end to the long discussion. As the solemn scene fixes their gaze on the heavens, as the dark cloud, on the bosom of which the lightning plays, is seen to gather over them, as the living fire leaps forth from the heart of that terrible canopy, and the roar of the thunder almost instantaneously afterwards shakes the solid ground, a deep awe falls upon all the spectators, and Elihu concludes with these abrupt, confused, agitated, but all the more suggestive words:—

'And now men cannot look at the splendour which is in the clouds,  
 For the wind sweeps along and brightens them.  
 Glory as of gold approaches from the north;  
 With God is terrible majesty!  
 The Almighty! we cannot find him out:  
 Vast in power and judgment, and abundant in righteousness,  
 He will not oppress.  
 Men should therefore stand in awe of Him;  
 He regardeth not any that are wise in heart.'

The Authorized Version mars this sublime poetry by rendering it in the following unintelligible form (chap. xxxvi. 29 to chap. xxxvii. 5, both inclusive):—

"29. Also, can any understand the spreadings of the clouds, or the noise of His tabernacle?

"30. Behold, He spreadeth His light upon it, and covereth the bottom of the sea.

"31. For by them judgeth He the people; He giveth meat in abundance.

"32. With clouds He covereth the light; and commandeth it *not to shine* by the cloud that cometh betwixt.

"33. The noise thereof sheweth concerning it, the cattle also concerning the vapour.

"1. At this also my heart trembleth, and is moved out of his place.

"2. Hear attentively the noise of His voice, and the sound that goeth out of His mouth.

"3. He directeth it under the whole heaven, and His lightning unto the ends of the earth.

"4. After it a voice roareth: He thundereth with the voice of His excellency; and He will not stay them when His voice is heard.

"5. God thundereth marvellously with His voice; great things doeth He, which we cannot comprehend."

In the New Testament we find numerous similar instances of mistranslation which require immediate correction; e.g., Acts. iii.

19, is thus rendered in our version, "Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord;" the correct translation of the original being that given by Dean Alford, "Repent ye therefore, and turn you, that your sins may be blotted out, *that* the times of refreshing may come from the presence of the Lord." Thus it will be seen that an entirely different sense is thrown over the whole of this passage. In 1 Thess. v. 22 there is the following somewhat equivocal passage: "Abstain from all appearance of evil." By a close adherence to the original we have instead, "Abstain from every kind of evil." In 1 Tim. vi. 5 we read "supposing that gain is godliness," instead of which we should have "supposing that godliness is gain." The effect of the misplacement of only one word will be seen by a reference to Heb. xii. 1, where we have, "Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight," &c., instead of which it should read, "Wherefore, seeing that we are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us also run," &c. Thus a considerable change is wrought by the proper placing of the word "also."

I pass over numerous instances where our rendering is inadequate to convey the force and meaning of the original, and notice only one or two passages as specimens; *e. g.*, Acts xvii. 22—"Then Paul stood in the midst of Mars' Hill, and said, Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious." This passage should be rendered, "I perceive that in all things ye are *very religious*." In Phil. ii. 6, speaking of Christ, the apostle says, "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God." The scholars of the present day translate this "did not deem it a thing to grasp at," or a "thing to be clung to," or "a prize to be seized on, to be equal with God."

The translations of many parts are manifestly absurd, but a proper rendering of the originals would make their sense complete, *e. g.*, "Nothing worthy of death was done *unto* him," in Luke xxii. 15, should be "nothing worthy of death was done *by* him." In John iii. occurs the question put to Nicodemus, "Art thou a teacher of Israel?" the correct rendering of which, as acknowledged by all Greek scholars, including Erasmus, should be, "Art thou *the* teacher of Israel?"

More serious errors, however, occur through the mistranslation or non-translation of the Greek article; and upon this point I quote Archbishop Trench "On the Authorized Version of the New Testament," who, after having pointed out the "serious doctrinal misunderstandings" which our version renders possible, in Romans v. 15, 17, proceeds to quote Bentley's criticism on the Authorized Version as follows:—

"This will enable us to clear up another place of much greater consequence, Rom. v., where, after the apostle had said, ver. 12, 'that by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed *upon*'

*all men*, for that all have sinned,' in the reditio[n] of this sentence, ver. 15, he says, 'for if through the offence of *one many* be dead' (so our translators), 'much more the grace of God by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.' Now who would not wish that they had kept the articles in the version which they saw in the original? 'If through the offence of *the one* (that is, Adam) *the many* have died, much more the grace of God by *the one man* hath abounded unto *the many*.' By this accurate version some hurtful mistakes about partial redemption and absolute reprobation had been happily prevented. Our English readers had then seen, what several of the Fathers saw and testified, that *the many* in an antithesis to *the one*, are equivalent to *all* in ver. 12, and comprehend the whole multitude, the entire species of mankind, exclusive only of *the one*. So, again, verses 18 and 19 of the same chapter, our translators have repeated the like mistake, where, when the apostle had said, 'That as the offence of one was upon *all men* to condemnation, so the righteousness of one was upon *all men* to justification; for,' adds he, 'as by one man's disobedience *the many* were made sinners, so by the obedience of one the many shall be made righteous.' By this version the reader is admonished and guided to remark that *the many* in ver. 19 are the same as *all*, in the 18th. But our translators, when they render it '*many* were made sinners, *many* were made righteous,' what do they less than lead and draw their unwary readers into error?"

In Matt. xiii. 34, our version gives us "All these things spake Jesus unto the multitude in parables; and without a parable spake He not unto them." This last clause is obviously erroneous, as numerous instances may be found in which Christ did speak to the people without parables. The fault, however, is in the translation, and not in the original, which gives us, "without a parable was He not in the habit of speaking unto them." One other example of a similar kind we find in Luke v. 6, where our version says, "And when they had this done, they enclosed a great multitude of fishes: and their net *brake*." Instead of this last word, a correct translation would give us, "*their net was at the point of breaking*."

There is still another, and not by any means the least urgent, reason for revision. The English in which our version now stands is the English of three hundred years ago, and this fact alone renders many parts almost, if not quite, unintelligible. If any one should object, that so long as it is English the rest is unimportant, I ask, should the inspired Scriptures be laid open to the reading and understanding of all, high and low, or should they be obscured by this cloud of antique English? Whose writings are the more attractive to the ordinary mind, those of Longfellow or of Chaucer? And the same principle may be justly applied to an ancient and modern rendering of the Bible. As it has been very aptly said,—

"The sole point to be considered is how the style of the Authorized Version affects those who are familiar only with the English of the present day. And we have no hesitation in saying that, in very many passages, it is to such persons very obscure, if not altogether unintelligible. Nor, considering the length of time which has elapsed since our version was formed, is it possible that the case should be otherwise. Who would expect any humble

peasant, or even one who has just received the elements of a good English education, to understand or be much attracted by the writings of such old authors as Francis Quarles or Sir Walter Raleigh? However interesting the subjects of which these writers treat, their style is so antiquated and so obscure to the majority of readers, that any attempt which might be made to peruse their works would be speedily abandoned. Yet they were coeval with the translators of our Authorized Version. And the same obscurities and perplexities which emerge in their writings to an ordinary English reader at the present day, may also be expected in the common translation. Nor does it require much investigation to discover that such is the case. Many passages might be brought forward which are couched in phraseology that cannot but be perplexing, if not misleading, to those who are acquainted only with their own language, as spoken or written in their own day."

The writer from whom I have just quoted cites numerous instances in proof of his assertion.

In several verses of Matt. v.; in Mark xiii. 2; Luke xii. 11, 22, 26, the phrase "take thought" is used, instead of the accurate expression, "being anxious." Thus, in Matt. v. 25, we have, "Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life," &c., which should be, "be not anxious," &c.; in ver. 27 of the same chapter we have, "which of you by *taking thought*, can add *one cubit to his stature*." In addition to the substitution of "being anxious" for "taking thought," a reference to a Greek lexicon will satisfy any one that the accurate and apposite rendering of the original for which our translators have given "can add one cubit to his stature" should be "can add one span to his life." Again, in Matt. v. 29, our translators have given us, "If thy right eye *offend thee*, &c., and in the following verse, "If thy right hand *offend thee*, &c., the accurate and intelligible rendering of the original being "If thy right eye *cause thee to sin*," &c., and "if thy right hand *cause thee to sin*," &c. The modern word for "leasing," which is used in the Psalms, is "lying;" the verb "to ear," used in various places in the Old Testament, means "to till the ground," and I venture to say that, to a modern English reader, understanding only his own language, and that probably inadequately, the proper meanings of the words quoted, and numerous other similar ones, would seldom, if ever, be attached to them.

Passing over the numerous, or rather innumerable, grammatical defects of our version, and only naming the desirability which exists for putting the proper names of the Bible heroes and places into such a state as that they may be recognised as denoting the same persons and places in both Testaments, I now come to notice another portion of Dr. Trench's work "On the Authorized Version," an extract from which I cannot refrain from giving, its propositions and reasoning being incontrovertible:—

"It is clearly the office of translators to put the reader of the translation as nearly as may be on the same vantage-ground as the reader of the original; to give him, so far as this is attainable, the same assist-

understanding the author's meaning. Now every exact and laborious student of the Greek Testament knows there is almost no such help in some passage of difficulty, doctrinal or otherwise, as to turn to his Greek Concordance, to search out every other passage in which the word or words wherein the difficulty seems chiefly to reside occur, and closely to observe their usage there. It is manifestly desirable that the reader of the English Bible should have as nearly as possible the same resource. But if, where there is one and the same word in the original, there are two, three, half-a-dozen in the version, he is in the main deprived of it. Thus, he hears the doctrine of the atonement discussed; he would fain turn to all the passages where 'atonement' occurs; he finds only one (Rom. v. 2), and, of course, is unaware that in other passages where he meets 'reconciling' and 'reconciliation' (Rom. xi. 15; 2 Cor. v. 18, 19), it is the same word in the original. In words like this, which are, so to speak, *sedes doctrine*, one regrets, above all, variation and uncertainty in rendering.

"Thus it will sometimes happen that when St. Paul is pursuing a close train of reasoning, and one which demands severest attention, the difficulties of his argument, not small in themselves, are aggravated by the use of different words where he has used the same; the word being sometimes the very key of the whole; as, for instance, in the fourth chapter of the Romans, *logizomai* occurs eleven times in this chapter. We may say that is the key-word to St. Paul's argument throughout, being everywhere employed most strictly in the same sense, and that a technical and theological. But our translators have no fixed rule of rendering it. Twice they render it 'count' (verses 3, 5); six times 'impute' (verses 6, 8, 11, 22, 23, 24); and three times 'reckon' (verses 4, 9, 10); while at Gal. iii. 6 they introduce a fourth rendering, 'account.' Let the student read this chapter, employing everywhere 'reckon,' or which would be better, everywhere 'impute,' and observe how much of clearness and precision St. Paul's argument would in this way acquire."

There is still another defect in the present version, which would render a revision highly advantageous. I refer now to that class of unnecessarily offensive expressions (I do not particularize them) which, from a due sense of delicacy, would prevent those parts of the Scripture containing them being read by or in presence of females or children. The meaning intended to be conveyed by those passages could be expressed with equal plainness, without this unnecessary offence, and it is therefore quite time that the verses containing them should be substituted by others of a more delicate and modest character.

The question then arises, by whom or under what sanction should a revision be made? I must confess that, to me, it appears highly desirable that this work of national importance should have the authority of the highest power in the nation, or, in other words, that it should be executed under a Royal Commission. Indeed, it is to be regretted that all the Protestant powers have not been invited to send their best scholars to join in the work, and thus to make the contemplated revision of the Protestant Bible; instead of merely a revised version of the English Bible.

Of course not even a Royal Commission could make a final version

of the Bible, nor would it be desirable to do so, as it is not to be expected that the phrases used now will be any better understood some centuries hence than are some of those used in the present *Authorised Version*.

This deservedly celebrated version was compiled under an authority somewhat similar to that of a Royal Commission. Dr. Rainolds, a Puritan divine, in January, 1604, stated to King James I. that a new translation of the Bible was an urgent national want. The Bishop of London opposed this proposition, but James sanctioned it, and in the following July, after the necessary arrangements had been made, he wrote a letter intimating the appointment of fifty-four scholars for the preparation of the version, and instructing the bishop that whenever "a living of £20" should become vacant, to inform him of the fact, that he might recommend one of the translators to the patron.

I will not anticipate the arguments which may be made use of on the other side, although it would not be difficult to do so, they having been declaimed by unwise preachers from their respective pulpits.

But, as the desire of all should be to attain the truth, at what cost soever, and it is the bounden duty of all to advocate and insist upon correctness and accuracy in the translation of this the most important Book of all, and where, therefore, precision is all the more necessary, there is only one class of persons which can, I conceive, have a tangible objection to revision; I refer to that class (composed of only few persons, it is to be hoped) who, having elaborated some favourite dogmas for their own peculiar benefit, fear lest a thorough revision should sweep the foundation of those dogmas away.

H. K.

**PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD.**—"The science of history, that of law, and that of ethics, remain imperfect until their several systems of phenomena, known to us by observation or experiment, are connected with their physiological basis, and with the system of states of consciousness dependent on physical structure and function. There are three things to be done: history to be studied, character to be analyzed, and the two connected together by referring history to character, in the first place, and character to history, by its reaction on it, in the second. There would then arise a complete and deductive science."—SHADWORTH H. HOBBESON.



## History.

## WERE THE CRUSADES BENEFICIAL TO SOCIAL PROGRESS?

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE verdict of nations is not unfrequently to be discovered by the unconscious change which comes over words in the course of time. As the years pass, and the associations of men concrete around the words or phrases, there comes to be attached to them an indirect, but irresistible suggestion of ideas which were not in the least related to the original term. Such terms are numerous: we have, for instance, Precisian, one rather too strict; Puritanical, religious overmuch; Cavalier, disdainfully haughty; Sophist, pretentiously wise, &c. These and similar words acquire their special connotation by an almost imperceptible gathering round them the ordinary associations which we have attached to them, until, by the frequency with which they are thought together, they begin to seem inseparable from the main meaning. Associations, like ivy, sometimes growing more noticeable than the original in which it has fixed, or round which it twines itself, comes to have prominence in our minds, and indicate by their suggestions the ideas we usually attach to them.

One of the words which has thus had a connotation given to it indicative of the verdict of the thoughtful, is that which first falls to be considered in debating a question such as that which has now been put before us. The word *crusades*, though originating in the Latin *crux* and the French *croix*, a cross, through the term *croisade*, yet enters our language very directly and appropriately from the Spanish *crusada*—a military expedition undertaken under the banner of the *cross*, particularly an expedition to redeem the Holy Land from the domination of the Saracens, who, being infidels, were unworthy to possess that good land. But the term has gradually declined from this special signification to mean any course of conduct undertaken for the suppression of an evil, or for the attainment of a benefit; and thence it has degenerated till it is employed to denote any romantic, hopeless, or foolish undertaking. Hence we speak of the "crusade against the corn laws;" making a crusade in favour of community of goods and of fraternity in labour; engaging in a crusade against the vices of courts and alleys; and of commencing a crusade against gin palaces. It has even been alleged that the criminal classes are combined in a crusade against property and life. If there is any truth in the theory of the present day regarding language, that words take their hue and colour from the minds through which they pass, it seems pretty obvious that the minds of men have taken up a pretty decided opinion, adverse to the nobility, grandeur, excellence, and praiseworthiness of the Crusades, and that they now look upon them with a species of com-

passionating contempt, as things on which men had foolishly set their hearts, and pursued with an earnestness disproportioned to their importance, or their possible results, perhaps on some accounts noble, but on others most certainly unwise, if not wicked.

Our first argument, then, is that, apparently, by the common consent of men, as gleaned from their use of the word, the Crusades have come to be regarded as in the main disadvantageous, because foolish and vain, wrong in aim, and fruitless in results. It is impossible, we think, either to gainsay the accuracy or to deny the relevancy of this initiatory argument—an argument which comes into immediate contact with the opponents, who believe that the Crusades have been beneficial to social progress.

I am quite well aware that it is easy to get into ecstasies on the Crusades—that the poets are against me, and especially what Leigh Hunt appropriately calls “the favourite epic of the young,” has given enchantment to the subject. Tasso’s “Jerusalem Delivered,” which has been translated by Fairfax, Hoole, and Wiffen, is “the History of the Crusades, related with poetic licence,” in which “the infidels are assisted by unlawful arts; and the libertinism which brought scandal on the Christians is converted into youthful susceptibility, led away by enchantment.” Other poets have made darlings of the crusaders, and have brought dramatic incident and fine language into play to quicken the fervour of feeling in their favour; but I am not thereby the less inclined to stigmatise the Crusades as unprincipled and pernicious wars, and to affirm that the crusaders have most probably been the greatest wasters of human life to little purpose of whom history speaks.

I shall, for brevity’s sake, for the present assume that the reader is acquainted with the material facts of the history of the Crusades, as related by Gibbon, chaps. 58—61; Hallam, in his “History of the Middle Ages;” Charles Mill’s “History of the Crusades;” the translation of Michaud’s “History of the Crusades;” Simon Ockley’s “History of the Saracens;” Heeren’s “Essay on the Influence of the Crusades,” or some other work of authority; as it would be impossible, within any reasonable limits, to give even an outline of those endeavours—

“To chase those pagans in these holy fields,  
Over whose acres walked those blessed feet  
Which, eighteen hundred years ago, were nailed,  
For our advantage, to the bitter cross.”

Our object is not historical, but critical; we do not require to describe, but to discuss. An able historian of the period of the Crusades has justly remarked that “in their estimate of these memorable expeditions upon the political, moral, and religious aspect of society, scarcely two historians of eminence are agreed.” Major Procter’s statement fully justifies the selection of the Crusades as a question in history requiring consideration; and it would be easy to show from a collection of passages from various writers on this period of the wars of the cross that there are sufficient dif-

ferences of opinion among them to excite a critical mind to examine the matter with some minuteness, in the hope that our observations may somewhat help in the solution of the difficulty. I proceed to state and defend certain opinions adverse to the idea of the beneficiality of the Crusades.

I. The Crusades were founded on, and encouraged a false opinion regarding the conditions of Christian faith.

Faith is a great, noble, and effective force, one of the mightiest movers of men; but force neither is, nor is able to excite or control faith. We cannot believe "on compulsion." Faith is free; it will only change by reason applied to the intellect or love applied to the heart; it cannot be brought about by blows, fire, imprisonment, or fight. To show fight may show faith, but is not very likely to change it. The Crusades were a series of endeavours to work out moral changes and religious reforms, to bulwark and promote Christianity by armed intervention, warfare, and belligerency. They were missionary expeditions to enforce conversion at the point of the sword; they were demands made by fanatical men, upon what, to their enemies, appeared fanciful and false grounds, for territorial concessions consequent on change of faith, which change was sought to be effected by the weapons of the kingdoms of this world. I affirm that it is a most disastrous form of thought to fix in men's minds and to practise among them that intellectual conviction can be effected by force, and that religious change can be brought about in men's minds by the application of war, persecution, and external violence. This is the essence of the principle of persecution; and in so far as the Crusades, directly or indirectly, tended to induce men to admire and to administer force as a means of altering men's faith, they were disadvantageous to social progress.

II. The Crusades were undertaken and persevered in from a superstitious regard for the places of the Holy Land, and so were akin in their origin to idolatry.

The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; neither is it dependent on sanctuaries and holy places, pilgrimages and shrines. The merit of Christianity is that it lives in the heart, and is personal, is independent of place and time. Anything that encourages superstitious reverences of such a sort as those which Peter the Hermit advocated is inimical to true Christianity and to social progress. We may even point to the long-continued evil influence arising from the superstition about the holy places by noting how much these ideas lay at the root of the disturbances of Europe which resulted in the Crimean war. It cannot be too expressly observed how little local the Christian religion is, and how particular our Lord was in denying to places any sacredness in themselves, making them appropriate for places of worship and associations of worshippers, and this should enable us to see that, in so far as the Crusades tended to induce men to form and to foster ideas concerning sanctities of place, they were creating influences disadvantageous to social progress.

III. The tendency of the Crusades was to build up the Papacy and increase its power. "Among the direct consequences of the Crusades, none is so prominent and undeniable as the advance of papal aggrandizement. This increase of an influence the most obstructive of any to social improvement—the deadliest paralyzer of activity, and the malignant foe of reason—is an evil of such magnitude as is not to be compensated by any accidental good. The eventual triumph of the Gothic mind over this monster mischief may have been collaterally aided by circumstances arising out of the Crusades. But these had not the impellent virtue which is by some ascribed to them. There was nothing more in them than may be found, in a greater or less degree, in the events of all wars, especially those which first brought the barbarian tribes into the abodes of civilization." The power, wealth, luxury, and corruption of the Papacy exercised a most deleterious influence upon the progress of men and nations. During the two centuries through which the Crusades lasted, the power of the Pope was not only confirmed, but enhanced; and not a few of those pernicious adjuncts to its power which most fatally affected social progress were added to it or strengthened by them. This intolerable growth has still a greater amount of *préstiçe* from these olden times than it ought.

IV. The Crusades distracted the minds of men from the true causes of social improvement and withdrew men from following out and pursuing those sound schemes of progress and prosperity which alone can lead men to happiness.

The bedazzlement of war always affects civilization for evil; but religious war has a bewildering effect far worse than common warfare. Warriors sought fame and eternal benefit from war, and they impoverished Europe by their demands; they arrogated on their return such special privileges and immunities, and they formed such formidable oppressors, that they greatly impeded the growth of liberty and independence. The glamour of these distant and costly enterprises blinded the eyes of men to the tyranny they employed and fostered, and they invested foreign warfare with glittering attractions, such as have not yet faded from the minds of those who delight in the gorgeous habiliments of soldiery. This sanctifying of bloodshed was greatly the result of the wars of the Crusaders.

V. The Crusades have had the effect of greatly increasing tolerance to military licence and mischief. It is a long time before the influences of the training of centuries is obliterated, and so we inherit from these ages our ideas of a celibate soldiery and camp debauchery.

VI. The Crusades encouraged a reckless disregard for human life, such as the nations have not yet had ability to reform.

It would perhaps be unfair in me, in this opening paper, to cover the entire field of the debate, but I think the dispassionate reader may see enough in what has been said already to make him pause before he accepts unhesitatingly of the affirmation that the Crusades were beneficial to social progress.

M. F. A.

## Coiling Upward.

THOMAS COOPER: SHOEMAKER, CHARTIST, AND POET.

### CHAPTER III.

(Continued from p. 295.)

ON re-entering the prison which he was afterwards to consecrate by noble intellectual work done within its walls, Mr. Cooper found that he was regarded simply as a common criminal, and that books and writing materials were to be withheld. He therefore petitioned the House of Commons for a relaxation of this, to him, great severity of treatment, setting forth his habits of life and the necessity of means for literary occupation. By the intervention of Mr. T. S. Duncombe, M.P., from whom he received gratefully remembered attention and assistance,\* and other friends, his request was partially granted, and he obtained liberty to correspond weekly with Mrs. Cooper, who remained at Leicester, and permission to receive his books—political publications alone excepted. "What did I want with *them*?" Mr. Cooper has said; "I carried my Chartistism with me. I wanted Milton and Shakspeare,—something for my mind."

By day he occupied a small room, or cell, with a stone floor, at first in conjunction with his fellow-Chartists—Messrs. Capper, Arthur O'Neill, and John Richards. But as their terms of imprisonment expired before his own, he was ultimately the sole tenant of it. It possessed a fireplace; but, when fire was wanted, he had to purchase the wood and coal. For his washing he also had to pay. When pecuniary supplies fell short, and he could not, consequently, obtain fuel, his only resource for warmth was to copy his earlier experience and to wrap himself up in flannels and woollen shirts which some of the Leicester "Shaksperians" had sent. A

\* In the "Life and Correspondence of the late T. S. Duncombe, M.P.," Mr. Duncombe's son has referred to Mr. Cooper in a manner which can only be termed gratuitously insulting. From a letter of Mr. Cooper to Mr. Thomas Chambers we are permitted to extract the following:—"I suppose I had about £25 from Mr. Duncombe in all, certainly not more. £10 he sent me when my first Chartist paper (at Leicester), the *Midland Counties Illuminator*, was stopped by corporation influence, and I started the halfpenny Chartist *Bushlight*, and then the penny *Extinguisher*; \$5 he sent me towards commencing the *Commonwealth's-man*, and £10 he gave me when I visited him, in the Albany, while out on bail, before I went the second time to prison. That would be in February, 1843."

"His attention to me during my imprisonment was his most noble service to me."—April 8, 1868.

spacious yard, in which a few flowers were cultivated, afforded room for exercise. His sleeping-cell was damp and unhealthy, and the natural consequences of such miserable accommodation were—"unutterable agonies from rheumatism, neuralgia, and I had almost said a thousand devildments beside."\* Other results of his durance, less to be expected, were—a magnificent poem, which, we think, "future generations will not willingly let die," an historical romance, and two volumes of sketches.

The Rev. Mr. Sedger, chaplain of the gaol from May, 1844, to the end of Mr. Cooper's detention, testifies to the quiet, orderly conduct of the Chartist prisoners, and to the meanness and discomfort of their quarters.† Of Mr. Cooper himself he says that studiousness was his special characteristic, reading and writing being his continual occupations. One drawback to the good man's satisfaction with the always respectful and thoughtful worker was his refusal to attend chapel—a result, partly, of now sceptical opinions, partly of some disagreement with the previous chaplain. The latter, perhaps, may have been occasioned by Mr. Cooper—he has himself told the story—having once seized the reverend gentleman forcibly in his surplice, as he was about to step into the reading-desk of the gaol chapel, and demanded that, as a minister of Christ, he should interfere and prevent the magistrates from persevering with their ill-usage—particularly their cruel decree that the prisoner should neither write to his apparently dying wife nor receive a letter from her. "But," he adds, "it was too bad; the chaplain was not to blame; he could do nothing in the matter."

Such, with a few instances which will be gathered from the "Purgatory" itself, is a picture of Mr. Cooper's exterior prison-life. We return to its results, and trace the steps of further "toiling upward" by which they were produced.

He had for ten years entertained the idea of writing a work in which the chief personages should be such as had died by their own hands. During the enforced leisure of Mr. Cooper's first confinement in Stafford gaol the purpose took definite form, and a first attempt was made towards its realization. A poem, to be called "The Purgatory of Suicides," was commenced, in blank verse, and exactly one hundred lines, forming a "first book," were written. The following passages‡ will illustrate its form and character:—

"Of kings and curses, and of priests and lies;  
Of human thralldom, and the withered forms

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\* Letter to the Leicester Chartists.

† In manuscript "Recollections," written by request of his nephew, Mr. Thomas Chambers, to whom the writer of this sketch is indebted for assistance and much valuable information.

‡ From the original MS., hitherto wholly unpublished.

Of toiling men and wives and weeping babes,—  
 I thought, and groaned, upon my prison bed,  
 And strove, with many an anxious throe, to sound  
 The depths of that unfathomed problem—Why  
 The many still are slaves unto the few."

The free soul, not suffering like the flesh from the hard bed upon  
 which the body in vain sought restful slumber,—

"Discursive, travelled over distant shores  
 Through ancient times. The spirits of the past,  
 God-like and glorious, shedding beams of light,  
 But sudden and fitful—coruscations brief—  
 Mere meteors gorgeous—fled athwart the dark,  
 Leaving a track all lucid, but so thin  
 And fragmentary that my eager eye,  
 Wearied with following, sank into the gloom—  
 The mortal gloom profound. Leonidas  
 Was there a moment—and Thermopylæ  
 Gleamed as if gods three hundred had unveiled  
 Their sun-like faces on that narrow path."

Of Rome he writes thus,—

"The tenfold gloom  
 Of basest superstition swallowed up  
 Each streak, each latent glimpse of glory left  
 Circling the Capitol, its native crown;  
 And Papal keys, shook o'er th' enervate sons,  
 Frighted them from their father's heritage—  
 Immortal freedom—heirloom of the brave."

When Mr. Cooper again entered the gaol, access to his papers was refused; but he had not been long a prisoner for the second time before he resolved to re-write the poem, and, abandoning blank verse, to adopt the grand old resonant Spenserian stanza as the more suitable vehicle for his imaginings. The following extract from a prison journal (unpublished) fixes the date of the recommencement:—

"In the evening of the day that the foregoing was scribbled (July 15, 1848) I made an earnest beginning of my long-projected epic, 'The Purgatory of Suicides,' and up to the present time I have completed sixteen Spenserian stanzas. The commencement I made while in gaol before (in blank verse) being in my trunk, which I am not permitted to have, I was thus prevented from using, and I think it is well that I was. My hope is very strong that I shall, this time, effect my purpose. If I embody my *beau idéal*, I shall not have lived in vain."

Progress in its composition was steadily made, at an average rate of sixty stanzas monthly; and the whole, in 1,206 stanzas, 10,854 lines, was completed upon the 10th of February, 1845.

So the slow weeks passed by, with little external break to their monotony, but marked in the prisoner's inner life by the fine conceptions which successively arose in his imagination, and his effectual efforts to embody these in sinewy yet harmonious verse.

By the aid of the "Purgatory" itself we can see some of the few

outward interruptions to the otherwise dull round of the unvarying days. Foremost, though not first, among these was the release of his fellow-Chartists, to one of whom, John Richards, previously unknown to him, he became specially attached. It must be told to Mr. Cooper's honour that, on regaining his own freedom, he at once sought out his old friend and supported him, at least in part, for many years. Mr. Richards' seventy-first birthday occurred upon the first Christmas day of their imprisonment. The loss of his companionship is referred to in the poem :—

" Now the blithe old man  
Is gone, who joked, and told his merry tale  
Each morning when the prison day began,—  
Who spread instruction through the hours' long span,  
Mingling the grave and gay with cheery tongue.  
Oh, how I miss the septuagenarian !  
I wonder what hath kept his heart so young,  
That still he dreams to live and see the end of Wrong ?  
" Gone are my younger fellow-rebels all,  
To bustle once more with life's elbowing crowd ;  
And I am left, a solitary thrall,  
Where stillness, like the silence of the shroud,  
Pervades both night and day—save when aloud  
Clash bolts and bars, and the shrill curfew tolls  
The prisoner must to bed."

Six executions took place in front of the gaol during Mr. Cooper's detention there, one of which occasioned the lines with which the sixth book of the "Purgatory" opens. In one case he saw the preliminary pinioning and the criminal actually *carried away*, fainting, to his death. He records, in a note, the pain which the knowledge of the terrible scene enacted outside the walls caused to him and his companions upon the first occasion, and also the comparative indifference subsequently produced by the strong involuntary sense of the uselessness of sympathy.

Another woeful sight, of a convict struggling in vain, before his removal for transportation, to kiss his child through the grated doorway of the prison, gave rise to the thoughts by which the scenes of book 9 are introduced.

Mr. Sedger speaks of the opening of a new organ in the chapel, to which the governor invited Mr. Cooper, and adds that the "lively interest" exhibited by the latter "unmistakably showed that he had not only an ear but a strong passion for music." The chapel adjoined the day-room where he wrote. To this were due the fine passages at the commencement of the eighth book, upon the "Sicilian Mariners," the "Evening Hymn," and the "Old Hundredth." The last-named two may be quoted ;—

" Hush ! 'tis my infancy's quaint ' Evening Hymn '—  
My mother's favourite. Tears, ye best can tell  
What thoughts the heart's deep fountains over-brim  
With tenderness when that loved choral swell



Its potency o'er memory aways. A knell  
 It seems; and yet a carol, sweeter far  
 Than mirth can troll. Lives in its train a spell  
 Which shows the grave that dear, brave face doth mar,  
 But ever shields that heart from the oppressor's war.  
 "Hark! 'tis the grand 'Old Hundredth' that now peals  
 Its solemn glory through the tranced soul!  
 That matchless marshals of chords reveals,  
 Luther! thy freeborn majesty—they roll  
 So boldly, gravely full—that man's control,  
 We feel, befits not the thewed mind upgrown  
 Which germs such thought-sounds. Term ye me a thrall?  
 How, then, awakes the Saxon with each tone  
 Within me? Nay, I feel true freedom still my own."

Relaxation from the intense labour of this prison rhyme was found in the composition of the sketches which afterwards formed the bulk of "Wise Saws and Modern Instances." A small work on Hebrew (which was never published), and part of "Captain Cobler," an historical romance of much power and interest, were also written during the industrious two years of Mr. Cooper's imprisonment.

Nor was the Chartist forgetful, amid the poet's meditations, of the cause for which he was "in bonds." His friends, too, were not wholly forgetful of him, and occasionally sent him a little help, upon which he was dependent, as we have seen, for the means of providing fire in his cold prison, and other small but necessary comforts.

He left his Leicester business in charge, for Mrs. Cooper, of a young man to whom, as a friend of the Charter and the people, he had for some months given board, lodging, and money for his journeys. This generosity was repaid by dishonesty and ingratitude; but its object defended himself on the ground that he "could not act otherwise than permitted him by the constitution given him by his Maker." As such a "creature of circumstances," he involved the business in ruin; so that Mrs. Cooper was now also left without the means of maintenance, and had to go into Lincolnshire to her relatives.

The jealousy of Feargus O'Connor led him to imagine that the Stafford prisoner would be his enemy when released; and this led O'Connor to stop a subscription for the prisoner's relief, which called forth the "Letter to the Leicester Chartists," avowing continued adherence to the Charter, and confirmed opposition to the proposal for union with the middle class association, to which frequent reference has been made.

Had it not been for the kindness of a friend whom Mr. Cooper had known in London, he must have left the prison in rags. But clothes were, however, provided for him; and when his term of imprisonment ended, on the 4th May, 1845, Mr. Cooper speedily proceeded to London with his manuscripts, only at first to encounter

the usual difficulties with publishers. He there met with O'Connor, who apologized for his attacks in the *Northern Star*, and on the "Purgatory" MS. being casually mentioned during the ensuing conversation, promised to take the responsibility of printing it.

Shortly after his release the poet, from sheer gratitude, waited upon Mr. Duncombe, by whom he was received with much kindness, and also introduced to Mr. Benjamin Disraeli, M.P. (author of the "Revolutionary Epick," novelist, and Conservative leader), who recommended him—in vain, however—to the publishers Moxon and Colburn. Mr. John Forster, historian, and author of the "Life of Goldsmith," to whom Mr. Cooper was introduced, through Mr. Disraeli, by Mr. Ainsworth, referred him to Messrs. Chapman and Hall; but they wished, as did Mr. Forster, to have the words, "the Chartist," removed from the title-page of the poem. To this the author would not consent, Disraeli thus sustaining him in the refusal: "Don't let any one persuade you to take that off." The influence of Douglas Jerrold at last secured Mr. Jeremiah How's consent to undertake the issue of the work; but, as How failed soon afterwards, the author did not realize one shilling by the first edition of the "Purgatory."

This appeared in November, 1845, bearing the words, "By Thomas Cooper, the Chartist," proudly upon its front. It soon met with a hearty reception, the way for which was prepared by a generous review, attributed to Dr. Croly, in a Conservative paper, the *Britannia*. The *Eclectic Review*, then a powerful Nonconformist organ (in an article written by William Howitt), and other critical periodicals, followed with appreciative and laudatory notices. The first issue, of 500 copies, was soon exhausted, and the work was afterwards brought out by Watson in a cheaper form.

The idea of the poem was an extraordinary one, and it was worked out in an extraordinary manner. It was to represent the souls of suicides in the future state of being; or rather, in the transition realm of purgatory, where they are alternately subject to intervals of punishment and respite, in grades or positions differing according to their rank or character or aims on earth. The reader is introduced, in the various books of the poem, to successive companies of these, met together under different circumstances—sometimes in places or vast chambers, of styles corresponding to the distinguishing features of the respective groups. The spirits enter into high, and often passionate converse, upon questions which touch the future ordering of the universe. The theme is thus, in truth, of the final state of all things; and the poet skilfully unfolds, without sacrificing the historical consistency of his *dramatis persone*, all doubts which had perplexed his own soul respecting the ultimate issue, though the faith of—

"One far-off, divine event,

To which the whole creation moves,"

is nobly triumphant over all.

The whole is prefaced by a dedicatory sonnet to Thomas Carlyle, from whom Mr. Cooper has received repeated kindnesses, and for whose works he has often expressed the highest admiration.

"TO THOMAS CARLYLE.

"Right noble age-fellow, whose speech and thought  
Proclaim thee other than the supple throng  
Who glide Life's custom-smoothed path along,—  
Prescription's easy slaves—strangers to doubt,  
Because they never think! A lay untaught  
I offer thee. Receive the humble song,  
A tribute of the feeble to the strong  
Of inward ken—for that the theme is fraught  
With dreams of reason's high enfranchisement.  
Illustrious Schiller's limner, unto thee  
Mind's freedom must be precious—or what lent  
His toil its light, and what fires thine? The free  
Of soul with quenchless zeal must ever glow  
To spread the freedom which their own minds know."

Each book may be divided into two parts: one introductory, presenting the author's own thoughts, fancies, speculations, and experiences; the other, into which the first is made ingeniously, yet naturally, to merge, however remote the first topic may appear, portrays a distinct vision of the suicides—not, however, as the title might be supposed to indicate—not writhing under purgatorial discipline, but during their times of respite and in the bliss of their final freedom. In these second parts, of course, the main interest of the poem lies, though a deep interest and value attaches to the others.

It has been said, by a not unfriendly critic, and the assertion has been copied by a subsequent compiler, that the true poetry of the work is found only in the prefatory portions of its respective parts. But this is to limit the poet's mission to the simple experience and expression of feeling; in short, merely to tender-heartedness; and to overlook the possibility of his possession and use of superlative intellectual power and insight, and what may be called the realizing imagination, by which he throws himself into and vividly reproduces the scenes and characters of past or present, and, merging his own personality in that of his actors, speaks with their thoughts and passions, purposes and aspirations, so that they live and move upon his pages, self-revealing; and his work becomes, not only a "thing of beauty" to the taste and heart, but a "joy for ever" to the mind. In nothing has Mr. Cooper's strength been so fully shown, nor his possession of the poet's imaginative genius so completely established, as in the passages descriptive of the halls of his purgatory, the journeyings of his suicides, and their lofty and impassioned speech.

All the suicides have become, of course, contemporaries in their world of penance. They speak together as such—as conversant with the same facts, fully knowing each other's history, and retaining

no traces of the mere accidents of their age, country, or education, except in so far as these have left their impress upon memory, character, and mental habitudes.

Nothing is more wonderful about the book than the manner in which the author's mind has formed a distinct conception of each spirit, congruous with its known history, yet such that each, by its own thought and language, creates a distinct impression of individuality. There is no repetition of manner or substance, although at least sixty-two separate personages—all known or supposititious suicides, from all ages and all countries—take part in the various conversations. Many other suicides are described or characterized; these sixty have each a distinct share in the intellectual action of the poem. They are drawn from universal history—British, French, Roman, Greek, Hindoo, Mexican, Hebrew, Chinese, Assyrian,—and so multifarious must have been the mere reading necessary for the simple knowledge of the names and histories of so many politicians, rulers, poets, philosophers, soldiers, philanthropists, revolutionists, patriots, and private citizens, as speak or are spoken of therein, that the expression of one reviewer is seen to be simply just, that "the 'Purgatory of Suicides' is incomparably the most learned poem in our literature since the 'Paradise Lost.'"

One further remark must be made before we pass on to sketch its outline more fully—that Mr. Cooper's "Purgatory," as a piece of imaginative architecture, stands, along with the sublime Miltonic "Pandemonium," the grand, shadowy "Hall of Eblis," and the "Inferno" and "Purgatorio" of the great Italian epic, akin to, yet separate from all, in its own original conception; imitated from none, worthy almost of any. The author had not read, either in a translation or in the original, the wondrous comedia of the "mighty Florentine" when his own poem was written.

The first book opens with a rendering in forceful verse of Mr. Cooper's words to the Staffordshire colliers, which it is interesting to compare with the commencement of the original blank verse, and also with the conclusion of the completed work. With the animating principle of all his Chartism—that the Many must cease their subjection to the Few—the poem begins and ends.

"Slaves, toil no more! Why delve and moil and pine  
To glut the tyrant forgers of your chain?  
Slaves, toil no more! Up, from the midnight mine,  
Summon your swarthy thousands to the plain;  
Beneath the bright sun marshalled, swell the strain  
Of liberty, and while the lordlings view  
Your banded hosts, with stricken heart and brain,  
Shout, as one man, 'Toil we no more renew  
Until the Many cease their slavery to the Few!'

"We'll crouch and toil and weave no more to weep!"  
Exclaim your brothers from the weary loom:  
Yea, now they swear, with one resolve, dread, deep,  
'We'll toil no more to win a pauper's doom!'

And, while the millions swear, fell Famine's gloom  
 Spreads from their haggard faces like a cloud  
 Big with the fear and darkness of the tomb;  
 How, 'neath its terrors, are its tyrants bowed!  
 Slaves, toil no more—to starve! Go forth and tame the Proud!

“And why not tame them all? Of more than clay  
 Do your high lords proclaim themselves? Of blood  
 Illustrious boast they? or that reason's ray  
 Beams from the brows of Rollo's robber brood  
 More brightly than from yours? Let them make good  
 Their vaunt of nobleness—or now confess  
 The majesty of ALL! Raise ye the feud—  
 Not, like their sires, to murder and possess;  
 But for unbounded power to gladden and to bless.

“For that I boldly spake these words of truth;  
 And the starved multitude—to fury wrought  
 By sense of injury, and void of ruth—  
 Rushed forth to deeds of recklessness, but nought  
 Achieved of freedom, since nor plan nor thought  
 Their might directed; for this treason foul  
 'Gainst evil tyrants, I was hither brought  
 A captive—'mid the vain, derisive howl  
 Of some who thought the iron now should pierce my soul.

“Let them howl on! Their note, perchance, may change:  
 The earthquake oft is presaged by dull rest:  
 Kings may, to-morrow, feel its heavings strange!  
 For my lorn dove, who droopeth in her nest,  
 I mourn in tenderness; but to this breast  
 Again to clasp my meek one I confide  
 With fervid trustfulness! Still self-possess,  
 Since truth shall one day triumph—let betide  
 What may, within these bars in patience I can bide.”

He dreams of evil apparently triumphant in what should be “the universe of good,” and asks despairingly if life is worth having in the face of such a fact: is not he wisest who “ends, self-drugged, his mortal miseries?” He strives to quell these questionings—

“By imaging that joy all-elevate  
 Which through earth's universal heart shall swell.  
 When over land and sea hath rung Oppression's knell.”

Sleep comes at last, and, binding his limbs, gives life and being to his thoughts; and so the true action of the book commences:—

“Methought I voyaged in the bark of Death,  
 Himself the helmsman—on a skyless sea,  
 Where none of all his passengers drew breath,  
 Yet each, instinct with strange vitality,

Glared from his ghastly eyeballs upon me,  
And then upon that pilot, who upheld  
One chill and fleshless hand so witheringly  
That, while around his boat the hoarse waves swelled,  
It seemed as if their rage that solemn signal quelled.

"I know not how these mariners I saw :  
No light made visible the grisly crew :  
It seemed a vision of the soul—by law  
Of corp'ral sense unfettered, and more true  
Than living things revealed to mortal view ;  
Nor can earth's Babel-syllables unfold  
Aught that can shadow forth the mystic hue  
Of myriad creatures, or their monstrous mould,  
Which thwart that dismal sea their hideous hugeness rolled." \*

When the voyagers landed, they—

"Took with an air of stern resolve their way  
Into a gloomy land, where startling visions lay,"

and the poet weirdly and vividly depicts the terrors of the road.

The spirits at length enter a cavern's mouth, and pass through a lofty and majestic subterranean aisle until they are obliged to separate, each to its appointed place of expiatory and redemptive discipline. But the dreamer is exempt from this compulsion, and gains, by some mystic influence or intuition, whatever knowledge he desires :—

"Conscious of this her high prerogative,  
The soul for mystic travel girt her thighs ; "

and, conceiving the purpose of visiting the suicides under penance, thinks first of the kings and rulers who are numbered with them :—

"When lo!—as if these new imaginings  
Flowed from the soul with architectural power,"

a regal hall, filled with thrones of ornate and wonderful design, and supported by colossal shapes of mysterious significance, at once appears. The occupants are known by the same unearthly sense : Sardanapalus, the Assyrian ; Chow-Sin, Emperor of China, more than eleven hundred years before the Christian era ; Cambyses, Nauplius, Ægeus, Saul, Ajax-Telamon, Codrus, Lycurgus, Cha-

\* After reading stanzas so truly Dantean in character as the foregoing, the reader is compelled to ask, with wonder, by what will of judgment—prudential or otherwise—the "Apollo" who holds the "bright scroll" upon which the "count" of our "mighty poets" is inscribed, according to Chambers' "Encyclopædia of English Literature," chose a juvenile fragment of little value from the "Baron's Yule Feast" as the best proof and illustration of Mr. Cooper's genius.

rondas, Appius, Antony, Nero, Otho, Maximian, Mithridates, Sisygambis, Cleopatra, Boadicea, and many others, are seen and named :—

“ But now my trance  
Teemed with more wonder ; for, enrapt, I learned  
These spirits' thoughts : no vocal resonance  
There was : yet soul to soul made mystic utterance.”

Sardanapalus is heard first ; and, addressing himself to Lyeurgus, who had predicted the triumph of democracy, upholds the permanence of kingship and popular submission, from the point of view of the right of the kings themselves. He is followed by the Chinese monarch, who supports the same thesis, but upon the widely differing principle of their necessity as guides and fathers to the peoples. He pictures the submission and contentment of his countrymen :—

“ Graian, behold, from China's terraced mountains,  
Meek, peaceful myriads to the valleys wend,  
And with their brethren by the silver fountains  
Reclining, to some hoary teacher lend  
Enraptured audience, while his lips commend  
The lessons of the ever-honoured seer  
Whose wisdom's lustre doth as far transcend  
The glimmering lights your westerlings revere,  
As doth the orient sun outvie each smaller sphere.”

Then Antony scornfully repudiates the theories of both, basing pre-eminence of power, not upon “ long descent,” or upon the preservation of nations from the calamity of change, but upon innate strength, bestowed by nature expressly for the overthrow of outworn systems. Nero denies the boasts of Antony—

“ That thrones to thy stout valour owe huge debt,—  
He spake, casting around a withering smile ;  
Is true as that thou wert an anchoret !  
Hero of Actium !—Vestal of the Nile ! ”—

asserts that the line of the Cæsars were “ Fate's true darlings,” and denounces the weak rulers under whom Rome declined and fell. Maximian replies ; and so the wordy warfare goes on, until it becomes a mere babblement between the mutually accusing Romans.

Then Mithridates rises,—

“ Hurling a throne of intellectual might  
Among their cowering sceptres,”—

and his mere presence stills the tumult. He requires of Lyeurgus the grounds of his startling prophecies, asking what he could know that they knew not. Lyeurgus answers, claiming for “ high humanity ” precedence of all pomps, and averring that it was gradually casting off the bonds of mystery and fear throughout

the world, and awakening to spiritual consciousness and self-control.

As he closes, the splendours of the high dome and its many thrones grow pale,—sign that another respite from penance closes, and that all must have the suicide's punishment afresh; but the great Spartan cannot close without appealing to the unquenchable hope which each one cherishes of final deliverance from this woe, as an argument for mind's universal enfranchisement and ennoblement. And yet the contrary possibility again wages itself,—

"The future *may* attest as the stained past hath sealed."

So the dream fades, and the first book of the poem ends.

Empedocles, Cleombrotus, and Calanus the Indian, form a group of suicide enthusiasts, to whom, in the second book—introduced by a magnificent address to the lyre of the poet's fatherland, and to the great spirits of the past who have struck its chords—the dreamer's soul is conducted by the shade of Milton.

It was originally the author's intention to prefix to each book a sonnet inscribed to some living author; but only three appear to have been written, and they have not hitherto been printed. That intended for the third book was addressed to Thomas Moore:—

#### "TO THOMAS MOORE.

"Friend of Hope's bard, and of immortal Childe!  
 Fired by their strains of Freedom and thine own  
 In youth I was; and, though a thrall unknown,  
 I dare to offer thee a harping wild  
 Of dungeon-dreams wherein the ghost defiled  
 I saw of him who sold thy country. Run  
 His race hath been full long, and some may shun  
 The verse severe, by softer lay beguiled—  
 Or deeming it unholy thus to doom  
 The solemn dead. But while Hibernia bleeds,  
 While millions justly curse him in the tomb—  
 Millions made breadless by his guilty deeds,  
 Thou who wert bold to awe the minion's king,  
 Wilt list me strike my rude but truthful string!"

The traitor-suicides, Judas and Castlereagh, are in this section revealed in endless counter-accusation.

In the fourth book post-suicides appear—Chatterton, Sappho, Lucretius, and Lucan—and discuss the great theme, *What will be?* To it was prefixed a sonnet to his early playmate and companion, Thomas Miller:—

\* Erroneously stated (*chap. i., p. 218*) to have been *four* years Cooper's junior. It should have been *two* years only. Their acquaintance began when Cooper was six years old, and Miller only four, and in petticoats.



— **THE NEW YORK TIMES**

RECEIVED JUL 19 1964

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...and mead,  
...the heart  
...the power,  
...the food

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"What Howard, when the dungeon is forgot;  
 What Montague, when no man's blood is shed;  
 What Hale, when justice can no more be bought;  
 What Bernard Gilpin, when no poor lack bread;  
 What Cartwright, when no tyrants on them tread;  
 What Clarkson, when the world hath not a slave;  
 What Owen, when free thought awakes no dread;  
 What Mathew, when there is no sot to save;  
 What MAN shall grace our isles, when wrong hath found its grave?"

M. de Pontalba, Atticus, Menedemus, Vibius Virius, and Varus, are the figures here; but the realm in which they appear is likewise tenanted by other suicides of sorrow, and whole companies and nations who sought voluntary death to escape oppression—like the "stern giant Cimbri," and the Jews at "old cathedralled York."

Book nine was inscribed to Miss Martineau, in these unpublished lines,—

#### "TO HARRIET MARTINEAU.

"Lady, a stranger unto thee would give  
 The lowly tribute of a prison rhyme,  
 For that thy high example, in our time  
 Of servile sordidness, doth hope revive  
 Though true nobility hath ceased to live  
 In men of mind, who deem it is no crime  
 With pensioned pelf from tyrants to beslime  
 Their palms—yet, shall thy sex restorative  
 Influence exert—our stern old English boast  
 Of independence to make once more bright—  
 And, in our land, the spectacle august  
 Create of Genius spurning gifts by Right  
 Unsanctioned—by usurping Power bestowed;—  
 Great thefts from the unfranchised toiling crowd."

It opens with the painful scene of the felon and his child before alluded to, and the vision is of female self-destroyers, who appear trooping with joy to hear the end of punishment proclaimed, and the poet recognises Portia and Arria, the wife of Asdrubal the Carthaginian, Sophronia and Baruna. These talk together with sisterly affection and sympathetic triumph over the speedy termination of evil for them on earth.

The last book commences with some noble lines to Liberty, and praises of its great upholders, and a denunciation of contemporary men, among whom "Harry" Brougham, "Harlequin-Demosthenes," as the author of the new poor-law—against which much of the Chartist agitation was directed—comes in for especially severe rebuke. Resolves for continued faithfulness to the cause of the poor and down-trodden are recorded:—

1870.

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"Here then, O holiest Liberty! my heart  
 I lay upon thine altar—undismayed,  
 Unswerving, unsubdued: the after part  
 Of life it aims to play with healthier aid  
 Of wisdom—but no guiltier thoughts upbraid:  
 It asks but to be kept from mortal stain  
 As free as now: let consciousness pervade  
 Each pulse through life that still by gold or gain  
 Unbought it beats; and it shall shun no toil, no pain."

Again the dream returns, but now it is "gladsome," and of "portents beatifical." The suicidal hosts, delivered from evil—save those who have preferred their sensuality and sloth—meet in the great chamber of the kings—kings no more, but glorious equals in a universal and happy brotherhood. The rainbowed roof is no longer supported by the toiling Cyclopean and distorted forms who have painfully upborne it hitherto. Lycurgus addresses the vast assembly in praise of Unity, Concord, and Truth, and then gives place to Mithridates, who confesses the error of his previous scorn, and pays the Spartan seer high tribute for his noble and now amply fulfilled forecastings of this blissful consummation. Cato, freed from his stern haughtiness, follows Mithridates:—

"'Tis, then, unto the Few, the tireless Few,  
 Who through all ages and in every clime  
 Pursued the Good, our gratitude is due;"

and to him succeed Zeno and Cleanthes, Clitomachus, Metrocles, Lucretius, Atticus, and many others, until the scene closes with one triumphant and united chant, in which the unfettered souls celebrate the advent of Eternal Peace and Blessedness, while the dreamer awakes to the realities of his dungeon,—

"Thence, to ponder when would come  
 The day that Goodness shall the earth renew,  
 And Truth's young light disperse old Error's gloom—  
 When Love shall Hate, and Meekness Pride subdue,  
 And when the Many cease their slavery to the Few!"

W. W.

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## The Reviewer.

### *On the Revival of Philosophy at Cambridge.*

By C. M. INGLEBY, M.A., LL.D. Cambridge: J. Hall & Son.

*A few brief Remarks on Cambridge University and College Reform.*  
By a MEMBER OF THE SENATE. London: Longman, Green, & Co.

THE "Reflections Historical and Critical" on the Revival of Philosophy at Cambridge, laid before the public by Dr. Ingleby, Foreign Secretary to the Royal Society of Literature, refer to the academical changes recently introduced at the *alma mater* of the author; and the "Remarks" concerning "the Past and Present Legislation" to which the university and colleges of Cambridge have been subjected. We place them together for notice on account of the similarity of their subject, not of their topic. Each, in regard to its own theme, is of interest, for there can be no doubt that the university life of our country affects the whole land by affecting a large proportion of the minds which directly or indirectly move or teach, influence or govern, the mass.

Though we have placed Dr. Ingleby's book first on our list, as denoting its greater congeniality to our own interest in Cambridge as a place of education, learning, and religion, yet we shall notice first the pamphlet of the Member of the Senate, because it concerns the legal constitution and the formal details of the institution more than the manner and matter of its teaching, and the influence it exerts through that.

It is pleasant to hear, on the authority of a member of the senate, that "the University and Colleges of Cambridge are no longer schools merely for the education of the clergy of the established church, but national institutions" (p. 5); that "the Colleges of Cambridge are not private boroughs, nor close corporations, but public institutions," and that their "masters and fellows are neither the owners nor the proprietors of the property they administer;" and may therefore "be called upon by the legislature to render an account of the property they hold in trust, and of the manner in which the revenues are annually distributed" (p. 6). The author proposes that such a return should be made imperative on the Colleges, and be laid before Parliament every year.

His practical proposals are (1) that the vice-chancellor should be relieved of book-keeping details, and should be superseded, in so far as these are concerned, by the appointment of a secretary and a burner; (2) the abolition of the residential qualification of members of the senate in voting for the council of the senate; (3) that the Hulsean, Christian, Advocate and the Norrisian Professorship of Revealed Religion should be reinstated, and made tenable either

by lay or clerical men of aptitude, and that the incomes of the professors should be augmented by the sums arising from lapsed scholarships; (4) that heads of colleges may be either clerics or laics—candidates being prohibited from voting for themselves: he would also extend the vote for the mastership to all who hold a degree higher than that of B.A.; (5) that fellowships should be held for stated periods, that payments should involve the performance of duty, that the creed-test should be considerably narrowed in its operation by making fellowships of two sorts—those tenable by members of the Church of England alone, secondly, those tenable equally by all British subjects: after this he would open the right of tutorship to all fellows; (6) that scholarships should be revised, brought to a point which would meet necessities and not augment luxury, shortening the terms, and paying, not weekly, but terminally; (7) that studies and teaching should be extended: an entrance examination is proposed with preparatory classes, and fitness for practical testing in the tutors should be essential, and thus means would be taken to make the teaching effective, and persons would be prevented from holding terms who were unqualified to derive benefit from the studies pursued. All these seem aims of a very desirable sort, and the author speaks with full information, aptness of reference, and evident knowledge of Cambridge requirements and the country's desires; and there can be little doubt that if his proposals were carried into effect, they would materially enhance Cambridge in the eyes of the country, and much conduce to the improvement of the University and its Colleges.

At this point Dr. Ingleby's "little volume," which we are glad to see "is gratefully inscribed to James Hutchison Stirling, LL.D., F.R.C.S. Edin., author of 'The Secret of Hegel,'" comes in fittingly to see to the crowning of the edifice. We have in the first place a "preface" setting forth the object of the book—"to trace the rise of the new *régime* [in regard to philosophy]; to examine into its workings and results; and to make suggestions for its material improvement" (p. 7). Chap. I., on "The Monopoly of Mathematics," contains an interesting and suggestive history of the progress of the great controversy, Mathematics *v.* Philosophy, which having begun at Oxford about 1825, affected Cambridge about 1833, and manifested itself in Edinburgh in 1836, a controversy in which the combatants were Adam Sedgwick, Wm. Whewell, Sir Wm. S. Hamilton, J. S. Mill, Augustus de Morgan, Sir Wm. R. Hamilton, George Boole, Whately, &c. A very interesting part of this chapter is that in which Dr. Ingleby discusses and detects the flaws in the contributions of Whewell and of Hamilton alike, and hits the blot in regard to the reasoning of each.

Chap. II. on "The Recognition of Mental and Moral Science," shows us the result of the famous polemic on mathematics as a means of mental culture, in the institution, 1851, of the Moral Sciences Tripos, and gives us a history and a criticism of its course, progress, and efficiency, of much value.

Chap. III. furnishes a very accurate and searching criticism on "The choice of Examiners in the Moral Sciences Tripos." He says justly that "the proclivities of the examiner may be inferred from the character of his examination papers;" and maintains that unless the papers were set by a philosophical student, it must almost necessarily happen "that the best logician, *as such*, or the best metaphysician, *as such*, would not be able to obtain the highest number of marks;" and he gives good reasons for urging upon the board the propriety of seeing to it, lest it should "become a grave scandal, throwing discredit on the whole concern." On looking at the lists of examiners from 1861 to 1869, exclusive of the Professors of Moral Philosophy, he finds "that not one of them save Mr. Cope and Mr. Venn is known to fame as a metaphysician or logician, though all are men of very great ability in other respects."

Chap. IV. deals with "the Selection of Text-books and Indication of the Course of Study." Here the author's extensive and careful reading has ample space for display, and he must have exercised severe self-restraint to condense his observations as he has done. Every remark is pertinent, each criticism is pointed and keen, but brief. The entire chapter has glimpses of the literature of the subject, and prove that the author is a philosophical student of wide information and accurate insight.

Chap. V. is on "The Examination Papers of the Moral Sciences Tripos," and is, perhaps, the most important chapter of all. We shall quote a few sentences here and there from the work, which will prove from their compact clearness that Dr. Ingleby is a thinker and a scholar. Sir Wm. S. Hamilton he characterises as—

"Learned beyond all his contemporaries, boorishly ignorant of mathematics, he conceived a hatred of mathematicians worthy of Goethe (p. 11). He had never succeeded in prevailing upon himself to go through the necessary drudgery of composition (not to insist on the severe toil of redintegration, if that were possible), and so to commit himself to a complete system of philosophy. His notes on Reid were then and still remain fragmentary; his lectures were then only in manuscript, and his philosophical contributions to the *Edinburgh Review* were upon special and subordinate topics, not then nor since gathered up into one concatenated scheme" (p. 21).

Of Kant, we have the following among other appreciative sentences:—

"Kant's *Critique of the Pure Reason* [is] the head and source of all that is worthy of the name of Philosophy, [but] it is necessary to understand Hume in order to appreciate the initiatory step of Kant. . . There is but one portal to modern philosophy, and but one key to ancient philosophy: that portal is Kant, and that key is furnished by the greatest outcome of Kant's philosophy, viz., Hegel. No other philosophy but what derives from Kant explains for us the source of *apodeictic judgments*. Clearly whatever a system of mental philosophy may do, it is *false* if it deny those judgments, it is *useless* if it fail to account for them. No other philoso-

but what derives from Kant, explains for us the nature of *second conditioned obligation*. . . . Whatever a system of moral philosophy may be, it is an *iniquity* if it ignore unconditional obligation; it is an *impertinence* if it fail to systematise it. . . . The simple fact is, Kant's *force* has never been excelled, and his *scope* has never been enlarged by any but Hegel. No other man's *horizon* has ever reduced Kant to a *foreground*. No other author has ever swallowed up Kant, and reproduced him in the form of new tissue. . . . Those who have struggled with Kant may with advantage attack Dr. J. H. Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, 2 vols., Longman & Co., 1866, which contains a translation of the *Logic*, with an ample commentary on both the Quality and the Quantity. But apart from Hegel, that splendid work affords the only trustworthy English commentary on Kant. For the sake of the third and fifth chapters alone, *The Secret of Hegel* should be added to the revised list. . . . The student ought most clearly to apprehend the synthetic form of Kant's work, which is developed in the order of nature, and not in that of experience, i.e., *Æsthetic* before *Logic*, *Analytical Logic* before *Dialectic*; and also the *transcendental* before the *empirical*, and the *immanent* before the *transcendent*."

Here is a wise, learned, and judicious explanation of one great cause of difficulty in translation, especially the translation of philosophical works:—

"A Greek or German word and its English synonym may be compared, as was done by De Quincey, to two intersecting circles, the common area being the exact interpretation, the other areas containing the sources of misapprehension. But the primary and derivative meanings of a word in the original may go to make up the entire extent and intent which it stood to cover; while the English equivalent not only excludes some of these meanings, but connotes others that are impertinent; and in the statement of a philosophical system *exactitude* of expression is the *sinon non*."

Here is a good remark on Majorities & Minorities:—

"There must always be a time when the minority of that world are right, and the majority wrong. It is always so: the less is more than the greater, before the greater is more than the less: a paradox of which the history of science affords a continual series of examples in point."

And this observation on Philosophy is good:—

"Philosophy, like any of its subordinate sciences, is necessarily rooted in the past, and has its history and its literature, which no student can with impunity neglect. But like them, philosophy is the subject of an *à priori* organon, and the one business of the philosopher is to render it perfect. The student, who is to become a philosopher, should not be taught 'to walk ever with reverted eyes.'"

"We may, perhaps, just notice that in speaking of Professor F. D. Maurice, Dr. Ingleby seems to have a sort of jealousy that Cambridge was overlooked and Oxford super-elevated by his appointment. We believe that Professor Maurice kept *all* his terms at Cambridge, and actually got a first-class in Civil Law in 1826-7, though he took no Cambridge degree. We speak on good authority.

## The Societies' Section.

### BIRMINGHAM DEBATING SOCIETIES NEARLY A CENTURY AGO.

CONTROVERSY, as a means of intellectual culture, as well as a gymnastic of the mind, is now one of the recognised agencies of the self-educator; and debating societies exist in almost every nook and corner of the land, wherever two or three can be gathered together with intellectual aspiration and a desire to indulge in active thought. They are, in general, quiet unostentatious growthlings, springing up for a season, and then, their special end accomplished, passing away into forgetfulness—potent while they last, but liable to rapid change and decay, as change works among their members to alter their tastes, habits, or circumstances, place of abode, or employment. Yet the history of such debating societies might have possessed much interest in tracing the career of many a promising youth and prosperous thinker. It is not pleasant that they should not only pass away themselves, but that their memory perishes too. Of how much interest records of such institutions may be, we have an opportunity of giving our readers a specimen in the following quotations from "A Century of Birmingham Life"—a book of quite an original character, and of a peculiarly interesting nature, compiled and edited by John Alfred Langford, LL.D. In 2 vols. London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.:—

"Debating societies must be considered as educational institutions. They make men read and think, and any society which accomplishes these two important results must exercise a considerable influence on

the mental character. In the year 1774 Birmingham produced two of these societies; the Free Debating Society, or, as it was afterwards called, the Robin Hood Free Debating Society, and The Amicable Debating Society. The first met at a public-house, called the Red Lion, and a bit of more curious reading than the record of their doings and the questions which they discussed, which are regularly advertised for some months, is rarely to be met with. There is no account of the formation of the Robin Hood Society, but we think the first notice we find of it indicates that the meeting reported was the first which was held for actual discussion. It appeared in April:—

"Birmingham, April 4, 1774.—The Free Debating Society will meet next Friday Evening, in Sam. Wiggins's Long Room, at the Red Lion Inn, to discuss the following questions, viz.

"1. Can a Juryman, consistently with his Oath, find a prisoner guilty without a proof Positive?

"2. Whether the Practice of Duelling is consistent either with true Courage or Christianity?

"3. Whether Generosity in a Rich or gratitude in a poor Man, is most amiable?

"4. Whether is an arbitrary, or mixt Government, most eligible?

"Resolved, That the pursuit of mild measures respecting the Americans will be most to the interest of Great Britain.—Resolved, That the present Laws respecting Bastardy are destructive of Virtue.—Resolved,—That compelling



Offenders to hard labour in the public Highways will be attended with more salutary Effects than the punishment of Death.—Resolved, That the present high price of grain and provisions is owing to Luxury.—Resolved, That an ignorant man is more an object of pity than a presumptive one—The company last Friday Evening was very numerous and respectable, and was pleased to give their thanks to the President for his conduct in the chair.—The debaters will begin at half-past seven o'clock precisely.—Tickets price 6d. each, to be had at the bar of the Red Lion; and of the President, to whom all Letters or Questions for the society are desired to be sent."

"The next announcement appeared in the same month; and we are astonished at the number of questions discussed. How often did they meet? and how long was each speaker allowed to address the meeting? If they settled seven such questions in one night, as are advertised on the 18th of April, they must have been model debaters:—

"Birmingham, April 18th, 1774.—The Birmingham Robin Hood Free Debating Society will meet next Friday Evening, in Samuel Wickins's Long Room, at the Red Lion Inn, to discuss the following questions, viz.:—

"1. Whether a Deist, consistent with the Moral Law, can be justified more than the Christian that does not live up to the Moral Law?

"2. Which contributes most to make mankind unhappy, Love, Avarice, or Ambition?

"3. Whether is Suicide, or what we call Self-Murder, the effect of Courage or Cowardice?

"Whether Lenity or Severity in a father towards an undutiful son, is the best means of bringing him back to his duty?

"Whether have the present

temptations of the age more influence over Man or Woman?

"6. Are Women who are led from the Paths of virtue, by the Wiles of ill-meaning People, pitiable or despicable?

"7. What constitutes Happiness?

"Resolved, That the present Combinations for prosecuting Felons will not be prejudicial to the Community in general.—Resolved, That the power vested in Justices of the Peace is not contradictory to the constitution of our Country, nor prejudicial to individuals.—Resolved, That Greatness of mind is more conspicuous by fortitude in Adversity than by moderation in prosperity.—Resolved, That it is necessary that sales by Auction should be laid under certain Restrictions.—Resolved, That the present mode of permitting Pawn-brokers is injurious to the trading parts of the kingdom. The debates will begin at half-past seven o'clock. Admittance 6d. each gentleman.—J. Jones, President."

"The postscript in the next week's advertisement indicates that the president had some trouble with his audience or his speakers, or with both. He says:—

"A plan is formed, which will be put into Execution, that cannot fail of preserving Order and Regularity, and notwithstanding the illiberal Attempts that have been made to suppress this Society, yet there is No Doubt to be Made, as some respectable Persons have promised their Aid and Support, but it will soon become the first society of the kind in the kingdom. Since Able Speakers have promised to attend."

"Was it the persons who made the 'illiberal attempts' alluded to in this N.B. who founded the Amicable Debating Society? This cannot be clearly proved, but it may be inferentially inferred. On the same day that the above notice appeared

the formation, origin, and objects of the Amicables were also announced. It will be seen that the early meetings of this new society were held at a coffee-house.

"Amicable Debating Society—Birmingham, April 25, 1774.—At a Meeting, held on Wednesday Evening last, to consider of the Propriety and Expediency of establishing a Society in this Town, for the Encouragement of free and candid Disputation, it was the unanimous Sense of the Company, that such an Institution might, if conducted with Harmony and Decorum, be generally useful and Agreeable. But as the indiscriminate Admission of Persons into such society must cause the best Rules for its Government to be ineffectual; so must it consequently render its Duration precarious, and its Advantages very circumscribed. In order, therefore, to remove these difficulties, a more liberal Plan has been adopted; a System of Laws has been formed, on the strict and Regular Observation of which the Permanency and Reputation of this Society immediately and ultimately depend. For, as the Power of making, without the means of enforcing, a Law, would be absurd; so would it be equally ridiculous, in any society, to establish Rules for the Maintenance of Peace and Good Order without a fixed Determination to enforce and obey them. It will therefore be expected and required of all Persons, who may hereafter be admitted Members of this Society, that they respectively subscribe their Names to such Rules as have been, or may be adopted, for the Support of this Institution. Copies of the Rules are left, for public Inspection, at S. Aris's and Mr. Swinney's, Printers; to either of whom all Persons, who may be desirous of becoming members, are requested to send their Names, sealed up and directed—To

the President of the Amicable Debating Society. N.B. A previous Meeting will be held at the King's Head in New-Street, on Wednesday Evening next, precisely at Seven o'clock, when such Persons, whose Names have been received, will be ballotted for.'

"The first meeting of, and the questions to be discussed by, this new society appeared in the paper on the following Monday :—' May 2, 1774.—Amicable Debating Society.—This Society will meet on Friday next, at Mrs. Ashton's Coffee Room in the Cherry Orchard, Birmingham, when the following questions are to be discussed :—

"1. Is a Drunkard the greater Enemy to himself or to Society?

"2. Which is most detestable in itself and most dangerous to Mankind, Treachery in Friendship or Hypocrisy in Religion?

"3. Which are the greatest real or imaginary Evils?

"The President will take the Chair precisely at 8 o'clock.

"N.B. As the Questions for Debate will not be advertised in future, they will be left for public Inspection at the Bar of the above mentioned House, where the Society is intended to be held.'

"Our friends of the Robin Hood were not to be intimidated by the unmistakable allusions to them, made by the Amicables, and on the same 2nd of May they advertised as follows :—

"Birmingham, May 2, 1774.—The Birmingham Robin Hood Free Debating Society will meet next Friday Evening, in Samuel Wiggins's Long Room, at the Red Lion Inn, in this Town, to discuss the following Questions, viz.:—

"1. What is true generosity?

"2. Is it possible for a Man who is born blind to have any true Idea of sight?

"3. Is not the Practice of Stat-

Lotteries prejudicial to a Commercial Country?

"4. Does not the Liberty that is allowed Ballad Singers tend to corrupt the Morals of the lower Class of People?

"5. Is not the sending of so many transports to America very detrimental to the trade of this Nation?

"6. Which is guilty of the greatest Crime, the Servant that robs his Master secretly, or the thief that audaciously breaks into his House?

"7. Is the custom so much practised (in Birmingham), of sending Children to the shops to work as soon as they are well able to walk, injurious or advantageous to the inhabitants in general?

"8. Who may, with the strictest propriety, be called wise Men?

"Resolved, That Mr. Wilkes is a very proper person to sit in Parliament.—Resolved, That Colonel Luttrell has no legal right to sit in the House of Commons. Resolved, That the Act of Parliament lately passed respecting the Bostonians is not founded on the principles of Justice or Equity. Resolved, That the inconstancy of the Fair Sex originally arises from the Men, and not from themselves. Resolved, That as this society is intended to be of general Advantage, that such Ladies who choose to hear the debates shall be admitted. The President therefore gives notice that the upper part of the room will beailed in for the reception of Ladies, that they may sit without interruption, but no gentleman is to be permitted to sit within side the Rail. The Ladies will be admitted without expense. Admittance 6d. each gentleman. The President will take the Chair exactly at eight o'clock. J. Jones, President. N.B. The President gives notice that the Wolverhampton Free Debating Society

will meet next Thursday Evening in the assembly room at the Red Lion Inn in that town. The questions and resolutions are delivered in handbills.'

"The Robin Hood did a bold thing. To both societies Ladies were admitted; but what shall we say to this announcement, which appeared on June 6th? Did not our liberal Robins anticipate John Stuart Mill, on the Woman's Rights question, and settle it for themselves? We wonder if any ladies availed themselves of the permission, and if so what was the length of the speeches they made. Who was and what has become of Mr. John Scott, the able orator whose abilities were recognised by the presentation of a silver medal? But we quote the notice:—

"June 6, 1774.—Ladies will be allowed to speak to any of the above Questions. The debates will begin at eight o'clock, and conclude at a quarter-past Ten. Admittance each Gentleman 6d.; the Ladies without Expense. A Silver medal was adjudged to Mr. John Scott, for his abilities as an Orator and an able Speaker. The resolutions of Friday night will be published in Thursday's paper. Ladies' tickets to be had of Mrs. Wickens, at the Red Lion Inn, and of the President.'

"Would our readers like to be present at one of these old debates? Fortunately we can introduce them, for a curious stranger who was present at one of these meetings has left us a graphic account of the proceedings. It appeared in a letter to the printer, June 20, 1774:—

"To the Printer of the Birmingham Gazette—If a stranger's sentiments on the debating society are deemed worthy of admittance in your useful paper, the following are at your service. Having a vacant hour, I attended at the Society held at the Red Lion, and, strange to

think, the Effect of Pain and Pleasure never perhaps in such quick transitions possessed the frame of Man. An Institution of this nature, conducted with proper decorum, is truly rational. What are the principles of this decorum? Observance of Rules and Ability in the speakers. The former, Method and common sense can conceive as well as execute; the latter, only Genius and Education can supply. The remark has often been made that the Ridiculous in the extreme pleases the Mind as much as the Extreme good sense: it may cause a laugh in others, but in me it always produces a pang. I feel for a Person who makes himself ridiculous more than probably the Object does for himself, and I ever enjoy the deserved applause given to the sensible Candidate for Fame. Thus, Mr. Printer, these quick transitions of Pain and Pleasure were caused. A question is proposed, up starts a poor Mechanic, or an Apprentice Boy, and commences Orator. Nature is certainly the primary principle of Oratory, and, if you will pardon a Pun, many of them must be truly Orators, being truly Natural; thus my Pain was produced. Soon after a judicious person discusses the Point, then succeeds my Pleasure; but, unfortunately for me, these latter instances were but few; a young Gentleman of the Law gave me indeed particular satisfaction; a bad cause requires an able pleader; was I to be tried for a Crime I should certainly be acquitted, provided I had a fee to employ him. These, Mr. Printer, are a few scattered sentiments; hereafter, perhaps, you may have more, but, pray, through the channel of your paper, whisper the would-be Orators of that assembly to be more attentive and less vociferous. That nature is the first principle in the composition of an orator is an undoubted fact,

assistive art is a secondary Cause, as requisite to his formation. What is this art? A refined education. How is it possible a poor Apprentice or a mean mechanic can possess it? Besides, the outward garb of many of those who spoke was rather indecent; a clean shirt and stock should surely be procured for this night, even though Sunday went unprovided; the ladies are permitted Gratis, and Cleanliness is a Compliment to the Sex everywhere. Milton beautifully describes the external appearance of an orator—

“Deep on his front engraved  
Deliberation sits, and Public care;  
His look draws audience and attention—still as night  
Or Summer's noontide air, while  
e'er he speaks.”

“I shall conclude this with a parody on the above, and leave it to the judicious readers whether it is not perfectly suited to some of the Orators of the Robin Hood Free Debating Society.

“Dull on their unshaven chins and  
dirty brows,  
Stupidity resides, and vacant  
thought;  
Their looks cause Laughter, while  
Contempt and Shame  
Loud as when ignorance made  
deadly drunk  
While e'er they speak.

“ALPHA.  
“P.S.—As decorum is well preserved, much Honour is due to the President, who, in every respect, seems worthy of this office; nothing remains wanting but able speakers in the Society; and though timidity is ever attendant on real merit, yet it is to be hoped that some other gentleman will follow the young lawyer's example; on such a scheme as this, oratory will again flourish, nor can the mind of man conceive a more effectual Plan for the encour-

agement of Elocution. On Monday next will be published, price 3d. in 4to, the Robin Hood Orators, a Satyric Poem. Inscribed to the President. Sold by the printer of this paper, and may be had of the Men who carry it.

"We learn nothing of this Satyric Poem. The most careful inquiries to obtain a copy have been ineffectual.

In July the Robin Hoods ceased to hold their meetings in the Red Lion, and removed to the great room, late Hopkins's, near Temple Row. The two societies continued to advertise their existence and debates for a few months longer, and then silently disappear from history."—*A Century of Birmingham Life*. Vol. i., pp. 239—244.

## The Topic.

### ARE EXCURSION TRAINS NECESSARILY DANGEROUS?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

THIS is a puzzling subject, and one which only the practical engineer can answer with authority. The general public as a body can only have its opinion on the matter. As the word "excursion" is used I presume that the ordinary trains are considered safe, and that the term unsafe is a relative one as compared with them. This being the case it would require statistics to work upon to compare the percentage of accidents occurring to ordinary trains with the percentage of casualties in excursion trains. Unfortunately these are not at hand. But considering that the ordinary trains do not vary for a whole month, and that the excursion trains are erratic in their times and motions, that in fact they resemble the motions of the planets and comets, there is some danger of a collision, in which case, as the excursion trains contain a larger number of passengers than the ordinary ones and are fewer in number, the loss of life per cent. would be far greater in the former than in the latter.—A. J. G.

Ordinary railway travelling is attended at all times with a consider-

able amount of risk. Frequent as railway disasters are, were it not for the exercise of a rigorous watchfulness their recurrence would be vastly increased. To meet the demands of public business lives are endangered by trains being hurried away at alarmingly short intervals. Such we know to be the case. How then must it stand with the "specials" or excursion trains? Being interlopers, so to speak, their position necessarily becomes unsafe. They are unsafe; because they are urged on frequently with appalling rapidity, in order to be clear of the regular trains. Their rapid running, and the great length they often are, make them unsafe in taking sharp curves on the line. They are unsafe from their tendency, through hard running with little or no stoppage, to fire, break, or otherwise damage their gearing. So perilous they seem to some engineers that we have heard them speak of their safe return with large parties in intensely thankful terms. We prefer, therefore, to affirm the proposition.—CRITO.

How can they be otherwise? Look at the reckless conduct of excursionists at every station; how intractable they are, and how in-

considerate of the time wasted by them, and its preciousness to trains which are timed to minutes and often half minutes. Then again there is the difficulty of pretiming a train which is liable to such sudden surplussage of weight at any station. Besides the very fact that it is set on to jink through among the general traffic of goods and ordinary trains makes it all the more dangerous, for it is a complication of complications.—D. F. R.

Just look at Bradshaw and try to comprehend it, in all the multiplicity of its arrivals and departures, then remember that an excursion train is an irregular amongst this regularity, and that many of the passengers are unaccustomed to travel, and what can you expect?—F. L.

#### NEGATIVE.

Popular fallacies are long lived. It was for a long time believed that the number of accidents on railways was much greater than in the days of coaching. Much of this misapprehension arose from the change which railways themselves made possible—the general distribution of news and the wider surface from which news was collected. A statistical investigation convinced all thinking men that this was a mistake; but many even yet adhere to the old belief. An almost equally prevalent and equally unfounded opinion exists among the common—and even many of the more intelligent—people that excursion trains are necessarily dangerous. It is well that this fallacy should be examined. I am not possessed of statistical information to prove they are not, but I think for several reasons that they are not. An excursion train is special; most men are most impressed with a sense of what is unusual, and hence there is a larger amount of caution in regard to excursion trains than in regard to ordinary ones. This is very obvious

in the much greater clearness of the evidence given about accidents on such trains than on the regular ones. The greater alertness of all engaged on excursion trains and the special attention they excite is patent to everybody; and on these accounts we believe that excursion trains, far from being necessarily dangerous, are, considering the freight they carry, much less so than ordinary ones.—C. E. E. D.

There seems to exist a larger amount of sensibility when accidents happen to excursion trains than when ordinary trains meet with similar disasters. While leaving the analysis of the causes to those who experience it, it is to be observed that this may so influence public opinion as to induce it to characterize all excursion trains as dangerous. But, indeed, so far from this being the case, the very fact that they are unusual, and that they are announced several days previous, should almost seem, thus far, on a well-conducted line, to insure their safety. Nor is it to be believed that railway companies recklessly and wilfully endanger life by employing old and worn out stock in this part of their business. In the absence of statistics on the subject it is doubtful whether the proportion of accidents occurring to excursion and ordinary trains would not be in favour of the former. And when statistics are obtained it would be fairer to compare the numbers of persons killed or hurt than the numbers of trains which ran.—C. F. A. S.

I do not see any reason for believing so; excursion trains are popular, and they have been conducted by the same parties in many cases for years. They would not be popular long, nor would they be long run, if there was any real truth in the idea broached that excursion trains are necessarily dangerous.—T. D. D.

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

901. Thomas Carlyle bases his chapter of "Hero Worship" entitled "The Hero as Divinity" on "the Norse Mythology." In what books can some more information on that mythology be had, their prices and publishers?—MYTH.

902. On the subject of "H dropping," different opinions are entertained. Perhaps some reader could give (1) the general euphonical law regarding it; (2) a statement of the actual practice in regard to it; and (3) the principles which ought to be applied to settle questions concerning it on the occurrence of circumstances in which "To H or not to H," that is the question.—G. A. J.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

893. This line—

"Too wise to err, too good to be unkind"

is attributed to various authors. The lines sometimes are quoted thus—

"Too wise to err, too good to be unkind

Are all the movements of the eternal mind,"

said to have been written by the Rev. John East, of St. Michael's Church, Bath. But in all probability the true author is Adam Clarke, who in his sermons (iii.) on "The Plan of Human Redemption" asserts that the following propositions have become incontrovertible axioms among religious people:—1. God is too wise to err. 2. He is too holy to do wrong. 3. He is too good to be unkind.—S. R. G.

895. A good song must fulfil two conditions. (a) It must be good verse; and the shorter the, more

perfectly executed. (b) It must be singable—i. e., fitted to serve as the freight of a melody. As to a, Mr. Palgrave's definition may serve (*Golden Treasury*, preface). It must "turn on some single thought, feeling, or situation," and it must have "rapidity of movement, brevity, and the colouring of human passion." With these restrictions there is no reason why a good song should not be *narrative*, *descriptive*, or *didactic*. A ballad is a narrative song, and such may have greater length than any other; but the best song is either *sentimental* or *humorous*. As to b, it is obvious that heroic and Alexandrine measures are inadmissible. Any of the accepted lyrical measures may be used. A good song sings itself. Now for an example. Strange that the most perfect song-genius of all our poets was deliberately excluded from Palgrave's *Golden Treasury*! What song is so perfect as *Annabel Lee*? Mr. Thomas Anderson, of Birmingham (Mus. Bac. Cambridge), has set those dissolving words to worthy music. We have many great song writers of modern times—Burns, Shelley, Campbell, Blake, Landor, &c., &c., but none so musical as Poe. Note the exquisite simplicity of the diction of *Annabel Lee*, reading itself into rhythmical prose, with no inversion, and also with no commonplace.

"And this is the reason, long ago,  
In this kingdom by the sea,  
A wind blew out of a cloud, chilling  
My beautiful Annabel Lee;  
So that her highborn kinsmen came  
And bore her away from me,  
To shut her up in a sepulchre  
In this kingdom by the sea."

Or take Tennyson's "Break, Break, Break," &c., so worthily set by Professor Oakeley of Edinburgh; or Hood's "I remember, I remember," set to melody by Dr. C. M. Ingleby, with an exquisite pianoforte accompaniment by Mr. C. J. Culwick, of Parsonstown; or Shelley's passionate burst of song, "I pant for Music," set by the same composers for Mr. Santley; on the whole, one of the noblest songs in the world, though just a little too orchestral, and therefore superbly fitted for swift execution by a military band, the air being taken by cornets-à-piston. 2. Alliteration is a vice in prose, or at best a rhetorical artifice. In verse it is in place, but is an ornament of difficult use, being "the guiled shore to a most dangerous sea." On this point Revill should consult Dr. Marsh's "Lectures on the English Language," edited by Dr. W. Smith, ch. xiv. 3. Dr. Roget's "Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases" will answer every purpose. It is in demy 8vo. and sm. 8vo. The former sells at 10s. 6d., the latter at 7s. 6d.—OMEGA.

1. It may be said generally, though it would occupy too much space to go fully into the question of song-criticism, that a song to be good must convey the language of passion or feeling; descriptive verse is inappropriate in metrical compositions of this kind, except as intended to elucidate or to intensify the sentiment. There should be a harmony throughout, and a leading idea, to which the other ideas embodied in it should be subordinated. A song of the greatest merit will be found usually to consist of not more than seven or eight stanzas, which should not be lengthy. Though a certain degree of abruptness at the commencement is no fault, but gives force to a song, the close should finish off so as to leave a sensation

of repose in the hearer or reader. As an example of a song which is almost perfect, I quote an exquisite little composition of our Laureate's which appears without a title, and is as follows:—

"Break, break, break,  
On thy cold grey stones, O sea!  
And I would that my tongue could  
utter  
The thoughts that arise in me.

"O well for the fisherman's boy,  
That he shouts with his sister  
at play;  
O well for the sailor lad,  
That he sings in his boat on the  
bay.

"And the stately ships go on  
To their haven under the hill;  
But oh for the touch of a vanished  
hand,  
And the sound of a voice that  
is still!

"Break, break, break,  
At the foot of thy crags, O sea!  
But the tender grace of a day that  
is dead  
Can never come back to me."

2. Some of our greatest poets have not hesitated to employ "apt alliteration's artful aid," and have given piquancy to some of their compositions by so doing; yet the use of it implies ingenuity rather than poetic fire, and it can by itself scarcely be considered a merit in verse. In prose, as a general rule, alliteration should be avoided, unless in humorous writing. 3. There has been recently advertised Brewer's "Dictionary of Phrase and Fable," and it is reported to be well compiled; but the best work, I think, is Roget's "Thesaurus of Words and Phrases," published by Longmans, at 10s. 6d. This has gone through several *bond fide* editions, and has received high commendation.—J. R. S. O.



## Literary Notes.

LAMARTINE'S "Autobiography," preceded by a memoir of his mother, is to be issued simultaneously in French and English soon.

A Life of (Ingoldesby) Barham, by his son, is announced.

A prize of fifty guineas for the best Essay on Taxation, Local and National, is offered by the Statistical Society.

A History of *Punch* by Mark Lemon is likely soon to be issued.

Mrs. Simpson, sister of Sheriff Henry Glassford Bell, authoress of "Poems by Gertrude," has been preparing an edition of the works of Robert Burns for years, and it is now about to be published.

"Characteristics of Biography," by S. Smiles, is in preparation.

Louisa Stuart Costello, historian and fictionist (born 1815) died April 30.

"A Life of St. Alban," the proto-martyr, in Norman French, by Matthew Paris, has been discovered in the library of Trinity College, Dublin.

"Quaker History and Biography," by William Howitt, is among the literary expectancies of the autumn.

Homer's *Iliad* has been translated into French verse by M. Thourou, President of the Academic Society of Var.

Alex. Murray has reprinted J. R. McCulloch's treatise on Political Economy.

Edward Arber has added William Habington's "Castara" to his English reprints, and he promises "Tottel's Miscellany" and Webbe's "Discourse on English Poetry" at an early date.

Dr. Leary, editor of *The Rock*, has in the press a translation of Virgil's "*Eneid*" into blank verse.

It is said that the Queen is writing an *Autobiography*.

Mr. John Morley, editor of *The Fortnightly Review*, and lately editor of *The Star*, is reported to be about to issue *Light*.

A new "Flora of India," is in preparation.

An Essay prize in commemoration of the late Dr. Jeune, Bishop of Peterborough, is to be instituted.

Mr. Fred. Mahon, of St. John's College, Cambridge, has had the Hulsean prize for 1869 adjudged to him.

The famed poetic firm of Moxon is about to issue a new edition of *The British Poets*. The series is to commence with "Byron," illustrated by F. M. Brown, and biographised by W. M. Rossetti.

Signora C. de Luna Folliero, authoress of "Studies in Moral Philosophy," "The Education of Women," &c., died at Naples 25th June.

A drama entitled *Phaedrus* has been produced at Berlin by Prince George of Prussia, nephew of the King.

The Aldine series of Poets is being issued, revised, in 52 vols. at 1s. 6d.

A promise of about twenty years' standing is about to be fulfilled in the issue of vol. I. of a new edition of the "Works of Alexander Pope," by Rev. Whitwell Elwin, born 1816, editor of the *Quarterly Review* 1853—1860, Rector of Boston, Lincolnshire, since 1849.

A French-Chinese dictionary has been composed, cast, and set by Mgr. Perny, Apostolic missionary.

## Many-sided Minds.

FRANCIS BACON,

*Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban's, Lord Chancellor of England,  
Lawyer, Statesman, Scholar, Poet, and Inductive Philosopher.\**

BY C. M. INGLEBY, M.A., LL.D.,

*Author of "The Revival of Philosophy at Cambridge," &c.*

THERE are but two legitimate modes of studying a science: the historical and the systematic. There may, indeed, be a latent system in its historical development, but that need not be identical with the system on which the science may be best studied, and by which it may be most readily taught. On the contrary, it is the rule, not without exceptions, that the history of a science is a history of error and its correction. The quarry is run down after many faults and doubles, instead of being picked off at a long range. Eminently interesting and instructive is such a history; but it is so in behalf of those who have acquired, with thorough comprehension, at least the elements of the science. *Mutatis mutandis*, but with far less force, may the same be said of Philosophy; for at present its elements are inextricably interwoven with its history.

\* The works of Francis Bacon, edited by J. Spedding, R. Leslie Ellis, and D. D. Heath. 1857, etc. Review of the above in the *Athenæum*, Sept. 11 and 18, 1858. "Francis Bacon of Verulam." By Kuno Fischer. Translated from the German by John Oxenford. 1857. "Bacon, sa Vie, son Temps, sa Philosophie." By C. F. Remusat. Paris, 1857. "Novum Organon Renovatum." By W. Whewell. 1858. Chap. viii., § 2. "On the Philosophy of Discovery." By W. Whewell. 1860. Chap. xv., xvi., and xvii. "On Bacon of Verulam and his Scientific Principles." By Professor Lanson. 1860. "On Francis Bacon of Verulam and the History of the Natural Sciences." By Justus Liebig. 1863. "Lord Bacon as Natural Philosopher." By Baron Liebig. *Macmillan's Magazine*, July and August, 1863. Review of Baron Liebig's Discourse in the *Home and Foreign Review*. Jan., 1864. A Reply to Baron Liebig's two Articles, in *Macmillan's Magazine*, by G. F. Rodwell. *The Reader*, June 2 and 9, 1866. "The Correlation of the Physical Forces." By W. R. Grove. Fifth edition. 1867. Pp. 8—10. "Was Lord Bacon an Impostor?" *Fraser's Magazine*, Dec., 1866. "Was Lord Bacon an Impostor?" By Baron Liebig. *Fraser's Magazine*, April, 1867. "The Poems of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam." For the first time collected and edited after the original texts by the Rev. Alex. B. Grosart, Blackburn. *Privately printed in the Fuller Worthies' Library Miscellanies*. 1870.

1870.

Of late years some French writers have attempted to identify the history of any branch of knowledge with the method on which it can be best taught. It has been confidently maintained that the only sound method of instruction is "la méthode d'invention"—"la méthode suivie par l'inventeur." If such be the fact in any case, it is so exceptionally. The only sound method of instruction is that which starts, not with the *locus standi* of the inventor, but with that of the learner, whose rude notions and profound ignorance must be the very groundwork of instruction. Ignoring both, and sublimely contemplating the architecture of the science to be imparted, we may find that our foundations have been laid on a morass or on a quicksand.

The history of a science, and therefore of science in general, is for the initiated; and for such it has almost the charm of a romance, at least of a romance read backwards, like Froude's "Lieutenant's Daughter." Fable, indeed, can hardly obtain a footing there, for the results always exercise some check on the narrative of those fictions and mistakes which the results have overthrown. We know, at least, from the results what could not have been observed or performed by the physical philosopher during the epoch of discovery. We know, for instance, that Bacon could not have burnt a candle in the flame of spirit of wine; and that Hævi's antimony could not have been rhombohedral. We may thus with certainty determine what, among alleged observations, were inventions or blunders, and what, among alleged experiments, were performed in fancy only, or not performed at all. We may indeed err, through the insufficiency of evidence, in assigning a discovery to one who was not first in making it, or who did not discover it at all. This has been done, with many notable additions to science, as the composition of water, the polarisation of light, and the doctrine of limiting ratios; in each of which there are still contending claims, where some find it hard to give the preference, while others administer a summary justice or injustice.

There is a small class of eminent men included in the larger class of "many-sided minds," who became distinguished by virtue of pursuits for which they had received no special professional training. Such men were Francis Bacon, Emanuel Swedenborg, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: the first of whom will now engage our attention. It may be remarked, however, in passing, that these three men, presenting so many marked differences, do also present some striking forms of agreement. All three were born to a position of eminence or affluence: all were functionaries of the government under which they lived, and rose to be eminent statesmen. All, by virtue of congenital powers and tastes, became physical philosophers, equally rejecting ideas, and working on nature by means of observation, experiment, and induction. The poet, however, is the only one who can be credited with a positive and unequivocal discovery in physical science. Between Bacon and Swedenborg (quite irre-

spective of the spiritual experiences of the latter) it will be found that a remarkable parallel subsists.

A sketch of Bacon's life is quite unnecessary here. Mr. Hepworth Dixon, on the one side, and Messrs. Jas. Spedding and J. T. Foard on the other, have completely exhausted the subject, and made the facts of Bacon's life "familiar in our mouths as household words." It is only with his philosophy that we are concerned. Bacon was born at York House, Strand, London, on Jan. 22, 1560, O.S. (Feb. 1, 1560. N.S.), i. e., four years and three months before Shakspeare. He died at Highgate, at Lord Arundel's, on April 9, 1626, having survived Shakspeare nearly ten years.

Bacon's best philosophical works appear to have been written in the seventeenth century; and the more important of them were published in the last four years of his life. Of the works by which this "many-sided mind" became his country's glory the following details may be found of interest to students of Bacon. In a letter written in 1623 or 1624, Bacon speaks of having composed an exposition of his philosophical method, to which he gave the title of *Temporis Partus Maximus*—"The Greatest Birth of Time." One of his successors in the chancellorship, John, Lord Campbell, thinks this work was published, though copies of it are unknown to bibliographers. If such were the fact, this constitutes his first work, and must be referred to 1584. His "Essays, Religious Meditations," first appeared in type in 1597. There were originally only ten of them; in the second edition (1612) there were thirty-eight; and the latest edition published in his lifetime (1625) contained fifty-eight. In 1605 his "Two Books of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human," were published. They, too, expanded and enlarged, were issued in Latin in 1623, with the title "*De Augmentis Scientiarum*." In 1610 the *De Sapientia Veterum*, "Concerning the Wisdom of the Ancients," a fanciful but wise and brilliant book, gave evidence of his continued activity of mind. Having projected an "Instauratio Magna," or grand restoration of the sciences, he published in 1620, as the second part of it, his *Novum Organum Scientiarum*, or "New Instrument of the Sciences." In 1622, despite his fall from place and power, he published his "History of the Reign of Henry VII.;" and in 1624 not only "The Translation of Certaine Psalmes into English Verse" (recently reissued in "The Fuller Worthies' Library Miscellanies" by Rev. A. B. Grosart), but also his "Apophthegms, New and Old," were published, having been produced during a fit of sickness in that same year. His political tracts, "Miscellany Works," the "*Reus-citatio*," many fragmentary additions to his "*Instauratio*," and other matters, to which we are unable to assign any date. His "New Atlantis," or Solomon's House, in which he aimed at excelling Plato, as in his "*Novum Organum*" he had endeavoured to outdo Aristotle, as well as many other literary schemes, was left unfinished at his death. It will be seen from this mere mention of works written by this "Lord of Induction and of Verulam"—as Herbert calls him, in

a most palpable anti-climax—that his authorship for the most part belongs to the seventeenth century, and that much of what he thought under the Tudors he wrote under the Stuarts. Of the illustrious Englishmen who lived in these times he is one of the most famed; and if we except Shakspeare under the former dynasty, and Milton under the latter, the entire literature of those times possesses no name equal to his own.

Above the fame of any discoverer in science is the glory of him who is believed to have furnished mankind with a certain if not a royal road to all physical knowledge: and such was once the lot of Francis Bacon. Hardly has such renown as his been associated with such a name. Think of the stupendous opposition to be overcome by poetic genius, before such names as Cottle and Tupper can act as a spell on men's imaginations. Philosophy had assuredly as hard a time of it with Bacon; and yet so intensely dazzling was the aureole that for two hundred years invested that unfortunate name that from henceforth its contemptuous associations were consigned to deserved oblivion, and, even now that its almost Aristotelian tyranny has been broken, it acts as a spell on the imagination still.

The works of Lord Bacon belong to the history of philosophy rather than to the history of science, and to the latter rather than to science itself. In the study of geometry we necessarily encounter the constructions of Thales, Pythagoras, and Euclid, not to mention the more important contributions of Michel Charles and the moderns. In algebra we as necessarily come upon the theorems of Newton, Euler, and Wallis, with those of very many other inventors. In physics we owe so much to particular discoverers that much of what we learn under that name is stamped with the peculiar genius of a few great men. Bacon is not one of these; nor yet is there a single physical discovery due to his industry or genius. The fact is certainly remarkable; for though he did not set up for a physical discoverer, he assuredly claimed to have constructed an organon, or instrument of universal discovery, which, accordingly, should have yielded some fruit in the hands of others. Some, indeed, have credited him with having discovered the relation of heat to friction. In point of fact, the correlation of heat and motion is found in Plato. In the *Theatetus*, chap. 26, we read,—

Τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τὰλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπείει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φθορᾶς καὶ τριψέως· τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις ἢ οὐχ οὗται γενέσεις πυρός; that is—

“For heat and fire, which engenders and supports other things, is itself engendered by impact and friction, *but this is motion*. Are not these [? modes of motion] the origin of fire?”

But we may find nearly the same thing in Heraclitus. I have no doubt whatever that Bacon did no more in this speciality than hundreds had done before him; and it is certain that the theory of heat made no advance in consequence of his famous *Inquisitio in Naturam*

*Calidi.* On the other hand, it is impossible, as I shall soon make manifest, to do justice to his unrivalled powers of mind without crediting him with a very remarkable *disposition* as to the essential mode of sensible heat, which, in the hands of a practised experimenter, must have hastened the epoch of discovery in that science. But such was not the event. The conjecture perished like the seed that fell on stony ground. The Organon of Bacon has not, I say, been the *direct* agent in any physical discovery. This is the all but universal verdict of competent critics. A few, indeed, whose competency it would be invidious, if not presumptuous, to call in question, contend that discoveries have been made on Bacon's method. Perhaps some new evidence in favour of that position may yet be adduced. But what is meant by the assertion is plain enough, when we find that able and elegant writer, Dugald Stewart, making this assertion:—

"I shall take this opportunity to remark that Newton had evidently studied Bacon's writings with care, and has followed them (sometimes too implicitly) in his logical phraseology."—*Works*, Ed. Hamilton, vol. iii., p. 236.

This is the inverted base of the pyramid, whose apex is the solitary fact that Newton twice employs the word "axiom" in the Baconian sense. But the pyramid will not stand inverted; besides, I hardly think that fact belongs to the pyramid; for Newton could not have failed to get the word "axiom," in the sense of *general expression*, from Peter Ramus, in the ordinary curriculum of studies at the University of Cambridge. Others assert that Newton employed Bacon's method, as in his experiments on inertia: this, however, is a mistake.

But, allowing that no physical discovery has been made directly by means of Bacon's Organon, the question still remains whether his works did not exercise a very powerful indirect influence on the course of physical science; and it is this question which has been so hotly debated in late years. Certain it is that never till Bacon wrote was the *corrupt* Aristotelian method denounced and exposed with such trumpet-tongued eloquence and with such studious and prophetic iteration. None, till Bacon rose, had wearied the ears of a generation with its eternal wail—*delenda est Carthago*. Yet it is said, on the other hand, that the labour was Quixotic, since the tyranny of Aristotle had already received its *quietus*. Certain it is that never till then had the key-note of induction—*well-digested observations first, theory afterwards*—been sounded in the van of a *Novum Organum*. Yet, on the other side, it is asserted that a better method than Bacon's had been actually employed with success before his great work saw the light. Equally certain it is that the publication of his work synchronized with the great epoch of physical discovery which was crowned by the immortal speculations of Newton and Laplace. Yet the enemy has something to say against Bacon's influence on the science of his own day: that

he was not the general but the herald of the victorious army; and that it was the blunder of a few enthusiastic followers to attribute to him the splendour of a glory which radiated from men of a very different order of mind. In this view, Bacon was simply *felix opportunitate vitæ*.

Coleridge, remarking on the necessity of amassing a store of materials before constituting "a sound and stable theory," thus indicates the special need of him who would execute successfully the great work in which, it is said, Bacon failed.

"All this, and much more, must be achieved before 'a sound and stable theory' could be 'constituted';—which even then (except as far as it might occasion the discovery of a law) might possibly explain (*ex plicis plana reddere*), but never account for the facts in question. But the most satisfactory comment on these and similar assertions would be afforded by a matter-of-fact history of the rise and progress, the accelerating and retarding momenta, of science in the civilized world."—*The Friend*, 1844, vol. iii., Essay 8.

It is just this need which has been so admirably supplied by Dr. Whewell's *History of the Inductive Sciences*, his *History of Scientific Ideas*, and the two other of his works to which I have assigned a place at the head of this paper. By the aid of these, and of Sir John Herschel's *Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*, and Mr. J. S. Mill's *Logic*, we may very well judge of the adequacy of Bacon's *Novum Organum*, as a means of enlarging the borders of science; and allowing, with the mass of competent critics, the inadequacy, or even failure, of that work, we shall, with these appliances, be fully prepared to estimate the effect which Bacon's writings had on the course of scientific discovery.

The time is not long past when Bacon's name enjoyed the repute both of success in his great attempt and of being the great regenerator of science. It was once the universal belief that to Bacon's method was mainly due the vast progress of science ever since the crystal spheres of Purbach were shattered by the arrowy intellect of Copernicus. Even Sir John Herschel once agreed with this verdict.

"This important task was executed by Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, who will, therefore, justly be looked upon in all future ages as the great reformer of philosophy."—*Discourse*, 1835, p. 114.

This opinion ran out its course, and it is now generally looked upon as a mistake. It is curious that it should have been combated by three distinct parties in this criticism, whereof two are diametrically opposed to each other. *First*. It was contested by those who held that Bacon taught nothing but old truth; that his system was as old as Aristotle, and that, though discoveries in science, and any number of them, had been made by pursuing the method prescribed by Bacon, it was so only by virtue of the fact that Bacon's method was the method pursued by all physical discoverers, from the Stagirite downwards. *Second*. It was contested by those who

held that Bacon's system was indeed a startling novelty, which neither Aristotle nor any one else, save its propounder, had ever dreamed of; but that unfortunately it was trifling and useless, and had about the same relation to science that a penny trumpet has to Spohr's "Power of Sound." Macaulay may be taken as the type of the former, and Larson or Liebig as the type of the latter. *Third.* It was contested by a few, on the high *priori* ground, that his method was a *sell*; that the salt of Verulam could not be applied to the tail of the old bird called "Nature," till the bird was actually in the hand; or, to change the metaphor, that nature's cabinet, having a snap lock which has been shut upon the key, the locksmith of St. Albans would be glad to pick the lock, in order to get at the key. The most superficial view of the *Advancement of Learning* suffices to show what Bacon was about; that he was proposing to himself a problem of the utmost difficulty, viz., to reduce the business of scientific discovery to a method which should be certain in its results, and, by its very perfection, be for the most part independent of private sagacity. His single aim was to invent an instrument of physical research which might be handled with thorough efficiency by average intellects, and which, being so handled, should constrain Nature to reveal her secret processes. Bacon never arrogated to himself the title which has been awarded to him, viz., that of Father of Induction; the actual claim he set up for himself was that he was the inventor of a new and infallible method of induction. As Mr. Leslie Ellis well puts it—

"Ordinary induction is a tentative process, because we chase our quarry over an open country; here it is confined within definite limits, and these limits become, as we advance, continually narrower and narrower."—*General Preface to the Phil. Works*, 1857. I., p. 35.

Bacon, in fact, proposed to do for induction what certain African Nimrods have done for hunting. Dr. Livingstone tells us that the tribe of the Bakwains, instead of hunting down the wild beasts in the jungle, or over the open prairie, are accustomed to employ a very ingenious device for snaring and destroying hundreds of head of game at once. They set up what they call a *hopo*, which is a wattled fence in the form of a V of vast dimensions, the angle of which is open, and debouches on a long deep pit. The Bakwain hunters send out scouts, who surround and drive their prey from their retreats towards the wide mouth of the *hopo*; they are thus chased unawares into an area which fatally narrows at every step, and ends in a prison or a grave. Bacon proposed, I say, to do the same by the universe and its "natures;" the *Novum Organum* is his *hopo*, or at least a portion of it; and it is yet the subject of fierce dispute whether, in the event of the entire structure having been realized, it would have been as successful as the African device. Certain it is that the only quarry driven into it by its inventor, viz., "the form of heat," had been marked before it entered the *hopo*, and was hastily captured by a secondary manoeuvre before it reached



the pit. It was thus that the efficacy of the *New Organon* remained untested.

Simple enumeration, or indiscriminate observation, or chance experiment, is hunting the game "over an open country." Bacon's alternative was a *plan* of observation and experiment, on which would sooner or later arise a vast number of definite issues to be tried by ulterior observation or experiment. From this second batch of observations or experiments would crop up a still smaller number of definite issues; and thus the field of research is narrowed at each step of the investigation, till at length the "natures" which are the objects of the induction are isolated and determined. Such, in general terms, was the project. Nothing in the nature of such an *Organon* had ever been proposed, still less executed; yet it can hardly be maintained that the end in view was a novelty, for it had been the common practice of physicists to restrict the sphere of observation and experiment by the adoption of some plan of operation, though its application was restricted, its name *Legion*, and *quot homines tot methodi*. No one knew better than Bacon that Aristotle and Plato taught induction, and that the former extensively practised it. On this point see the *Novum Organum*, Book I. Aph. 63 and 105. But whatever plans might have been worked upon by the Stagirite, the only induction taught by him was that "by simple enumeration," which, by its very form, is a barren process, and that, moreover, is the only induction taught by modern writers on logic, with a few notable exceptions, Mr. J. S. Mill, the Archbishop of York, Mr. S. Neil. Aristotle's example of this form of induction is as follows: "Every man, horse, mule, is long-lived; whatever is galless is man, horse, or mule; therefore whatever is galless is long-lived." To sustain the validity of the conclusion, says the Stagirite,—

ἐπὶ νοεῖν τὸ Γ (i.e. man, horse, mule, &c.) τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον συγκείμενον . . . κ.τ.λ.—*Prior Analytics*, ii, 23.

That is, it is requisite that they be *full representatives* of the class to which they are referred; so that the class must be unwarrantably assumed, or else established by some more subtle process. Bacon not only knew how barren was this form of induction, but also that other inductive methods were practised with success; yet from so partial a study of causes, and one, moreover, in which native wit and lucky accident had so great a share, he augured ill for the restoration of physical science, as a whole. Verulam, though from the pressure of professional duties and the infirmity of ill health he had been able to acquire but a comparatively small *répertoire* of natural facts, and these not seldom very inaccurately noted, was as clear-sighted and as far-sighted as an eagle. He saw that induction, however constituted, did extend knowledge; whereas deduction could only serve as the handmaid of induction, to disclose what was thought, however obscurely, in our general conceptions. He did not indeed anticipate Kant in his famous distinction

of ampliative and explicative judgments: but he discriminated between the deductive syllogism and the inductive method with as much precision and rigour as Kant himself in his *Methodologie*.

It is not easy for us, standing on the eminence which inductive philosophy has raised for our speculation, to realize the actual state of the figment which passed for science at the time when Bacon wrought and wrote. It was not a fragmental discovery of Gilbert or Copernicus that can be shown as a sample of the methods then in vogue, or of the conclusions thereby arrived at. The human mind was under an incubus of physical speculations, handed down from the schoolmen, who had monstrously corrupted and deformed what they had received from Aristotle. It was in respect to science what it now is in respect to theology. The mass of educated persons were taught and made to believe in traditions, which, happily, while they had the effect of postponing the epoch of discovery, served to create the technical terms by which future discoveries were to be expressed. Bacon describes as truthfully as eloquently the state of things which then prevailed, and of which traces lingered in our universities long after the innovations of Newton's *Principia* had been somewhat gradually established. Scientific method was, for all purposes of instruction, wholly deductive, and its scheme consisted of logical *sorites* and *dilemmas*, depending upon notions formed haphazard from a superficial, cursory, and inexact survey of the universe. Such, indeed, are all our notions till we are educated in observation; and they are therefore called *notiones primæ*. Into the truth, generality, clearness, or fitness of such notions to represent real things and their qualities and relations, it was the business neither of the teacher nor of the pupil to inquire. In playing with such scholastic toys as were the instruments of the dialectician, it was sufficient entertainment to expound all that was connoted by the terms standing for those notions; and thus it came to pass that it was the subjective notion, and not the objective phenomenon, that was expounded or explained.

Bacon resolved to put a term to all such trifling: but in his attempt to do so he was "wise in his generation." He knew the old fabric was doomed, though men had grown so accustomed to its reprieve that they almost adjudged it immortal. As it had awaited its destruction for two thousand years, so my lord of Verulam was well content that his great work should bide its time in patience, if only he could get it written and published before death arrested his labours (see *Proemium*). In the meanwhile he assured his readers that he had no wish to overthrow at once the old edifice; no, not even to win admiration for his own. Note the irony and covered sarcasm of his protest:—

"For those who prefer the former, either from hurry or from considerations of business, or for want of mental power to take in and embrace the other (which must needs be most men's case), I wish that they may succeed to their desire in what they are about, and obtain what they are pursuing."—*Preface to "Nov. Org."*

But all "true sons of knowledge" he invites to rally round his standard: just as the more liberal among ourselves congratulate those who have thrown off the yoke of an obsolete and effete theology, and in the same breath protest that they have no wish to unsettle the faith of timid and weak-minded persons, bidding them affectionately God-speed. They who pursue this course, if they have not large hearts, have assuredly long heads.

It seems to me that Bacon addressed himself to his task with no self-seeking, but with as honest a love of truth and with as earnest a resolve to pioneer for it as ever inspired Kepler or Galileo: and this point is to be the more carefully noted, because, as we shall shortly see, it has been bluntly impugned by one of Bacon's later critics. Whatever be the fact, I must insist on this, that it is grossly unfair to prejudice him a liar because he conformed to the corrupt judicial customs of his time, and to set down all he says as to the purity of his ends and aim to the score of ambitious hypocrisy: on the contrary, we are bound by the lowest principles of humanity to presume that he speaks truth till he be found a liar. As to this love of truth, then, let us hear his own words:—

"For my own part at least, in obedience to the everlasting love of truth, I have committed myself to the uncertainties and difficulties and solitudes of the ways; and, relying on the Divine assistance, have upheld my mind, both against the shocks and embattled ranks of opinion, and against my own private and inward hesitations and scruples, and against the fogs and clouds of nature, and the phantoms flitting about on every side; in the hope of providing at last for the present and future generations guidance more faithful and secure."—*Preface to the Inst. Mag.*

Here he professes that his hope is the benefit of his race; but even this hope is secondary to his allegiance to the everlasting love of truth. Next, as to his humility, he adds:—

"Wherein if I have made any progress, the way has been opened to me by no other means than the true and legitimate humiliation of the human spirit. . . . And the same humility which I use in inventing I employ likewise in teaching."

Then in the first book of the *Novum Organum*, which was designed as the second treatise of the *Instauratio Magna* (the *De Augmentis Scientiarum* being a first sketch of the first treatise) he enumerates, in a strain of graceful rhetoric, the various grounds of hope for the realization, at least by his successors, of his magnificent project. Among these is the following, which is pregnant with "true and legitimate humiliation of spirit:"—

"And this I say, not by way of boasting, but because it is useful to say it. If there be any that despond, let them look at me; that, being of all men of my time the most busied in affairs of State, and a man of health not very strong (whereby much time is lost), and in this course altogether a pioneer, following no man's track nor sharing these counsels with any one, have nevertheless, by resolutely entering on the true road and submitting my mind to things, advanced these matters, as I suppose, some little way. And then let them consider what may be expected (after the way

has been thus indicated) from men abounding in leisure, and from association of labours, and from successions of ages: the rather because it is not a way over which only one man can pass at a time (as is the case with that of reasoning), but one in which the labours and industries of men (especially as regards the collecting of experience) may with the best effect be first distributed and then combined. For then only all men begin to know their strength, when, instead of great numbers doing all the same things, one shall take charge of one thing, and one of another."—*Aph.* 118.

In Bacon's scheme this collecting of instances was the *premier pas* which implicitly involved everything else. But they were to be collected on a definite plan of operation. From one class of such instances he was to obtain an *axiom*, or general expression of some relation or law. This was an axiom of the first order of generality; and this, like the axioms of Euclid, was to be made a basis of deduction forthwith. The conclusion thereby arrived at was to become the principle of a new class of observations or experiments, from which might be derived an *axiom* of the second order of generality; and so forth.—See "*Nov. Org.*," book i., aph. 104. He says:—

"Hitherto the proceeding has been to fly at once from the sense to particulars, up to the most general propositions as certain fixed poles for the argument to turn upon, and from these to derive the rest by middle terms: a short way, no doubt, but precipitate, and one which will never lead to nature, though it offers an easy and ready way to disputation. Now my plan is to proceed regularly and gradually from one axiom to another, so that the most general are not reached till the last: but then, when you do come to them, you find them to be not empty notions, but well-defined, such as nature would really recognise as her first principles, and such as lie at the heart and marrow of things [*talía quæ natura ut revera sibi notiora agnoscat, quæque rabus hæreant in medullis*]."—"*Nov. Org.*" *Distributio Operis*.

"The one [way] begins at once by establishing certain abstract and useless generalities; the other rises by gradual steps to that which is prior and better known in the order of nature [*ad ea quæ revera naturæ sunt notiora*]."—"*Nov. Org.*," book i., aph. 22.

"Lastly, the true form is such that it deduces the given nature from some source of being which is inherent in more natures, and which is better known in the natural order of things than the form itself [*notior est naturæ*]."—"*Nov. Org.*," book ii., aph. 4. Cf. *ibid.*, book i., aph. 43.

The contrast between *notio*, *prima aut prior*, and *id quod notior est naturæ* (it should rather be *naturâ*), though expressed in an obsolete and somewhat mistaken phraseology, is radical and thorough-going. Whatever be the method to follow, *the preamble is proved*. Be that method practicable or not, his philosophy has a valid foundation, which the subsequent course of inductive science has never disturbed. The inadequacy of first notions to deal with nature is further treated by Bacon under the head of *Idola Fori*; and he elsewhere declares the end of his labours to be "a true and lawful marriage between the empirical and the rational faculty, the unkind and ill-starred divorce and separation of which has thrown

into confusion all the affairs of the human family." The term *form*, which plays so important a part in this philosophy, and is used in the third extract given above concerning first notions, is so utterly obsolete that it needs to be translated into modern technology, if that may be. Bacon contemplated the properties of matter as form-natures and sensible natures. The form was ideal; the sensible was real. The leading inquiry of the new philosophy was, how is the form of a given sensible nature to be determined from the various manifestations of that sensible nature? Hence we see, rudely at least, that the form-natures relate to our primary qualities, and the sensible natures to our secondary qualities of matter. This will become plainer as we proceed. But first, I must premise a few words more on the inutility of the old deductive method, which there are still critics to praise, both as being the method of Aristotle and as being the method employed by modern men of science.

It is plain that a notion, in order to serve as the middle term of a syllogism, must connote the predicate of the conclusion: so that, in fact, nothing can be got out of it but what is already thought in it. The very formula of deduction, then, is merely explicative, and cannot extend our knowledge of nature, though it may serve to force on our attention what we already know. It has, in truth, the same relation to induction that an analytical or explicative judgment has to a synthetical or ampliative judgment in Kant's philosophy. In fact, Kant's distinction involves the whole difference between deduction and induction; for, if there be no ampliative judgment in a syllogism, the procedure is barren, and the conclusion is a truism. If, then, the notion which is used as the middle term of a syllogism be not commensurate with nature—be neither precise, clear, nor appropriate—and such is the case with all *notiones primæ*—the syllogism is not merely incompetent to enlarge the borders of science, but its explicative power is thrown away by dealing with the contents of a notion which is utterly worthless. Against the dominion, then, of this alliance between *notiones primæ* and the syllogism Bacon waged war; and I am satisfied that he did not—

"Come in the rearward of a conquered foe,  
But in the onset."

In his attempt to substitute an unfailing inductive method for the old scholastic trifling he claimed the credit of a reformer, and proclaimed the novelty of the attempt. "*Sunt certe prorsus nova*," &c. These words occur in his dedication to James I., which is singularly free from the usual servility and sycophancy of such compositions. It is here, too, that he makes a request in simple and dignified language, that the king, who resembled Solomon in so many things, would further follow that wise man's example "in taking order for the collecting and perfecting of a natural and experimental history, true and severe, such as philosophy might be

built upon." Here we have the key-note of his *Organon*, and he is never wearied with sounding it. Now, James did not grant Bacon's request. The work was not set in order by the king, nor undertaken by others. Well might he utter his old complaint,—

"I have at length become a mere labourer and hod-carrier, there being many things necessary for completing the design, which others, from an innate pride, have avoided."—"*De Augmentis*," book vii., chap. i.

By some means or other the work of collecting instances must be first accomplished. He might well insist on this preliminary; for he had gone a little too far in discrediting hypothesis as the initiative of experiment. At one time he seems to have thought it practicable to make such collections exhaustive. Probably we must not take his statements quite *au pied de la lettre*. He writes,—

"Moreover, since there is so great a number and army of particulars, and that army so scattered and dispersed as to distract and confound the understanding, little is to be hoped for from the skirmishings and slight attacks and desultory movements of the intellect, unless all the particulars which pertain to the subject of inquiry shall, by means of tables of discovery, apt, well-arranged, and as it were, animate, be drawn up and marshalled; and the mind be set to work upon the helps duly prepared and digested which these tables supply."—"*Nov. Org.*," book i., aph. 102.

And in aph. 103 he speaks of the time when "all the experiments of all the arts shall have been collected and digested, and brought within one man's knowledge and judgment." Truly it has been said, "*C'est le premier pas qui coute*;" and it may well be asked, "Who is sufficient for these things?" Some suspicion of the impracticability of realizing this stupendous preliminary must have crossed Bacon's mind; and it was probably this which moved him to allow the inductive philosopher to proceed from time to time to provisional vindeminations, as an "indulgence of the understanding." Still, the method of Bacon demands, to say the least of it, a provision of vast collections of instances in each department of research, before the actual work of induction in each can begin. How are these collections to be made? What are their guiding principles? The observers find themselves committed to a task of Briarean multifariousness. "The world is all before them *what to choose*." Even after the universe is parcelled out into special fields of research, the possible instances of any one department are practically infinite, and the energies of the experimenter are paralyzed by the vastness of his resources.

Accordingly, it follows that he must work on some principle of selection. In our days the principle is furnished by intelligent hypothesis, and there is always a definite issue (that Bacon called a *crucial case*) to be tried. But Bacon's object was to perfect an organon which should be theoretically independent of individual sagacity; and it is from individual sagacity that intelligent hypothesis arises. To this question, then, of the principle of

selection, the method according to which the observer could always select the most promising and suggestive instances for his collection, Bacon now addressed himself. As a principle of selection, and a method of classification of instances, Bacon propounded his doctrine of prerogatives, the nature and plan of which, in the Baconian induction, we shall consider in the second part of this paper.

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**CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY.**—Among the many problems of history, none perhaps are so generally interesting or call out so much passionate advocacy, as those which concern the personal character of distinguished men and women. There are still men who can hardly listen calmly when the purity of Mary Queen of Scots is impugned; and, if Mr. Carlyle's book has for a time inclined the balance of feeling not only against Charles I. but in Cromwell's favour, there is yet no reason to believe that Mr. Carlyle's estimate of the Protector has been accepted in its entirety. It is easy to see why this uncertainty should exist. No man ever lived more in public than Napoleon I.; yet the different verdicts upon him by M. Thiers and Mr. Goldwin Smith are only current varieties expressed with more than usual force and pungency. Nor would it be easy for a future historian, if he were deprived of other sources of information, to reconcile the conflicting views which Lord Palmerston and Mr. Kinglake formed, partly from personal knowledge, partly from intimate study, about Napoleon III. It is no argument against the final value of history if different men sum up differently from the review of a complex character, or speak doubtfully where they only know partially. Yet, in general, it may be said that our estimates of the great dead are likely to be more certain and truer than those we form of men living amongst us. Petty jealousies disappear, misconceptions are cleared away by time; we see from a truer perspective as we see from a distance; and the lines which were coarse and blurred in the living man are fashioned into a marble distinctness by death. For a time indeed, the old confusion of judgment seems to prevail, or even to be intensified, as various writers contribute various estimates. But gradually it is seen that every man who has done honest work has removed some difficulty of detail, or perhaps penetrated, by force of poetic insight, to a more sympathetic intelligence of the human life he describes. Mr. Grote's Cleon or Mr. Carlyle's Cromwell may not be altogether adequately conceived; and the next great writer on these subjects may add a touch here or strike away a line there, with real gain to historical truth. But it seems safe to predict that every future history will have to take these characters into account, and to allow much as certain for a little that it may retrench as unsound."—*North British Review*.

## Epoch Men.

## THOMAS HOBBES, OF MALMESBURY.

*(Continued from page 100.)*

"Hobbes' language is so lucid and concise, that it would be almost as improper to put an algebraical process in different terms as some of his metaphysical paragraphs."—*Hallam*.

WE continue and conclude our analysis of Hobbes' "Leviathan," the greatest work of a man of such remarkable ability and such uncommon intellectual force, that friends and foes of his opinions alike regard his fame as firmly built and enduring. We have now reached Part IV., which treats "Of the Kingdom of Darkness," and consists of four lengthy chapters, with a review and a conclusion, in which he considers the state of speculation in his day on these subjects, the place which his opinions held, and the influence they were likely to exercise among those who thought upon topics of such commanding interest.

PART IV.—XLIV. "Of Spiritual Darkness, from Misinterpretation of Scripture. Besides these sovereign powers, divine and human, of which I have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another power, namely, (Ephes. vi. 12) that of the rulers of the darkness of this world; (Matt. xii. 26) the kingdom of Satan, and (Matt. ix. 34) the principality of Beelzebub over demons, that is to say, over phantasms that appear in the air: for which cause Satan is also called (Ephes. ii. 2) the prince of the power of the air; and because he ruleth in the darkness of this world, (John xvi. ii.), the prince of this world: and in consequence hereunto, they who are under his dominion, in opposition to the faithful (who are the children of the light), are called the children of darkness. . . . The kingdom of darkness, as it is set forth in these and other places of the Scripture, is nothing else but a confederacy of deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, endeavour by dark and erroneous doctrines, to extinguish in them the light both of nature and of the gospel, and so to disprepare them for the kingdom of God to come.

XLV. "Of Demonology, and other Relics of the Religion of the Gentiles. The impression made on the organs of sight by lucid bodies, either in one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from opaque, or refracted in the passage through diaphanous bodies, produceth in living creatures in whom God hath placed such organs, an imagination of the object from whence the impression proceedeth; which imagination is called sight; and seemeth not to be a mere imagination, but the body itself without us; in the same manner as when a man violently presseth his eye, there appears to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth but himself; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but only a



motion in the interior organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes him think so. And the motion made by this pressure continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call imagination and memory; and in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by sickness and violence, a dream.

"This nature of sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to natural knowledge, much less by those who consider not things so remote as that knowledge is from their present use, it was hard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy and in the sense, otherwise than of things really without us: which some, because they vanish away, they know not whither or how, will have to be absolutely incorporeal, that is to say immaterial, or forms without matter; colour and figure without any coloured or figured body; and that they can put on airy bodies, as a garment, to make them visible when they will to our bodily eye, and others say, are bodies and living creatures, but made of air or other more subtle and ethereal matter, which is there where they will be seen condensed. But both of them agree on one general appellation of them, demons. As if the dead of whom they dreamed were not inhabitants of their own brain, but of air, or of heaven, or hell; not phantasms, but ghosts; with just as much reason as if one should say he saw his own ghost in a looking-glass, or the ghosts of the stars in a river; or call the ordinary apparition of the sun, of the quantity of about a foot, the demon or ghost of the great sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world; and by that means have feared them as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to do them good or harm; and consequently given occasion to the governors of the heathen commonwealths to regulate this their fear by establishing that demonology (in which the poets, as principal priests of the heathen religion, were specially employed or revered) to the public peace, to the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some of them good demons, and others evil: the one as a spur to the observance, the other as reins to withhold them from violation of the laws. . . . To honour is to value highly the power of

any person, and that such value is measured by our comparing him with others. But because there is nothing to be compared with God in power we honour Him not, but dishonour Him by any value less than infinite. . . . The inward thoughts of men, which appear outwardly in their words and actions, are the signs of our honouring, and these go by the name of *worship*; in Latin, *cultus*; . . . in sum, all words and actions that betoken fear to offend, or desire to please, is *worship*. . . . The worship we exhibit to those we esteem to be but men, as to kings, and men in authority, is *civil worship*; but the worship we exhibit to that which we think to be God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions be, is *divine worship*. . . . Having shown what is *worship*, and what an image, I will now put them together, and examine what that idolatry is. . . . To worship an image is voluntary to do those external acts which are signs of honouring either the matter of the image, which is wood, stone, metal, or some other visible creature; or the phantasm of the brain, for the resemblance or representation whereof the matter was formed and figured; or both together, as one animate body, composed of the matter and the phantasm, as of a body and soul. . . . Such finite gods are but idols of the brain, nothing real, and are commonly called in the Scripture by the names of *vanity*, and *lies*, and *nothing*. . . . *Idolatry is to*

worship by signs of an interna and real honour; but *scandalous worship* is but seeming worship, and may sometimes be joined with an inward and hearty detestation both of the image and of the phantastical *demon*, or idol, to which it is dedicated, and proceed only from the fear of death, or other grievous punishment; and is nevertheless a sin in them that so worship.

. . . He that worshippeth in an image, or any creature, either the matter thereof, or any fancy of his own which he thinketh to dwell in it, or both together; or believeth that such things hear his prayers, or see his devotions, without ears or eyes, committeth idolatry; and he that counterfeitteth such worship for fear of punishment, if he be a man whose example hath power amongst his brethren, committeth a sin.

XLVI. " . . . Of Darkness from vain Philosophy and fabulous Traditions. By philosophy is understood the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from the manner of the generation of any thing, to the properties; or from the properties to some possible way of generation of the same; to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter and human force permit, such effects as human life requireth. . . . We are not to account as any part thereof that original knowledge called experience, in which consisteth prudence, because it is not attained by reasoning, but found as well in brute beasts as in man, whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright but general, eternal, and immutable truth. Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false conclusions; for he that reasoneth aright in words he understandeth can never conclude an error; nor to that which any man knows by supernatural revelation, because it is not acquired by reasoning; nor that which is gotten by reasoning from the authority of books, because it is not by reasoning from the cause to the effect, nor from the effect to the cause, and is not knowledge, but faith. . . . *Leisure* is the mother of *philosophy*, and commonwealth the mother of *peace* and *leisure*. . . . The place where any of them [the philosophers] taught and disputed was called *schola*, which in their tongue signifieth *leisure*; and their disputations *diatribæ*, that is to say, *passing of the time*. . . . Plato—that was the best philosopher of the Greeks—forbade entrance into his school to all that were not already in some measure geometricians. . . . The natural philosophy of those schools was rather a dream than science, and set forth in senseless and insignificant language. Scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which is now called *Aristotle's Metaphysics*; nor more repugnant to government than much of that he hath said in his *Politics*; nor more ignorantly than a great part of his *Ethics*. . . . That which is now called an *university* is a joining together, and an incorporation under one government, of many public schools in one and the same town or city. . . . There is a certain *philosophia prima* on which all other philosophy ought to depend, and consisteth principally in right limiting of the significations of such appellations or names as are of all others the most universal, which limitations serve to avoid ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning, and are commonly called definitions; such as are the definitions of body, time, place, matter, form, essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, passion, and divers others, necessary to the explaining of a man's conceptions concerning the nature and generation of bodies. The explication, that is, the settling of the meaning of which, and the like terms, is commonly in the schools called *metaphysics*, as being a part of the philosophy of Aristotle, which hath

that for title. But it is in another sense; for there it signifieth as much as books written or placed after his natural philosophy; but the schools take them for books of supernatural philosophy; for the word *metaphysics* will bear both these senses. . . . From these metaphysics, which are mingled with the Scripture to make school divinity, we are told there be in the world certain essences separated from bodies, which they call abstract essences and substantial forms. . . . For physics, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and secondary causes of natural events, they render none at all, but empty words. . . . If such *metaphysics* and *physics* as this be not *vain philosophy*, there was never any. . . . From Aristotle's civil philosophy men have learned to call all manner of commonwealths but the popular (such as was at that time the state of Athens), *tyranny*. As also to call the condition of the people under the democracy, *liberty*. . . . This is another error of Aristotle's politics, that in a well-ordered commonwealth, not men should govern, but the laws. They induce men, as oft as they like not their governors, to adhere to those that call them tyrants, and to think it lawful to raise war against them. . . . With the introduction of false, we may join also the suppression of true, philosophy, by such men, as neither by lawful authority, nor sufficient study, are competent judges of the truth. . . . Whatsoever power ecclesiastics take upon themselves (in any place where they are subject to the state), in their own right, though they call it God's right, is but usurpation. . . .

XLVII. "Of the Benefit that proceedeth from such Darkeness, and to whom it accrueh. Cicero maketh honourable mention of one of the Casii, a severe judge amongst the Romans, for a custom he had, in criminal causes, when the testimony of the witness was not sufficient, to ask the accusers, *Cui bono?* that is to say, what profit, honour, or other contentment, the accused obtained or expected by the fact. For amongst presumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the author as doth the benefit of the action. . . . And first to this error; that the present Church now militant on earth is the kingdom of God (that is, the kingdom of glory, or the land of promise; not the kingdom of grace, which is but a promise of the land), are annexed these worldly benefits; first, that the pastors and teachers of the Church are entitled thereby, as God's public ministers, to a right of governing the Church; and consequently, because the Church and commonwealth are the same persons, to be rectors and governors of the commonwealth. This benefit of a universal monarchy (considering the desire of men to bear rule), is a sufficient presumption that the Popes that pretended to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the authors of the doctrine by which it was obtained, namely, that the Church now on earth is the kingdom of Christ. After that certain churches had renounced this universal power of the Pope, one would expect, in reason, that the civil sovereigns in all those churches should have recovered so much of it as before they had unadvisedly let go, was their own right, and in their own hands. And in England it was so in effect; . . . but in those places where the presbytery took that office, though many other doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught, yet this doctrine was still retained. But *cui bono?* What profit did they expect from it? The same which the Popes expected—to have a sovereign power over the people. The authors therefore of this darkness in religion are the Roman and the Presbyterian clergy. To this head I refer also all those doctrines that serve them to keep the possession

of this spiritual sovereignty after it is gotten ; as, first, that the *Pope in his public capacity cannot err*. 2nd. That all other bishops have not their rights, neither immediately from God, nor immediately from their civil sovereigns, but from the Pope. 3rd. The exemption of these, and of all other priests, and of all monks and friars, from the power of the civil laws. 4th. The giving to their priests, which is no more in the New Testament, but presbyters, that is, elders, the name of *sacerdotes*, that is, sacrificers, which was the title of the civil sovereign and his public ministers amongst the Jews, whilst God was their king. Also, the making the Lord's Supper a sacrifice. 5th. The teaching that matrimony is a sacrament. 6th. The denial of marriage to priests. 7th. From auricular confession. 8th. By the canonization of saints, and declaring who are martyrs. 9th. They secure the same, by the power they ascribe to every priest of making Christ, and by the power of ordaining penance, and of remitting and retaining sins. 10th. By the doctrine of purgatory, of justification by external works, and of indulgences. 11th. By their demonology, and the use of exorcism, and other things appertaining thereto. Lastly, the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms, and obscure language of the Schoolmen, taught in the universities, which have all been erected and regulated by the Pope's authority, serve them to keep these errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the *ignis fatuus* of vain philosophy for the light of the gospel. . . . But the emperors and other Christian sovereigns, under whose government these errors and the like encroachments of ecclesiastics upon their office at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions and of the tranquillity of their subjects, though they suffered the same for want of fore-sight of the sequel, and of insight into the designs of their teachers, may nevertheless be esteemed accessories to their own and the public damage. For without their authority there could at first no seditious doctrine have been publicly preached. . . . But as the inventions of men are woven, so also are they unravelled out ; the way is the same, but the order is inverted. Therefore the analysis, or resolution, beginneth with the knot that was last tied ; as we may see in the dissolution of the prester-political Church government in England. . . . Nor ought those teachers to be displeased with this loss of their ancient authority. For there is none that should know better than they, that power is preserved by the same virtues by which it is acquired ; that is to say, by wisdom, humility, clearness of doctrine, and sincerity of conversation. . . . From the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for bishop universal, by pretence of succession to St. Peter, their whole hierarchy, or kingdom of darkness, may be compared, not unfitly, to the kingdom of *fairies* ; that is, to the old wives' fables in England, concerning *ghosts* and *spirits*, and the feats they play in the night. As the *fairies* have no existence out in the fancies of ignorant people, rising from the traditions of old wives or old poets, so the spiritual power of the *Pope*, without the bounds of his own civil dominion, consisteth only in the fear that seduced people stand in of their excommunications, upon hearing of false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of the Scripture.

"It was not, therefore, a very difficult matter for Henry VIII. by his exorcism, nor for Queen Elisabeth by her, to cast them out. But who knows that this spirit of Rome [*Jeausism*], now gone out, and walking by missions

through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yield him little fruit, may not return, or rather an assembly of spirits worse than he enter, and inhabit this clean-swept house, and make the end thereof worse than the beginning? This is all I had a design to say concerning the doctrine of the POLITICS."

So ends the work ; but the author, in " a Review and Conclusion," adds some observations explanatory, and makes some references to the time and circumstances of the issue of the work :—

" From the contrariety of some of the natural faculties of the mind, one to another, as also of one passion to another, and from their reference to conversation, there has been an argument taken to infer an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civil duty. To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities ; for by education and discipline they may be, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment and fancy may have place in the same man, but by turns, as the end which he aimeth at requireth. So also reason and eloquence, though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet in the moral, may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. There is therefore no such inconsistency of human nature with civil duties as some think. . . . Because I find by divers English books lately printed, that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of time it is that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror ; nor what is conquest ; nor how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his laws ; therefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I say the point of time wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror is that point wherein, having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by express words or by other sufficient sign, to be his subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit I have showed before in the end of Chapter XXI. ; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former sovereign but that of an ordinary subject, it is then, when the means of his life are within the guards and garrisons of the enemy ; for it is then that he hath no longer protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution. . . . Conquest is not the victory itself, but the acquisition, by victory, of a right over the persons of men. So that conquest, to define it, is the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory. . . . I have set down for one of the causes of the dissolutions of commonwealths, their imperfect generation, consisting in the want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power ; one reason whereof is this, that they will all of them justify the war by which their power was at first gotten, and whereon, as they think, their right dependeth, and not on the possession. Therefore I put down for one of the most effectual seeds of the death of any state, that the conquerors require, not only a submission of men's actions to them for the future, but also an approbation of all their actions past ; when there is scarce a commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in conscience be justified. I ground the civil right of sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty of subjects, upon the known natural inclinations of mankind, and upon the articles of the law of nature : of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the power ecclesiastical of the same sovereigns, I ground it on such texts as are both evident in themselves, and consentant to the scope of the whole

Scripture. And therefore am persuaded that he that shall read it with a purpose only to be informed shall be informed by it. But for those that by writing, or public discourse, or by their eminent actions, have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not be so easily satisfied. For in such cases it is natural for men at one and the same time both to proceed in reading and to lose their attention, in the search of objections to that they had read before. . . . In that part which treateth of a Christian commonwealth, there are some new doctrines. But in this time that men call not only for peace, but also for truth, to offer such doctrines as I think true, and that manifestly tend to peace and loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more but to offer new wine, to be put into new casks, that both may be preserved together. And I suppose that men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of antiquity as to prefer ancient errors before new and well-proved truth. Though I reverence those men of ancient time that either have written truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out ourselves, yet to the antiquity itself I think nothing due. For if we will reverence the age the present is the oldest. . . . There is nothing in this whole discourse, nor of that I writ before of the same subject in Latin, as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the word of God or to good manners, or to the disturbance of the public tranquillity. . . . My Discourse of Civil and Ecclesiastical Government was occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application, and without other design than to set before men's eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience; of which the condition of human nature and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an inviolable observation. I return to my interrupted speculation of bodies natural; wherein, if God give me health to finish it, I hope the novelty will as much please as in the doctrine of this artificial body it useth to offend. For such truth as opposeth no man's profit nor pleasure is to all men welcome."

We have now placed before our readers a pretty full, and we hope a fairly comprehensive epitome of one of the epoch books in English literature. We have, as far as possible, employed the very language in which Hobbes expressed his paradoxical sentiments, shrewd thoughts, vigorous philosophy, and novel politics, so that the luminous and precise style of the writer might lose nothing of its point or brilliancy from our handling which could be avoided in making an abstract. Those of our readers who desire to peruse an abstract formed after a different manner may be referred to Hallam's "Literature of the Middle Ages," Part III., chap. iii., sect. iv., comprising paragraphs 113—149 in Vol. II., pp. 463—491, and Part III., chap. iv., sect. ii., comprising paragraphs 56—71 in Vol. II., pp. 530—537; minor notices and abstracts may be found in R. Blakey's "History of the Philosophy of Mind," J. D. Morell's "History of Modern Philosophy," G. H. Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," Jouffrey's "Introduction to Ethics (Channing's translation), Lectures XI. and XII., &c.

We expect to be able in another paper to complete our notice of the events and writings of the latter years of the lengthened life of the sage of Malmesbury, and the founder of the English school of sensational metaphysics.

## Religion.

### IS THE GOSPEL ADAPTED TO MODERN LIFE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"The light of classic antiquity was as the diffused illumination of a cloudy day. There was then no direct radiation from above; and when at noon of an over-clouded day the sun suddenly shines forth in his power, we all rejoice in those beams, nor do we think we do a wrong to the ancient classic splendour to exclaim, 'The darkness is past, and the True Light now shineth.' . . . I take from its place one of that class of books just above mentioned—a third or fourth rate book; it is the 'Homilies of a Coptic Monk,' and I bring this obscure yet edifying writer into comparison with the profound author of the 'Phædo,' and the 'Phædrus,' and the 'Apology.' As to intellectuality, immeasurable is the space intervening between the pious Macarius and the illustrious disciple of Socrates. Nevertheless this interval is not greater than that which measures the distance which the human mind and the modern civilization have passed on, under the teaching of Christ, beyond the position it had reached under the teaching of Plato. . . . The purport of this now present tendency is toward the acceptance of a Christianity—abated—a gospel shorn of its forces. . . . All we need, it is said, in this advanced stage of European civilization is *an amiable ethics*, and an easy after-life in prospect, with no terrors appended. . . . The compromise which is now pleaded for must embrace such things as these:—The exclusion of 'dogmas' of all sorts, a declared indifference toward 'speculative belief,' a rejection of superstitions, . . . the utter removal of the ancient belief concerning the vicarious death of Christ. . . . To abate the *forces* of the gospel might seem a practicable enterprise, if this indeed were all, but . . . other than such as it is—powerful to shake the Babel of human pride—powerful to vanquish the obduracy of our alienation from God, the gospel quickly gives place to any illusion—philosophical, or literary, or sensual—which may suit the bent of each mind."—*Isaac Taylor.*

THE inherent value and applicability to the subject under discussion of the above words are such that, we think, no apology is needed for inserting so lengthy a quotation—indeed, we would gladly have quoted still more largely from the concluding pages of Isaac Taylor's essay on "The Family Pen." In considering this subject there are four points to be noticed:—I. The nature of modern life; II. The character of the gospel; III. The influence exerted by the gospel in past days; and IV. The adaptability of the gospel to the present time.

I. What is modern life? It seems to have for its distinguishing feature a something which its votaries look upon with an overweening pride. Its principle is to set up Reason on the throne of the heart, falling down to worship that as though it were a god; to

make Reason the pole-star of life by which alone to steer the ship, shape the course, and test conclusions, forgetting that many have foundered on the quicksands through giving a too exclusive heed to this guide. Modern life would freeze the warm affections by the icy coldness of conclusions drawn from the premises of a materialistic utilitarianism; it would quench the flame of love with the many waters of intellectual distrust and doubt. Modern life teaches us not to admit a belief in miracles or in anything which the intellect cannot understand, forgetting that there are many mysteries and miracles connected with our existence and history which we must believe, yet cannot comprehend. Faith and love were the ruling principles in the sincere worshippers amongst the ancient Jews; and in the heathen nations superstition and reason took the place of faith and love. When Christianity was promulgated its disciples were taught to abandon superstition, and to put faith, love, and reason in their proper places, each working in its own sphere in harmony with the other two principles. From the time when the Church was first allied with the State under Constantine, abuses and absurdities crept into the profession of Christianity, and in the Middle Ages, superstition usurped the place of faith, and reason was mystified. At the Reformation, faith again asserted its right to occupy the place usurped by superstition, and reason emerged from behind the cloud which had so long interrupted its light. In the present day superstition is making a feeble attempt to regain its position by proclaiming the infallibility of a man; but in the opposite direction a much stronger influence is at work. Reason is seeking to dethrone faith and love, in order that it may itself reign despotically and arbitrarily over the human mind. We would not depreciate reason and intellectual power. Reason is valuable as a counsellor and guide, but must not be set up as a tyrant or a despot. There are secrets which reason cannot discern, there are recesses into which its light cannot penetrate, and there are distances to which its vision cannot reach. The tallest Englishman, with the clearest possible eyesight, standing upon the loftiest mountain of Britain, with one of the most powerful of telescopes, would not be able to gather any knowledge of the distant lands of Australia by the exercise of his organs of sight; and if he had no other means and no other position for making observations, must for ever remain in ignorance of that country. The shortest and dullest of students, at the bottom of the valley, with a reliable text-book of geography in his hand, would know more of that country than he would, notwithstanding the advantages of his position. But, not to pursue this subject further, we believe that the tendency of the present age is to exalt reason, not in conjunction with, but at the expense of, faith and love.

II. What is the gospel? It is good news from a far country, glad tidings of great joy. But doubtless the word gospel is used in this question in its more extended sense to signify the Bible, which contains the authoritative declaration of the gospel, foreshadow-



in the Old Testament, more fully developed in the New; the word has been employed in this sense by the gentlemen who have opened the debate, and we will follow in the same track. We may here observe that, strictly speaking, the gospel is the declaration of salvation through Christ, having a duplex manifestation,—viz., the *letter* of the gospel, as embodied in the Scriptures; and the *spirit* of the gospel, as developed in the mind and heart of every person under the influence of that "Spirit of truth" which Christ repeatedly spoke of, as specially recorded in John xv. 26 and xvi. 13. But in speaking of the gospel as signifying the Scriptures we would say that it declares the terms upon which God deals with man, it speaks of Him who "came to seek and to save that which was lost;" it shows how the gospel is made the power of God unto salvation, and it tells us what should be the feelings, aims, motives, and conduct of those who have found this good news to be glad tidings to their own hearts. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God" (2 Tim. iii. 16), and the power which it has had over many lives and in many hearts, the wondrous fulfilment of its prophecies, and the essential uniformity of the teaching in all its parts, give evidence to show that it really is what it professes to be. The Bible is a revelation from God to men of the will of God concerning men. The wording of this question implies a previous admission of the truth of the gospel, and we have merely to inquire into its adaptability to modern life.

III. What influence has the gospel exerted in past days? Some may think this question foreign to the present discussion; but if we briefly inquire into the influence of the gospel in past days, we shall be better able to judge whether that influence is adapted to and required in the present day. The gospel has ever displayed a power of arresting the tendency of man to degenerate. Without a belief in and subjection to the influences of the gospel man may improve his intellectual power and mental attainments, but he will most certainly degenerate with regard to his moral character and his relationships with God. Of this assertion we will offer a little historical evidence presently. Wherever the influences of the gospel have pervaded a nation, its power has been more or less made manifest in civilizing and elevating the people. The gospel, as an instructor, revolutionizes the mind of its disciples, leads their thoughts in paths they had not previously known, and diverts their minds from the old channels of thought; as a luminary it sheds a light upon many subjects which were before enshrouded in darkness. When the gospel first spread through the Roman empire Christian authors soon began to abound among the Gentile nations, then pagan literature became scarce. After this time there were but few fresh contributions to the heathen classics, and the supply of them quickly ceased altogether. The sunlight of the gospel extinguished the moonlight of pagan reason, and the unlettered Christian of the second century knew more of the truth upon some important matters than the most learned of those who had listened

to the sublimest speculations of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The gospel tends to put down superstition on one hand, and on the other to restrain reason within its legitimate sphere, by raising to their proper places faith and love. The gospel has ever been a more powerful agent in overthrowing what Isaac Taylor has spoken of as "the Babel of human pride," in restraining cruel, sensual, rebellious passions, and in preserving the mind from illusions, than reason, mental vigour, or intellectual acquirements.

IV. Is the gospel adapted to modern life? We now come to the main subject of this debate, and if what we have said concerning modern life and the gospel, its nature and its effects, be admitted, it can scarcely be denied that this question should be answered in the affirmative. We would remind our readers that we are not called upon to prove that the teaching of the gospel and the tendencies of modern life are in accord with each other, that there is no opposition between them; the task which devolves upon us is to show that the gospel is an agent able to exert a beneficial influence in the present time. This beneficial influence may be equally exerted in restraining the evil and restricting the good within proper limits, as well as in fostering that which is most worthy in the tendencies of the age. We maintain that the gospel is an agent adapted to and needed in modern life, because it supplies a knowledge which cannot be obtained from any other source, because it vigorously opposes the evil tendencies of the time, and because it is the only efficient barrier to keep us from drifting down the river of rationalism, doubt, and speculation, into the sea of scepticism, libertinism, anarchy, and folly. We would ask, Is this tendency of the present age to a deification of reason defensible? Are faith and love to have no influence upon the human mind? Must they succumb to the arbitrary commands of reason without a struggle? Will the worship of reason be safe for life in this world, and satisfying when this life draws to a close? We answer, No. Where then shall we look for a power to resist this tendency of modern life, to submit to the absolute, uncontrolled, unregulated sway of reason? We answer, to the gospel. This is the only power that will cause us to put reason, faith, and love each in its proper place. This alone can exert an influence sufficient to restrain the great, the rich, the learned of this age from a worshipping of reason. What can mere intellectual power discover of the relationships which have existed, do exist, and shall exist, between the created and the Creator? what can mental vision discern of the duration and ultimate destiny of this world? what can unaided reason tell of the state of the vital principle of man's inner being when the body lies in the grave of death? Nothing, or at least next to nothing. But these are important matters, and it deeply concerns us to know as much of them as we can. Where then shall we go for information concerning these mysteries? To the gospel, the light which alone can open up these dark places to the human mind. In referring to the vagaries of George For-

Macaulay very justly says, "No powers of mind constitute a security against errors of this description. Touching God and His ways with man, the highest human faculties can discover little more than the meanest. In theology the interval is small indeed between Aristotle and a child, between Archimedes and a naked savage." Many an Englishman now knows more of God than Socrates or Plato ever discerned in their most profound speculations. The progress of civilization and the march of intellect have not raised the British rustic to an equality with Euclid, Xenophon, Cicero, or Caesar in terrestrial affairs or mental power; but the promulgation of the gospel has brought him to occupy a more exalted position than the wisest of heathen sages with regard to the knowledge of supernatural mysteries. But some may say the gospel has done its work, it has dispelled the darkness which bedclouded the minds of heathen philosophers, it has taught mankind much, and opened up new channels of thought and knowledge; but now we have advanced so far, we have got beyond its teachings, we have left all that behind us, and may discard it as an antiquated affair. To such reasoning we reply, the gospel sheds a light upon the mysteries which it elucidates, and teaches truths concerning the subjects with which it deals, that, without it, cannot be arrived at by any human wisdom or skill; and we have no more reason to conclude that this light and this knowledge would remain with us when their source was removed than that natural light would still be enjoyed in this world when the brightness of the sun had been for ever extinguished, or that a knowledge of Euclid would continue amongst our students after all mathematical teachers had been banished from the country. Even when the sunshine is brightest, there are many dark corners in the world to which its light cannot penetrate; in spite of the large number of teachers in this land of learning and civilization, there are thousands who live and die without receiving any scholastic tuition; and notwithstanding the great power of the gospel there are large numbers in this country who have not been brought under its influence. But the fact that the light does not illuminate every cavern affords no proof that the sun does not shine; the fact that all children do not receive instruction does not prove that the schoolmasters do no good in their educational labours; and the fact that all the inhabitants of Christian countries are not under the influence of the gospel does not prove that it exerts no power over those nations. How different would be our state if those influences were withdrawn! Even with the light of the gospel shining around us we have had monstrous absurdities promulgated by Joanna Southcote, Edward Irving, Dr. Newton, &c.; and what would be our condition if that light were withdrawn?

We have referred to man's tendency to degenerate with regard to his moral character and his relationships with God when left to himself and unaided by divine revelations. This is proved by the whole course of sacred and secular history. Adam and Eve had divine revelations in the garden of Eden, which they could speak of

to their children after their expulsion from that earthly paradise. But man soon degenerated, and we read that "the wickedness of man was great in the earth" (Gen. vi. 5), so great that the whole human race, with the exception of one family, was swept away by a mighty flood. There was now no man living but such as had heard and seen a special revelation from God; but mankind soon degenerated again, the builders of Babel were confounded, Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed for their iniquity, Abraham was chosen out from the people, and to him and to his descendants God specially revealed Himself again and again. The divine revelations were now confined to one race; but even they degenerated, and seem to have forgot what God had revealed to their forefathers, for when Moses first visited them in their bondage they do not appear to have had any expectation of deliverance (Acts vii. 25). God, however, released them from Egyptian bondage, and gave them a special revelation of His will on Mount Sinai. They, however, speedily degenerated again, and those who forgot the divine revelations forsook the true and living God, and worshipped heathen idols. Then the people were taken captive by the Assyrians; in their captivity they again thought upon the divine revelations, and they were permitted to return to their native land. Notwithstanding that they had such a history to look back upon, this people soon degenerated again; the last of the prophets was dead, the people slighted the words of God given to their forefathers, and when Christ came to this earth they had become mere formal worshippers, and taught the traditions of men in the place of the commands of God (Matt. xv. 8, 9); soon after, Jerusalem was taken by Titus, and now the Jews are a scattered nation. When Christ had appeared among men, the "true Light" (1 John ii. 8) shone forth in all its fulness, the gospel was preached to the Jews first and afterwards to the Gentiles. Rome was brought to the profession of Christianity, the canon of Scripture completed, and a curse denounced against those who should add thereto or take therefrom (Rev. xxii. 18, 19). Whilst the Bible remained in the hands of the people and its truths in their hearts the gospel exercised a great power over those who bore the name of Christians. But when the Bible was kept in the hands of the priests alone, and its truths were not translated into the language of the common people, then we have the darkness of the Middle Ages. In the fourteenth century Wycliffe translated the Bible into the English language, and the first beams of a new light dawned upon this country. In the sixteenth century Luther translated the Bible into the German language, and expounded its truths in the vernacular of the common people, and thus a light was shed abroad which all the power of Rome could not extinguish. We fear that the cloud of degeneracy is again creeping over the profession of Christianity through a wilful slighting of the word of God, and it seems as though we should by and by need a second Luther to reform Protestantism. The same tendency to degenerate is to be found among heathen nations; they all descended from a source

acquainted with divine revelations, and the farther removed from that source the wider the divergence from Scripture truth. We have read just sufficient about pagan mythologies to have noticed that the traces of truths revealed in the word of God are more numerous and more striking in their resemblance in the ancient than in the more recent systems; *e. g.*, the Persian mythology contained a greater resemblance to the truths of the Bible than the Grecian mythology; and the religion of the mountaineers in some districts of Hindostan, which was the prevailing religion of the country when Sanscrit was the current language of the people, contains more points of resemblance to the gospel than Brahminism or Buddhism. A devoted adherence to the gospel will check, and a neglect of it will hasten, this tendency of mankind to moral and spiritual degeneracy.

In the present day of vacillation, doubt, change, and speculation, we greatly need some power having authority to claim unlimited obedience to its commands and unlimited assent to its teaching. Such a power we have in the gospel, and although there may be disputes about its interpretation, yet the sincere acknowledgment that "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God," and must be right in every word, affords a sure foundation upon which the mind of the agitator, speculator, and thinker may rest, and be kept from sinking into such quagmires as engulfed the philosophers of the French Revolution after they set aside the word and worship of God. Archimedes thought he could move the earth from its place in the solar system if he could but get a fulcrum upon which to rest his lever; but for want of that fulcrum his disquisitions upon this subject all ended in barren speculations. The acknowledgment of the authority of the Bible affords a fulcrum upon which men may with confidence rest the levers with which they seek to overthrow oppression, injustice, speculation, doubt, and error, and without which they are liable to find that their strength is spent for nought, because, like Archimedes, they have no fulcrum upon which to rest their levers.

In the present day self-seeking, policy, and expediency are the ruling passions of the multitude. The gospel teaches us to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us; it enjoins us to return good for evil, and commands us to yield to the directions of moral principle rather than to those of mere policy. It teaches us to hold with right against might, and though its precepts are not fully carried out it is nevertheless a powerful agent, exercising a salutary influence by opposing the selfishness of man, and teaching the nobler law of love. It is a striking fact that hospitals, asylums, and charitable institutions have ever been unknown among those nations that had not felt the power of the gospel. We believe that the nearest approach to such establishments in non-Christian nations is to be found in the caravansaries of the East, and the asylums for monkeys in Hindostan. In our own country the charitable institutions are almost entirely, if not wholly, supported

by those who acknowledge, and not by those who deny the power of the gospel. These facts go far to show the influence exerted by the gospel in upholding the law of love.

The whole of the reasoning in F. F. A.'s article may be summed up in one sentence—viz., that the influence of the gospel does not prevent many things being habitually and commonly practised in direct violation of its precepts, and that therefore the gospel cannot be adapted to modern life; for if it were, such things would not be done. Now this is a very lame argument: we might as well say the penalties of the law are not adapted to modern life because they do not prevent thieves from stealing; the police force cannot be adapted to modern life because many criminals escape detection; and medical science cannot be adapted to modern life because so many patients die under the doctor's care. If the depredations of thieves do not prove that the penalties of the law are not adapted to modern life; if the escape of criminals be not a proof that the police force is not adapted to modern life; if the death of the patients does not prove that the physician's skill is not adapted to life; then the fact of so many things being done contrary to the precepts of the gospel affords no proof of the assertion that the gospel is not adapted to modern life. The question is, Would not these practices increase if the influences of the gospel were withdrawn? We believe they would. Take the classes which acknowledge the power of the gospel and those which do not acknowledge its power, and see to which belongs the larger proportion of moral and social crime.

The article of A. F. F. is framed to prove that the principles of the gospel are not in harmony with the tendencies of the age; but this is not the point under discussion. We maintain that the very opposition of the gospel to some of the tendencies of the age proves it to be adapted to the requirements of modern life. The criminal law of our country is not in harmony with the habits of the thief, but it is adapted to restraining him from indulging his evil propensities, and to the preserving of contemporary society from his depredations. So the gospel is adapted to modern life, because it exerts a powerful influence in controlling that which is good within proper limits, and in restraining that which is evil in the tendencies of the present age. The sermonizings, disquisitions, expositions, apologies, &c., to which A. F. F. refers do not prove that the gospel is not adapted to modern life; they are merely efforts to extend the sphere of the gospel's power, and to bring those who have slighted its teachings under its influences.

The considerations adduced in this article lead us to the conclusion that the gospel is adapted to and needed in modern life. Happy is that man who, having great mental power with wide intellectual acquirements, is also under the influence of the power of the gospel.

SAMUEL

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE Prusso-French war just brings this question to the test. The gospel is said to be the gospel of peace. The eldest son of the Church Roman Catholic proclaimed that the empire is peace. The most Christian sovereign, Protestant William, assumes in his phrases and phrases the utmost benignity of the faith Lutheran. And in both kingdoms, in every parish and commune, there is a preacher of righteousness and peace. Religious forms and ceremonies are incorporated with the every-day life of the inhabitants of these nations, and the heads of these nations unite, under their respective crowns, the double sovereignty of Christ and Constantine. Yet these two nations—professing faith in the gospel message of “Glory to God in the highest, on earth *peace* and good will to men,” are engaged in an internecine war, mutually praying for the destruction of each other, and asking God to bless the arms of those who are about to shed brothers’ blood, and cause the tears of widows and orphans to be poured out like water, while the voice of many shall be heard crying, “*Me have ye bereaved of my children!*” Is the gospel adapted to such a state of things as this?

It is true that the Religious Tract Society is engaged in pouring a deluge of tracts, Bibles, &c., over the territories deluged with the blood of slaughter, and that humane persons are employed in administering bandages and balms to the wounded in the name of Christian charity. But how can Christian charity look on with complacency while the battle rages and the wounds are made?

In these two things, then, in which the lessons of the gospel are pre-eminent, the proclaiming of a reign of peace, and the production of a right and charitable frame of mind, the gospel has not shown itself to be adapted to modern life. Surely if it is the gospel of peace, it ought, in nearly two thousand years, with the undisputed occupancy of millions of pulpits, to have made some progress towards the quieting of the raging passions, the selfishness, and the criminal bloodthirstiness in which war has its origin. Surely, if it is the gospel of charity, it should, by this time, have got somewhat beyond the merely mechanical system of almsgiving and help-rendering, and have inoculated the spirits of men with some of that inner grace which marks the greatest, chiefest, and best of Christian attributes? Put to the test by the absolute facts of today—war and the administration of charity—the gospel is found to be plainly not adapted to modern life. Are not all the organizations of Christianity together capable of influencing men and monarchs to learn the art of war no more? are all the organizations of Christianity so helpless and so worthless as to be paralyzed when the hour arises for the exercise of prevention of evil in preference to the cure of its effects? If this is so—and that it is so who can doubt who knows the events of the month?—can it be with truth and honesty affirmed that the gospel is really adapted to modern life? Must it not be conceded that it is thought of as a

thing apart from it—a creed which has but small effect in the control of any deed?

We are not now expressing any doubt of the truth of the doctrines, the excellence of the dogmatics, or the absolutely divine inspiration of the law of the Lord. We do not say that the Gospels are incapable of being made effective upon modern life; we simply affirm that they are not adapted to modern life. Christianity has the vastest organizations for the propagation and popularization of its doctrines. It has Sunday schools and baptism; convents and nunneries; education under its supervision; the confessional, laying bare to its gaze the inmost thoughts of the human heart in its worst estate; orphanages, reformatories, and sisterhoods; gaol, ship, and barrack chaplaincies; hospitals and home missions; young men's associations, and young women's societies; mothers' meetings and deacons' courts; laymen's united endeavours under their control; the mighty armies of the brotherhoods of Rome and the Patriarchate, and the constant assiduity of popes and cardinals, archbishops and bishops, deans and canons, rectors and vicars, curates and clergymen, ministers and missionaries, preachers and elders, nurses and Bible women, tract distributors and revival leaders, with a whole legion of commissariat labourers in Bible, tract, book, education, and charitable societies, not to speak of local squires of excellent aims, and Lady Bountifuls of amiable character, and a thousand other supernumeraries; and yet it has not effected its end—the subduing of men to the principles of truth, honour, peace, holiness, and piety; and, independent of all these agencies for adaptation, it has not adapted itself to modern life.

We admit the excellency of the machinery, but we deny its adaptation. Men do not employ a mitrailleuse to crack a walnut, nor a cricket-bat to discharge a cannon-ball, nor lay rails across the gulf-stream, or plough the sea to render navigation easier; they do not measure wheat by a thermometer, nor weigh air in the marketplace scales. The machinery is in each case excellent for its own purpose, but very unsuitable for any other; mere perfection of machinery or multiplicity of means do not necessarily prove adaptedness to gain ends. If they did, the fagot and flame, the gibbet and the rack, the thumb-screw and the iron boot, the virgin and the maiden, the gag and the pillory, the convict ship and the dungeon, would equally have proved how well the Christianity of a former age was supplied with the means of destroying doubt, abolishing heresy, maintaining the truth, and producing conviction. These things were thought to be adapted to the production of such results, but they were signal failures. Of their adaptation, those who used them had little doubt, yet their inefficacy was palpable. They were means of adapting the gospels to those ages, but they were means through which, as channels, the graces of the gospel would not flow—they were non-conductors. Electricity is not less present, nor less powerfully present, because its action has been impeded in any particular direction by the use of insulators; neither may Chris-



tianity be less powerful, in itself, now-a-days; but our question concerns not the essential power of the Gospels, but their adaptation.

This touches the very point of dispute, which is not the inner, essential worth of the gospel, not even its suitability, its capability of being adapted to modern life, but that adaptation. If the gospels could be incorporated with human thought and action, it is not denied that modern life would be greatly bettered and men much benefited; the truths they teach and the duties they inculcate, the laws they lay down and the prospects they afford, are all calculated to bless and ennoble, to comfort and elevate, but they confessedly have not been so incorporated into human thought and feeling; for there are many, very many unchristian practices and fashions in common life, not only among the children of the world, but among the professed children of the covenant. There are among even those who frequent our churches and partake of the sacraments—among those, not unfrequently, even who minister at the altar—the shameful sins of shameless men. Do we not know well that advertising is a system of shameless lying in too many instances, and that that is practised by the church-going community in its worst form—even in the advertisements of religious books, by religious societies? Do we not know that instead of following the precept of Christ in almsgiving, not to let the left hand know what the right hand doeth, even in regard to church-building and hospital support, the names of donors and subscribers must be advertised and vanity be gratified that charity may have its dole?

Such things as these are violations of the very spirit of the gospel in modern life, and that in the life, too, which holds itself to be nearest the gospel. In not a few churches the pecuniary contributions of all the members is published, so that a pounds, shillings, and pence estimate of Christian earnestness may be furnished. Our allegation is that the gospel is impeded in its progress and efficacy by these means, and is not adapted to modern life by them; and we affirm that our attempts to adapt the gospel to modern life have been failures because we have persisted in enfolding and enwrapping Christianity in the old-fashioned trappings of worldliness and priestcraft; and have made Christianity too much—in clergy and laity alike—a profession and a creed, a mass of forms of sound words accepted for true, instead of a practice, a personal devotion to God, a change of nature and a reformed purity of character. We too frequently hear, among church frequenters, the vile maxim, "We must just do as the world does," "We must be world-like," "We must take the world as we find it," &c.; whereas the gospel came to make the world what it should be, to make men unworldly, to transform the children of this world so that they might be *in*, yet not *of* the world. Worldliness and other-worldliness, however mixed, will not adapt the gospels to modern life; we must change our modern life *by* and *to* the gospels.

The reader of these remarks will see at once that A. A. has made a mistake in regard to the question at the very outset. He explained (p. 33) the word "adapted" properly enough as fit or suitable; but the phrase to be explained is "adapted to," which is like, yet unlike; as we may easily see. Early in the present century a conviction was entertained that steam would be a *suitable* agent for ocean navigation, and yet much study, effort, and ingenuity were required to get it *adapted to* that form of sea transit. Similarly, it was thought that the steam-engine was a fit and proper agent for locomotive purposes; but it required the invention of the railroad and the reconstruction of the engine before it could be *adapted to* railway progression. In the same way it has been attempted to adapt the gospel to modern life by forms, ceremonies, and formularies; by the substitution of faith in preaching for faith in penitence, practice, and perseverance in righteousness; faith in creeds for faith in Christ.

A. A. makes even a more thorough mistake when he argues that the gospel "can never become obsolete." That is not the question. What it may or may not *become* is a matter of opinion, what it *is* is a matter of fact, but what it is "adapted to" is an inquiry different from either. "Adapted to" signifies specifically fitted to affect, to influence, and act upon; and hence "become" is an intrusion. We also might argue that if it has only to become "adapted to" modern life, it is not yet adapted, and therefore the negative is plainly gained.

A. A. asserts that the gospel is adapted to modern life (1) politically, (2) socially, (3) individually, (4) morally; but if his allegation were sustained by proofs, he would require to show that in our political relations we are guided by the gospel—and the one word, *diplomacy*, will show that that is, at least, a mistake; that in our social relations we are governed by the laws of the gospel—but a reference to our numerous social fictions, hypocrisies, sins, shams, and shames, will indicate that something is wrong in his argument; that in our individuality we are pure, holy, and conscientious; and to this we can only say, Look into thine own heart, reader, and say, art thou so?—while morally our modern life is, in almost all points, at quite a distance from what the gospel affirms it should be. This is admitted by S. S., but he blames the modern life, not the gospel. We blame the adaptation; we assert that the intervening agencies of creed and church, sect and organization, are to blame; that the communication is interrupted, and the adaptation of the gospel to modern life must be so injured as to be irretrievable, unless the gospel itself be applied to the soul; the gospel pure and simple, the gospel of Christ in direct contact with the soul; that alone, it seems to us, will make modern life sweet and wholesome, pure and good. Adaptation, and attempts at adaptation, have been the bane of gospel progress.

B. C. R.

## OUGHT THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES TO BE REVISED BY A ROYAL COM- MISSION?

### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

BIBLICAL revision is a subject which concerns every thoughtful Christian, and ought to receive consideration as a topic on which the highest interests of the soul and of society depend. But it ought to be looked on not as an abstract question, but as one which has a history and is history. Our Authorized Version of the Bible is a marvel and a treasure, and it has become the inheritance of the entire English-speaking population of the world. It is an accomplished fact; and it is difficult, if not impossible, to delete from history the traces and signs of an accomplished fact. It is, besides, an accomplished fact which has had most important bearings upon life and thought, on literature and art, on the forms of pulpit and expository teaching, and in the causation out of which the events of history arise. I am aware that to the question—taken as an abstract question—"Ought we to have a pure, correct, unmingled transfusion of the word of God into our language?" no answer could be given but one, and that is, "Certainly, if it is—and as far as it is—attainable." We have not this abstract question to deal with. On that there cannot be two opinions; for what we want brought close to—even into our hearts, is the perfect will of God. Our present debate concerns another issue altogether, and is as different from the question as stated above as an agitation about Reform would be different from the question, "Ought we to have the best, purest, and most perfect form of government attainable under Christian civilization?" Every one would grant at once a reply in the affirmative. It would be only after that that discussion would arise, when we came to decide on the form suitable to the terms. History does not recede; it is a progressive issue from all the causes that operate in the past on the present. We cannot ignore what has been, in any attempt to realize what should be; and least of all can this be wisely done in regard to the more important concerns of man—those which relate to civil and religious life.

On the general question, according to our notions of things, no issue can be raised, for upon that as a mere *theorem* there is nothing to be advanced in opposition. But we neither live in a world of theory nor of theorems; ours is an existence of problems and practicabilities. We are not at the commencement of an era in which is to be initiated a new world—Owenitic or Comtean, Pauline or Petrine, Papal or Protestant, Mormonic or Secular. We are in the midst of events, and we are under the impress of them. Our position is historically given to us, and we cannot remake it. We must consider this in this debate. Many things which might have been

better done at first, being done, cannot be redone without evil results. In not a few things it is the true philosophy rather to "bear the ills we have than fly to others which we know not of." We know what we are in regard to our present translation of the Scriptures, but we do not know what we should be with a new version. At present, Christendom, so far as it is English-speaking, is one in reference to this matter,—How many changes might a new translation necessitate? It is to bring under the consideration of our readers a few of those considerations which men of one idea are too apt to overlook, that we write. We have received the power of looking before and after, in order that we may direct our path by experience while exercising foresight and prudence. In an affair of such importance as the revision of the Authorized Version of the Bible, we think it would be well if some of the over-earnest spirits would pause and look about them, rather than rush in headlong haste upon a pre-determined journey incautiously.

The English version of the Scriptures is the common standard of all the nations and colonies who are in possession of English blood or have been subdued to English power and influence. Not only the three kingdoms, but the immense English-speaking territories of the Southern Seas, the greater part of the American continent, a large extent of India, considerable portions of Africa—are all interested in the Authorized Version, and not only should be thought of in regard to it, but should be consulted about it. We cannot by any form of pressure or legislation compel the use of a new translation, and we shall run great risk of destroying the wonderful universality the present version has already attained without invigorating men's regard of the sacred original or increasing their respect for the present version. The union and unanimity extant in favour of our standard Scriptures are great points in the negative side of this question. Unless there are some probabilities, and a good many possibilities, of securing and insuring a like union and unanimity among all the English-speaking people of the earth, we do not think that the issuing of a new revision of the text of our translation would compensate by its advantages for a sectarianized, localized, and partially used new version.

I find I have in the preceding sentence used the word sectarianized rather hastily; for I have adduced no reason as yet for supposing that a new translation would sectarianize the use of the Scriptures; but I am of opinion it would. As it is, sects have accepted the Authorized Version as a good standard edition. This they have long employed and enjoyed. They have been in the habit of expounding it, and they have not scrupled to criticise it sharply. It would be a very difficult thing to find the sects agreeing in the acceptance of any new form of the written Word. They have grown to the use of this version by the necessities of history; but this they would accept of their own choice, if they took it up at all, and that is a very different thing from holding to the version of Scripture

already existing—from the time when it was Hobson's choice: this or none!

I object, then, to the revision of the Authorized Version of the Holy Scriptures by any means which has not made certain of the concurrence and agreement of all the people whose language is English, as well as the concurrence and agreement of all the sects in the countries in which the Authorized Version of the Scriptures is already employed. Any new cause of schism in faith or in the usages connected with faith, and any fresh cause of estrangement in manners, customs, and thoughts, would carry disaster into the future. What a fine glow and thrill of joy flashes through and affects the spirit when the thoughtful reader of these Scriptures of ours reflects that in the whole great realm on which the sun never sets, and in that great territory which is only a daughter land of England, the same words are read and spoken in the services of religion and in the private worship of Christian families! Here is a "unity of spirit" which would be ill-exchanged for the slight improvement in the letter of the word that any revision could effect. But, as we shall show hereafter, perhaps the least probable of all ways to effect the object aimed at by those who wish a revision to be adopted would be that of a Royal Commission. Any revision would probably tend to affect the unity of the English-speaking races; but the acceptance of a revision executed under a Royal Commission would complicate matters beyond calculation.

I do not wish to extend my remarks to much length; but I think that, by the suggestion of a few particulars, accompanied with a remark on each of them, just sufficient to show their bearing on the question and their reality as arguments, I may help those who are open to be reasoned with to hesitate before too readily assuming that a revision would be a good thing in itself; and that, being so, it would be good under any circumstances.

And first I remark that the peculiar character and history of the Authorized Version of the Scriptures has had a greatly beneficial effect in preventing Bibliolatry.

Done at the time it was, it was felt to be a piece of honest work, honestly performed to the best of the ability of those who were engaged on it. It was brought into general use and received into general favour before the unitive energies of Protestantism had had opportunity for becoming relaxed, and prior to the appearance of any powerful schismatic influence. But though this was the case, and the sects saw that it was so as they arose, while they did not oppose the Bible as it was thus in ordinary use, they yet criticised it and called attention to the defects of it; and hence there grew up a separation in idea of the word of life and the truth of life which it contained, which prevented Bibliolatry, while it secured substantial unity.

This observation naturally leads me to remark, in the second place, that this freedom from Bibliolatry had important effects on

free inquiry, and had the special peculiarity of keeping in constant exercise the critical faculties.

This has necessitated the exercise of thoughtful comparison of place with place and text with text; has brought under review the unity of the gospel and the consistency of its texts, and has afforded constant use for the watchful application of exegetical criticism whenever any special doctrines were broached or maintained. The thoughtful perusal of the Scriptures is of great importance; and if we had earlier had a version of the Scriptures put before us in any other than a merely "authorized" shape, it might have acquired from the accident of power an influence too great for the independence of human thought, and been received as a true and perfect copy of the very idiom and idea of the holy word. Before such a version criticism would have been paralyzed, and free thought would have become impossible. Luckily, there were imperfections in the books sufficient to justify criticism, and hence we have had Protestant free thought. We can easily see that a Scripture which has been *inherited* is much more open to criticism than one which has been *accepted*; and this is one great difference between our present version and any revision.

From the foregoing remark it may easily be seen that our present Authorized Version has made it almost indispensable for our divines and all those who would properly expound and comprehend the Scriptures to make and employ constant reference to the original. Hence we have had all the investigations into the text and its significations which have elicited so much ingenious remark, elaborate commentary, and famous scholarship. There has been constantly flowing through the very texture of the version the influences and effects of the original sources. This would not have occurred had there not been that sense of need for reviewing the revisers which comes upon men who have had the version handed down to them which it would be almost impossible to bring to bear upon one which would require to be accepted. The issue of a new authorized version would do a great deal to discourage scholarship and research by stereotyping for a long time to come an accepted version. This may be illustrated by an allusion to the effect the adoption of the Latin Primer has had on the suppression of endeavours to improve the mode of teaching the elements of the Latin tongue. Had we an authorized version of Homer, would we have had the glorious contest after a worthy rendering which has of late illustrated our literature?

That word literature brings my next argument into view.

Our literature is very extensive and valuable. The religious literature of our country is particularly valuable and extensive, not only in prose, but in poetry; not only in sermon, but in treatise; not only in moral, but in philosophical disquisition. In this literature our present version is quoted and referred to; and can any one imagine the terrible confusion in literature which would arise from such a wholesale destruction of the allusions, references, inference

quotations, &c., in which our literature abounds; such an upsetting of all the associations and influences of literature? What a volcanic force of confusion would such a step have on our literature! It would be a terrible work for us; but to what a far more terrible state would posterity be brought when the whole library of literature had been made for them a series of inapt and confusing Scriptural references which they could not understand and were unable to verify?

I venture to lay the foregoing thoughts before the reader. I shall not use second-hand scholarship on the question, but trust that good sense may bring men to determine that the Authorized Version of the Scriptures ought not to be revised by a Royal Commission.

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE wording of the question proposed for discussion does not make it perfectly clear whether the propriety of revision is to be assumed by debaters or not, and it is therefore somewhat doubtful whether it is incumbent on affirmative writers to discuss that question preliminarily. Strictly interpreted, the question for debate amounts to this: Assuming a revision, ought it to be by Royal Commission? Taking that view of it, the discussion would, of course, properly be confined to those who are favourable to revision, the point at issue between them being one simply as to the mode in which it can best be accomplished. As it is, however, writers will no doubt come forward on the negative side, who, in discussing the question, will take their stand on arguments intended to show that there ought to be *no revision at all*. In anticipation of this, and to meet this class of debaters, it was wise of H. K. to go beyond what I think was strictly required of him, and, in opening the discussion, to state, as he did, clearly and forcibly, the numerous and unanswerable arguments for a revision of the present version of the Scriptures. In doing so he has also cleared the ground considerably for those who will follow on the same side, and who will now be able to devote themselves more at length to the important point of debate on which H. K., having exhausted his space, scarcely touched—ought not the revision to be by Royal Commission? It is to this point that I shall mainly direct my paper.

One or two objections to revision may, however, be first noticed.

Amongst a certain class a feeling prevails—taking the form of a vague notion with some, but more distinctly defined in others—which leads them to look upon revision with jealousy, distrust, and suspicion. Those who hold this semi-superstitious idea regard with disapproval, mingled with awe, the movements of those who, as it seems to them, are, with something of impious daring and irreverent presumption, about to alter and revise the word of God. They cannot feel it to be right for human hands to make changes in the sacred text; nor can they feel reconciled to any meddling

with it. Perhaps there are not many, comparatively, who take such extreme views of the supposed impropriety of revision, yet such ideas have found utterance since the question has been under discussion, and though we cannot help sympathizing to some extent with the feelings that prompt them, it is impossible for persons of clear judgment not to perceive that they result from a mistaken view of the question. Such persons are really giving to man's words a reverence and regard which, properly, is due to God's word only, and are thus acting under the influence of a mistaken feeling, as misplaced as it is unreasonable.

Want of reverence for the sacred text is, in fact, almost the last charge which can, with reason and justice, be brought against the advocates of revision. On the contrary, in desiring a revised version, they are actuated by motives which can spring only from sincere regard for the word of God. The divine revelation of the Scriptures has, for wise purposes, been given to man through the medium of two languages, which are now ancient and dead, and the people of modern times have therefore to accept and read God's word in "fallible human versions." To make the translation as faithful to the original as possible, and to bring our Authorized Version of the Holy Scriptures into closer proximity to the text in which those Scriptures were written, is what those who press for a revision are desirous of doing; and in that desire is not a very high regard for the Scriptures manifested? "In the esteem of those" (says Dean Alford) "who set the highest possible value on Scripture, no assignable deviation from its actual meaning ought to be a trifle." And again, "Just in proportion to a man's reverence for the sacred text will be his anxiety to see it brought as near as possible to its original purity." All those, therefore, who really reverence the Scriptures would naturally be supporters of revision when revision was necessary, as it is now; and the charge brought against the revisers that they are wanting in regard for the Bible is thus repelled with double force.

The argument of expediency is also raised against revision. Dean Alford has termed this a "miserable argument." He says, "There is danger, we are told, in unsettling the minds of those who simply rely on their English Bibles as the word of God. I am amazed at hearing this plea from lips which frequently utter it. For what abuse, for what dereliction of unwelcome duty, may it not be made an apology? And even if we descend to its own cowardly level, and begin to weigh expediencies, which of the two, think you, is the greater danger—manfully to meet the present unsatisfactory state of things by an authorized revision, or to allow a text which we vaunt as the word of God to be continually either held back because it will not bear examination, or brought into doubt and contempt by being disavowed from our pulpits?" It is my belief, however, that the advantages resulting from an authorized revision far outweigh the disadvantages, if, indeed, there be any. As to the people's confidence being disturbed, let us rather anticipate the



contrary. "To disturb is sometimes a duty. When men are mistaking the imperfect for the perfect, accepting as absolute what is conditional merely, declaring the fallible to be infallible, or through desire of evading responsibility and effort, are improperly eager to rest and be thankful, then it is both wise and kind to disturb their false security. Moreover, the fact that imperfections and errors attach to the present version is not and cannot be concealed. The pulpit at times proclaims it, the conscientious teacher has often to affirm it, and references are made to it in newspapers and magazines. The disturbance, therefore, of the unquestioning confidence of past generations is inevitable. Revision will not increase, but will greatly remove it. Revision may occasion a temporary discomfort to a few; to leave things as they are is to abandon the unlearned to the tyranny of doubts and uncertainties which, to very many, will be both painful and perilous. While men are ignorant of the character and extent of the changes demanded, their fears will magnify them. The mind that is unsettled by the announcement of defects and errors will be calmed when it learns how slight comparatively they are, and be grateful when it sees how much brighter the page has become by the removal of the blemish."

The four methods by which a revision may be accomplished, as stated by Professor Newth, are these:—(1) By the self-originated labours of individuals; (2) by the organized effort of a single denomination; (3) by the united action of all the churches; or (4) by Royal Commission. The last method, I am convinced, is the best. Passing over the first, as inadequate to meet all the requirements of the problem, I may quote Professor Newth's own words, in which the objections to the second method are stated. He thinks it "little likely" that a revision could be thus secured "such as would win a general acceptance." "No arrangement is more to be deprecated than one which would affix a denominational stamp upon the Bible of the English people; any organized effort whose result would be to offer an Episcopalian Bible, or a Baptist Bible, or a Unitarian Bible for circulation in place of the present version would either defeat its own purpose by the resistance it would excite, or, by provoking to similar undertakings, give rise to unspeakable mischief in the variety of the Bibles which would then be brought into use."

In choosing, as we must now, between the third and fourth methods, it must be remembered that "in order that the revision may be accompanied with the maximum of gain and the minimum of injury, it must be effected in the way that will secure the widest possible extent of confidence and support." In this it is to be feared that the present Committee of Convocation will not be successful. The work to be done is a national one,—indeed, more than a national one. The Bible of England is the Bible of America and Australia also, and it is eminently desirable that the version should be revised, not simply for ourselves, but for the English-speaking race throughout the world. We want,

therefore, for the work, that it may be done satisfactorily, an "adequate representative selection of the ablest Biblical scholars, lay and clerical, in the world." This we are very far from having in the present committee. It is a committee of the Southern Province of Convocation, and does not even represent the Church of England adequately, to say nothing of the great Nonconforming body. And if it does not represent the people of this country, much less does it that of America. True, the resolution which appointed the committee decided that it "should be at liberty to invite the co-operation of any eminent for scholarship, to whatever nation or religious body they may belong." But how far has this been done? Certainly but to a limited extent; and even here, as Mr. Buxton pointed out in his speech before the House of Commons, the "enterprise has already been marked by failure; several of the most eminent British scholars having declined to sit upon the committee." And though, in some instances, the invitation to join the committee has been accepted, the revising companies are and must inevitably be "substantially ecclesiastical."

It is very much to be regretted that, the Government being of opinion that revision should be left in private hands, Mr. Buxton withdrew his motion for an address to her Majesty, praying her to invite the concurrence of the United States in appointing a joint commission for carrying out the work of revising the Authorized Version; for in this mode, and this only, do we see good promise of success both in the work of revision and in securing for the revised version general acceptance in place of the present.

The arrangement is one which has the advantage of being acceptable by Churchmen and unobjectionable to Nonconformists. The latter may allow the Government to inaugurate the work of revision without detriment to their principle of non-interference by the State in religious matters. The work of translation is one which "has no distinctive character, either secular or ecclesiastical;" hence, as a matter of strict principle, no objection can be made to revision being conducted under the auspices of a joint Commission, appointed by this country and America. So much for principles involved. As to the expediency of revision being by Royal Commission, there can be no doubt of the advantages of that plan. A Royal Commission would take up a position completely neutral, and from an independent standpoint would be able to invite the concurrence and support of all sections of the community; and by "its power of inviting men to come together in their private capacity," it is "most favourably situated for constructing that machinery by which it can be precisely ascertained what is the English sense of the Scripture books." The two most important requisites are thus secured, together with a fair prospect that the same authority and general acceptance will be gained for a revised as for the present version. Let us, then, hope that in this way the important, necessary, and desirable work of revision may, at no distant date, be carried out.

G. T. H.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WHAT are we to discuss? Not, certainly, what H. K. has begun about. Ought the Authorized Version of the Scriptures to be Revised? is one question, and that, the present debate assumes, has been replied to in the affirmative. A farther query then arises, How is this to be done? Ought it to be by a Royal Commission? I do not know that it is wise to limit the question to revision. I think we do wrong to the object we seek when we accept the Authorized Version as a standard or a test, as a thing fixed and authoritative, which may be advisably amended. The subject might be far more advantageously considered, were we to ask, Ought we now to reduce to use and bring together effectively the knowledge we have lately acquired of the proper text of Scripture, of the mode of interpreting and expressing it, so as to be best understood and laid to heart? We have not only to revise our Authorized Version, as it is called, we have also to revise our *textus receptus*, the originals from which our version has been made, as well as our version itself. It is not a mere matter of Anglification that we are engaged upon in regard to the Scriptures, it is interpretation as well; and that interpretation depending on the readings adopted by those who are to give us as near an approach as possible to the word of God which has been written for our learning.

We have insularized this question as we do so many others, and reduced it to paltry dimensions. We have considered it as if England were the centre of the universe, and the metropolis of gospel certainty; and we have brought down to national, if not denominational insignificance, a matter of moment and import to the whole of the English-speaking races of the earth. Why should we seek a Royal Commission to do that for which we have God's own commission? "Search the Scriptures" (John v. 39). For what purpose? To know their contents, their truths, and their saving efficacy; to have their meaning impressed on our minds, and their influences made active on our hearts and in our lives. *Search* them. How? By keeping our eyes closed to all that can be known regarding them, or by striving our utmost to acquire all the knowledge about them, in them, and from them, that we can? *Search the Scriptures*. Which? The roughest, rudest, readiest we can get, or the nearest approach to God's truth we can discover? This is our commission for revision: for revision is only investigation applied to the perfecting of the seed of the word; is nothing else than search as to the contents and signification brought into efficacious utility to the souls of men by being put before them, so that he who runs may read, and, reading, understand what great things God has done for the salvation of sinners. If the people of Berea were more noble than those of Thessalonica, because they "searched the Scriptures daily, to see whether these things were so" (Acts xvii. 11), how shall we be to blame if we follow and imitate their noble example? We take the texts of Scrip-

ture as they did, and endeavour to discover what they contain, what they teach, what they approve; we try to understand what they reveal, and we do our best to bring into our hearts the good news of the gospel—so far does God's commission run, and it surely empowers us to inquire, and to discover, if we can, what is the perfect will of God, for ourselves at any rate. If we ought to take into our own souls the best and most perfect forms of God's truth, why should we be restrained from accepting it in our authorized or any other version? There is no good ground for that, but there is very much to say against it, as we shall see.

Our Saviour gave a command to His disciples—"Teach all nations." Teach all nations what? The will of God. Well, are we fulfilling this if we take, or give, or use, or cause to be used, an imperfect, a misrepresenting, and a misleading gospel? This we do if we do not get and give the best text, in the most correct form, in the fittest translation, and in the clearest terms. It is at our peril if we "teach" otherwise, and most of all if we teach man's error as God's truth.

Against this way of treating the Scriptures we protest. Every sincere lover of God and of truth must see that if the Scriptures are the word of God and the bringers of the offer of eternal life through Jesus Christ, then we ought not to require to see the glad tidings of great joy through a glass darkly, but in the very sunlight of our Father's countenance. Every obstruction should be cleared away, and as, before the Saviour came, His forerunner was set to make straight a pathway for the Lord, so now, in the message of salvation, every possible hill of difficulty should be brought low, and every valley of doubt should be exalted, and the rough places should be made plain. In other words, the pure, clear, simple, and direct revelation of the Most High ought to be given to men—pure as the sunlight, clear as the waters from the fountains of heaven, simple as the beauty of the lilies of the field, and direct as the rays of the morning. In no other way can we avoid the fearful threatening given at the close of the sacred book against those who "diminished from" its holy revelations. Do not those who persist in keeping our Authorized Version as it is most certainly "diminish from" its power, instructiveness, excellence, and efficacy, by their opposition to the setting before the people of the whole gospel of God in its most thorough and perfect state? If a free Bible is the true glory of Protestantism, then surely a correct, true, and trustworthy Bible ought to be even more than a glory—a duty.

How is a Bible correct and trustworthy to be got at? Only, as we think, by a Bible Revision Congress, open to all scholars, and under the auspices of all the English-speaking races of the earth. We have examples of this sort of thing in the "British Association for the Advancement of Science," the "Social Science Congress," &c. First a congress of scholars should settle the best text of all the books in the canon—that is a work of scholarship, and ought to be done by scholars alone, as scholars, not as divines. W-

should then have these canonical books independently translated by the best scholars, giving a textual translation merely—a translation only as a translation, an accurate and effective version of the *litera scripta* of the book of God. This is the second process. We have then a third. This translation being given, let us have a congress assembly of the best English scholars, and let them, having the Authorized Version of Scripture before them, fix and determine where and how far the text of that version adequately conveys the strict and impartial signification of the Scriptures, as thus translated by the best scholars from the best texts. Where it is fully and properly rendered let the version stand, and where it is defective in any form let these scholars suggest and supply the precise and exact meaning in such terms as most nearly agree with the present version of the Scriptures. Having thus far kept theology and theologians aloof from the work, let the work thus revised and amended be sent for criticism and ratification to the responsible heads of the several churches, and when this has been done and duly considered, let deputed members of these religious bodies meet for a solemn act of ratification. Thus should we gain a Bible for the English-speaking races, which would be free from cavil, and true as the heavens which gave it to man.

But a Royal Commission is a merely insular idea, which would confine the adoption of the version only to British subjects, and would give us only a Bible for a section of society. We require a united movement of all the English-speaking races,—British, American, Australian, Indian, and Insular, who, by their parliaments and official organs, shall organize, recognise, and provide for the expenses of this work. This would unite all Christians in the great work, and would make it universal. The scholarship of course could be brought from any country, and so we might have a great Bible council, in which all eminent men might have a share in working for the glory of God and the good of men. Neither a Royal Commission nor a Convocation could accomplish this, and less than this would, we fear, not only complicate religious matters, but disintegrate the interests of nations in the Scriptures. Hence we do not think that the Authorized Version of the Scriptures should be undertaken by a Royal Commission.

Again: a Royal Commission could only be national; in all probability it could only be Episcopalian. The Church, at any rate, would fight hard for the chief power and the highest authority, and this would evoke a strife of sects which would do more harm than the good to be gained by revision. Royal Commissions have of late been makeshifts, and we do not want a makeshift version of the Scriptures.

J. V. Y.

## Social Economy.

### OUGHT THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO BE DISCONTINUED?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"SUBJECTION," forsooth! a pretty question, truly, for this time of the world's history! The petty tyrannies of men, are they to be continued for ever? Is enfranchisement to be given to all and every creature except that special one who has the misfortune to be born—a woman; and are all tyrannies to be opposed, resisted, and set at nought except those which men—so let us call them—practise on their co-partners in the progress of the world? Is it possible that men can be found who will *argue* for the continuance of the subjection of women, instead of apologizing in the most humble style for its commencement?

Perhaps we may congratulate ourselves upon having got the subject the length of argument. For a long time the proper position of women has been the topic of ridicule and of doubtful theological twaddle. To bring the topic out of the old rut and get it on a new line may be of some service. At any rate, we have made a step in advance. There is no arguing against a sneer, still less against a flouting jeer and the grandiose pooch-pooching of pulpiteers and pamphleteers. If we do get anything in the shape of argument, we may try the strength of our minds against them, and we may well trust that we shall not see truth worsted in a fair, free, and honest encounter of mind against mind.

It is argued—woman is the inferior, and ought therefore to be the subordinate of man. This assumes the entire question; it merely translates inferior into subordinate, and is only a piece of word-play.

T. F. M. assigns four reasons for the subjection of women; at least, we suppose, in deference to the masculine reasoner, we must count them as four. "Unless," he says, "sex and the physical organization of the animal frame can be annulled; unless marriage and its duties can be abrogated; and unless family life is to be made of none effect, we do not see how the subjection of women can be discontinued."

We, for our part, cannot see how "sex and the physical organization of the animal frame" can be regarded as a twofold element in the question. Sex seems to be an inherent quality of the physical organization. In so far as this question is concerned *sex is physical organization*, and it cannot be annulled; for were it annulled the

very terms of the question would lose significance. There would be no *men* to subordinate, no *women* to be subordinated. Sex is indispensable, not only in the world, but to the argument, and T. F. M., instead of, as he fancied he was, "chopping logic," has been doing what is far more common, "talking nonsense." What can be the meaning of the physical organization being annulled? If it means anything, it means universal death; and if that were to happen, what would be the need of discussion, and who would discuss it? We may safely dismiss T. F. M.'s firstly from our consideration. This discussion and the annulment of sex are incompatibles.

Yet we can see a shadow of meaning in the words of T. F. M. We suppose he intends to say that as long as women are women they must be subordinate; this, however, again assumes the question, and is a mere reiteration that women are subordinate, and hence they must remain so. *Sex* is the ground of subordination. But *sex* is relative, and if it implies subordination of one to another, then the question requires to be asked, which other? We, however, do not require to answer it. We are not advocates for the insubordination of women, we are only claimants of equality—that equality which T. F. M. at once grants and takes away, equality in value of nature. We neither press gallantry nor poetry into this question. We merely seek to know what is just. We neither regard sex as a misfortune and a crime, nor a treasure and a happiness. It is an allotment by the All-wise; and it seems to us a flagrant blasphemy to affirm that God made subordination the irrevocable destiny of woman. Neither reason nor Scripture makes any such affirmation. Eve was *not*, as is commonly supposed, the first sinner, but Adam *was*. Adam alone received the commandment from God, she did *not*. It was given to her at second-hand through Adam. The covenant was expressly made with Adam. Eve was innocently tempted that she might be made an effective temptress, though she was guiltless in her tempting. The first sin is invariably attributed in *Scripture* to Adam. It is a fallacious gloss which induces people to suppose that Eve "brought sin into the world and all our woe." Where there is no law there is no transgression, and Eve had no law of God against eating the forbidden fruit. The religious argument that subordination is a righteous punishment for being the introductress of sin is all founded on a mistake. The words read, "For as in *Adam* all die," &c., not Eve; and the obedience required by the gospel, of which S. S. speaks, is not an obedience of subordination, but an obedience to the just, the convenient, the suitable, law fairly determined upon, and agreement to do what is best. If, as S. S. seems to think, because the man was first formed and then the woman, therefore the man should rule, as the monkey was probably made before either, ought he not to be the supreme ruler? A proper interpretation of the Scripture shows that there is no inequality in the marriage state, that it is expressly founded on the idea of equality, and that man has debased this, as he has done

so many other good and merciful, just and wise arrangements of God. But even this would only refer to married women, and would not include unmarried women, whether maidens or widows.

The abrogation of marriage and its duties would as fatally impede the possibility of debate as would the annulment of sex; equally so would the abolition of family life. So that I do not think T. F. M.'s objections to the immediate total and unconditional exemption and release of women from subordination have any argumentative value.

The equality of the *sexes*, in the eye of the law, and the making of marriage and family relations a compact, covenant, and bargain, to be entered into wisely, and implemented fully, is required to make the world's laws just. At the old-world prejudices about supernatural decisions regarding the subjection and subordination of women entertained by S. S., the world now laughs; the Scriptures are recognised as the issue of the spirit of a just God, and woman-tyranny is no more consecrated in that Word than was slave-driving. Let S. S. recollect that it is not only independence but interdependence, that fulfills the perfect law of liberty, and he will see that to charge the Divine One with injustice in His own creation is not orthodoxy.

To give up fighting with figments, not arguments, we may now turn and tell what we do affirm in regard to women.

Women have life, and life involves duties and responsibilities. The duty of self-preservation compels woman to ask her share of the world's work and wealth, as she is asked to take her share of the world's woes and sorrows; and the responsibilities of life compel woman to insist on having the opportunity of culture, to the utmost extent of her powers. It is imperative on woman, as on man, to fulfil a life of probation; but hitherto she has had her share of the difficulties of this probationary state doubled by the selfish greed and graspingness of man. His Salic law, not God's, has prevented inheritance, and seized upon all the well-paid and pleasant posts in life for his own gratification. Woman has now learned to think on the works and ways of God without the mediocrity of the priest, and she believes that she has as good a right to a fair day's wage—of whatever sort it is; pleasure, honour, or profit—for a fair day's work—of whatever sort it is; whether physical, social, industrial, or intellectual—as man has. The advocates of women's rights, and the opposers of women's wrongs, have been maligned, brow-beaten, caricatured, and sneered at; and they have lived these down. We have defeated force—all force except the force of argument; if there is any, bring forth your strong reasons, that they may be tested. As yet the reasonings of T. F. M. and S. S. are such that they pass by us as the idle word which we regard not: something stronger surely than they have advanced is necessary to prove that the subjection of women should be continued?

ROSALIND.



## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

I do not think it is necessary to depreciate women to reply to this question in the negative. Even such a favourite of women as Jean Paul Richter has said, "A woman has much virtue, but not many virtues; she requires a confined sphere and social forms." I do not sympathize with those who hold the idea of any natural inferiority arising from sex. I am of opinion that the joys and sorrows of life, as well as the virtues and the sins of life, are pretty equally distributed between the sexes; and that each has, in the respective positions assigned to them by nature, difficulties and compensations which bring them wonderfully near. Sneers as to womanhood, and scorn of the sex as either weak or worthless, are alike far from our thoughts. We look on this question as one not to be dealt wisely with by ridicule, but requiring conscientious acknowledgment of the very frequently forgotten truth that any disparagement of womanhood is a disparagement of God's aim and purpose in creation if it refers to natural incapacity; while any moral disparagement may not unjustly be replied to by the saying, "He who is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone."

Honour to woman in her own sphere, for out of it she can receive no true honour; beneath it she cannot be happy, above it she cannot be secure, beyond it she ought not to swerve, out of it she should neither be driven nor enticed. L. A. J. advocates a perfect equality of the sexes, but he speaks as if equality signified selfsameness, and implied non-subjection. No idea could be more false or more foolish. Law is subjection, licence is insubordination, the absence of submission is anarchy, but there can only be equality when each is subordinate in his own sphere, and both are in subjection to the conditions of well-being. The greatest happiness is to be found in a due admixture of likeness and contrast, not in identical sameness. Woman is only made subject to those conditions which social life requires her to yield to, and man is equally compelled by social requirements to be in subjection to the conditions which are found most suitable. We cannot abolish subjection, even though we had perfect equality; we can only arrange it on the give and take principle of mutual subjection, which I am glad to see L. A. J. recognises.

I am quite at one with him that women ought not to be subjected to falsehood, fraud, and wilful imposition; and that the laws, customs, and requirements of society ought to be so administered as to secure her, as well as all other members of society, from any possibility of injurious dealing. But this is scarcely the kind of subjection which is meant in this discussion. It is, Ought women to be subject to those disabilities which society imposes on her on account of her sex? There can be little doubt that there are many things to be amended yet in our relations one with another. But the relations of man to man are not less in need of reform than

those of man to woman. In the general progress of society this is likely to be brought about; but it will not result, so far as we can see, in the release of woman from her state of subjection, if that is what it is to be called. Sex is a settled matter, and it is an irreversible condition of life: it is not an inseparable accident, as some argue, but a difference. And this difference implies many other differences, and necessitates more. It implies, for instance, differences of habit, association, influence, and effectiveness, and it necessitates difference of customs and costumes, regulation of life, and dealing with the industries and duties of the social existence which civilization implies. It is a deeply rooted and indelible characteristic, and is altogether insuperable. No training, education, or up-bringing can materially affect it, as one of our modern metaphysicians remarks:—

"If there is a fundamental difference in the character of the sexes, it would probably require, in order to obliterate it, a greater change in the direction of the course of education, of habits, institutions, and modes of life, than could be effected by human volition; for the tendencies of character would themselves operate against such a change."—*Shadworth H. Hodgson*.

This shows that the subjection to which woman is subject is in reality a necessity of nature, and founded on the facts of life.

We should like, however, to direct our readers' attention to one of the phases of the question which has been too little attended to—female competition with men considered as a matter of policy and common sense.

The economic relations of life are fixed by the quantity of available labour in the market, as well as by the quality of it. The best and fittest it is difficult to discover; but the cheapest is easily found out. It is the few unemployed, who can and must underbid the employed, that lessen and lower wages; and the larger the number of unemployed, the keener becomes the competition for work, and the struggle for life ends in a reduction of wages with no reduction of toil. The greater the number of those seeking any given sort of employment, and capable of fulfilling its conditions, the lower the level of remuneration given, in general, to those who are engaged in it. We have an example of the evil results of the introduction of female labour into the market in the weaving departments. Weaving was, at one time, one of the most remunerative of our manufacturing employments, and those engaged in it were among the most comfortable and independent of our artisans. Greed of gain, and perhaps the occasional necessities of families, induced some parents to teach the trick of the trade to the female members of the family; and so soon as this became general, a deterioration in the condition of the weaving population became observable. The wages fell to the lower level of remuneration, and men required to be contented with women's wages.

Every branch of the weaving business has thus become deteriorated.

rated as a means of acquiring the wages suitable for supporting life, especially family life. And an amount of labour which ought to yield the means of comfortable subsistence is remunerated at a merely makeshift rate. It is not paid as labour is and ought to be which is to be the main-stay of existence. Hence the wealth attained by manufacturers has been so great, and hence the poverty of all the weaving districts has been intensified. Men are at a discount, and young persons of the opposite sex require to become the bread-winners. How often do we hear of the younger members of a family contributing as lodgers to the up-keep of the family, while the parents can get nothing to do! No demoralization, in our opinion, can equal that which, as a rule and custom, makes woman a bread-winner, and heaps upon her, in the name of independence, dependence on daily toil of her own for daily food. Wherever there is this depression of the sex—for depression it is, not exaltation—there is an upsetting of all the ordinary conveniences of life, and homes are made impossible. It is incontestable that family life is the true life of humanity, and anything that lowers or impairs the relationships of families is wrong. Women's work there is indeed in plenty: let that be done; but do not bring the sexes into industrial competition with each other.

Labour is already too abundant and too ill-requited to release women from their subjection to the proper restraints by which they are kept within the limits of household life and the occasional requirements of husbandry as much as possible, and to make them free of the labour market would be to alter the whole condition of the labouring classes, and to introduce a tendency to reduce wages to the minimum on which an individual could exist. That is seen to be the case in the agricultural counties, where the competition of the sexes in labour has been brought to such a point as to bring down labourers' wages almost to starvation point. The suggestion to bring into the field such a number of competitors to do the work and get a share of the wage-fund of the country is one which cannot be entertained by those who wish to secure the elevation of the working classes. The dependence of women on men has made it necessary that the wages of an ordinary labourer shall be such as to enable him to aid in the maintenance of mother, sister, wife, daughter, or other female relative, or by paying for board and lodging, giving help in some other way to the maintenance of women without allowing them to press into competition in the industries of skill, intelligence, and operative art to which men are bound, and which they follow as their one means of life.

But for our own sakes it seems to me that we ought to resist any attempt to bring all the creatures in society under the engrossing competitions of life. Among the crowds of the world what a woe it is to see the jaded and worn, the wan-cheeked and the trouble-tempted! Were there no forms and frames free from the excitements and depressions of life as a money-search and a work-doing, how tenfoldy miserable would the world be! Where could

we find sympathy and calm, comfort and release from the pressure of commerce and citizenship? It would be a fearful world to live in if politics absorbed poetry, labour ousted love, business overcame bounty and beauty, marketing had the preference over marriage, and commerce gave the *coup de grace* to courtship. And what but this could be expected in a world where there was no escape from the intense pressure of competition for competence, and where there was a straining on the part of every one to outdo the other? There could be no leisure in life if the engrossments of toil or speculation were to become paramount in society. We need some vision of rest, we require some preservative against absolute worldliness; and this is only really to be gained by setting free from the care and toil of business and life the motherhood of the nation, and by keeping that part of society in the protected subordination to which they are subject.

It is our candid belief that this is a point of the question requiring much more consideration than has yet been given to it. Would it be wise to destroy the economic relations of life without some guarantee that a greater equivalent good would result? Ought the pressure and haste of life to be quickened and increased? Are we not already too prone to go on unhastily, unrestingly? If we heighten the pressure until every man begins to look on every woman, not as a possible helpmeet, but a probable rival, are we likely to be bettered by it? Is it to be believed that, if the number of claimants for a share in the wage fund is doubled, there will be the same share as formerly given to those who do the work, or the same ease to those who depend on those who do the active wage-paid business of the world? Besides the tendency to make social units, mere individuals, the social disintegration that such a system would occasion requires to be recognised and looked in the face. If we are to be mere individuals, each struggling against the other for a dole of the good things or the necessities of life, what helpfulness, comfort, ease, sympathy, can we either expect or exercise? I am sure that this is a matter requiring careful consideration; I hope it will receive it, and that all that is best in argument may be honestly brought forward and candidly subjected to the tests of reason and conscience.

R. R.

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**SHAKESPEARE'S POPULARITY.**—It is of some importance that the error as to the alleged neglect of Shakspeare after the Restoration should be circumstantially corrected. It is easy to do. Between 1660, the year in which the two theatres set to work with a joyous will, and 1667, when Dryden, with Davenant for confederate, attacked Shakspeare by bringing out an improved "Tempest" (forsooth!) there had been restored to the stage these plays of the National Poet: "Othello," "Henry IV.," "A Midsummer Night's Dream," "Hamlet," "Romeo and Juliet," "Twelfth Night," "Henry VIII.," "Macbeth," and "The Merry Wives of Windsor"—in all, nine plays, and every one successful.

## Toiling Upward.

### DR. THOMAS BLACKLOCK, BLIND POET AND DIVINE.

A PECULIAR interest must ever attach to the lives of the illustrious blind. The loss of what is justly regarded as the queen of the outward senses, though not really so deep a misfortune as the deprivation of hearing, involves difficulties which engage our keenest sympathies, and suggests associations which strengthen and refine impressions already touching and powerful. The contemplation of genius or goodness debarred at once from that marvellous receptivity which belongs to the eye, and from the expressive power it can exert; of the struggle with hard fate which this loss implies, and the triumph so frequently won; of the inward spiritual strength which works its way in defiance of physical disability, cannot fail to recall to us some unforgotten names of the mighty dead; we think of the traditional Homer and the shadowy Ossian; of Galileo, and of Milton, who could himself recall—

“Blind Thamyris, and blind Mæonides;  
And Tiresias, and Phineus, prophets old.”

But these were men visited by the sorrow of blindness; they were not born blind, nor thus afflicted before they had acquired power to use the windows of the soul. Of one who belonged to the last class we are now to say a few words; and when we consider his gifts and his virtues, his struggles and his achievements, we cannot but feel that in the noble roll of those who have “toiled upward,” an enduring place is due to the name of Dr. Thomas Blacklock.

He was born at Annan, in Dumfriesshire, in November, 1721. Both his parents were natives of Cumberland. His father was a bricklayer; his mother's surname was Rae. Before he had lived six months he was attacked by the dreaded small-pox, which a few years before had proved fatal to Queen Mary the Second, and whose ravages spared neither peer nor peasant. The disease departed, but left him blind; and he grew up a child of poverty, with apparent incapacity for work or learning. But the affection and intelligence of his father overcame these early obstacles. The boy soon listened eagerly to the books which were read to him, and afterwards became capable of enjoying the works of the English poets. In this direction, at least, his mind was precocious; for at the age of twelve he produced some sprightly and musical lines, addressed

"To a Little Girl whom I had offended," in which a kind of boyish chivalry is blended with playful fancy.

As his mind expanded, however, a painful sense of his misfortune pressed upon his spirit; and the untimely death of his father, killed accidentally, naturally deepened his dejection. For his feelings and fears he found vent in these touching lines :—

"Nor end my sorrows here; the sacred fane  
Of knowledge, scarce accessible to me,  
With heart-consuming anguish I behold:  
Knowledge for which my soul insatiate burns  
With ardent thirst. Nor can these useless hands,  
Untutored in each life-sustaining art,  
Nourish this wretched being, and supply  
Frail nature's wants, that short cessation know."

To these gloomy thoughts, however, the mind of Blacklock did not permanently succumb. From an early period of his life he seems to have exercised a simple confidence in God's providential care. He had already, through the assistance of kind companions, acquired some knowledge of Latin, and the circulation of some poetical effusions drawing towards him the attention of a few literary men, his mind dwelt with hope on the prospect of an academic career. His misfortune, the source perhaps, or at least the nurse, of his poetic tendencies, thus brought its best remedy; and a kind physician, Dr. John Stevenson, of Edinburgh, was honoured to fix his resolution by aiding him in the prosecution of his studies at the grammar-school, and afterwards at the university of the Scottish capital.

But there he was destined to meet with new trials. Into the midst of the prosaic, orderly, prosperous Scotland of the eighteenth century was projected that startling phenomenon, the "Rebellion of 1745,"—the last flash of chivalrous feudalism, the final uprising of Celtic patriotism, the latest outburst of legitimist devotion. For a secluded blind student, half Englishman and entirely Whig, such a manifestation of romantic enthusiasm had no charms; the drawbacks, the terrors of the situation were felt by him in their utmost force. He left Edinburgh, where Charles Edward was holding court, and repaired to Dumfries, where he resided some time with his brother-in-law, Mr. McMurdo. How he fared there we know not; but at one period of the campaign, Dumfries, Hanoverian as it was, must have been a less comfortable residence for a Whig than even half-Jacobite Edinburgh. We learn, however, that when peace was restored he returned to the latter town to complete his studies, and that he distinguished himself alike in science, in languages, and in philosophy. About this period he also formed the acquaintance of several eminent men, and published his verses with some pecuniary profit. To this measure of success we may believe that the knowledge of his blindness partly contributed, afford:

another instance of that compensation of evils which the laws of Providence bring about.

Two important events, not unconnected with each other, now broke the quiet uniformity of our blind poet's life. He had for some time desired to become a clergyman, and in 1759, at the mature age of 38, he was licensed as a preacher by the Presbytery of Dumfries. Encouraged by some apparent popularity as a pulpit orator, he accepted (in 1762) a presentation from Lord Selkirk to the parish of Kirkcudbright. About this time, also, he married a lady—the Melissa of his poetry—to whom he had for some time been attached, Sarah Johnston, daughter of a surgeon in Dumfries. His blindness, however, was regarded by the people as a fatal objection to the exercise of the ministry, and a litigation commenced, which, after two years, was terminated by a compromise. For his own fame and comfort it would have been better had he never accepted the presentation; yet we may not judge him harshly. Of merely selfish or secular motives he may be acquitted, for we are told that he took delight in the composition of sermons, and that his preaching had not previously been unacceptable. The law and practice of the time were favourable to the unrestricted exercise of patronage; while the people, deprived of their old standing, were all the more eager to avail themselves of every remaining opportunity of displaying their power. Thus Blacklock, who had little of the partisan in his nature, was probably the victim of party strife and its attendant abuses.

He now removed to Edinburgh, where he assumed a position for which he was eminently qualified by his learning, his cheerfulness, and his goodness of disposition. He received boarders into his house, taking the superintendence of their education. Music was his delight at this time, as it had been at the beginning of his career; although he had steadily refused, even in the most adverse circumstances, to pursue it as a means of obtaining his livelihood. His acquaintance with literary men brought him into intercourse with David Hume, but the friendship was not of long continuance. More permanent ties connected Blacklock with the eminent poet and philosopher Beattie, to whose "Essay on Truth" he contributed an analysis. The honorary degree of D.D., bestowed on Blacklock by the College of Aberdeen in 1767, is said to have been one of the results of this friendship. Between the two poets there passed many literary compliments, couched in the florid language fashionable at the time; but we cannot doubt that the author of the "Minstrel" and "the Blind Bard of Annan" were kindred spirits.

Blacklock, indeed, became, in his prosperous days, a patron of neglected genius. A youthful native of Cumberland, Richard Hewitt by name, had acted for a time as the blind poet's leader. Educated by his master, Richard obtained by his influence the situation of secretary to Lord Milton, and, imbibing Dr. Blacklock's love of music and poetry, he produced, among other effusions, the song of "Roslin Castle."

A greater poet has acknowledged, in emphatic terms, his obligations to the discernment and kindness of Blacklock. In the calm evening of his days, when society, apparently slumbering in political torpor, was already swelling inwardly with those impulses that were speedily to break forth in the mightiest of European convulsions, an unwonted star appeared on the literary horizon, to the bewilderment of ordinary observers. Robert Burns began to publish his poems, which, in their direct appeals to nature and to man, heralded the rise of a new power on the earth, and anticipated the day when the honest peasant should reign as a "king of men,"—

"When sense and worth, o'er a' the earth,  
Shall bear the gree, an' a' that."

Blacklock had been trained in another school, and in an age which had found its highest poetic expression in the tender simplicity of Goldsmith, the classic pomp of Gray, or the melodious melancholy of Beattie. Cowper represented newer impulses, but did not renounce old forms. Blacklock, however, was able to appreciate the works of the Ayrshire peasant, and was the first man in Edinburgh who called attention to them. More than this, he encouraged Burns to persevere in his literary efforts when despondency had nearly forced the bard to expatriate himself; he introduced him to influential patrons, and gave him kind and judicious advice. The gratitude manifested by Burns towards his well-wisher seems to have been sincere and constant, and the relation between them forms one of the bright redeeming passages in the tragic life of the former.

The latter years of Blacklock brought infirmity and occasional deafness, but his domestic life was happy, and his literary labours were unceasing. Among his last productions were several articles in the "Encyclopædia Britannica," one of which, entitled "Blind," has been frequently quoted. He left behind him many manuscripts, including a Treatise on Morals.

He died, after a short illness, in 1791, in the seventy-first year of his age, and was buried in St. Cuthbert's churchyard, at Edinburgh. An inscription for his tombstone was composed by his friend, Dr. Beattie.

His contemporaries have described him as a man of most gentle and amiable temper, and it has been said of him that he "never lost a friend, nor made a foe." With him, however, benevolence seems to have been an active principle as well as a native disposition, and his steadfast confidence in a higher power prevented his sensibility from degenerating into peevishness, and his depression of spirit from subsiding into gloom.

He was one of the most prolific authors of his time. Philosophy, philology, theology, poetry, tragedy, classical translation—all in turn engaged his attention; and his works, which were carefully prepared and widely circulated, must have fulfilled a good end



their time. Fastidious as he was, however, in their preparation, it is not improbable that had he written fewer books, his productions would have been longer remembered. Truly, the world (in the restricted sense of the term) cannot contain a tithe even of the good books that have been written, and thus Blacklock's are mostly "fallen dead." One of his early volumes lately came under our notice, and we were surprised by the merit both of the prose and verse it contained. A short treatise on the "Immortality of the Soul" seemed to us to rise above the ordinary and conventional views of the time. In addition to the usual metaphysical arguments from unity, identity, and indivisibility, it appeals to the faculties of man's mind, to the course of Providence, to the sense of beauty and sublimity, to the incompleteness of earthly life, and finally to the supremacy of conscience. Anticipating some modern arguments, he points out that the thoughts form a connected series, that the common images of a recipient vessel, or the impress of a seal, do not correctly describe the active principle we call a soul; he even refers to the want of correspondence between matter and our perceptions, and the variety of these in different persons, as proving that the mind is no modification, nor even dependency, of the world without. In reading the following passage we feel that the blind man's soul was "instinct with inward light;" and in tracing this Platonic tendency, so alien to his time, we incline to say,—

"That strain I heard was of a higher mood."

"Whoever will turn his intellectual eyes inwardly, and make his mind the object of its own attention, will easily discover traces of energy and grandeur beyond all that can strike the corporeal senses; and in proportion as the mind is successfully cultivated, all her inimitable graces arise in number and brightness. Modifications of form and colour, symmetry and order of parts, proper disposition of light and shade, are only faint indications of this internal beauty, and owe their brightest charms to the tendency they have towards elevating the mind above them, to the contemplation of her own majestic form. Is it not, then, natural and highly agreeable to all our experience to imagine that this fair structure, this supremely amiable beauty, shall be more permanent than those of an inferior kind? . . . Can we then easily be led to think that the soul, which of all the known productions of Nature seems to be her favourite child, shall only be coeval with flowers of the field, or the fading glories of the rainbow? . . . If strength and compactness lead us to conclude that the work of any inferior artificer will be durable, why should these fair indications have less force in the works of the universal Architect?"

During his lifetime the fame of Blacklock was supposed to rest chiefly on his poetry. Subsequent ages have seen his claims as unduly lowered as they were once exaggerated; although this change of sentiment is perhaps a testimony to the fact that the blind author was a far greater wonder than his works could be. That he could write poems of respectable merit, containing many

allusions to light and natural scenery, was a phenomenon which demanded explanation, and it engaged the close attention of contemporary metaphysicians. Was this descriptive power the result of imitation or of association? Does it point to the existence of a real analogy between the experiences of different senses, such as some affirm and others deny? Or is there a deeper sense than all, an inward power, proceeding from soul itself, which will manifest itself either by means of, or in despite of, external appliances; the power attributed by Coleridge to—

“That blind bard who, on the Ohian strand,  
Beheld the Iliad and the Odyssey  
Rise to the swelling of the voiceful sea”?

These questions are most interesting, but we must leave this to be discussed by other “British controversialists.” They are referred to by Spence, Mackenzie, and Dr. Johnson, all of them friends and admirers of Blacklock.

In visiting his native Annan, the birthplace also of Clapperton and Edward Irving, we have thought of the advantages that blended with the misfortune of Blacklock. He could not behold the play of light and shade on the silvery Annan, nor admire the verdure of its blooming meadows. But he could scent the meadow gales, and listen to the river's gentle or stirring music, mingling with the varied breath of the breezes. The noble Solway estuary, now a spreading lake, now a wilderness of sand and salmon rivers, and at intervals a mighty “ocean stream,” emulating St. Lawrence or La Plata, was all invisible to him; but its everchanging voices, as its unresting waters flowed and ebbd, a shifting maelström, in obedience to nature's law, spoke deeper things to him than to men who could see with the eye of sense. Yet little could he know of its bordering mountains on either side; of Criffel, sung by Burns; or of the grander ranges beneath whose shadows young Wordsworth, in Blacklock's latter days, was growing up to manhood, unknown to either predecessor:—

“Alas! where'er thought's current tends,  
Regret pursues and with it blends,  
Huge Criffel's hoary top ascends,  
By Skiddaw seen;  
Neighbours we were, and loving friends  
We might have been.”

No wonder that Blacklock's poetry is deficient in glow and picturesqueness. We must note also the fact that he lived in a prosaic age; the quiet resting-place of the world-stream between foaming currents; that interval betwixt revolutionary movements, in which only conventional, or at best domestic poems, are usually published. What he might have produced in more stirring days, when Annan-

dale sent forth Irving to electrify London audiences with his marvellous utterances, and Carlyle to write the true Epic of the Revolution; it were vain to guess. As it was, he sometimes rose above the level of his period. His translations, such as those of several Psalms, and of the beautiful poems of George Buchanan, are fluent and happy. Some of the Scottish paraphrases of Scripture are ascribed to him, one of them containing the familiar verse,—

“ Deep on thy soul, before its powers  
Are yet by vice enslaved,  
Be thy Creator's glorious name  
And character engraved.”

One of his best effusions seems to have been suggested by the “Hymn of Divine Love and Beauty” of his favourite Edmund Spenser. It is interesting on account of its religious fervour, and its poetic merit seems to us by no means inconsiderable. We conclude this notice by inserting some verses :—

“ O Love, coeval with thy parent God,  
To thee I kneel, thy present aid implore ;  
At whose celestial voice and powerful nod  
Old discord fled, and chaos ceased to roar ;  
Light smiled, and order rose, unseen before,  
Save in the plan of the eternal Mind,  
When God designed the work, and loved the work designed.

“ Thou fill'dst the waste of ocean, earth, and air,  
With multitudes that swim, or walk, or fly ;  
From rolling worlds descends thy generous care  
To insect crowds, that 'scape the nicest eye ;  
For each a sphere was circumscribed by thee,  
To bless, and to be blessed, their noblest end,  
To which, with speedy course, they all unerring tend.

“ Conscious of thee, with nobler powers endowed,  
Next man, thy darling, into being rose ;  
Immortal, formed for high beatitude,  
Which neither end nor interruption knows ;  
Till evil, couched in fraud, began his woes ;  
Then to thine aid was boundless wisdom joined,  
And, for apostate man, redemption thus designed.

“ By thee, his glories veiled in mortal shroud,  
God's darling Offspring left His seat on high ;  
And heaven and earth, amazed and trembling, viewed  
Their wounded Sovereign groan, and bleed, and die.  
By thee, in triumph to His native sky,  
On angels' wings, the victor God-aspired,  
Relenting justice smiled, and frowning wrath retired.

"To thee, munific, ever-flaming Love,  
 One endless hymn united nature sings;  
 To thee the bright inhabitants above  
 Tune the glad voice, and sweep the trembling strings.  
 From pole to pole, on ever-waving wings,  
 Winds waft thy praise, by rolling planets toned;  
 Aid thou, O Love, my voice to emulate the sound!

"It comes, it comes! I feel internal day;  
 Transfusive warmth through all my bosom glows:  
 My soul, expanding, gives the torrent way;  
 Through all my veins it kindles as it flows.  
 Thus, vanished from the scene of night and woes,  
 O snatch me, bear me to thy happy reign!  
 There teach my tongue thy praise in more exalted strain."

B.

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PAUPERISM AND STATESMANSHIP.—"Ours is a small country. And the greatest object of our statesmen should be to compensate our geographical insignificance by developing to the utmost both *the natural resources of the country and the productive powers of the people*. The first step towards the attainment of this grand object of national policy is to diminish the numbers of our pauper class, and turn to remunerative account the labour of those who remain. Irrespective of the present distress, and on the average of years, fully one-thirtieth part of our population are not only unproductive, but a positive burden upon the wealth, and a drawback upon the general welfare, of the community. Every day of the year there are upwards of a million of persons on the poor roll, of which number at least 150,000 are able to work—a vast army of industry at present turned to no account. Even if one-third of those able-bodied paupers were employed on works which would simply repay the cost of their maintenance, a sum might annually be saved amply sufficient to pay the interest on the State loans required for the execution of such works; while these would not only give employment to those paupers, but would permanently increase the field of employment, while adding to the productive area and wealth of the country. We should thereby turn to account a portion of our unproductive labour, while extending the natural resources of the country. As regards productive power, we must seek to *make every man of our labouring class in the future worth two in the past*. Just as, by the appliances of science, we have doubled the motive power of the steam locomotive in the lifetime of a single generation, so must we seek, by means of education and culture, to develop the highest latent powers of our people. And progress, in that form, is happily almost illimitable.—R. H. PATERSON.

## The Reviewer.

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*An Inquiry concerning the Origin of Christianity and Christian Theism.* By CHARLES C. HENNELL. London: Trübner & Co.

*Present Religion as a Faith-owning Fellowship with Thought.* By SARA S. HENNELL.

*Comparativism: Introduction to Present Religion, Part II.* By S. S. HENNELL. London: Trübner & Co.

WHEN Charles C. Hennell was alive he held "a distinguished place among the earnest advocates of free thought," and was regarded as "quite the most eminent among modern English writers on the side of free Biblical criticism." He was, we believe, a Unitarian minister of much force of character, great energy of thought, and singularly enthusiastic zeal in study. His sister, Sara S. Hennell, is one of the most acute, thoughtful, serious, and learned in the best sense of the term of the remarkable women of our day. Besides the works quoted at the head of this notice, she is the authoress of "Thoughts in Aid of Faith," gathered chiefly from recent works in theology and philosophy. In this work she passes in review her brother's work on "The Origin of Christianity," Feuerbach's "Essence of Christianity," Herbert Spencer's "Social Statics and Principles of Psychology," Lowe's "Biographical History of Philosophy," Buckle's "History of Civilization," &c., comprehensively and clearly, with full understanding of their merits, and keen perception of their defects and errors. In the essay on "the sceptical tendency of Butler's Analogy" she argues for a readjustment of the whole question raised by Butler in regard to natural and revealed religion. Her Baillie prize essay on "Christianity and Infidelity" contains a statement of the arguments on both sides, derived from the best authors, so arranged on opposite pages as to afford a *conspectus* of the controversy, executed with scrupulous candour and rare ability, and in such a way as to be highly beneficial to all who are able to think, and are not afraid to exercise their reason in the investigation of opinions argumentatively given. In another prize essay she has examined the early Christian anticipation of the end of the world, and criticises the argument contained in the fifteenth chapter of Gibbon's History. She has besides been, we believe, a contributor to the *Spectator*, the *Monthly Repository*, the *Westminster Review*, &c. She is acquainted with the classical languages, and with the languages of the learned in our day, German and French, and she has a considerable knowledge of the facts and principles of science. She has besides given long and careful study to the philosophy of religion—an innate tendency to these studies having been fostered by

the intellectual atmosphere of critical thought and reflective religiousness in which she was brought up.

Charles Hennell's "Inquiry concerning the Origin of Christianity" was undertaken prior to the appearance in 1835 of the celebrated *Leben Jesu* of Strauss; and, though it was not published till 1838, was, we have reason for believing, conducted in independence of that work. Indeed, its independence of that work is so far guaranteed by the fact that a translation of the first edition of it, which Dr. Strauss saw in the hands of one of the author's friends (perhaps Miss Marian Evans), was issued by the advice of Dr. Strauss, and with an introduction from his pen prefixed to it; and it was noticed in the German reviews as a work of utility. Taking advantage of the works of Bruno, Bauer, Strauss, the suggestions of his reviewers, &c., Charles Hennell revised his, of which a second edition was called for in 1841. From the text of this edition, which was issued at 12s., we have the present "third people's" reprinted, along with the smaller tractate on "Christian Theism," originally issued in 1839 at 2s. 6d., and both together cost but half a crown in a volume bound in cloth containing 480 pages 8vo.

It is almost sufficient, in regard to the contents of the book, to say that it is more conservative than Strauss, and that it seems to have been considerably followed by Renan, to show the kind of opinions it advocates. Though opposed to orthodox tenets, it is learned and serious; and yet from its pages the orthodox thinker can find many helps for the better understanding of the life and times of the Lord our Saviour.

The critical sagacity and steady survey of the facts of the gospel history, so far as they are on the level platform of ordinary life, which the author has displayed, have produced results which, however we may disagree with them, are full of value; while the processes of reasoning employed are always such as to instruct; and yet not unfrequently, as we think, to induce one to take an opposite turn occasionally, and to revert to orthodoxy with even a higher appreciation of the truth of the gospel. Many facts of higher interest, not a few observations going far into the hidden meaning of the word, and a good many remarks of great point and pertinence, occur in the work. It is one of the very best of the treatises which take the line of argument adopted or followed by Strauss, Renan, &c.; and is superior, in our opinion, to the course of thought employed by Parker, Bowen, &c. He is not a sceptic of the broad school; he is a reverent and holy thinker; there is little in the book which could shock the truly pious mind; and much which, if thoughtfully read, might aid many of the writers on the evidences of Christianity to see courses of thought which they generally ignore. As showing the spirit and ability of the book, we make the following lengthy quotation:—

"Whatever be the spirit with which the four Gospels be approached, it is impossible to rise from the attentive perusal of them without a strong reverence for Jesus Christ. Even the disposition to cavil and ridicule

forced to retire before the majestic simplicity of the prophet of Nazareth. Unlike Moses or Mahomet, he owes no part of the lustre which surrounds him to his acquisition of temporal power; his is the ascendancy which mankind, in proportion to their mental advancement, are least disposed to resist—that of moral and intellectual greatness. Besides, his cruel fate engages men's affections on his behalf, and gives him an additional hold upon their allegiance. A noble-minded reformer and sage, martyred by crafty priests and brutal soldiers, is a spectacle which forces men to gaze in pity and admiration. The precepts from such a source come with an authority which no human laws could give; and Jesus is more powerful on the cross of Calvary than He would have been on the throne of Israel.

"The virtue, wisdom, and sufferings of Jesus, then, will secure to Him a powerful influence over men so long as they continue to be moral, intellectual, and sympathizing beings. And, as the tendency of human improvement is towards the progressive increase of these qualities, it may be presumed that the empire of Christianity, considered simply as the influence of the life, character, and doctrine of Christ over the human mind, will never cease. The most fastidious scepticism is forced to admit the truth of the facts which such a view of Christianity requires. For no one who regards historical evidence will deny that such a Person was put to death in Judea, and that He gave rise to a new system of religion. The four Gospels on these points are strengthened by many other testimonies, agree with each other, and contain relations conformable to the order of nature. Moreover, the excellence of the perceptive parts of the Gospels carries with it its own evidence in all ages.

"But when a higher office is claimed for Christ, that of a messenger accredited from God by a supernatural birth, miraculous works, a resurrection, and an ascension, we may reasonably expect equal strength of evidence. But how stands the case? The four Gospels on these points are not confirmed by testimony out of the church, disagree with each other, and contain relations contrary to the order of things. The evidence of these points is reduced to the authority of these narratives themselves. In *them*, at least the most candid mind may require strong proofs of authenticity and veracity; but again, what is the case? They are anonymous productions; their authorship is far from certain; they were written from forty to seventy years after the events which they profess to record; the writers do not explain how they came by their information; two of them appear to have copied from the first; all the four contain notable discrepancies and manifest contradictions; they contain statements at variance with histories of acknowledged authority; some of them relate wonders which even many Christians are obliged to reject as fabulous: and in general they present no character by which we can distinguish their tales of miracles from the fictions which every church has found some supporters ready to vouch for on its behalf. . . . The order of nature, the combination of human feelings and motives at the particular juncture in question, have been shown to be enough to account for the life and death of Jesus, and the proceedings of His followers. And, whatever be our disposition to show deference towards Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, or the persons writing under their names, the inquirers for truth are obliged to ask, Who are these, that we should believe them in contradiction to the known order of nature, and receive from them as indubitable truth stories which, coming from other mouths, we should reject at once as

palpable fiction? Where are the proofs of their caution, judgment, and veracity? How are we assured that they could neither be misled, nor attempt to mislead? They vouch for the resurrection of Christ; but who shall vouch for them, and certify that they were so far different from the rest of men as to be void of credulity, and incapable of mistake or falsehood?

"That the resurrection of Jesus was intended as a pledge to mankind of a general resurrection is a delightful idea. But the only safe basis for such a belief is historical evidence. If this fail to establish the fact, the agreeable nature of the belief is so far from proving it, that it rather furnishes an explanation of the general prevalence of the belief in the face of insufficient evidence. . . . Christianity forms a striking passage in the history of human nature, and appears as one of the most prominent of the means employed in its improvement. It no longer boasts of a special divine origin, but shares in that which the theist attributes to the world and the whole order of its events. It has presented to the world a system of moral excellence; it has led forth the principles of humanity and benevolence from the recesses of the schools and groves, and compelled them to take an active part in the affairs of life. It has consolidated the moral and religious sentiments into a more definite and influential form than had before existed; and thereby constituted an engine which has worked powerfully towards humanizing and civilizing the world.

"Moreover, Christianity has given currency to the sublime doctrines of man's relationship to the Deity and of a future state. . . . Christianity has invested them with the authority of established principles, and thereby contributed much to the moral elevation of mankind. . . .

"Enough is understood to enable us to see, in the universe itself, a Son which tells us of a Father, and in all the natural beauty and moral excellence which meets us in the world an ever-present Logos which reveals the grace and truth of its invisible source. Enough is understood to convince us that to have a place on this beautiful planet on almost any terms is an unspeakable privilege, that virtue produces the highest happiness, whether for this or another world; and that there does exist an encircling mysterious intelligence, which, as it appears to manifest its energy in arrangements for the general welfare of the creation, must insure a provision for all the real interests of man. From all our occasional excursions into the abysses of the unseen world, and from all our efforts to reach upwards to the hidden things of God, both reason and piety bid us return tranquilly to our accustomed corner of earth, to use and enjoy fully our present lot, and to repose implicitly upon the higher wisdom in whose disposal we stand, whilst indulging the thought that a time is appointed when the cravings of the heart and of the intellect will be satisfied, and the enigma of our own and the world's existence be solved."

It is a little more difficult to deal with his sister's book. It aims at once at the continuance of Christian influences and the absorption of Christianity into a higher and more philosophical school of religionism. She rejects Comte's "positivism" with even greater emphasis than she declines to accept of the creed of Christendom as possessed of inherent validity and actual power. She admires and reveres the Messiah of the old time; she admires but does not revere "the Messiah of positivism"—his system of "world-restitution" does not quite commend itself to her judgment, nor yet to her feelings.



## The Topic.

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### WHICH IS THE MORE BLAMEWORTHY IN REGARD TO THE WAR—FRANCE OR PRUSSIA?

“War’s a game, which were their subjects wise,  
Kings should not play at.”—*Cooper*.

#### FRANCE.

PRUSSIA is marching in the vanguard of civilization. She desires to see settled dynasties and constitutional authority exercising power over free and happy peoples. But France is a constant menace to tranquillity, a centre of uncertainty. It is the capital of *coup d'état*. Europe recognised Napoleon's rule in the interests of peace; but the restless spirit of Napoleon will only be contented with dynastic recognition—and this Europe will not grant. Prussia makes war against this fatuity of France, and therefore it is right. Its part in the war is noble and excellent. It is engaged in the holy effort of progressive, yet settled civilization.—M. C. O.

There is the evidence of a determination on the part of France to have war. On the 5th July we have the Duc de Gramont declaring in the Corps Législatif that a Prussian prince had accepted the candidature to the throne of Spain, that it must not be, or France must go to war with Prussia. A few days later we have the Duc de Gramont informing the neutral states that the withdrawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold would end all prospects of war. This was done a day or two after by the prince's father. Instead of the matter ending here, a fresh demand was made on the King of Prussia to guarantee that the prince should not, at any future time, accept the throne of Spain.

The Prussian king, who had already disclaimed any knowledge of or connection with the matter, naturally resented such conduct, and refused to see the French ambassador, stating that he had no more to communicate on the subject. On the receipt of this, war was instantly declared by France against Prussia. The first announcement was made by the Duc de Gramont on the 5th, and war was declared on the 15th. To say nothing of the injustice of the demands of France, there is a precipitancy in her conduct that clearly shows a determination to go to war with Prussia if she did not instantly comply. Her first demand had been complied with, but not by Prussia. This seems to have partly disconcerted France; but another was soon found, and a refusal to entertain that was instantly seized as a pretext for war. Her demands were most unjust and unreasonable, and could not have been complied with on the part of the Prussian king without going beyond his legitimate power as a constitutional king, and thereby showing fear of France, and a disregard for his own honour. He would, in fact, humiliate Prussia in the eyes of the whole world. His conduct may have been too “high.” Had he displayed a little less of the proud spirit, and a little more kindness, he could have made France more inexcusable still, and perhaps altogether unable to declare war.—R. M.

No fitter subject could have been selected for discussion than this, yet the information respecting it is very unsatisfactory and most conflicting. Judging with our present knowledge we are led to the conclusion that France is mainly responsible for the disturbance of the peace. The Hohenzollern candidature to the crown of Spain has been made to supply what was wanting in the Luxembourg difficulty. And the rapidity with which the Emperor carried on the communications, that ended in the declaration of war, sufficiently prove that no great effort was made to maintain peace. The reception which King William gave to M. Benedetti appears, indeed, to have precipitated events. Yet in this apparently important feature a weakness exists in the information regarding it. We are told that M. Benedetti sought an interview with the King of Prussia at a certain place, and that his Majesty refused to see him; but we are left entirely ignorant of M. Benedetti's conduct and mission. Surely King William would not so far have forgotten the courtesy which the representative of one great nation owes to that of another, unless something very offensive indeed was anticipated. This is a point Europe has yet to know more about. And it is idle, nay, it is absurd, for the Duc de Gramont to endeavour to vindicate the conduct of France by protesting that war is made upon Prussia alone, and not upon Germany. For the only points of interest to non-Germans is the unity of Germany, which dates from the Treaty of Prague, that Prussia has sole charge of the army and fleet, and conducts the diplomatic relations of the North German Confederation. The Emperor may attempt to retard the consolidation which has so earnestly commenced, but the safest plan would have been to acquiesce

in what has been accomplished, and to have pursued a course of peace and civilization, instead of embittering animosities which, though deep, it was hoped had found an everlasting oblivion.—C. F. A. S.

We feel bound to say that France is the more blameworthy in regard to the war, on the following grounds:—If the war did result from the quarrel about the crown of Spain, then when the German candidate for the throne of Spain was withdrawn, France ought to have been content. What will our opponents say to the rudeness of the French ambassador at Ems? and why could he not wait a little longer? Again, though Prussia and its king were grossly insulted, they delayed to throw down the gauntlet; and France declared war in hot haste, without even consenting that the neutral Powers should try to settle, in a peaceful way, as they, with others, agreed to do. We believe that the war was premeditated and predetermined by France. Thus we think France to blame.—A. S.

If in this nineteenth century a nation by universal suffrage elects a man to the office of chief magistrate, and invests him with supreme authority, that nation is responsible for the government he administers, and the official acts performed under his authority. If a nation of thirty-five millions of civilized, educated Europeans allows an unscrupulous politician, by fraud, chicanery, violence, murder, perjury, &c., to usurp the government, to overthrow the constitution, to seize and hold the reins of government, to direct wholly and solely for himself the national and international affairs thereof, and to continue to do so for twenty years, that nation is responsible for the misdeeds of their ruler, for not bringing that criminal to justice, and for every act he commits while in power. Louis Napoleon B.

parte finds it necessary, in order to secure his own position in France, to interfere with the internal arrangements of other countries, and to endeavour to bring them under his sway. Is not France responsible for the Crimean war?—Lombardy? Mexico? Mentana? And is not France responsible now, when this Corsican, quaking for his own safety on the throne, and for the stability of his dynasty, hazards all on one desperate throw, on this fearful leap in the dark which he has forced Germany and France to take? He will be responsible hereafter for the thousands sent into eternity before their time, for all this misery inflicted by the war; but France is responsible now for allowing him the power to do so. Is there an overruling Providence, to whom belongeth retribution and vengeance? Yea, verily; and surely a second St. Helena awaiteth "Napoleon the Little!"—HIAWATHA.

We consider both nations deserving of considerable censure for engaging so hastily as they did in a struggle which must certainly be attended with many disastrous results; such a mode of deciding a dispute is a foolish, and, morally speaking, an unjustifiable one. It is true many are of opinion that an appeal to arms is a legitimate method of settling a disagreement, and that nations should, schoolboy-like, begin to fight the moment one offends the other; but there are few who, upon lengthened consideration, will deny that such a practice is absurd and unreasonable. Some have reasoned,—the French were the first to declare war; but then the Prussians were, and indeed have been for some time, as anxious to encounter in battle the French as were the French to meet the Prussians; therefore whatever blame is merited by the one is equally deserved by the other; but we think that so long as the two

nations were merely possessed by a hostile feeling, little or no practical harm would have ensued; and although neither nation had sufficient cause for the present war, we regard the French as the more blameworthy, on account of their unnecessary interference in Prussian affairs, and their being the first to declare war.—H. SCOTT.

The history of Prussian aggrandizement has been neither more nor less an object of commendation to us than the Napoleonic policy of the past. But of nothing are we more clearly satisfied, within sight of the occasion of the present war, than that the blame lies at the door of the Empire. It is by a careful review of those facts in regard to the Spanish candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, upon which has ensued the rupture, that the relative blameworthiness of the two parties is to be assessed, and those side-pleadings about older causes are to be judged as entirely apart from the real issue. Accordingly, we would confine discussion to the question whether the King of Prussia's conduct with reference to that candidature may be vindicated, or ought he to make apology to France, with confession of error on his part, and concession to her demands? We maintain that, after the voluntary pocketing of his throneward aspirations by the prince, the attitude assumed by the Prussian sovereign was only consistent with the duty of a constitutional monarch, who must respect in the subject a right to choose as he thinks best. France, having got a reply to this effect, renews her demands through her minister at Berlin, who is curtly treated, but not before he has infringed diplomatic etiquette in the manner of his approach to King William. France now feels insulted, and says, "Apologize or fight," and—said to

tell—the most deplorable of modern European wars is the result. A paltry cause, forsooth! And we repeat that the burden of guilt must be adjudged to lie upon France.—J. F. B.

France, by her insulting demand on Prussia, pushed the latter power to the fatal necessity of self defence. Again, France by her audacious abnegation of political right to Spain, boldly ignores the principle of non-intervention. But for the principle of non-intervention, and the general adhesion of Europe thereto, a Bonaparte dynasty would not be tolerated for an hour. Faithful to her traditions, France appears again in her favourite but offensive character of European dictator. She makes war without presenting the merest shadow of a plea for doing so. We aver, therefore, that on France mainly rests the responsibility of this tremendous struggle.—CRITO.

#### PRUSSIA.

What matters it to Prussia who reigns in France? What right has she to dictate to a noble country under which dynasty or under whose rule she shall hold on her way in the world's course? She fears a shaking of thrones. She is unhappy at the practical proof that even without the right divine of kings imperial government can be maintained, and she is jealous of the might of mind in the capital of capacity. Hence she labours to re-establish legitimacy, and she favours her, because of our proclivities towards sovereignty and Protestantism. But we are wrong, and Prussia is wrong. Kings have no right to dictate to nations under what government they shall live. Prussian dictatorship will not be submitted to in France, and it is highly blameworthy in attempting that. France is right to resist.—M. S. N.

Both of the parties are to blame.

The statement of the question implies that each is "blameworthy," and we are called upon to apportion the amount of blame less or more between the two. In our opinion Prussia is more to blame than France. Diplomacy is the strategics of cunning in the management of affairs. Prussian diplomacy is perhaps the most subtle in Europe, and its diplomacy has hitherto fore-run war. It endeavours to gain its ends by the talents of the fox, and when refused or outwitted it strives to attain them by the ferocity of the tiger. There can be no doubt that Prussia is an aggressive power. Its late history has been that of extension. It had excited the jealousy of Europe on that account, but its stealthy policy did not meet its due reward and defeat, because it menaced Europe with war. It made a leap into Spain whenever chance offered, to tighten its grasp round the only strong man who could grapple with it. Heresented the attempt, and Prussia stood not on its honesty, but its army. It provoked the war by its grasp and greed, and is therefore more blameworthy as the real aggressor and challenger, though not the first declarer of the war.—W.

History has seldom had written on her much-defiled pages a war so obnoxious to human instincts, feelings, and sympathies, as that which, while we write, drenches Europe's fairest fields with gore. It involves no principle, and is merely, in reality, a cockfight between the contending parties, having less than even the usual excuse of the wager of battle. Prussia, we cannot but believe, is far more to blame than France. It was well known that Prussia had spread a huge spider-web of diplomacy over Europe, and had seated herself prepared to see who would get entangled in its cunning involution. Men were wary and char-

human endurance has a limit. When Prussia, aptly provided with an army for its nefarious purpose of trying to enrich and greatness itself by the disturbance of Europe, saw that prudence was restraining those whom it desired to provoke, it took to intrigues to attain its end by throwing out its spider-lines into Spain, to place a Hohenzollern on the south border of France, and so encircle France in its garrotting embrace. France resisted, claimed the breaking off of the design, and made just war against the crafty machinations of the Bismarckian spider.—G. G.

The court of Berlin is presided over by a king who is the successor of a long line of dynastic sovereigns, and the ally of many monarchs by birth. He has a near neighbour, an upstart, and the nephew of a *novus homo* in the history of Europe—one who actually boasts of being a *parvenu*. It is uncomfortable to have a neighbour of such a sort. "Comparisons are odious," and how are people likely to reverence and regard the right divine of kings if there be here the real article and there the sham—and each seems to be about as useful and noble as the other? These *parvenus* ought to be snubbed, when it seems to be convenient. So, assume all the *hauteur* of majesty by ordinary generation, sire of Prussia, and when the representative of majesty, by extraordinary ability, approaches your Highness, freeze him with the stateliness of a king-descended king. Sickness, anxiety, and the cares of a troubled government afflict the Man in Office, and now you have the chance. So the interlude at Ems is played on the stage of Europe; and the tragedy of the Rhine frontier follows as the afterpiece,—and all to bolster up that old fable of sovereign rights acquired by birth and long descent, rather than by astute activity of mind, vigorous leadership, and mar-

vellous dexterity in manipulating the interests of a country. This is the blameworthy cause of the war. Prussia is foolishly jealous of popular suffrage as the basis of thrones, and makes war for an obsolete idea, that "divinity doth hedge a king."—E. A. G.

France has Prussia, or territories under the influence of Prussia, all round its border, from the mountains of Savoy to the mouths of the Scheldt. Had Prussia succeeded in making the Prince of Hohenzollern king of Spain, a much wider district of its territory would have been brought under the sweep of German ambition, and open to Prussian aggressions or influences. Spain afforded France a chance of an ally against Prussia so long as it had a sovereign of any other dynasty than that of Prussia on its throne, but so soon as such an event should take place, a cordon of Prussian rivalries would have surrounded the whole territory, and it would have been cut off from help or helpfulness—the former if assailed, the latter if Prussian ambition should lead to the absorption of Portugal, the annexation of the Swiss cantons, or the subjugation of Italy. Nothing but resistance was left to France when such a danger threatened. It was a most justifiable *casus belli*, and the righteousness of the protective measures France adopted cannot be gainsaid. National self-preservation called the French to arms, national aggrandizement urged on the Prussians to war, therefore Prussia is much more blameworthy than France.—J. S. B.

The unpopular side is not always the wrong side. I am aware that Prussia is almost universally believed to be justified in her warfare, and that France is diligently blackballed. I believe this is an error. We are prone to regard France as wrong, and to think Prussia in the right. France is traditionally our natural

enemy, and Prussia is a young and rising friend, with whom we have relations not only of faith but of domestic interests. It is an easy and a natural fallacy of the affections to think that France must be the wrong-doer. But it is a fallacy. France has a righteous cause of quarrel, and is this time in its right place engaged in a chivalrous crusade against the ambitions of despotic policy and an armed police for the prevention of freedom and progress. Prussia's policy has been steadily aggressive. Notwithstanding the temptations of his position, Napoleon has sedulously restrained his not easily governed subjects, until the last limit of endurance had been snapped by the fact that Prussia attempted to put France in a state of siege from seaboard to seaboard, enclosing it in a net not only of political intrigues, but of military environments. In the interests of peace and nations France has resolved to oppose the cunningest of Europe's despots, whose army and whose diplomacy are the menace of Europe.—P. N. S.

Diplomacy is an edged tool which often cuts both ways. Aggressive trickery, which is the proper name of diplomatic intrigue, may be gilded over by figures of speech, but is still

aggression. To aggression a great nation cannot assent; and tricky aggression, when detected, it cannot hesitate to condemn and punish. Prussian diplomacy has always been employed on dark projects, and has been noted for intermeddlement in other people's affairs. Its diplomacy was made more difficult to resist, because on the failure of its cajolery it employed threats to secure its ends. Under cover of its huge army—while it steadily resisted all arrangements for the reduction of military forces—it plied its arts of political ducce in the belief that fear would prompt what art could not promote. Europe ought long ago to have checkmated the Berlin chess-player, who reintroduced Machiavelism into European politics. But trusting to its long impunity, Prussia made a movement which was intended to humiliate a monarch whose greatness excited its envy and concern. Napoleon, knowing the wily nature of the danger, at once, and properly, protested against any such reconstructive and destructive movement, and determined to keep at bay the conspirator for despotism. It will yet be seen that Prussian diplomacy was more dangerous than French *fanfaronade*.—W. E. C.

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THE inquiry of truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it,—the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it,—and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it,—are the sovereign good of human nature. The first creation of God in the work of the six days was the light of sense—the last was the light of reason—and His Sabbath work, ever since, is the illumination of His Spirit. First, He breathed light upon the face of matter, or chaos, then He breathed light into the face of man; and still He breathes and inspires light into the face of His chosen. Certainly it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in Providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.—Bacon.

## Our Collegiate Course.

### THE PROGRESS OF POESY.

A PINDARIC ODE.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

[To compensate for the ills of life, imaginary or real, the Muse has been given by the same Providence who sends the day, by its cheerful presence, to dispel the gloom and the terrors of night.]

#### STROPHE II.

Man's feeble race what ills await!—  
 Labour and penury, the racks of pain,  
 Disease, and sorrow's weeping train,  
 And death, sad refuge from the storms of fate. 45  
 The fond complaint, my song, disprove,

How much sorrow is laid upon helpless humanity! He is exposed to toil and poverty, the torture of anguish, ill-health, and the sad attendants of grief and death, the last grievous covert from the tempests of destiny. Let my poem show how inaccurate is the foolish repining of mankind, and

---

(42)    "Many and sharp the numerous ills  
           Inwoven with our frame!  
       More poignant still, we make ourselves  
           Regret, remorse, and shame;  
       And man, whose heaven-erected face  
           The smiles of love adorn,  
       Man's inhumanity to man  
           Makes countless thousands mourn.

\*   \*   \*   \*

      "O Death! the poor man's dearest friend,  
       The kindest and the best!  
       Welcome the hour my aged limbs  
       Are laid with thee at rest;  
       The great, the wealthy, fear thy blow,  
       From pomp and pleasure torn,  
       But oh! a blest relief to those  
       That weary-laden mourn."—Burns.

(45)    "The weavers of life's web—the Fates—but sway  
           The matter and the things of clay."  
                           *Schiller's "Ideal and Real Life"* (Lytton).

And justify the laws of Jove.  
 Say, has He given in vain the heavenly Muse?  
 Night, and all her sickly deas,  
 Her spectres wan, and birds of boding cry, 50  
 He gives to range the dreary sky:  
 Till down the eastern cliffs afar  
 Hyperion's march they spy, and glittering shafts of war.

make it plain that the divine ordinances are righteous altogether. Tell me, has God bestowed unavailingly on man the celestial gift of poesy?—Evening, and all the sad some moisture of her hours?

Her grey sheeted ghosts, her birds of ominous shriek, He permits to career along the darkened heavens, till they observe the moving hosts of the day-god making their way down the slopes of the Orient and the bristly spears of night-conquering sunshine.

(47) Justify, to vindicate as right, as in Milton's—

"And justify the ways of God to man."—"Paradise Lost," i., 26.

(48) "Sing, heavenly Muse."  
 Milton's "Paradise Lost," i., 6.

(49) "Fly like the moon-eyed herald of dismay,  
 Chased on his night steed by the star of day."  
 Campbell's "Pleasures of Hope," ii.

This couplet from Cowley has been wrongly quoted by Gray in his own notes to this poem, and so has continued to be by his different editors. It occurs in "Brutus," an Ode, stanza iv. :—

"One would have thought 't heard the Morning crew,  
 Or seen her well-appointed star  
 Come marching up the eastern hills afar."

In Gray's letter to Dr. Wharton, containing a journal of his tour to the Lakes, he says, "While I was here a little shower fell, red clouds came marching up the hills from the east," &c.—Mason's edit., iv., p. 175, and Wharton's Note on Milton, p. 304.

(50) Boding means *ominous* here—not *prophetic*, as in—

"No boding maid of skill divine  
 Art thou, no prophetess of good,  
 But mother of the giant brood."—Gray's "Descent of Odin."

(53) Hyperion, the Sun, "the heaven-walker"—a Titan son of Uranus and Ge, and father of Helios the Sun, Selene the Moon, and Eos, Morning. On this account the Sun is called Hyperionon, which is contracted into Hyperion. In Homer, Phœbus Apollo and he are two distinct deities, but in after times they became confounded, both being sun-gods. In "Odyssey," i., 24, Homer uses this proper name for the sun :—



[The extensive influence of poetic genius over the most remote and least civilized nations; its connection with liberty and the virtues which naturally attend on freedom.]

### ANTISTROPHE II.

In climes beyond the solar road,  
Where shaggy forms o'er ice-built mountains roam, 55  
The Muse has broke the twilight gloom  
To cheer the shivering native's dull abode.

In regions which lie far off from the orbit of the day-god, where furred creatures wander over the icebergs, poesy has burst the gathering darkness, that she might enliven the dreary dwelling of the chill and trembling inhabitant.

"Ethiops, most distant of men, who dwell divided  
Part by falling and part by rising Hyperion."

(54) "Extra anni solisque vias."—*Virgil*.  
("Beyond the pathways of the year and of the sun.")

(*Tutta lontana dal camin del sole.*)—*Petrarch, Cans. 5*

Wakefield has traced this imitation to Dryden; Gray himself refers to Virgil and Petrarch. Wakefield gives the line from Dryden thus:—

"Beyond the year, and out of heaven's highway,"

which he calls extremely bold and poetical. I confess a critic might be allowed to be somewhat fastidious on this unpoetical diction, on the *highway* which, I believe, Dryden never used. I think his line ran thus:—

"Beyond the year, out of *the solar walk*."

Pope has expressed the image more elegantly, though copied from Dryden:—

"Far as *the solar walk*, or milky way."  
*Districk's "Curiosities of Literature," 211.*

(54—57) In hyperborean regions, referring to the Norwegian, Icelandic, and Lappish poetry, and Runic rhymes. These lines form a periphrasis for the arctic region, where, amongst—

"Ever-during snows, perpetual shades  
Of darkness,"

the Esquimaux, the Lapps, the Finns, &c., whose dress consists of the

And oft, beneath the odorous shade  
 Of Chili's boundless forests laid.  
 She deigns to hear the savage youth repeat, 60  
 In loose numbers wildly sweet,  
 Their feather-cinctured chiefs and dusky loves.  
 Her track, where'er the goddess roves,  
 Glory pursue, and generous Shame,

Not unfrequently, too, reclining under the profound calm of the limitless graves of Chili, she condescends to listen to the cultureless strippling detail in unpolished rhymes, artlessly peasing, the merits of their plume-girt nobles and the charms of their dark-hued darlings.

Renown and noble-hearted sensitiveness go where she goes, and follow

skins of animals, dwell; for though "shaggy forms" might be regarded as signifying bears and other fur-coated creatures, peculiar to the polar regions, the context evidently implies that the "shivering natives" are human, because they are capable of feeling the cheer of the Muses. The specific allusion of the poet is most probably to the "Eddas," those literary monuments of the mythology and the poetry of the ancient people of the north."

(59) Chili, a republic of Spanish origin, in South America, between the watershed of the Andes and the shores of the Pacific, and lying coastwise between Bolivia and Patagonia. The chief Indian tribes in the district are called Araucanians, whose deeds of heroism have been celebrated in at least six poems, of which Ercilla's epic, "The Araucana," is the best known. It is inspired with somewhat of the Homeric fire, and from it probably Gray took his idea of the savage youth in the boundless forests, which latter only occur in the south and in the island of Chiloe.

(60) Thomas Campbell considers this picture of the "Indian poet amidst the forests of Chili" a beautiful passage.

(61) "Seu per audaces nova dithyrambos,  
 Verba devolvit numerisque fertur  
 Lege solutis."

(Whether, audacious dithyrambs along,  
 He pours new-minted phrases in his song,  
 In loose measures free from law.)  
 Horace, "Odes," IV., ii., 10—12.

(62) So Milton — "Such, of late,  
 Columbus found the American, so girt  
 With feathered cincture; naked else, and wild,  
 Among the trees on isles and woody shores."  
 "Paradise Lost," ix., 1115—1118.

(64) The Greek Aidos, spontaneous and unsought nobleness of nature and act; a noble, natural insensibility to dishonour; inborn modesty; as in Homer's—

The unconquerable mind, and Freedom's holy flame. 65  
in the course she leads, while the dauntless soul and the pure light of  
liberty accompany her progress.

"O friends, be men; and noble shame aye cherish in your soul."  
"Iliad," xv., 561.

"A generous virtue of a vigorous kind,  
Pure in the last recesses of the mind."—Dryden.

(65) "The strong divinity of soul  
That conquers chance and fate,"  
Akenside's "*Pleasures of Imagination*," i., 431-2.

The love of true liberty is a characteristic of each noble mind. True  
liberty is the freedom of nature, chastened and regulated by just laws,  
acting with readiness, uniformity, and ease, for, among, and through every  
portion of the body politic. Hence, as Milton says, he—

"Who loves that must first be wise and good."

"Et cuncta terrarum subacta,  
Præter atrocem animum Catonis."

(And all the lands of all the earth subdued,  
But not *unvanquished* Cato's *hardihood*.)  
Horace, "*Odes*," ii., 23, 24.

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

903. What sort of wood was the  
gopher wood of Scripture, the  
wood of the ark (Gen. vi. 14)?—  
W. L.

904. What is plagiarism? The  
question I want answered is not  
what is that sort of plagiarism which  
legally punishable, as literary

robbery or roguery, but what is  
plagiarism as distinguished from  
originality and coincidence? How  
can that sort of second-hand thought  
be defined so as to be stigmatised as  
plagiarism, as different from that of  
using up old material which owes  
suggestion to another but does not  
imitate?—R. S. M.

905. Who is it that affirms that "stupidity will baffle the gods"?—  
F. D.

906. What would be the best method of starting, conducting, and keeping up the activity of, and the interest in, morning classes for the study of the Bible, and the promotion of religious life among young men? I should like particularly that this query should be replied to by some one whose experience, knowledge, and favour for these institutions can suggest something really beneficial. I should perhaps say that I do not mean senior Sunday school classes but mutual improvement (voluntary) associations of young men, i. e., persons who have passed their twentieth year.—ECCLE.

907. What is the meaning of "chap-books?"

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

895. *Song* is derived from the Sanscrit *cinj*, to tinkle, and is connected with German *singen*, to utter musical sounds by the voice, and signifies a poem, generally short, adapted to a vocal recurrent melody by its adherence to a similar measure throughout. It is usually one outgrowth of the inner emotions of man into lyrical expression. Its chief features are freedom, sincerity, spontaneity, and personal passionateness; because it is the ringing out of the impression of the mind in the expression of the singer. E. S. Dallas says that "you can almost count on the fingers of one hand all the songs in the English language that are worthy of the name, at least all those written by Englishmen." I quote the following from Shakspeare:—

"Come away, come away, Death,  
And in sad cypress let me be  
laid ;

Fly away, fly away, breath—

I am slain by a fair cruel maid.  
My shroud of white, stuck all  
with yew,  
O prepare it !  
My part of death no one so true  
Did share it.

"Not a flower, not a flower sweet  
On my black coffin let there be  
strown ;  
Not a friend, not a friend greet  
My poor corpse where my bones  
shall be thrown.  
A thousand thousand sighs to save  
Lay me, oh! where  
Sad true lover never find my grave  
To weep there."

From the manner in which Shakspeare speaks of this song I am inclined to believe it was a favourite of his own, which had probably been composed to an air which delighted him. Was it a tune of his friend Dowland's, who was only two years his elder, or was it set to an old air he had heard in Shottery, sung by Anne Hathaway? The Duke calls it "that old and antic song,"—says it is old and plain:—

"The spinsters and the knitters in  
the sun,  
And the free winds that weave  
their thread with bones,  
Do use to chant it ; it is silly  
sooth,  
And dallies in the innocence of  
love  
Like the old age ;"

and Viola affirms of the music of it that—

"It gives a very echo to the seat  
Where love is throned."

It seems to me simple, sincere, passionate, and recurrent, though it does not appear quite so intense as the songs of Burns, in one single

stanza of one of whose songs we have, as Mrs. Jameson said, the precious distilled essence of all possible novels:—

"Had we never loved so kindly,  
Had we never loved so blindly,  
Never met or never parted,  
We had ne'er been broken-hearted."

Of modern song-writers in England Eliza Cook, Charles Mackay, Edward Capern, Wm. Bennet, and the Hon. Mrs. Norton are perhaps those who have attained the fairest popularity and acceptance.—R. M. A.

Perhaps the most elaborate yet concise exposition of the subject of this query is contained in "The Composition and Rhetoric" of Professor Alexander Bain; from it we quote the passage, as "Reville" may not be able readily to see the book:—

"*The Song*.—A song is usually short; simple in measure; broken up into stanzas, each complete in meaning, yet falling into a place in the arrangement of the piece; modified according as it is to be sung or merely pronounced; in the first place being more abrupt and more metrical. The varieties of the song may be enumerated thus:—

"I. The sacred song, or hymn, expressing (a) awe, reverence, fear; (b) love, thankfulness, confidence; (c) supplication and intercession; (d) self-abasement and contrition; or (e) being hortatory (a departure from the strict poetical vein, almost peculiar to the Christian hymns).

"The Psalms include all the varieties. The old Latin hymns (*Dies Irae*, &c.) may also be referred to. Luther's hymns are remarkable outbursts of his own personality; as in the tone of confidence displayed in—

'A great stronghold our God is still.'

The modern missionary hymn,

'From Greenland's icy mountains,' is an example of the hortatory kind. The old Greek hymns to the deities, generally sung by the choruses, are pure instances of (a), (b), and (c).

"II. The secular song, corresponding to the more exciting occasions of common life.

"(a) The war-song partakes of the nature of eloquence; the means of persuasion being the impassioned excitement and burning words of the author. It may be composed for a special emergency, or for nourishing patriotic sentiments at all times. One need refer only to Tyrtæus, Burns ('Scots wha hae'), the Mar-seillaise, Arndt's and Körner's German war lyrics ('War of Freedom,' 1813). The sentiments bodied forth are defiance of the foe, disregard of death, the dishonour of cowardice, the miseries of defeat.

"It is of importance to remark, however, that *narrative* or epic compositions, such as ballads reciting heroic deeds of the past, have probably a still greater influence in rousing military sentiments. Didin's songs have the narrative and not the lyric form. It was to the ballad of 'Chevy Chase' that Sidney's famous saying was applied, 'It stirs the heart like the sound of a trumpet.' The explanation has already been alluded to. It is in the unfolding of action and incident that the feelings can be most surely stimulated. The lyric is adapted to a special want of the mind, namely, to give vent to, and to moderate, feelings once aroused. Incidentally it cultivates the feelings, but principally it gives them utterance.

"(b) The love-song, used in the various forms of tender feeling. First is the love of the sexes. To this, in all its situations, the song adapts itself. In ancient times, Sappho, Horace, Catullus, gave choice examples. Ben Jonson's 'Drink to me only with thine

eyes' is probably unsurpassed. Shakspeare has numerous snatches. Suckling's songs are exquisite. Burns, Moore, Campbell, Béranger, are a few of the host of composers of love-songs. The other affections of kindred have had their share of celebration. Burns has sung of friendship. Expression has been given to home, country, and patriotic sentiment ('Rule Britannia,' &c.)

"(c) The drinking song, sociality, genial feeling, and the praises of wine, have been the occasion of lyrics both in ancient and in modern times. Burns and Moore have contributed a number of these. The German Burschen songs may also be quoted.

"(d) The political song; as the Jacobite songs, and all outbursts of party feeling.

"(e) The purely sentimental song; for example, Tennyson's 'Break, break, break.'

"The comic song is generally a ludicrous narrative. Many so-called songs are in fact ballads."—Bain's *"Composition and Rhetoric,"* pp. 228, 229.—T. U.

Alliteration is an ornament of style, and ought not to be pushed into prominence. Its chief use is to be suggestively imitative; such is Clare's line in "Summer,"—

"Crows crowd croaking overhead."

A less known instance is, that in Fletcher's "Purple Island," Canto v. stanza 61, representing a snake,—

"Thinking to kiss, filled with his forked spur."

One of the most expressively excellent instances of alliteration combined with contrast of sound to give imitative euphony to words may be quoted from the weird and wonderful "Raven," by Poe,—

"And the silken, sad, uncertain rustling of each purple curtain."

What an effect produced by such a

simple contrivance as the change of sound in "certain" and "curtain!" The only justification for alliteration in prose is when it aids the sense or emphasizes the meaning. Poetical prose produces pleasing effects only when it makes the meaning of the matter more manifest and animated.—T. N. P.

896. The editor has sent me a question (No. 896) on the last page of my "Introduction to Metaphysic," 1869. What, it is asked, is the alleged error of striking averages in the usual way? In brief it is that of ignoring the order in which the amalgamated events occur. Events *cannot* be counted and lumped and averaged without error. The arithmetical mean of the number is *not* the true mean. I am not dictating to statisticians what they should do. All I say is that it is customary to draw conclusions from statistical tables which the events summarized do not justify; and so far the tables do not represent the events. Take a horizontal line to represent time; take equal parts, AB, BC, CD, &c. (from left to right), and from A, B, C, D, &c., draw uprights proportional to the numbers recorded at those times. The common mode of striking the average is to add all those sets of numbers together, and to divide the sum by the number of sets. But the average so obtained is rarely or never the mean required. Through the tops of those uprights an infinite number of curves may be drawn, of which *one only* exactly represents the particular case in hand; but every one *approximately* does so. Taking one of these for trial, the mean ordinate is obtained by finding the area of the square between the curve and the horizontal line, and dividing that area by the length of the line. Mathematical tables are published by which the value of the mean may be approximated to without recourse to

geometry and the integral calculus. The mean so found rarely or never coincides with the arithmetical mean. The *differentia* of any case is simply dropped out of account by the ordinary process; and by consequence no secure induction can be made from statistical tables. To deal with the question satisfactorily would require much more space than I dare ask for.—C. M. INGLEBY.

903. The words "gopher wood" only occur in this passage, Gen. vi. 14, and are thus written as they stand in the original. Partly on account of the nature of the wood, and partly on account of the agreement between the radical consonants of the name, it has been conjectured that the gopher wood of Scripture was cypress. But the following conjectures have also been made:—(1) That it signifies the wood of any tree which shoots out horizontal branches, as the fir, the cedar, &c.; (2) that it signified squared timber; (3) planed or smoothed timber; (4) any light easily floating wood; (5) any kind of wood not easily corroded; (6) wood in which pitch is contained; (7) wicker or basket work, like the ark of Moses, made of pliant materials; (8) resinous wood. The cypress is a conifer, a member of that class of plants (exogenous) which comprises the pine, larch, and cedar, fir, juniper, yew, &c. It is a dark evergreen of sombre aspect, and from very early times was used as an emblem of mourning; hence Shakspeare says,

"Poison be their drink,  
Their sweetest shade a grove of  
cypresses trees."

The coffins in which Greek heroes and Egyptian mummies were deposited were made of cypress, and from this circumstance a kind of mourning crape was called cypress lawn. Specimens of this wood,

which are known to be thousands of years old, exist in museums. The doors of St. Peter's at Rome, made of this wood, lasted from the time of Constantine the Great to that of Eugene IV., upwards of 1,100 years, and were perfectly sound when they were removed to give place to the present brazen ones. The wood, which is of a reddish yellow, is hard, compact, and durable—the ancients believed it to be indestructible. Hence Horace, in his "Art of Poetry," symbolizes immortal works as those "worthy of being embalmed in cedar and locked up in cypress wood." There are many species of this tree. In the cypress swamps of Delaware specimens have been seen 120 feet in height. The nearness of the etymology, the fact that it is scented and resinous, and the idea of its being indestructible, as well as of its funeral associations, when all combined give great probability to the idea that cypress is meant. Many persons think it is the terebinth or teil tree, which is very common in Palestine under the name of the turpentine tree—such a tree as that in the shadow of which Abraham sat. It is a strong hardy kind of oak, but it seldom grows above forty feet. It is a resinous tree, but it has few associations, and therefore we do not think much stress can be laid on this idea. I am inclined to think, upon the whole, that probably the cone-bearing trees as being easily worked, were allowed to be employed; they were pitchy, readily squared, durable, scented, they were common in the great plains of the East, and they conjoined the two lessons of the flood—the funeral doom of the unrepentant, and the indestructible safety of those who were within, who trusted in God.—R. M. A.

905. F. H. will find the phrase in Schiller's "Joan of Arc."—W. P.

907. Chap-books are small books or pamphlets carried about for sale by hawkers or chapmen. The greater part of them consisted of a single sheet done up into twenty-four pages. The subjects were of a miscellaneous nature,—lives of heroes, martyrs, wonderful personages, stories of giants, ghosts, hobgoblins, witches, ballads, songs, fortune-telling, weather interpretations, and sometimes theological tracts, &c. Most of them have a rude woodcut on the first page, and not unfrequently the most popular stories were those of roguery and broad humour. In John S. Roberts's preface to "The Legendary Ballads of England and

Scotland" he speaks of a "variety of the then popular chap-books; such as 'Wise Willy and Witty Eppie,' 'Leper the Tailor,' 'Simple Jock Sandeman,' 'Geordie Buchanan, the King's Fool,'" &c. "Notices of Fugitive Tracts and Chap-books," by J. O. Halliwell, and "Popular English Histories," by the same author, forming respectively Nos. 83 and 79 of the Percy Society Publications, contain some interesting particulars about those pedlars' wares. They are now to be found chiefly in the hands of bibliomaniacs. In our boyish days we perused many—perhaps too many.—S. N.

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## Literary Notes.

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GEORGE GILFILLAN is engaged on a centenary memoir of Sir Walter Scott, born 15th August, 1771.

A. C. Swinburne, author of "Chastelard," a Queen Mary drama, is now employed on "Bothwell," on whose career Aytoun composed the best narrative poem since the days of Scott.

"A History of the Study of Algebra," by Dr. Gerhardt, of Berlin, has been published in Germany.

The Earl of Warwick and Brooke has forwarded to Rev. A. B. Grosart the entire MSS. of the poetry of Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke (6 vols. folio), for collection, &c., for his complete edition of Lord Brooke's works in "The Fuller Worthies' Library," of which thirteen vols. have been issued, the two latest being the first half of Brooke's Works, with memorial introduction.

"In Memoriam" has been translated into German.

"The Laws of Verse" have been made the subject of exposition by Professor Sylvester.

A new and greatly enlarged edition of J. S. Mill's "Political Economy" is nearly ready for issue.

W. C. Bryant's translation of the *Iliad* has won such golden opinions that, in his 77th year, he has commenced a version of the *Odyssey*.

Of a full biography of *Turgot*, the French economist, by John Morley, an instalment has appeared in the *Fortnightly Review*; and two Lectures on "Turgot, his life, times, and opinions," by Dr. W. R. Hodgson, have been published.

An endeavour is making to secure Isaac Newton's observatory to be presented to the nation—like Shakespeare's birthplace: the sum required will not exceed £350.

The Swedenborgians, English and American, have raised upwards of £3,000 towards photo-lithographing Swedenborg's manuscripts, pre-



served in the library of the Academy of Sciences, Stockholm.

Dr. Tufnel's photo-lithographs of the MSS. of Swedenborg have arrived in Newcastle.

Seyd Ahmed Khan Bahadoor, C.S.I., has issued "A Series of Essays on the Life of Mohammed; he has already distinguished himself as the author of a "Mohammedan Commentary on the Holy Bible."

"Traditions and Hearthside Stories of West Cornwall," by Wm. Bettrell, of Penzance, has gained a good success, and a second series is in preparation.

Charles G. Lelland is preparing a complete edition of his Germano-English Ballads, including amusing ones on France, Belgium, Holland, the Rhine, the Alps, Italy, &c.

Mr. Ernst Steiger, of New York, offers a prize of 800 dollars for the best historical essay on "The Intellectual Life of the Germans of North America, and its Influence on the Politics of the United States."

M. E. Littre's "French Dictionary" is now so nearly ready that the publishers can "guarantee the completion" of it.

A cheap reissue of Froude's "History of England under the Tudors" is in progress.

Dr. Andrew Wood, one of the chief medical practitioners in Edinburgh, a gentleman who takes an enlarged interest in educational and literary matters, has in the press a version of "The Satires of Horace."

The *Methodist Treasury* is to be the organ of the body whose name it bears, and a localisable penny magazine has been arranged by the Connexionist book-room.

The late Prof. G. L. Craik, who was himself a striking illustration of his theme, wrote an admirable work on "The Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties," which has been translated into Italian, with additions by the translator, Pietro Ro-

tondi. Smiles' "Self-Help" has also been introduced to Italy by G. Strafforello, and has reached a fourth edition.

A memoir of Richard Trevithick, inventor of the locomotive and high-pressure engine, is in preparation by his son; and the controversy of engineering, which will probably be evoked by the biography of the distinguished Cornishman, will gain a farther cause of excitement from a work on "Early British Railways," by Mr. John Braithwaite.

Fanny Lewald's "Letters on Women" are to be translated into the chief European languages simultaneously.

In the "History in the Popular Songs of Sicily" Signor S. Marino has found a capital field of research.

A critical edition of "*Sarontala*," Kalidasa's celebrated Indian drama, is nearly ready, under the editorship of Dr. Burckhardt, of Vienna.

J. F. MacLellan, whose singularly able works on Marriage and Polyandry have excited so much attention, has in the press a book on "The Origin of the Family."

Thomas Miller, the basket-maker, author of "Gideon Giles," &c., who has not for a long time produced any new work, is now about to issue in parts a new novel, to be entitled "The New Park Road."

Mrs. Janet Hamilton, the Scottish poetess, is about to republish her entire works in one volume, entitled "Poems and Essays."

Prof. Seelby is collecting his "Essays from the Serials" for republication.

Prof. Jowett's "Plato" is now promised *shortly*.

Plutarch's "*Moralia*," in 5 vols., with a Preface by E. W. Emerson, under the editorship of Prof. Goodwin, of Harvard College, is nearly ready. It is based on the English version of Shakspeare's time and that of Dryden's age.

## Many-sided Minds.

FRANCIS BACON,

*Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban's, Lord Chancellor of England,  
Lawyer, Statesman, Scholar, Poet, and Inductive Philosopher.*

BY C. M. INGLEBY, M.A., LL.D.,

*Author of "The Revival of Philosophy at Cambridge," &c.*

(Continued from page 174.)

SIR JOHN HERSCHEL thus defines prerogative instances:—

"Phenomena selected by the investigator on account of some peculiarly forcible way in which they strike the reason, and impress us with a kind of sense of causation, or a peculiar aptitude for generalization."—*Discourse*, 1835, p. 182.

Bacon discusses these under the classes of *solitary, migratory, glaring, clandestine, constitutive, crucial*, and many other heads.

The collections of prerogative instances being thus made up in tables, the business which devolves on the philosopher is to construct from them four kinds of tables. 1. Tables in which the presence of the given nature is shown. 2. Tables in which the given nature is not presented at all. 3. Tables in which the instances presenting the given nature are graduated, according to the degree in which that nature appears. 4. Tables of rejections of instances.

Having arrived at this point, Bacon allows the philosopher to frame a *hypothesis*, which, for purposes of verification, he has to treat as if it were an ascertained *axiom*. This hypothesis is the first vindemiation, or first vintage. The *Athenæum* review, writing in depreciation of Bacon's method, says:—

"Wrong hypotheses rightly worked from have produced more useful results than unguided observation. But this is not the Baconian plan."—*Athenæum*, September 18th, 1858.

Now, curiously enough, this is a mere paraphrase of Bacon, who assigns as his reason for allowing the use of hypothesis as a basis of deduction, that "truth will sooner come out from error than from confusion."—" *Nov. Org.*," book ii., aph. 20. The result of this verification, if it do not lead to the most general axiom, will assuredly enable the observers and experimenters to restrict the field of their research. (See "*Nov. Org.*," book i., aph. 106.)

I have given Sir John Herschel's definition of prerogative instances; I will now add his opinion of their value,—

1870.

"It has always appeared to us, we must confess, that the help which the classification of instances under the different titles of prerogative affords to inductions, however just such classification may be in itself, is yet more apparent than real. The force of the instance must be felt in the mind, before it can be referred to its place in the system; and before it can be either referred or appreciated, it must be known; and when it is appreciated, we are ready enough to interweave it in our web of induction, without greatly troubling ourselves with inquiring whence it derives the weight we acknowledge it to have in our decisions."—*Discourse*, 1835, p. 183.

This opinion comes to us with the highest possible authority. Of course we are not prepared to regard it as conclusive; indeed, the utmost care must be taken to view Bacon's doctrine in every light, and so to do the utmost justice to it; for we must bear in mind that the doctrine of prerogatives is cardinal. If the proposed classification is useless as an economic of research, the question may be asked in vain, "what other means are proposed by Bacon as a principle of direction for the collector of instances?" Let us now hear Whewell's opinion on the matter,—

"Such a classification is much of the same nature as if, having to teach the art of building, we were to describe tools with reference to the amount and place of the work which they must do, instead of pointing out their construction and use;—as if we were to inform the pupil that we must have tools for lifting a stone up, tools for moving it sideways, tools for laying it square, tools for cementing it firmly. Such an enumeration of ends would convey little instruction as to the means."—*Philosophy of Discovery*, 1860, p. 140.

This metaphor is less happy than Sir John Herschel's, for the instance is a woof in the web of induction, a constituent part of the entire method; but it is not a tool for accomplishing the work. The real tool is the *Organon*, and its constituent parts are no more like building-tools than are the stones and bricks of which the house is built. But letting the metaphor pass, it hardly tells against Bacon's prerogatives. For if a large chest of building and other tools were placed at the disposal of a man who knew nothing of the builder's art, the bare description of the kind of work usually done by the requisite tools would be some guide to him in his attempt to select them from the *omnium gatherum* of the tool-chest. In another place Whewell attacks Bacon's "classes of instances" from another point.

"But we may remark that instances classed and treated as Bacon recommends in those parts of his work, could hardly lead to scientific truth. His processes are vitiated by his proposing to himself the *form* or *cause* of the property before him, as the object of his inquiry; instead of being content to obtain, in the first place, the law of *phenomena*."—*Nov. Org. Renovatum*, 1858, p. 225.

And, in continuation of the penultimate extract, he says,—

"Moreover, many of Bacon's classes of instances are vitiated by the assumption that the 'form,' that is, the general law or cause of the pro-

party which is the subject of investigation, is to be looked for directly in the instances; which, as we have seen in his inquiry concerning heat, is a fundamental error."—*"Philosophy of Discovery,"* 1860, p. 141.

And elsewhere, in reference to the *"Inquisitio in Formam Calidi,"* Whewell says,—

"One main ground of Bacon's ill-fortune in this undertaking appears to be, that he was not aware of an important maxim of inductive science, that we must first obtain the *measure* and ascertain the *laws* of phenomena, before we endeavour to discover their causes."—*"Philosophy of Discovery,"* 1860, p. 137.

It is curious to find Whewell correcting Bacon almost in his own words. Thus, in the penultimate extract Bacon is charged with the vice of looking for the cause directly in the instances. Now Bacon, in his 70th aph., book i., says,—“For no one successfully investigates the nature of a thing in the thing itself.” And as to the next extract, Whewell might have been well assured of Bacon's acquaintance with the “important maxim,” for in his 98th aph., book i., he complains of the natural history of his own day, for that “nothing [was] duly investigated, nothing counted, nothing weighed or measured.” Bacon may indeed have neglected all this in his own collections; but it can hardly be said that his “ill-fortune” in his *"Inquisitio in Formam Calidi,"* was due to his ignorance of the maxim.

To these objections, Whewell adds Bacon's attempt to dispense with private sagacity. To this it is sufficient to reply that Bacon does not, as some have asserted, propose to supersede all use of sagacity. As to this, see the *Preface* to the *"Instauratio Magna,"* and the *"Novum Organum,"* book i., aph. 61 and 91; and book ii., aph. 27. So far from this being the case, he looks to sagacity for aid in the investigation of “physical conformities and similarities,” which play so important a part in the formation of tentative and provisional vintages, as well as in the selection of prerogative instances.

Leslie Ellis, in his character of editor of Bacon's Philosophical Works, may be expected to rate Bacon's merits as an inductive philosopher at their highest, yet even he finds himself obliged to indicate two essential defects in Bacon's method. The chief of these must receive our best attention. This, without directly invalidating the doctrine of prerogatives, does in effect establish its utter insufficiency. The physical discoverer is supposed to be master of the operations which precede induction. He has, we will suppose, an army of observers, experimenters, collectors, marshals, and recorders under him, whom he directs like a centurion, and who obey him with the promptitude and precision of Roman soldiers. If the collections could but be adequately made, Bacon's method, in Mr. Ellis's opinion, “leads to certainty, and may be employed with nearly equal success by all men who are equally diligent.” But the collections cannot be adequately made; for n

only is the prerogative, the only aid to collection vouchsafed by Bacon, utterly insufficient, but *no such aid can be given*. Hear Mr. Ellis's own words :—

"We may, perhaps, be permitted to believe that, so far as relates to the subject of which we are now speaking, Bacon never, even in idea, completed the method which he proposed. For of all parts of the process of scientific discovery, the formation of conceptions is the one with respect to which it is the most difficult to lay down general rules. The process of establishing axioms Bacon had succeeded, at least apparently, in reducing to the semblance of a mechanical operation; that of the formation of conceptions does not admit of any similar reduction. Yet these two processes are in Bacon's system of co-ordinate importance. All commonly received general scientific conceptions Bacon condemns as utterly worthless. A complete change is therefore required; yet of the way in which induction is to be employed in order to produce this change he has said nothing. The omission is doubtless connected with the kind of realism which runs through Bacon's system, and which renders it practically useless. For that his method is impracticable cannot, I think, be denied, if we reflect not only that it never has produced any result, but also that the process by which scientific truths have been established, cannot be so presented as even to appear to be in accordance with it. In all cases this process involves an element to which nothing corresponds in the tables of comparison and exclusion; namely, the application to the facts of observation of a principle of arrangement, an idea existing in the mind of the discoverer antecedently to the act of induction."—*General Preface to the Philosophical Works*, 1857, p. 38.

On the other hand, let us hear Mr. Spedding, who was partner with the late Mr. Leslie Ellis in the production of his admirable trade edition of Bacon's works. He says,—

"One man may be used to make a rough and general collection, what we call an *omnium gatherum*. Another must be employed to reduce the confused mass into some order fit for reference. A third to clear it of superfluities and rubbish. A fourth must be taught to classify and arrange what remains. And here I cannot but think that Bacon's arrangement of instances according to what he calls their prerogatives, or some better arrangement of the same kind which experience ought to suggest, would be found to be of great value; especially when it is proposed to make, through all the regions of nature, separate collections of this kind, such as may combine into one general collection."—*Preface to the Parascene Works*, vol. i., 1857, p. 379.

Mr. Spedding wrote these remarks in 1847. He submitted them to Mr. Ellis, with the context, which certainly should be read with them, though space fails me for presenting it here. Mr. Ellis's judgment on the question is so important that I subjoin it.

"That it is impossible to sever the business of experiment and observation from that of theorizing, it would, perhaps, be rash to affirm. But it seems to me that such a severance could hardly be effected. A transcript of nature, if I may so express myself—that is, such a collection of observed phenomena as would serve as the basis and materials of a system of natural

philosophy—would be like nature itself, infinite in extent and variety. No such collection could be formed; and were it formed, general laws and principles would be as much hidden in a mass of details as they are in the world of phenomena. The marshalling idea, teaching the philosopher what observations he is to make, what experiments to try, seems necessary in order to deliver him from this difficulty. Can we conceive that such experiments as those of Faraday could have preceded the formation of any hypothesis? You allude, I think, to what has been done in the way of systematic observation with reference to terrestrial magnetism. And beyond all doubt the division of labour is possible and necessary in many scientific inquiries. But then this separating of the observer from the theoriser is only possible (at least in such a case as that of magnetism) when the latter can tell his 'bajulus' what experiments he is to make, and how they are to be made. As a matter of fact, the memoirs of Gauss, which have done so much to encourage systematic observation of terrestrial magnetism, contain many results of theory directly bearing on observation, *e.g.* the method of determining the absolute measure of magnetism."—*Ibid.*, p. 386.

Mr. Spedding accepts this judgment "as perfectly sound and just." But he thinks that, without aiming at the completeness contemplated by Bacon, and admitting "that the collection of natural history could not have been used in the way Bacon proposed unless it were more complete than it ever could have been made," yet much might be done in that direction which has been hitherto unattempted.

My old friend, now, alas! no more, James Walker, C. E., when a young man, formed one of a deputation to wait on James Watt, who, sinking under bodily infirmities, was then living in retirement near the north bank of the Thames (I think in Surrey Street), in order to ascertain his opinion on the projected scheme of steam-locomotion. The veteran engineer shook his grey head in doubt as to its practicability; yet, after all, said, "I think it's worth a trial." Mr. Spedding seems to be more confident of success in his attempt to realize, to some extent, the project of Bacon, than James Watt was of the success of steam-locomotion. For myself, I must confess I think Mr. Spedding's scheme may be "worth a trial," though I fear the trial would be very costly. Three sciences have already been conducted in the manner proposed; and, as to two of them, with very encouraging results. Not to speak now of Brahe, or of Flamsteed and his staff of observers, or of Gauss and his staff of observers, let us consider the single case of meteorology. As opinions differ, let us hear what Herschel, Whewell, the *Athenaeum* reviewer, and Mr. Spedding have to say on the prospects of this science. My extracts shall be as brief as possible. Herschel shall speak first:—

"Meteorology, one of the most complicated but important branches of science, is at the same time one in which any person who will attend to plain rules and bestow the necessary degree of attention may do effectual service."—*Discourses*, 1835, p. 133.

"Occasional observations apply to occasional and remarkable phe

mena, and are by no means to be neglected: but it is to the regular meteorological register, steadily and perseveringly kept throughout the whole of every voyage, that we must look for the development of the great laws of this science."—*Manual of Scientific Inquiry*,<sup>1</sup> p. 281.

Mr. Spedding, who quotes the last extract, with its context, adds:—

"Between the officers of her Majesty's navy registering the readings of their instruments in all latitudes and longitudes, and the man of science in his study deducing laws of meteorology from a comparison of the results, the division of labour is surely as complete as Bacon would have desired."—*Preface to Parascene Works*, vol. i., p. 389.

But have their labours, distinct but co-operating, been as fruitful as Bacon would have expected, or are they likely to be so? Have any such laws been deduced? On this let us hear the *Athenæum* reviewer:—

"There is an attempt at induction going on, which has yielded little or no fruit, the observations made in meteorological observatories. This attempt is carried on in a manner which would have caused Bacon to dance for joy; for he lived in a time when Chancellors did dance. Russia, says M. Biot, is covered by an army of meteorographs, with generals, high officers, subalterns, and privates, with fixed and defined duties of observation. And what has come of it? Nothing, says M. Biot; and nothing will ever come of it."—*Athenæum*, Sept. 18, 1858.

Whewell allows the record to have a certain value, but adds:—

"Observations of the weather, made and recorded for many years, have not led to any general truths forming a science of meteorology; and, although great numerical precision has been given to such observations by means of barometers, thermometers, and other instruments, still no general laws regulating the cycles of change of such phenomena have yet [*i. e.* up to 1858] been discovered."—*Nov. Org. Renovatum*, 1858, p. 57.

I suppose by "general laws," &c. Whewell did not include such a fact as "the diurnal oscillations of the barometer;" for he knew of it, and uses it as an illustration of "the method of means."—"Nov. Org. Ren.," 1858, p. 214. The same might be said of Oaler's law of "the rotation of the wind," discovered by a reduction of the continuous record of his anemometer; though that discovery was made since Whewell's lamented death.

It must be owned that the prospects of meteorology are not very bright: yet I think we may hope for a better state of things than at present exists by the improvement of the means of observation and registration, and by the substitution of *continuous* for *periodic* observation. To effect this, without the costly use of photography, Mr. Alfred King, of Liverpool, has perfected an instrument which he calls the Floating Barograph, which self-registers, by means of clockwork, the curve of atmospheric pressure. A description of this most ingenious instrument, with illustrations, is given in the *Report of the Astronomer to the Marine Committee, Mersey Docks*

and *Harbour Board*, Dec. 1865. The instrument itself may be seen at work in the Liverpool Observatory.

In the various critical remarks on Bacon's system which I have brought together in this paper, there is but little agreement. One might be disposed to argue from this that the critics have not all understood their author. If I might hazard an opinion on this point, I should say that Sir John Herschel and Mr. Leslie Ellis are the only two clear-headed and understanding critics among them. Of the rest, the *Athenaeum* reviewer is the most flippant, and his remarks are tinged with the genuine German spleen. Still that writer, as well as Sir J. Herschel and Whewell, has the merit of insisting on the immense debt under which inductive science lies to mathematics. Hypothesis, suggested by facts, made the basis of mathematical analysis, whose outcome has to be tested, and, if possible, verified or falsified by express experiment, has been the most fruitful source of inductive science. But while it is fair enough to hold up this method as distinguishable from Bacon's, it is not correct to assert that Bacon's method is that of modern meteorologists. So far from Bacon dancing for joy at being made aware of a network of meteorological observatories over Europe and America, with their legions of observers and their voluminous records, I make no doubt that he would have frowned upon, if he could not have frowned down, the whole proceeding as blind and objectless. For two or three narrow-minded men to be pottering over and pondering the same kind of observation of the same kind of fact excited his ridicule and scorn. That whole armies of intelligent beings should be engaged on this sort of work, at an enormous cost, would assuredly have filled him with despair.

The almost uniform failure of meteorological enterprise is not, I apprehend, far to seek. Compare this embryonic science with the tidal theory, which has made but little more way. Determine, which it is easy to do, why that theory has been so unfruitful, and you have the opposite reason for the meteorological failure.

"In all other departments of astronomy, as, for instance, in the cases of the moon and the planets, the leading features of the phenomena had been made out empirically before the theory explained them. The course which analogy would have recommended for the cultivation of our knowledge of the tides would have been to ascertain by an analysis of long series of observations the effect of changes in the time of transit, parallax, and declination of the moon, and thus to obtain the laws of phenomena; and then to proceed to investigate the laws of causation."—"History of the Inductive Sciences," 1867, vol. ii., p. 191.

Conversely, the failure of meteorology has been due to the fact that hitherto there has been no mathematical theory; there have been observations, and nothing else. In truth, the theories of the dynamics of fluids, of electricity, and of heat (not to mention others) are in their infancy. When they advance, meteorology—not long remain an all but barren record.



Bacon's mathematical attainments were unquestionably small; and, to judge by the slight and almost slighting manner in which he occasionally speaks of mathematics, as well as by their occupying no conspicuous place in his method, we must conclude that he was far from anticipating the dominant power which they now exercise on the course of inductive science. To speak plainly, Bacon, like Goethe, was not only non-mathematical, but was somewhat jealous of mathematicians. The likeness holds, too, in many other respects. Just as Bacon wished to emancipate astronomy from the dominion of mathematics ("Nov. Org.," book i., aph. 98), so did Goethe endeavour, at great cost of experiment and theory, to accomplish a like emancipation for optics.

Both had an innate contempt for theology and priestcraft; both were courtiers, and did homage to rank; and both were selfish. Great differences there were, undoubtedly: for though Bacon's system is pervaded by a strong realistic leaven, yet he was eminently the philosopher, as Goethe was the poet. Even here, however, there was likeness; for, while both mistrusted the ideal, both, in fact, derived their excellences from the ideal. If we look carefully into the matter, it is not on the prescribed method of Bacon that his fame was built. It was the power of divination in the man which made him great and influential. Let us see how the matter stands in respect to his famous judgment on the form of heat. Concerning this, Professor Tyndall's evidence is important: for he it is who has wrought with such remarkable success in perfecting the theory of "Heat considered as a mode of motion;" and this great authority, in the first of his course of lectures so named, gives the credit of this magnificent discovery to Bacon. It derogates no whit from his credit that he had been, in some degree, anticipated. Bacon, it appears, was very near discovering the law of the correlation of the physical forces. In the "Novum Organum," book ii., aph. 4, he lays down with minute accuracy the relation of the form-nature (as the special configuration and motion of molecules) to the sensible nature (as heat, colour, sound, &c.). But, perhaps by the accident of his scholastic training, he places the form only in the relation of cause, and the sensible quality only in the relation of effect. Still his use of the word "convertible" is eminently suggestive of the actual correlation. He writes:—

"For a true and perfect rule of operation, then, the direction will be *that it be certain, free, and disposing or leading to action*. And this is the same thing with the discovery of the true form. For the form of a nature is such that, given the form, the nature infallibly follows. Therefore it is always present when the nature is present, and universally implies it, and is constantly inherent in it. Again: the form is such, that, if it be taken away, the nature infallibly vanishes. Therefore it is always absent when the nature is absent, and implies its absence and inheres in nothing else. Lastly, the true form is such that it deduces the given nature from some source of being which is inherent in more natures, and which is better known in the natural order of things than the form itself. For a

true and perfect axiom of knowledge, then, the direction and precept will be, *that another nature be discovered which is convertible with the given nature, and yet is a limitation of a more general nature, as of a true and real genus.*"

His favourite examples are latent *motion* and latent *configuration*: as in the "Novum Organum," book ii., aph. 1, and "Valerius Terminus," book ii., chap. 1. Taking Bacon's *form* as a departure from the term of the schoolmen, i. e. as the scholastic form with a realistic element, we may readily perceive that in Bacon's works it is *our idea of a specially conditioned primary quality*. Bacon's experiments soon taught him that latent motion of some sort was the form of heat, and latent configuration the form of colour; and, armed with these most sagacious divinations, his business was to determine how, by his own method of philosophizing, these axioms could be evolved from experiment. Like Dr. Whewell, I accept the view of Mr. Ellis:—

"If it were affirmed that Bacon, after having had a glimpse of the truth suggested by some obvious phenomena, had then recourse, as he himself expresses it, to certain 'differentiæ inanes' in order to save the phenomena, I think it would be hard to dispute the truth of the censure."—Footnote to *N. O.*, book ii., aph. 20.

In any view of the method of Bacon, it must be allowed that his attempt to exhibit the operation of that method in the inductive determination of the form of heat is a miserable failure. If Mr. Ellis's statement is correct, "that the process by which scientific truths have been established cannot be so presented as even to appear to be in accordance with Bacon's method, it is not unreasonable to suppose that its inventor would have found it as little answerable to his expectations as it has proved to be conformable to any *actual* process of discovery. But granting that, it by no means follows that Bacon, in his attempt to apply it, even to a foregone insight, would have been reduced to the miserable shift of bolstering it up by such trifling and absurd "instances" as he has pressed into its service. In fact, a greater contrast cannot be found or conceived than that between the masterly grasp, as well as eloquence, displayed in the first book of the "Novum Organum," and the imbecile and worse than childish trifling which pervades the whole of the *Inquisitio in Formam Calidi* of the second book.

Such is the general result of modern English criticism on the Baconian philosophy. It is, in all conscience, sufficiently adverse to the actual claim of its author, without reinforcing it with the unfair and spiteful attacks of German critics: yet it is necessary to glance at these before our survey is at all complete. We will take Professor Lasson and Baron Liebig, the invidious champions or rather ringleaders in the anti-Bacon revolt, as a sample of the band to which they belong. Liebig, indeed, has been exceedingly well answered by Mr. G. F. Rodwell in the *Reader* for June 2nd and 9th, 1866; and a writer in *Fraser's Magazine* for December, 186

and April, 1867, has attempted to discharge the same task, but with far less ability, and, I regret to say, with no manner of fairness. He has fought Liebig with his own weapons; and the result is, to say the least, unsatisfactory. Of Professor Lasson, one of the most celebrated men in Europe, this writer is so bold as to say that "his name is unfortunately unknown in this country." It is, indeed, possible that the writer had never heard of him; though "not to know *him* argues himself unknown." In this matter at least I beg to assure Professor Lasson, if he should happen to encounter and be so good as to read *this* article, that the paper "Was Lord Bacon an Impostor?" is no representative of the knowledge which Englishmen have of illustrious foreigners.

In the first place, both Lasson and Liebig fall into a number of positive mistakes concerning Bacon's philosophy; and, unfortunately, *all* their mistakes are to Bacon's prejudice. I am not disposed, for my part, to rate Bacon's moral character very high. He was unsympathetic, unamiable, unscrupulous, and sensual; a lover of power and rank, a hater of women. Yet, for all that, I believe that, in the single scope of physical discovery, Bacon was a lover of truth, and an investigator for truth's sake, as well as for that of utility. Small blame to him if he did combine both motives in all he attempted to do and all he accomplished. Small blame to him if, when advancing under the spur of "the eternal love of truth," he found his energies provoked and his industry sustained by the reflection that "man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upwards;" that the very elements are, as in Blake's masterly sketches, arraigned against him; and that the "tyrants, giants, and monsters" of the world, man's miseries and necessities" ("Valerius Terminus," book ii., chap. 11) are so often triumphant over the only defenceless and reasonable creature in it. In that direction the truth-seeker had a touch—only a touch I own—of that kindly sympathy which "makes the whole world kin."

Just to show the sort of error into which these Germans have fallen, I will take an example from each, and place, side by side with the extract, the words of Bacon himself. First: Lasson writes:—

"To Bacon, perceptions of sense and memory are sufficient: the task of reason begins only when the experiment is performed."—"Bacon von Verulam." 1860.

"Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant; they only collect and use: the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course; it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the power of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments, and lay it up in the memory as it finds it; but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested."—"Novum Organum," book i., aph. 96.

Secondly, let us hear Liebig:—

"In all his investigations Bacon sets great value on experiments. Of their meaning, however, he knows nothing. . . . But in science all investigation is deductive, or *à priori*."—Second article in *Fraser's Mag.*

"But my course and method, as I have often clearly stated and would wish to state again, is this,—not to extract works from works or experiments from experiments (as an empiric), but from works and experiments to extract causes and axioms; and again, from these causes and axioms, new works and experiments, as a legitimate interpreter of nature."—"*Nov. Org.*," book i., aph. 117.

What is this but the method of verification by deduction, which is denied to Bacon alike by Baron Liebig and by the writer of the review in the *Athenæum*. It is in this same aphorism that Bacon points out the inadequacy of his own collection of natural history (the *Sylva Sylvarum*) "to serve the purposes of a legitimate interpretation:" yet a great part of Liebig's censure is devoted to extracts from this very work, which he quietly assumes to have been destined to occupy the place of book ii. in the "*Novum Organum*," and to have been intended to serve the very end for which, as we have seen, Bacon says it is wholly inadequate. I can hardly think the Baron had read the 117th aphorism; and if he ignored that, other aphorisms may have shared the same fate. Such mistakes as these are fundamental, and are only acceptable to a reviewer on the ground that a critique which is infested with them can hardly be worth detailed review. But Baron Liebig's articles are rendered worthless by another fault, viz., personal invective. Bacon, according to this would-be censor, "shows like a quack doctor;" in whose vocabulary "the word *truth*, as we understand it, which is the sole aim of science, is not to be found;" whose "experiment to cheat the world has succeeded;" who "approached nature with a lie in his mouth;" and whose intellect "had only receptivity for the false, no feeling for the true;" and so forth. When we find the Baron indulging in this reckless slander of a man who has been three centuries in his grave, we can hardly help believing that he attacked Bacon with a sinister motive, and intended to wound others through his sides. If this production has been received in Germany with respect, we are satisfied that time will reverse the judgment; and if Bacon's countrymen have given the Baron a fair hearing, he must none the less expect that his discourse will be speedily consigned to that oblivion which such a combination of perversity and malignity deserves.

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## Religion.

### OUGHT THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES TO BE REVISED BY A ROYAL COM- MISSION ?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It would be exceedingly difficult to calculate the amount of mischief which has been occasioned to communities and to individuals, not by the positive rejection of a duty, but by the undue and indefinite postponement of it. Not only is the performance thereof greatly impeded by a variety of obstacles which have grown up from year to year upon the motionless form of what had at first vigour and promise of action; more than that, it comes at last to be a matter of discussion whether the once clearly conceived duty be actually incumbent upon any man or assembly of men.

I apprehend that a notable instance of this sort is furnished by the position at present occupied by our Authorized Version of the Scriptures, made under the auspices of James I., well-nigh 260 years since. The proposition that it should be revised or amended, or that a translation *de novo* should be undertaken, in order that we might have, in modern English, the nearest approach possible to the meaning of the Hebrew and Greek texts, as settled by the most approved modern criticism, can neither be considered as outrageous or utterly impracticable. It is this very long and unfortunate interval which has seemed to so many a chasm which can never be bridged over, and which leads them to attempt to defend positive errors, and ignore most obvious facts. Now that the Authorized Version, from the force of custom and usage, has come to be regarded by a multitude unlearned in or indifferent to the results of criticism, almost as if it were indeed inspired, who, it is asked, would venture upon so hazardous an experiment as the unsettling of the confidence they place in it, and attempt to produce a version which may, after all the pains bestowed upon it, prove to be inferior to the present, or open up the way for a host of bitter and protracted religious controversies? What can be more dangerous and delusive than such a line of attempted argument? To let in the light of truth in every direction where it is in our power to do so is a plain and most obvious duty; nor ought we to spare the most venerable, or, as we think, the most trivial error, in a case where it affects the right understanding of the inspired volume. And it is a matter which occasions much regret in the minds of those who have thought carefully upon this subject, that so much opposition to the movement for the amendment of the Authorized Version has come from the clergy of different denominations. We expect to find amongst them a decided majority opposed to those changes,

religious or political, which appear to be revolutionary in their character; yet, in this instance, those who are engaged in the ministry of the word have nothing to apprehend from a measure likely to promote the study of the Scriptures, and in various ways to facilitate their labours. One of these at once suggests itself; we are all aware that in their pulpit ministrations those of our clergy whose hearts are thoroughly devoted to their work have to expend a certain portion of the time in elucidations and explanations necessitated by divers defects and mistakes in our English Bible as now extant. Given a revised version, which has had bestowed upon it that accurate attention from a number of competent scholars and critics, which must inevitably result in the production of a work adequate to the exigencies of a day when progress in science and literature will not admit of the existence of errors and mistakes which are remediable,—this given, and in many things the hands of those employed in teaching and preaching the truth would be strengthened. Misapprehensions they have now to correct would no longer exist; their hearers would come with minds better prepared for the reception of the human exposition of doctrines and facts, when the divine basis on which it rests is clearly apprehended; and time, that has often at present to be occupied in preliminaries, could be at once devoted to the special purpose of the speaker.

There is little force in the difficulty so gravely propounded by some (and amongst others the writer of Negative Article 1, p. 198), which, if it had any real potency, must be acknowledged to have a special bearing upon the clergy; viz., that a revision of the Scriptures would unsettle and derange all our theological literature. How? The issue of a new version by authority marks an epoch; and from that date it would be the business of every author in quoting Scripture to use *that*, or if not, to state from what version he was quoting. All books or other literature which had appeared prior to this, and subsequent to the year 1611, it would be at once seen, must have extracted the quotations given or discussed in any way from what we call King James's Bible, unless the contrary was expressed. There is no more difficulty in this than in the fact that most of those who wrote between 1568 and 1611 made use of what is known as the Bishop's Bible. But we have a better opinion of our clergy than to suppose they would shrink from a slight, a very slight additional amount of mental exertion, when the cause of it would be a change likely to confer a great boon upon their congregations. And as those individuals amongst the clergy acquainted with the Hebrew and Greek languages (as all should be), must be fully aware of the inadequacy of the present version in certain particulars, from the nature of their studies, which brings them more frequently than others into contact with Scripture, let us hope that they will see the wisdom of supporting rather than retarding any judicious and broadly based scheme which has in view the preparation and the circulation of a faithful and well-considered revision of our English Bible. For it is impossible to

conceive that any advantage can accrue from the yet farther postponement of the settlement of a question which has already too long agitated the public mind. Will the deferring of it for fifty years longer facilitate the introduction of an amended version? Not at all. This might have been said if the public mind had not been drawn to the matter, and if various efforts had not been made, by persons of greater or less repute, to bring into use amended or new versions, too often designed to further some particular view of the translator, or at best only showing that degree of merit which was to be expected from the isolated labours of one, or at any rate of but a few men. What is required is the immediate preparation of such an amended English Bible as will be acknowledged at once to be superior to all the individual attempts at the improvement of the Authorized Version which have of late appeared; and thus settle the question satisfactorily for a considerable number of years; as it is not very probable now that any speedy alteration will occur in the English language; for it, though increased by the recent introduction of a certain number of words, mostly scientific, shows, on the whole, less tendency to change than it did in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Such a Bible would be a valuable heritage for the Britons of our day to leave to their descendants; to prove, perhaps, yet more fruitful in its influence for good than was the version to which we undoubtedly owe (under God) the vigour of Puritanism, as manifested in the great struggles for religious and political freedom during the reigns of the monarchs of the House of Stuart. We do sincerely believe that a considerable revival of religion would ensue, were such a revised version of the Bible as we have referred to, set afloat in our land, and in other countries where our Anglo-Saxon tongue is wholly or partially used. There is nothing improbable in this. The Spirit of God works by a variety of agencies, and next to the oral declaration of divine truths, the reading of Scripture is most instrumental amongst these in exerting effects upon the hearts and consciences of men. The issue of what many would regard as a new Bible (though not so in fact) would lead to an extensive, careful, and comparatively critical perusal of the sacred volume, and the old doctrines and facts when reset, and freed from whatever tarnish may have obscured them partially through the lapse of time, shall shine out anew, and display their perennial lustre, until it may be that day arrives when the predicted diffusion of gospel principles throughout the earth shall be realized, and the good shall predominate over the evil.

A little consideration will show to any one desirous of judging impartially on this subject, that it is only by a Royal Commission that this work could be executed satisfactorily, or when completed obtain that measure of general respect which it would undoubtedly deserve. It is a national object we have in view, and by the Government acting for the people it should be carried out in a way becoming a great Christian nation. There is no justification for

any attempt to depart from what is, at any rate here, a time-honoured practice. Probably there is truth in the remark that it is this very circumstance, namely, that to Government the people have looked expectantly, which has caused so long-continued a delay. Busy in a variety of matters, deemed of more pressing because of present importance, days of war and days of peace have alike, as yet, failed to bring about the fitting moment for a task which, though confessedly one of anxiety, is not of such an exacting nature as some appear to think. After this "long-deferred" hope, surely we are not to be expected at last to accept a revision executed by a part only of our Church of England dignitaries, with such arbitrary selection of aid from other sections of British Christians as they choose to make. Let a duly constituted and fairly representative body of scholars devote themselves to this work, and their performance will find acceptance not only in Britain and its dependencies, but with a great portion of the North American continent. It would be impossible in such an assemblage, and in the face of the scrutiny to which, in the present era, it would be subjected, not indeed unfairly where matters so important are under consideration, that any attempt to distort or misrepresent a word or a clause could be attempted successfully, even if any member were so inclined,—which is hardly probable, since none but men of recognised probity and honour would be selected. Differences of opinion would arise frequently, and these might sometimes be of an important nature, yet their settlement would be achieved by full and free discussion, and, as a final resource, an appeal to the majority of voices. We think that it is but justice that in this suggested Royal Commission men should be allowed to sit who do not profess to hold the main principles of, or even the same principles as, the State Churches in England and Scotland, provided they were in accord with those fundamental ones which evangelical Christendom has now almost unanimously agreed to recognise. How far others, representing religious sections of the community of diverse creeds who are yet persons of adequate scholarship, and prepared to acknowledge, in general terms, the divine authority of the Bible, should be admissible to take part in this national work of revision or translation, is not so easily decided. On the one side it may be argued that, as it is a *national* affair, none should be excluded, and each religious organization of a Christian character, not inconsiderable in numbers, might be considered to be deserving of at least a consultive voice. And even if a vote might be added to this, as all doubtful or disputed points must come finally to the decision of the majority, there would be no danger that a minority, however active or intriguing, could work any actually mischievous result. And, on the other hand, we must consider that it is very doubtful whether such persons as are here indefinitely referred to, who must naturally be aware of the views of the bulk of their coadjutors, and could have little expectation, under the circumstances, that a version would be produced at all in unison with their special



peculiarities, would sit on a Commission for this purpose were they appointed. Or if they did consent, some might be inclined to foresee the introduction of an element of constant discord; and that their very impotency to produce any marked effect upon the work in hand might occasion them to resort to plans of obstructive and contentious interference, which might greatly impede the general progress of the enterprise. One thing is quite evident, that Government must, in any case, leave the Commission with its hands entirely free. No interference of the kind practised by James I. would be attempted at the present time; but there are other ways, which need not be enumerated, in which the due power of such a Commission might be curtailed or checked in action. The English Bible ought to be a work performed by the State, for the people, through competent men; and when these are appointed, it should be the duty and the interest of rulers and ruled to allow them to execute it as they know best how to do,—in full dependence on their scholarship, position, integrity, reverence for Scripture, and love of God.

Lastly, let those who are so keen in their animosity against proposals for the revision of the Authorized Version by a Royal Commission remember two facts: first, that a precisely similar opposition was called up by the translation of 1611, though there were no newspapers and magazines to give it vent; secondly, that these translators of a bygone era, whom some now eulogize to the skies, candidly admitted that the time would come when their labour must be superseded, and a better version than their own would be called for and produced. They say also, emphatically speaking of previous translators, that they might not be thought to offend against them at all, "Blessed be they, and most honoured be their names, that break the ice, and give the inset upon that which helpeth forward to the saving of souls. Yet for all that, as nothing is begun and perfected at the same time, so if we, building upon their foundation that went before us, and being helped by their labours, do endeavour to make that better which they left good, no man, we are sure, hath cause to mislike us; they, we persuade ourselves, if they were alive, would thank us." So might those now say who are anxious to present to the people of this era a more faithful and intelligible version than was possible in 1611. ASPIRATE.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

NOTWITHSTANDING the opinion of one of our coadjutors, as well as that of one of our opponents, that the intention of the question now being debated is not, "Ought the Authorized Version of the Holy Scriptures to be revised?" but, "Ought that revision to be undertaken by a Royal Commission?" we believe with H. K. that this debate in reality implies two queries, viz., Ought the Authorized Version of the Holy Scriptures to be revised? and, second, If the Authorized Version of Scripture ought to be revised, should that revision be undertaken by a Royal Commission? We address ourselves to the latter inquiry in the first place, and we believe

that the Scriptures ought not to be revised by a Royal Commission; for what guarantee can we have that the persons composing a Royal Commission would be possessed of the requisite qualifications for revising the Scriptures? Are those to whom the choice of a Royal Commission would be entrusted necessarily possessed of qualities rendering them fit to make such a choice? The selection of persons for revising the Scriptures by the Premier, or by the members of the Cabinet generally, seems to us similar to the nomination of bishops by the Prime Minister. He and all the members of his administration may be able statesmen and well qualified for the work they have to do in the government of a nation, but they may be quite unqualified to make a choice either of bishops or of individuals properly qualified to revise the Scriptures. A Royal Commission might be composed of the same individuals as have been appointed by Convocation for the work of revision, and doubtless would include some of them; and if certain individuals of them were included it would—as we hope yet to show—comprehend persons altogether unfitted for the important work of satisfactorily revising the English version of the Scriptures. Therefore the Scriptures ought not to be revised by a Royal Commission.

Besides the objections which exist against the revision of the English version of Scripture by a Royal Commission, there are weighty objections against any revision thereof, some of which we shall now adduce:—

1. The state of mind, in which a large proportion of our learned men are, at the present time, makes it undesirable that the Scriptures should now be revised. The state of mind to which we here refer is an unsettled, sceptical, latitudinarian disposition—a disposition to pare down all expressions that are offensive, and to make the Scriptures free from every controverted point. As evidence of the existence of this state of mind, we may notice that amongst other objections which have been brought against the Authorized Version of Scripture is the following:—"A theological bias is displayed in many instances, and theological terms are used, which form points of contention between different religious denominations." Now if the English Scriptures are to be divested of terms which form points of contention between different religious denominations, it is certain that they must be not merely a revised translation, but an altogether different book from that which they now are; for in that case they must exhibit neither a Trinitarian nor a Unitarian, neither a Calvinistic nor an Arminian bias. Both Trinitarians and Unitarians, Calvinists and Arminians, now believe that the Scriptures furnish grounds for their faith. But if the English Bible is to be devoid of points of contention, it must be free both of Trinitarianism and Unitarianism, both of Calvinism and Arminianism, and therefore must be admitted by both Trinitarians and Unitarians, by both Calvinists and Arminians, to be not a revised translation, but an altogether different book from what it now is.

If we now notice some of the individuals who have been appointed by Convocation to revise the Scriptures, and who, or individuals of a similar stamp, would almost certainly be chosen by a Royal Commission, it will not be difficult to show that they are not the right sort of men for revising the Bible. First, there is Dean Alford, one of whose emendations, so-called, of the Authorized Version is, "Every scripture inspired by God is also profitable," &c., instead of the passage as it reads in our version, "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable," &c. (2 Tim. iii. 16). The assertion that *all* scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable, and Dean Alford's revision, that every scripture inspired by God is profitable, are widely different from each other. Alford's revision reads like an admission that there are scriptures which are not inspired by God, and is a specimen of revision just such as we expect to see given should the Authorized Version be revised by a Royal Commission. Dean Alford is certainly too much of a latitudinarian to be entrusted with the revision of the Scriptures. Then there is Dean Stanley, whose latitudinarianism is that of indifference; for he seems to have no creed at all, and can fraternize with the Greek Archbishop of Syra. There is also Bishop Ellicott, of whom the newspapers have recently related, in giving publicity to a speech lately delivered by Lord Fitzhardinge at a public meeting, that he was playing billiards with Lord F—— on a Saturday night, and when the hands of the timepiece pointed to the hour of twelve p.m., inquired of Lord F—— whether he could not reverse the hands, this circumstance being related by Lord F—— himself in his speech at the public meeting. These are specimens of the individuals to whom Convocation has entrusted the work of revising the Holy Scriptures, and were a Royal Commission appointed, these persons, or persons of a similar class, would be selected for the task. Their unfitness for it must, we think, be apparent; for the mental tendencies of these individuals are such as to render it impossible for them to apprehend aright the drift and spirit of the word of God.

2. There is no real need for a revision of the Authorized Version of the Scriptures. Some of the most learned and able men have stated that the Authorized Version cannot be improved to any great extent, and they have shown that we should gain nothing by revision, but should doubtless lose much by disturbing the present authorized translation; therefore the needlessness of a revision, together with the consideration of the unsettling effects of it, are decided objections against it.

3. On account of the professors of Christianity being now divided into so great a multiplicity of sects, *any* revision of the Scriptures will be exceedingly unsatisfactory. For more than two hundred years the present English version of the Bible has been appealed to by the various denominations professing Christianity. This hold on the minds of the people in general, which has been so long retained by our present Authorized Version, will most certainly

not be possessed by any revision whatever ; and by whosoever that revision may be carried out, there will be found denominations professing Christianity by whom the revised version will not be acknowledged or used.

4. The existence of a variety of English versions of the Scriptures which is likely to be occasioned by a revised translation, will give great encouragement to scepticism and infidelity, as sceptics and infidels will have ground afforded them for affirming that the Bible is not to be depended on, as it cannot be known which version is a faithful rendering of the original. Surely such a consequence of a revision of the Scriptures is to be deplored and ought to be sufficient to cause all who reverence the word of God, and yet have advocated a revision thereof, to pause before taking any other steps to bring about such a momentous change.

5. Those objections to the Authorized Version, for which there is good ground, of which H. K. has furnished examples, are not of sufficient importance to require a revised translation. We freely admit that objection may be taken to the great plainness with which certain occurrences are recorded in the Bible, as well as to the very plain allusions to certain other circumstances, as likewise to the employment of certain terms which, though when they were used by the translators carried with them no air of immodesty or vulgarity, yet do so now, as also to the employment of a few words in a sense which was then their meaning, but which, through lapse and change, is not their signification now, and to the imperfection attending the division of the book into chapters and verses. But all these defects are easy to be remedied without a revised translation. Certain occurrences which are recorded with too great a degree of plainness can have that plainness modified. Certain other circumstances can be alluded to in a more indirect manner. Terms which now have an expression of vulgarity can be exchanged for others of the same meaning to which this objection would not attach. Words which have lost the meaning which they had when our present version was translated, can be changed for terms having the same signification as those words formerly had, and the division of the book into chapters and verses in a more perfect manner is a thing easy to be accomplished. The above-mentioned alterations are, we believe, all that are really requisite in our Authorized Version, and as they involve no doctrinal point, nor any question as to the meaning of any term of the language in which the Scriptures were originally written, they can be accomplished by any persons who are masters of the English language, irrespective of classical, Oriental, or Hebrew learning, and an English Bible simply so altered would possess the advantage of not giving occasion to any who profess Christianity to reject it. The head under which we now write leads us to notice some of the objections made by H. K. to the Authorized Version of Scripture. Neither our time nor our space will allow us to take notice of all of them. The futility of them it will not be difficult to point out,

and those which we shall leave unnoticed are of the same futile character as those to which we shall devote some attention.

H. K. tells us that 1 John v. 7 is a pure invention; that it is not to be found in any of the ancient manuscripts, that none of the patriarchs of the Christian Church allude to it, and that all scholars are agreed that it ought to be erased from the Scriptures. Now, in opposition to the statement of H. K., we beg to remind him that this verse is to be seen in many Latin manuscripts of an early date, that it is found in many Greek manuscripts, that out of sixteen ancient copies of Robert Stephens's, nine of them had it; that it is cited by many of the ancient Fathers—by Fulgentius, in the beginning of the sixth century, against the Arians; by Athanasius, about the year 350, and, before him, by Cyprian in the middle of the third century, as well as being referred to by Tertullian about the year 200; that the genuineness of this verse has been maintained by many eminent scholars—by Bengel, Horsley, Middleton, Burgess, Nolan, Hales, Wiseman, Knittel, Mill, and many others—and that there never was any dispute about it till Erasmus omitted it from the first edition of his translation of the New Testament, while even he put it into another edition of his translation. H. K. tells us that, instead of the reading in Jude 1, "To them that are *sanctified* by God the Father," a revised translation would give us, "To them that are *beloved* by God the Father." But what *material* alteration would such a change make? Whether we view the word *sanctified* as signifying set apart or consecrated to a sacred purpose, or as meaning made holy, it implies that those who were sanctified were beloved; for the love of God is the cause of sanctification, and we believe it will be generally admitted by those who acknowledge the Scriptures as a divine revelation, that sanctification is the certain consequence of God's love. If the change here desiderated by H. K. be a specimen of the alterations to effect which a revision of the Authorized Version of Scripture is called for, we must say that there is no need to meddle with the English Bible for the purpose of effecting such unimportant changes. We cannot at all see, with H. K., that the context of Exod. xxxiv. 33 shows that the word *till* in this verse should be rendered *when*. *When* Moses had done speaking with the children of Israel, there would have been no occasion for him to have put a veil on his face; but *till* he had done speaking with them there was occasion for it, as there was a glory on his face which the people could not bear to look at. Though H. K. believes it to be universally admitted that the word *till* is an error, yet such an admission is not universal, as Dr. Gill—of whom Bishop Horne testified that no man was "more competent to expound the Old Testament Scriptures on account of his extensive and accurate acquaintance with Oriental languages and rabbinical learning"—maintains that the word *till* is the correct term, and that the substitution of *when* for *till* would destroy the sense of the passage.

H. K. asks whether any who espouse the negative of the question

now being debated, will give the meaning of Job xxxvi. 33: "The noise thereof sheweth concerning it, the cattle also concerning the vapour." We will endeavour to give the meaning of this passage. Its signification we believe to be this. The clouds had just been spoken of—the noise of these clouds—which noise is thunder, and not infrequently an immediate forerunner of rain—showeth that rain is coming. The cattle also, by certain motions and gestures understood by those who are accustomed to them, show concerning the vapour, by which they discern rain to be at hand. Instead of this passage being, as H. K. so confidently asserts, beyond the comprehension of the most subtle theologian, it requires but little depth of wisdom to expound it. H. K. asks whether there is any and what connection between the former and the latter clause of Job xxxvii. 22: "Fair weather cometh out of the north, with God is terrible majesty." We think it is not difficult to discern the connection between the two clauses of the above sentence. "Fair weather cometh out of the north," for "the north wind driveth away rain" (Prov. xxv. 23); and the wind is sometimes so terrific as to display conspicuously that "with God is terrible majesty." The twenty-ninth Psalm is taken up with a description of the majesty of God as it is displayed in the various atmospheric phenomena. H. K. calls 1 Thess. v. 22, as it stands in the English version, a "somewhat equivocal passage." We cannot see that it is so. Christians are exhorted to abstain, not only from actual evil, but from that which would bear the appearance of evil, though no real evil were committed. H. K. tells us that 1 Tim. v. 5, instead of reading "supposing that gain is godliness," should read, "supposing godliness is gain." We cannot at all see this, as godliness is gain. The words immediately following declare that it is so. If, then, those ungodly men against whom Paul is writing had supposed that "godliness is gain," there would have been, under that head, no cause for censuring them, as their supposition would have been a perfectly correct one. But instead of doing this, they supposed gain to be godliness; that is, they felt and acted as if there were nothing in religion but worldly profit, and they sought after and served their own interests.

H. K. speaks of the translation in Luke xxiii. 15 as being "manifestly absurd," and tells us that the sentence, "Nothing worthy of death was done *unto* him," should be, "Nothing worthy of death was done *by* him." It appears that H. K.'s perception of what constitutes a manifest absurdity is not very keen. In the passage quoted, Pilate is addressing the Jewish rulers, and he tells them that Herod had done nothing worthy of death *unto* Jesus; that is, Herod had done nothing *unto* Jesus which showed that he judged Christ to be worthy of death; for he had passed no sentence of any kind upon him.

The remainder of H. K.'s objections to our Authorized Version of the Scriptures are of a similar character to those we have noticed.

In the last paragraph of his article, H. K. states it to be his opinion that there can be only one class of persons having a tangible objection to revision—that class, viz., “who, having elaborated some favourite dogmas for their own peculiar benefit, fear lest a thorough revision should sweep the foundations of those dogmas away.” We might retort upon H. K., and say, with justice and charity at least equal to that expressed in the paragraph just quoted, that most likely those who advocate revision are that class of persons who, having elaborated some favourite dogmas for their own peculiar benefit, fear lest, without a thorough revision of the Scriptures, the foundations of their dogmas cannot be firmly established.

G. T. H. produces no argument in favour of a revision of the Authorized Version of Scripture, but simply notices some objections which are made to a revision. On this point, therefore, his article needs no remark from us; and on the question of revision being undertaken by a Royal Commission we have already written.

We conclude, not without hope, that we have succeeded in showing that a Royal Commission is incompetent for the work of revising the Scriptures, that no material advantage would accrue from their revision, and that much damage would be the result of such a performance.

S.S.

## IS THE GOSPEL ADAPTED TO MODERN LIFE?

### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I HAVE been induced, on reading the article of F. F. A. on the negative side of this debate, to take up my pen, and for the first time enter the lists as a debater in the *British Controversialist*.

My attention was directed to the above article by a curiosity to learn what could be advanced on that side of the question. I thank F. F. A. very much for his very able article, but am sorry to have to disagree with him. F. F. A. endeavours to prove that the gospel is not adapted to modern life, for two reasons. It has not been generally adopted, and also, civilization has developed obligations and relations too minute, intense, intimate, and diversified, for the application of the gospel. He states that, because the gospel does not “exert an influence direct, immediate, and tangible on the habits, manners, and customs of society now prevalent,” it is not adapted to modern life. Does F. F. A. wish to state that, were the gospel adapted to modern life, all the people would receive it and conform themselves, in their lives, to all its precepts and admonitions? He evidently seems to imply this. If he will take the trouble to read his Bible again, he will find that he has formed a very wrong notion of the gospel. He will there find that the gospel was never intended to overrun the earth like a flood, but rather, wily and surely to change it, as leaven put into meal leavens the dough. And were it to do so, it would be rather the sign of weak-

ness than of strength, stability, and power. The ideas, opinions, and sentiments that spread over the earth like wildfire, and are taken up by every one, die out quite as fast; for instance, fashion; and all those which are of real good and of great benefit are of very slow growth, the works of ages and generations; for instance, liberty. It will be sufficient evidence in favour of the gospel if it can be proved that its influence and power are gradually increasing and spreading at the present time. This, I think, can be fully proved.

F. F. A. holds very much on the extensive trickery and evasions practised in business, and the vast corruptness of society; and that the gospel cannot be adapted to the age because it has not effectually put a stop to them. Can F. F. A. point to any time or age when trickery was not practised, and when society was not corrupt? It is true many of the tricks now in vogue were not so a generation or two ago. They are peculiar to and belong to the present state of science and learning. It is no new sin or evil. It is the old sin of human nature, which has brought in all the aid of learning and science to help it to work out its accursed practices. But learning and science, which enable these tricks to be practised, gives also the power to detect them; they carry with them a compensating power. It is no argument against the gospel that it does not stop the spread of these peculiar forms of sin. To stop these, the gospel would have to arrest the progress of science and learning. It is not the province of the gospel to endeavour to put down any new or peculiar form of sin, but rather to destroy the root itself. Until sin is effectually uprooted, it will adapt itself to the form most in keeping with the age it is practised in.

Has the gospel, then, made progress in its aim to uproot sin? Look at society in the present day and compare it with society in any previous age. Is there not a higher moral tone pervading this one? Corruptness is still here, but there is no class so degraded now as there used to be. The peculiar vice of one class of society may have now a more extended practice, but no class is now so deeply pervaded by it. There is, in all ranks and classes of society, a higher moral perception and susceptibility than ever existed before. These, however, are only the general influences of the gospel. Let us see if the personal influences of the gospel, from which this general influence emanates, is spreading.

If we compare the number of Christians who profess to accept the gospel and its teaching, of the present age, with those of any previous age, we shall find that they have increased immensely and are still increasing. The statistics of every body of Christians prove it. The extraordinary multiplication of churches and chapels proves it. The innumerable Christian societies and agencies of every description which we see spring up every year are proofs, both indisputable and assuring, that the gospel is spreading. But F. F. A. affirms that the Christians of the present age are very indifferent ones, and are practically unchristian in their lives and habits. This is too true about many, but not of all. I am sorry F. F. A. has



allowed himself to be led so far astray as to condemn the whole because a few have been found unworthy. He has not intentionally libelled the Christians; but it is surely a libel on them to say that they are not actuated by the principles they profess. I am afraid he has formed an opinion of Christians in general from what he has seen a few do in particular. A little more knowledge of the religious world would soon undeceive him.

F. F. A., however, does not attribute so much fault to them as to the gospel. He charges the gospel with the immorality of its professors. He attributes to it an inapplicability to meet the defects he mentions. It is not sufficiently pointed in its condemnation of the peculiar forms sin takes in modern life. Its doctrines "are too general, and fall wide of the mark." They "do not come home directly and efficiently to the heart and conscience of transgressors."

If F. F. A. could guarantee success—direct, immediate, tangible, against sin—if we only find a pointed, direct, and sufficient condemnation of that sin in the gospel, we should not be troubled very long with the peculiar sins he complains of. We will take one of those he has named as being most rife in the present age—false weights and measures—and of which, among others, he has said that, "were the ethical precepts and doctrines of the gospel adapted to modern society, such things could not be."

In Deut. xxv. 13, we have, "Thou shalt not have in thy bag divers weights, a great and a small; but thou shalt have a perfect and just weight, a perfect and just measure shalt thou have, that thy days may be lengthened in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. For all that do such things, and all that do unrighteously, are an abomination unto the Lord thy God."

Prov. xi. 1,—"A false balance is an abomination to the Lord; but a just weight is his delight."

Micah (in chap. vi. 10, 11) asks, "Are there yet the treasures of wickedness in the house of the wicked, and the scant measure that is abominable? Shall I count them pure, with the wicked balances and with the bag of deceitful weights?"

These are a few only. Are they not sufficiently pointed and condemnatory? The fault is not the gospel's; it does not fail either of sufficient directness or power. The work is great, and although success is certain, yet the process is necessarily slow and gradual. As we have before stated, the gospel does not aim at destroying and overcoming any particular form of sin, but at its complete eradication and utter extirpation from the world.

The next point held by F. F. A. is, that civilization has developed obligations and relations too minute, intimate, intense, and diversified for the application of the gospel: the world has reached such a stage in development that the gospel is no longer applicable. Social relations have become too complicated, and political ones too varied. Women clamour for equality with men. Almsgiving is no longer what it used to be, and the House of Commons is the omnipotent ruler. Our social system is to be reversed, our political

one is altogether new. So the teaching of the gospel has become obsolete, unnecessary, and worthless!

Such are some of the cases brought forward in support of this view, and we must confess that we entirely fail to comprehend their force. I have been unable to see any relations either too minute, intimate, intense, or diversified for the application of the gospel, neither do I see that F. F. A. has succeeded in showing us one. Is he afraid that if the House of Commons places women on an equality with men, that injunction of the gospel that wives submit themselves to their husbands will no longer be applicable? Will it render the statement that the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is head of the Church, void and worthless? Let him not be afraid. Our Parliament *may* grant it, but a greater parliament, nature, whose acts are never a dead letter, will still support and enforce the statement of the Bible.

That husbands should be found who love other men's wives rather than their own, proves nothing beyond the depth of man's degradation and sin, that he can, in the face of the most clear and sure warning, recklessly follow the path of destruction. Can there be a time when these grand and simple rules of the gospel will no longer be adapted to man, when man will no longer be guided by them, when he will, so to speak, have outgrown them? It is simply impossible. Almost every relation of life is therein spoken of, the duty of each set forth, and the commands to each well suited and adapted to it.

F. F. A. should know, however, that the gospel was never intended to teach social and political economy. It was given to teach man his duty to God and to his fellow-men. This it has done and is doing.

We have now done with the particular objections of F. F. A., and although we may have a word more to say to him before we finish, we think it necessary to add one or two more considerations to meet what we fancy may be urged against the gospel. We will put them in the form of two questions.

(1) Has civilization rendered the gospel unnecessary?

We had fully expected to see the greater part of the negative arguments based upon the sufficiency of civilization. In the two articles we have seen, so far, they are not used at all. Should they be used again, we find in the papers of F. F. A. and A. F. F. the best proofs for controverting them. These papers tend to prove that the more civilization advances, the greater the necessity there is for the gospel.

(2) If modern society adopted the gospel, would it have to renounce some or any of the benefits of civilization?  
Would society be better or worse for the adoption?

If we consider what the real benefits of civilization are, we shall find that the gospel is absolutely necessary for their existence. The benefits of civilization are those of material welfare.

accrue from a more extended knowledge of the laws of nature and their application, the division of labour, and a closer relation between man and man. Some of the fruits are increased comfort, greater accommodation, a wider field of communication and enjoyment, and a greater security of life and property. Does the gospel require that any of these or any others should be renounced? Quite the reverse, I think; it helps rather to augment them. It keeps up the moral tone necessary to their existence, sustains the efforts for further improvement, and ensures full enjoyment of them. Without it, civilization could not exist, and man would again sink to vice and utter degradation.

However, the great objection that has been urged against the gospel is, not that its maxims, exhortations, and injunctions are unsuited to modern society, but that it fails in the power to infuse its spirit and life into society at large. This is what I see in F. F. A.'s accusation that its injunctions are not sufficiently pointed, direct, and condemnatory.

Now, in order to get people to leave their sins and sinful ways, it is necessary to have something more powerful than direct and pointed condemnation, otherwise we might look to the maxims and precepts of philosophers for overcoming evil. They condemn evil in sufficiently unmeasured terms, if condemnation is everything necessary. Again, if condemnation, with punishment added, were sufficient, then would our laws have long ago rid us of many of the vices F. F. A. complains of. But to get men to forsake their sinful ways, we must have something more powerful, more influential, and more sustaining than condemnatory language or condemnation and punishment. This power I argue the gospel, and the gospel only, has. It is not in its condemnation that the power of the gospel lies, but in its persuasion. The grand aim and highest purpose of the gospel is to rescue fallen humanity, to show men the way of life, to tell them of the love of God, and by the influence and power of that love to lead them along the paths of virtue, righteousness, purity, and holiness, to the enjoyment of peace, joy, and life everlasting in heaven. The gospel is not a dead system of doctrines, moral precepts, and duties, but a living, active, and ever-exerting power, "able to exert an influence—direct, immediate, and tangible—on the habits, manners, and customs of men" in any condition of society, form of life, or state of civilization. R. M.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you please, revelation comes in, confirms every doubting fear which could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future unprevented consequence of wickedness; supposes the world to be in a state of ruin; (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if not proveable by reason, yet is in no wise contrary to it;) teaches us too, that the rules of divine government are such as not to admit of pardon

immediately, and directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it: but then teaches at the same time, what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral government of the universe was not so rigid, but that there was room for an interposition, to avert the fatal consequences of vice; which, therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us. . . . That God hath mercifully provided, that there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind; whatever that destruction unprevented would have been. *God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth, not, to be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, that whosoever believeth in Him, should not perish.* . . . He interposed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon them: or in such a manner, as to prevent that punishment from actually following, which, according to the general laws of divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such interpositions."—*Butler's Analogy, Part II. c. v.*

THE two rocks on which we are in danger of splitting in this debate are,—the meaning of the gospel, and our idea of adaptation. Bishop Butler, in the above extract, has given us the very marrow of the gospel. It is "good news;" but the good news refer to our salvation from sin through Christ, and that salvation certainly involves obedience to the commands of Christ, or the practice of virtue and the fruits of holiness.

Adaptation means "fitness," "suitableness." When we say that some men have great facility in adapting themselves to all kinds of company, we mean that they readily fit in to the peculiarities of other people, till they become an harmonious whole. There seems also to be included in the word the notion of flexibility, or power of change, in the thing or person in which resides the power of adaptation.

Our opponent A. A., in his admirable opening paper, gave the true meaning of the word, but in his subsequent reasonings departed from it in effect, though not in fact; for, after saying that the gospel is fitted for or suited to modern life, he proceeded to show that it is suited to *some* of the aspects and relations of modern life, picking out, of course, those aspects and relations with which it happened to be in harmony: and this, too, allowing him, for the sake of argument, to be correct in his account of the gospel—an account far too comprehensive, as his follower S. S. has shown, (page 109.) But A. A. must not be allowed thus to put a part for the whole. It is giving but a poor account of the gospel to say that it is in harmony with the progressive character of the age, or that it encourages and develops our social nature, or that it is a reviver of morality. In all such remarks the essential characteristics of the gospel are not touched upon on the one hand, nor the deep necessities of man on the other. The underlying woe of man is his sinfulness, and the pre-eminent mission of the gospel is to save the race from their sins. Hence the gospel seeks to put men

right, not in their social, political, and moral relations, *as such*, but in their relation to God. It is true at the same time that this right relation God-ward has its reflex influence on every other relation of man, or we should not be justified in asking the question now under consideration. How the gospel, in process of manifestation in the lives of men, develops itself, is forcibly and eloquently shown in the following words of the late Rev. William Archer Butler, M.A.: "I suppose it may be said with truth, that if any man were to be asked, what it is that characterizes Christianity as a practical system distinguishably from all that preceded it, or from all that have followed without imitating it, he might state it correctly enough in two words,—*love* and *sorrow*; the blessedness of mutual affection, and the blessedness of suffering. . . . In Christ himself, who is His own religion alive and in action, they seem, like rainbow colours, evermore blended and lost in each other; He is the immortal image of both; love and pain are the footprints by which we trace Him from page to page. And who shall say *which* was foremost on Calvary? Love drew the godhead of Christ from its throne; sorrow,—sanctifying sorrow,—lifted the manhood into meekness to share it."\* A divine sadness pervading the soul as the means to a divine joy; a divine humility filling the soul previous to a divine exaltation; a divine purity ever deepening within us preparatory to our admission into a sinless heaven; a divine faith in the Redeemer of men leading us to self-sacrifice previous to glory: such is the gospel of the Son of God, as developed in actual experience.

And what is modern life? Certainly scientific, the tendency being to believe nothing unless demonstrated by experiment. This cultivates the critical faculty, and gives us a desire to examine most minutely the foundations of belief. The result of this in many cases is scepticism, a frame of mind totally unfit to examine and adjudicate upon the wonders of revealed truth—a result not owing to faulty evidence so much as to the necessary antagonism between a critical state of mind and the spirit of the gospel. There is great diffusion of knowledge, but less strength of intellectual grip. The waters of truth cover a wider area, but are not so deep in consequence. The freer and fuller intercourse of modern life promotes activity and increases our acquaintance with the race, giving rise to commerce,—especially the gigantic commerce of the present day; but out of this grow many evils;—luxury, excessive competition, a sad dissatisfaction, which in one extreme leads to a renunciation of all self-control and individuality, and in the other to excessive self-assertion and self-dependence, this latter no mean cause of the prevailing unbelief. The religiousness of the age is more a fashion than a life,—more a habit acquired by education than a something consciously chosen; and this occasions much insincerity in action, leads to self-deception, if not hypocrisy, and

\* Sermons, First Series, p. 38.

ultimately, we are afraid, to a feeling of dislike and disgust, and often of scepticism in reference to religion. The conditions of modern life are such that it is extremely difficult to realise a moderate livelihood, not to say competency; and in the struggle for life, both religion and morality are made to subserve the interests of a greedy and selfish lust of wealth or power. The spirit of modern life is an aggrandising, a self-sufficient, a selfish and an irreverent spirit. Though open wickedness may not be so strikingly prevalent as in the last generation, yet the excesses of humanity find vent in less open ways,—the breaches of morality are more secret. Modern life, in its social, political, moral and religious relations, is in anything but a satisfactory state, looking at it in the light, not of the Scriptures, but of an enlightened conscience. They who adapt the gospel to their whole life are now, and ever have been, in a small minority,—a minority which, if abstracted from modern life, would not appreciably alter its prevailing character.

It cannot therefore with any degree of exactness be said that the gospel is adapted to modern life in the sum of its most commanding characteristics; for "what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? And what communion hath light with darkness?" Where is the fitness,—the adaptation? They who maintain the affirmative are thrown on the horns of the following dilemma;—they must maintain either that the gospel is much lower in character than it professes to be, or that modern life is much higher in character than it seems to be. We quite agree with our opponent A. A. (page 33) when he affirms the question to be, Have we outgrown the gospel? Have we risen above that product of an elementary world? Are its truths true for us, or is it but a preparatory lesson, which, after having served its purpose, is to give way to something higher? But to answer in the affirmative, is to shut our eyes to notorious facts proving the contrary; for upon an intelligent and a just comparison of the gospel,—its purity, faith, humility, love, and spirituality,—with the state of modern society,—its uncleanness, scepticism and disbelief, pride, self-sufficiency, and unlovingness,—we shall be quite satisfied that we have not yet left the gospel behind us in our upward march; and to answer in the negative is to condemn modern life and to declare at once that it and the gospel are "unequally yoked together." In the former case we affirm that the gospel is not adapted to modern life, and in the latter that modern life is not adapted to the gospel. Our opponents can take which they please. Our friend F. F. A. in his closing paragraph on page 45 states this argument most pertinently, to a few words of which we would give emphasis by repetition: "It may be attempted to rebut all these arguments by the assertion that it is not the gospel that is not adapted to our age, but our age that is not adapted to the gospel. This will be a damaging retort, not to our side of the question, but to those who rest upon it." Certainly; for if the gospel were adapted to modern life, if the two fitted into and were in harmony

with each other, the terms of the question would be interchangeable. The fact that they are not so proves that the gospel is not adapted to modern life.

We are led to the same conclusion by another route. Modern society is an unsettled, unbalanced force. Like the ever-shifting sands of the sea, it is ever moving to and fro, obeying some mighty impulse which it seldom understands. The waves of some power higher than itself bear it blindly onward, for it knows not the nature of the power nor the reason of its exercise. National opinions, habits, modes of thought, rise, reach their meridian, and set; until the night of some dark stagnation is dissipated by the rising of other and not always more glorious systems of thought and popular beliefs. The social life of the age has its periods of repose and of action,—its quiet enjoyments and its propelling excesses,—and the gregarious instincts of the race very often overpower the morality superinduced by an educational process. In the midst of this change, there is one thing that changes not: whatever fluctuations of feeling or of thought may afflict or bless society, this unchanging gospel remains unaffected. It is the characteristic of the one to be in motion; of the other, to be at rest. It is the nature of the one to be dissatisfied, discontented, and to crave after something else in search of something better; of the other, to be calmly assured of an accomplished perfection. The one is the surging, troubled ocean, the other a rock in the midst of it. From the first century to the present, the essential truths and the principles of the gospel have remained the same; and, so far as we can see, are likely to remain the same throughout the coming ages. Yet, if the gospel is adapted to modern life, it seems to us that one of two things must take place: either the gospel must receive into itself something of the life and take to itself some of the characteristics of modern society, or modern life must assimilate to itself more of the spirit of the gospel. Before the one can be said to be adapted to the other, this mutual accommodation is necessary. And this leads us to—nay, involves—a further question, Which has authority over the other? Which shall be the subject, and which the ruler? Which in the long run shall lose itself in the triumph of the other? The question, as put in the present debate, certainly implies that, not the gospel, but modern society, is the moulding influence, the subjugating power, the ever-abiding ruler to whom all else, even the gospel itself, is to be subject on pain of abiding condemnation. But we believe that the gospel is the all-assimilating influence, the authoritative law to which modern life is to be subject, on pain of eternal loss. Its mission is to infuse its spirit into society until society is brought into complete harmony with it. The gospel cannot come down to modern life: modern life must go up to the gospel. At present, the obvious antagonism proves their unfitness.

In asking the very pertinent question, Why is not the gospel supreme in relation to modern life? we would not be understood

with our coadjutor F. F. A., as impeaching it, for just reasoning will not call for its impeachment. The gospel, though now either very much in advance of or very much behind the age, asserts that the time shall come when all things shall be in harmony with it. Modern society, as yet, is not in harmony with it; but if we are spiritual beings, if we have no right of ownership in ourselves, if this world is but a star in the bright constellation of God's innumerable creations, and but the shadow of the cloud of His glory,—if existence derives any significance from the past, and we can see in the present a hand which waves us towards a developing future,—if the things which are seen are but many-coloured threads with which God is weaving the web of His great and eternal purposes in His unseen dwelling-place,—if these things are true, then is it also true that in some period of future life the wondrous loveliness of the gospel shall be reproduced: and perhaps that is the

“Far-off, divine event,  
To which the whole creation moves.”

In the meantime she proclaims, “The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof; the world and they that dwell therein. . . . Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath *clean hands, and a pure heart, who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully*. He shall receive the blessing from the Lord, and righteousness from the God of his salvation.” (Psa. xxiv.) But while we reject the impeachment of the gospel implied in many of F. F. A.'s remarks, as not logically following from his premises, it will be seen that all the above reasonings involve the supposition that, as a fact, the gospel is not adapted to modern life.

We trust our opponents will not persist in arguing that because modern life in the great principles of justice, truth, and honesty, in its general moral excellence and increasing utility, compares favourably with any past age, and on many sides of it is in harmony with the gospel, that therefore the gospel is adapted to modern life; for (1) such could be said with truth of heathen nations, and (2) the gospel is something more than mere morality and justice, &c. We have guarded ourselves against the charge of putting the gospel and modern life as far apart as possible that we might show the one not adapted to the other, for our argument throughout has been one of fact, and to fact we have appealed. The gospel, without doubt, is a whole antipodes removed from modern life, in its spirit, claims, and purpose, and is no more adapted to it than is oil to water. Can figs be gathered off thistles? or sweet water be obtained from a bitter fountain? If this consummation, so devoutly to be wished, ever takes place, the adaptation must be the result of a movement originating in society itself, and not a change in the gospel.

DIAMOND.



## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

ALTHOUGH the gospel of Christ brings peace, glad tidings of joy, and good-will to men; yet the gospel and the world are not compatible. God's plan of salvation, as brought to light in the gospel, is not a system based on accommodation. God's method of redemption has not met fallen man half-way; but it is His plan alone, founded independently of any work of our own, or any worldly crutch or support. We are not saved of ourselves, but through the "grace of God." The "world of fashion" with its attending vices, and the sovereign sway of "society," are ever contending, as they were in the primitive days of Christianity, with the teaching of the Bible. Jesus, in His special prayer for the apostles, clearly foresaw the trials, tribulations, and contentions, which His faithful followers would have to pass through in their journey in this world. "I pray," said Jesus, "not that Thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that Thou shouldest keep them from evil. I have given them Thy word, and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world even as I am not of the world." The gospel and modern society are antagonisms. The straightforwardness and pungency of truth and the solidity of opinion are objectional to modern ideas and fashion. If one holds to an idea which he believes is right, with anything like an energetic spirit, he is accused by "the world" of being "dogmatic," "a bigot," "illiberal in his views," &c. Yet these same accusers will ever be ready, with a liberal spirit, *no doubt*, to palliate the most atrocious criminals, by writing long woeful letters to the Secretary of State, for the purpose of proving the extenuating circumstances under which their crimes have been committed. In these days there are persons always ready to "whitewash the most notable tyrants, who have been the cause of deluging this world with blood, and sending death to the cottage and the palace." Napoleon, Nero, Queen Mary, Robespierre, Popish burning of heretics, and even the arch-traitor Judas Iscariot, have had their partizans, who would have us believe that they were not so black as they have been painted, but were very good in their way; fully justified in their actions by the boldness, perseverance, and audacity with which they carried on their designs; are to be admired! and if indeed their zeal carried them on to commit any awful deed, we must make an allowance for the "dark ages" they lived in!

The same laxity of opinion is extended to the reception of the teaching of God's word. It is becoming a very common expression for persons to state "that they do not see any material difference what religion a man may believe in, as long as he is honest and earnest in the faith he upholds."

"For forms of faith let zealous bigots fight,  
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

All religions to them *are alike*, and it is the principle on which

they are severally taken up, which ensures, as rewards, heaven and happiness. This I maintain is at utter variance with the character of God, and the positive teaching of the Bible. It is in consequence of the dogmatic and exclusive doctrines of the Bible, as being the only means of obtaining salvation, that in this age "men have tried to adapt the gospel to their different and peculiar views of "religious progress."

It is impossible that the gospel can be adapted to modern society. The two cannot be equal, one must be our standard, and if a standard, *infallible*. We must either adapt—fit in—the Bible to society's standard, or *vice versa*. The former is in every way consistent with the teaching of the Word of God, that the world must adapt itself to the principles of the gospel, and *not* the gospel to the world. The verb adapted in the sentence signifies that the objective gospel must conform—adapt itself to—modern life, *not* modern life adapt itself to the teaching of the gospel. It will be perceived by this that we who maintain the negative of the question are upholding the excellency, the moral superiority, the divine source, the efficacy, the sufficiency and independency of the gospel in not yielding or being conformed to the ever-changing tide of fashion and society.

The gospel is of God, and like unto God's immutability, it changeth not. The gospel is God's way of salvation. We have no choice but to *accept* its "rule of faith" and doctrines as divine, and grant "neither is there salvation in any other; for there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved;" or to *reject* it, and be brought under condemnation; for "He that rejecteth Me, and receiveth not My words, hath one that judgeth him. The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day." There is no *middle* path to heaven. We cannot meet God half-way. Of the Laodiceans, who were neither cold nor hot, the Lord said, "He would spue them out of His mouth." The vital consequences of the rejection or acceptance of the gospel message are of too great importance for any uncertainty as regards that which is necessary for man to believe in order to obtain salvation. Therefore the word of God is emphatic, exclusive, and authoritative in its preaching. The "world," before it can be made congruous to the gospel, must be transformed by the renewing influence of the Holy Spirit. The world needs to be regenerated by the faithful preaching of the everlasting and changeless gospel of God.

Modern life and society may be reformed and adapted to, but the gospel is perfect, needs not adaptation to make it acceptable to man's puny reason or sensual and worldly desires. Man, if he receives the gospel, cannot serve God and Mammon. He must with Paul suffer "the loss of all things" that he "may win Christ." He must forget "those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus."

God did not send the gospel to satisfy man's carnal thoughts and vain imaginations. It was not to please man, but to renew him in soul and body, to purify him from sin, through the blood of Jesus; to change man's "vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body;" and to make men partakers of eternal life. The requirements of modern society and those of the gospel are incongruous. The former are of a worldly nature, those of the latter insist on heavenly-mindedness. The very idea of the gospel adapting *itself* to modern life brings a case of carnality *versus* spirituality.

True, the substantiality of the above arguments rests on the correctness of the rendering of the word *adapt*. As I do not agree with the paraphrase of A. A. in its entirety, I give the following definition as being more correct:—Adapt is derived from two Latin words, *ad*, to; *apt*, to fit; and it literally means to make *apt* or fit; to *make* anything to incline, to agree, to fit, and become suitable to another; a yielding or a bringing down one thing to the use or requirements of another. By *adapt*, it is not inferred that the object referred to is equivalent to—able to be of any special use in regard to, or concerning, when we judge of its suitability from its own standpoint. We are not asked to prove whether the gospel is adaptable to be of any *special use* in regard to or concerning the world's welfare; neither is it inferred in the present question that we have to support or disprove the claims of the gospel, in its assertions of adaptability to meet the spiritual requirements of all ages and climes. But whether it is possible that the gospel, examined according to modern life or society's standard, is adapted to the *mode* of the world, "modern civilization," and taste?

Can we reform the gospel? Can we modernise it, make it fashionable and popular? Such has been been *vox populi* for some time past. Even there are not a few who maintain and who preach that for any one to teach that the Bible is God's complete and last revelation to man, they are not only under a strong delusion, but are putting stumblingblocks in the paths of "spiritual development," "progress," and "civilization;" and also that the upholders of the inspired and infallible revelation of the "Word of God" are inculcating doctrines adverse to man's individuality and freedom of thought. The progressionists are living testimonies that the gospel does not adapt itself to the *wishes* of modern life. Neither do they hint at the possibility of the gospel adapting itself thereto. But their import is stronger: they maintain that the gospel has been superseded by God's personal revelation of Himself in dreams, in visions, and by spiritual manifestations. Certainly it may be fairly argued that this conclusion is deduced from the views of "modern thinkers" of the adaptability of the gospel to supply the wants of the age; still it is not inferred, in the wording of the title of the present theme, that modern life is to give the judgment? This I think will be more clearly seen,

if we place the emphasis on the preposition *to*—adapted *to*. To what? To modern life!

In the present day, society proclaims loudly at the corners of the streets, that the gospel is "old," "antiquated," "a finely-woven tale of past ages, suitable for old women," "that the primitive method of worshipping God is dull and monotonous," "that the gospel ought to move with the times," "that revelation is now made to man either through his reasoning faculties, his soul, or his conscience," and by some, as before mentioned, "by communications from departed spirits;" the fruits of which theories are everywhere seen. We have our "Church for the People," "Re-creative Religionists," "Church of Progress," "Spiritualism," with its "scientific evangelists," Ritualism and Rationalism in our reformed and Protestant Church of England, the Nonconformists with their fine steeples, trained choirs, and entrancing music. These are all accommodating and adapting themselves to the so-called necessities of "the times." Religion is the fashion; full congregations the aim. Subjects of a "progressive" character are the themes. *Adapting* the gospel to "the times" is their defence. All are in a sense catering for the public—the "working classes." Thus is the simplicity of the religion of Christ rejected, and *religions for the times* instituted in its place. Have those who have not been so bold as to reject the gospel entirely, succeeded in their endeavours to adapt the gospel "to the times," to modern life? Have the so-called improvements been consistent with the spirit of the word of God? And are the "reformers" unanimous in their adaptation of the gospel to "the times"? Until these are answered in the affirmative, I maintain it is impossible to adapt the gospel—God's plan of salvation—to the *so-called* requirements of modern life. "The fashion of this world passeth away; but the word of the Lord endureth for ever. And this is the word which by the gospel is preached unto you."

The modern adapters of the gospel are like the man in the parable of the marriage of the king's son. He accepted the invitation, went to the banqueting hall with the other guests, but without conforming to the usual custom and conditions of the invitation, he "had not on a wedding garment." The consequence was, although he had accepted the invitation, he was "cast into outer darkness, there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." The same may be said of many of the modern reformers of the gospel. They admit that God has sent the glorious message of peace and salvation to men. They do not deny that God has sent His gospel into the world. But like the man in the parable, they have not put on the wedding garment—the robe of righteousness—they are not content with the simple truths, the lowly spirit, and aggressive doctrines of the word of God. "For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strongholds." These modern religionists are dissatisfied with the gospel as it is in Jesus, have made several

adaptations to please the world, which adaptations *annul* the character and vital purpose of the gospel. They accept the gospel (if only for the name), wish to have its advantages, to partake of its heavenly food; *but* on their own conditions. Why should they go to the wicket-gate, when they could make a short cut of it by climbing over a wall near at hand, avoid many inconveniences, difficulties, and trials which they had heard many pilgrims, who had gone the other way to Mount Zion, had met with? Having enjoyed a very pleasant walk through beautiful fields and shaded lanes, they, like Formalist and Hypocrisy in Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress," congratulate each other with this, "If we get into the way, what matter is it which way we get in? If we are in, we are in." Thus do they trouble us, "and would pervert the gospel of Christ," and bring themselves under strong condemnation. May the language of St. Paul, when writing to the Galatians concerning the spread of rationalism, be ours, "Do I now persuade men or God? or do I seek to please men? for if I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ."

GEORGIUS D. E.

**THE WORST WOE OF WAR.**—"The darkest aspect of this monstrous enormity is seen in the fact that it sweeps away to their eternal doom ignorant and unprepared men whom it has first demoralised and debauched. We say nothing now of the mental waste and destruction of vigorous life involved in all this. We dwell not on the withering grief that falls on the bewidowed, the orphaned, and those left childless. Nor can we speak of the wounded and mangled, to whom the cup of existence must be a thing of dregs rather than that of fresh and pure enjoyment. All that might be seen on the morning after the battle has never been reproduced by 'art or man's device;' and the most graphic language is powerless to picture it. But, if the appalling horrors and carnage of the scene could be sketched with all the minute fidelity of photography, and set fully in order before the eyes, what were they, in all their awful ghastliness, as compared with the more unspeakable woes that are realized and witnessed in that state which is obtained off from our gaze! No 'gates ajar,' nor open door gives us to see what transpires within that veil. But we have it revealed to us here by the Lord: He pictures it as a place of weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth. And whatever hope we may have of men who sicken upon their bed, and whose latest hours may be passed amid circumstances that awaken reflection and stir conviction, giving opportunity for repentance and prayer, and to whom the Father of Mercies may extend the blood-bought blessing of pardon and life eternal,—what can the largest and loftiest charity think of the excited and maddened masses that are smitten dead on the field of blood? They go red handed and reeking into the presence of their God and Judge, with no subdued feelings of sorrow for sin and no fervent cry for mercy, but with all their passions raging like demons in their breasts, cut off in the midst of their days, carried in chariots of fire to their final account."—*Rev. J. W. Todd.*

## Social Economy.

### OUGHT THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO BE DISCONTINUED?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"Under an idle notion that the beauties of character of the two sexes are mutually incompatible, men are afraid of manly women; but those who have considered the nature and power of social influences well know that, unless there are manly women, there will not much longer be manly men. When men and women are really companions, if women are frivolous, men will be frivolous; if women care for nothing but personal interest and idle vanities, men in general will care for little else: *the two sexes must now rise or sink together.*"—*J. S. Mill's Speech in the House of Commons, 20th May, 1867.*

It seems to be assumed by all who write in support of the present system of female subjection, that the grand climax and ultimatum of woman's life is marriage, and its consequent—especially with the poorer class—state of legal if not actual servitude; that she ought to be educated with that sole end in view, that her nobler instincts should not be awakened, that she should only be recognised as the domestic drudge, that her talents and intellect should not be cultivated, lest she should compete successfully with the lords of creation, or lest she should become—as she certainly would do—discontented with her present limited sphere of action.

I am quite sure, however, that no man, married or single, who has any breadth of mind, or who has given any thought to the subject, would advance any such or similar sentiments as those referred to.

Before entering seriously upon the consideration of the subject, I must just say a word or two by the way as to T. F. M.'s article in the July number of this magazine.

It would be easy to dissect it sentence by sentence, and show its utter absurdity, but the occupation would be so agreeable that, for once, I practice a little self-denial, and leave the performance of that task to L. A. J.

But really one cannot help admiring T. F. M.'s kind condescension to the other sex, when he says (the italics are mine), "Equality in *value of nature* she *may* be granted to possess, equality of culture she *may* be entitled to demand, equality of influence she *may* be entitled to *aspire* to, but she must cease to be woman before she can secure such an emancipation as will free her from the *need of subjection.*" Poor woman! You must be periodically thrashed,

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like other animals, and you must lick the hand that inflicts the wound, and be satisfied that it is only done for your good, because you *need* to be kept in subjection!

The way, however, in which T. F. M. avoids facts and reason is admirable, while the self-complacency with which he regards the subject race from his own pinnacle of egotism is supremely amusing. Listen to what he says:—"Besides this, however, the business of the world requires to be done in a sort of even-tempered, calm way; and women are not always able in peculiar circumstances, which are, however, strictly normal with them, to perform the duties of employments which demand *moral serenity, intellectual balance, and emotional coolness.*" But on this the question arises, Are men? Again: "A clear perception of this fact has led to the settlement of the respective spheres of male and female labour, and male and female life, in the manner in which it at present is fixed," &c. T. F. M. must have learned his history very badly to have arrived at this conclusion. But what, think you, is T. F. M.'s great reason for believing that the present subjection of women is beneficial to them? Nothing short of this; viz., that in all life insurance tables women are taken to live longer than men. I do not know whether this be correct or not, but we will suppose it to be so, for the sake of enjoying the conclusion which T. F. M. draws from it: "Now this fact proves that, with all their 'subjection,' they are better off than men; inasmuch as, by being allowed to remain in the quiet havens of life, they have an extended measure of life."

T. F. M. surely cannot know much of female statistics, or he would not talk about the "quiet havens" in which they are "allowed" to remain. I hope to be able to give a few figures in the course of this article, which may perhaps enlighten him on that part of the subject.

But, says T. F. M., "All the measures which society has arranged for the preservation of female purity, peace, safety, home-keeping, and happiness, ought to be not only enjoyed, but valued." He does not, however, tell us what these measures and arrangements are, and I, for my part, can assure him that, when he comes to investigate the matter, if he should ever do so, he will find that most of the measures and arrangements now in vogue facilitate objects quite the opposite of those which he names.

But T. F. M.'s lachrymose conclusion is quite pathetic: "If we discontinue the subjection of woman, we must make her independent; but independence is incompatible with home life and home duty. We may quite as well advocate the discontinuance of sex and of society as the discontinuance of 'the subjection of woman.'" But (accepting for the moment T. F. M.'s bad reasoning) is independence incompatible with home life and home duty? If so, how is it that some men fulfil all its conditions satisfactorily to others, although not to themselves? In this, however, as in other things, T. F. M. quite begs the question, as it is not proposed to

make wives independent of their husbands, any more than to make husbands independent of their wives. I must, however, sincerely condole with T. F. M. on the low estimate he appears to have formed of female capacity and character, and with the expression of this condolence I bid him farewell.

My remarks on this subject will, for the most part, be but an abridgment, and a very poor one, of Mr. Mill's argument in his book on "The Subjection of Women;" but his reasoning is so full, and I so entirely concur with him, that it would be next to impossible to discuss this question without using the arguments he puts forward, although necessarily in language inferior to that with which he clothes them.

The fact is indisputable that the position in life into which a human being is born cannot of itself now prevent that human being from rising to any higher position in the world to which he may aspire. Do we, or do we not, believe that this fact embodies the only correct principle for the proper working of human life? If we do, then the conclusion is obvious that "we ought to act as if we believed it, and not to ordain that to be born a girl instead of a boy, any more than to be born black instead of white, or a commoner instead of a nobleman, shall decide the person's position all through life—shall interdict people from all the more elevated social positions, and from all except a few respectable occupations. Even were we to admit the utmost that is ever pretended as to the superior fitness of men for all the functions now reserved to them, the same argument applies which forbids a legal qualification for Members of Parliament. . . . In all things of any difficulty and importance, those who can do them well are fewer than the need, even with the most unrestricted latitude of choice; and any limitation of the field of selection deprives society of some chances of being served by the competent without ever saving it from the incompetent."

No other instance can be cited in which, from the mere accident of birth—a fatality which nothing can overcome—more than one-half the human race is excluded from all the higher social functions. Religious opinions did at one time effect a similar result, but even in that case a conversion would reverse all the disqualifications; but in this instance there can be no conversion, so that the exclusion is inexorable.

It must be borne in mind that, although it may have been, and probably will still be, often asserted that experience is in favour of the present system of subjection, yet the assertion is a false one, as there has, as yet, been no experience of the results which would follow the emancipation of women, women not having yet been emancipated. Before experience can be cited as favouring the one system or the other, both systems must have been tried.

It is said that women care nothing for politics; and from this unsubstantiated assertion it is sought to draw the conclusion that "the general good is naturally less interesting to women than to



men." But fortunately, "History, which is now so much better understood than formerly, teaches another lesson."

But let us suppose for the moment that, up to the present time, women have manifested no interest in politics, it must be borne in mind that numbers of men are quite apathetic on the subject, although they have the means of displaying any interest they might feel; and the question arises, Is it just to exclude women from the possibility of participating in them? If not, then whether they care for them or not, their disabilities should be swept away. If they do not care for them, they will not participate; while, if they do, justice and reason alike teach that they ought to be in a position to give proof of their interest.

Mr. Mill put the question with his usual fairness and precision in the House of Commons on 20th May, 1867, on his proposal to extend the electoral franchise to women. He then said, that the simple question was,—

"Whether there is any adequate justification for continuing to exclude an entire half of the community, not only from admission, *but from the capability of being ever admitted*, within the pale of the constitution, though they may fulfil all the conditions *legally and constitutionally sufficient in every case but theirs*." "There is no other example of an exclusion which is absolute. If the law denied a vote to all but the possessors of £500 a year, the poorest man in the nation might—and now and then would—acquire the suffrage; but neither birth, nor fortune, nor merit, nor exertion, nor intellect, nor even that great disposer of human affairs, accident, can ever enable any woman to have her voice counted in those national affairs which touch her and hers as nearly as any other person in the nation."

*Prima facie*, every one is entitled to a voice in his own affairs; and Mr. Gladstone has, with his accustomed justice, himself said, that in order to refuse the suffrage to any one, it is necessary that there should be a ground laid, either of personal unfitness or public danger. Now, does either of these exist in the present instance? Of course it is only proposed to extend the suffrage to women fulfilling the conditions which the Reform Act of 1867, or any other Act which may be in force, requires to be performed by electors. At present the extreme test of fitness is that a voter must be rated to the relief of the poor. Thousands of women are rated to the relief of the poor equally with men, vote in municipal and parochial elections, can hold office as overseers, &c., and even fill the post of mayor of a borough. Now, is there any sense in which women are less fit to vote in parliamentary elections than men? They are householders, they pay their rates, their conduct is better in the majority of instances than that of male voters, and the laws are made for them, affect their individual interests and rights, operate upon them, and they are bound by them; and yet, in violation of the well-known axiom of representative government (which that of England professes to be)—viz., that all interests affected by legislation should be represented in the Legislature when those laws are

made—one of the largest classes in the kingdom is arbitrarily excluded from having even a voice in the election of representatives. As Mr. Mill urges,—

“Can it be pretended that women who manage an estate or conduct a business—who pay rates and taxes, often to a large amount and frequently from their own earnings—many of whom are responsible heads of families, and some of whom, in the capacity of schoolmistresses, teach much more than a great number of the male electors have ever learned—are not capable of a function of which every male householder is capable? Or is it feared that, if they were admitted to the suffrage, they would revolutionize the state—would deprive us of any of our valued institutions, or that we should have worse laws, or be in any way whatever worse governed, through the effect of their suffrages? No one believes anything of the kind.”

And be it remembered that amongst the most essential principles of our constitution is the principle that taxation and representation should be co-extensive; that is to say, whoever is taxed shall, by his representative in Parliament, have a voice in the making of those taxes. And yet here are two people who contribute as largely as each other to the revenue of the country, each possessing the same qualification, one of whom may not vote from the simple fact that she is a woman.

There are many reasons why this unjust political subjection should be discontinued. What is the immediate effect of the denial of a vote to a woman? Simply this; that society does not expect from her, and will not allow her, to concern herself with or take any part in public interests; and her mind is accordingly cramped. How can it be accounted for that, as a rule, women take less interest in national and political history than men, otherwise than by the fact that, from her childhood, it is impressed upon her that she will have nothing to do with it when she attains to years of maturity.

Happily numbers of women have, despite this obstruction, burst the bands of subjection, and shown that the class can take active and useful interest in large public concerns, and thus, by proving to demonstration that they are equal, and in a large number of instances superior to men, have given practical proof that the time has arrived when this subjection should be discontinued.

I say with Mr. Mill on this part of the subject, that “we ought not to deny to them what we are conceding to everybody else, a right to be consulted; the ordinary chance of placing in the great council of the nation a few organs of their sentiments; of having, what every petty trade or profession has, a few members who feel especially called on to attend to their interests, and to point out how those interests are affected by the law, or by any proposed changes in it.”

Unfortunately for both sexes the artificial conditions of society are such that it is impossible for the one sex to study the charac-

of the other, and it therefore happens that (*the italics are mine*)—

“The most favourable case which a man can generally have for studying the character of a woman, is that of his own wife; for the opportunities are greater, and the cases of complete sympathy not so unspeakably rare. And, in fact, this is the source from which any knowledge worth having on the subject has, I believe, generally come. But most men have not had the opportunity of studying in this way more than a single case: *accordingly one can, to an almost laughable degree, infer what a man's wife is like from his opinions about women in general.* To make even this one case yield any result, the woman must be worth knowing, and the man not only a competent judge, but of a character so sympathetic in itself, and so well adapted to hers, that he can either read her mind by sympathetic intuition, or has nothing in himself which makes her shy of disclosing it. Hardly anything, I believe, can be more rare than this conjunction. It often happens that there is the most complete unity of feeling and community of interests as to all external things, yet the one has as little admission into the internal life of the other as if they were common acquaintances. Though nothing may be intentionally withheld, much is not shown.”

It is attempted to be argued that the present position of women is their *natural* state, and that for them to undertake any of the occupations at present monopolized by men would be repugnant to nature. But surely those who use this argument cannot comprehend the meaning of the word “nature,” for if we can be certain of anything it is “that what is contrary to women's nature, to do they never will be made to do by simply giving their nature free play. The anxiety of mankind to interfere in behalf of nature, for fear lest nature should not succeed in effecting its purpose, is altogether unnecessary solicitude. What women by nature cannot do, it is superfluous to forbid them from doing. What they can do, but not so well as the men who are their competitors, competition suffices to exclude from; since nobody asks for protective duties and bounties in favour of women, it is only asked that the present bounties and protective duties in favour of men should be recalled. If women have a greater natural inclination for some things than for others, there is no need of laws or social incitement to make the majority of them do the former in preference to the latter. Whatever women's services are most wanted for, the free play of competition will hold out the strongest inducements to them to undertake; and, as the words imply, they are most wanted for the things for which they are most fit; by the apportionment of which to them the collective faculties of the two sexes can be applied, on the whole, with the greatest sum of valuable results.”

And here it may be fairly asked, Why do men so strenuously object to the proposal to put women on terms of equality with them? I think the reason supplied by Mr. Mill is the real one, although quite unworthy of any man who desires that real comfort, companionship, and sympathy which marriage should afford, but

which it is impossible it can uniformly do in the present condition of the female sex. Mr. Mill says,—

"I believe they are afraid, not lest women should be unwilling to marry, for I do not think that any one in reality has that apprehension; but lest they should insist that marriage should be on equal conditions; lest all women of spirit and capacity should prefer doing almost anything else, not in their own eyes degrading, rather than marry, when marrying is giving themselves a master, and a master, too, of all their earthly possessions. And truly if this consequence were necessarily incident to marriage, I think that the apprehension would be well founded."

Having just glanced at one or two points of the question, let me now draw attention to the state of servitude into which a woman enters when she marries. Let us look, in the first place, to its effect on any property she may have at marriage. "By means of settlements the rich usually contrive to withdraw the whole or part of the inherited property of the wife from the absolute control of the husband, but they do not succeed in keeping it under her own control; the utmost they can do only prevents the husband from squandering it, at the same time debarring the rightful owner from its use. The property itself is out of the reach of both, and as to the income derived from it, the form of settlement most favourable to the wife (that called 'to her separate use') only precludes the husband from receiving it instead of her; it must pass through her hands; but if he takes it from her by personal violence as soon as she receives it, he can neither be punished nor compelled to restitution."

But what is the effect of the present laws of marriage on the poor? Mr. Russell Gurney has carried through the House of Commons a Bill on this subject, and the arguments used by him in that assembly on the 18th May last appear to me to be unanswerable. It is well known that by the present state of our law all the property which a woman possesses at the time of her marriage, and all that may come to her after her marriage, whether acquired, by her own hard earnings or not, belongs to her husband, who, as Mr. Gurney—no mean legal authority—said, "may tear it all from her, squander every penny of it in debauchery, leave her to support by her labour herself and her children; and if, by heroic exertion and self-sacrifice, she is able to put by something for their future wants, unless she is judicially separated from him, he can pounce down upon her savings and leave her penniless." And this is not only saying what he can legally do, but is what numbers of husbands actually do every day in the week. Mr. Gurney has very aptly compared the effect of marriage on the property of a woman with the effect of a conviction for felony. Is this a state of subjection which should be continued? In America it has been removed, the Americans being again in advance of us; and we are told, on reliable authority, that the result has been most advantageous to all. It has already been said that this does not so much

affect the rich portion of the community, who can protect their daughters to some extent by making private laws for themselves through the medium of expensive marriage settlements; but it affects the large mass of the people, and it is therefore all the more urgent that this crying evil shall be done away with. I therefore repeat the question asked by Mr. Gurney in the House of Commons, "Why is not that which is done in every case which we personally care for, made the law of the land, so that a poor man's child, whose parents could not afford the expense of a settlement, may retain a right to any little property that may devolve on her, and may have a voice in the disposal of *her own earnings*, which, in the case of many husbands, are *the best and only reliable part of the incomes of the family*?"

But it may be objected that I am assuming a necessity to exist for a change in the law in this respect. Let us see, therefore, how the facts stand as presented by Mr. Russell Gurney to the House of Commons. "There are at least 800,000 married women who are earning money in this country at the present time, and the disadvantages which they have to encounter under the existing law can scarcely be conceived. Two committees have sat to inquire into the subject: one during the last Parliament approved the principle of the measure, and one during the present Parliament has approved its details. Before those committees abundant evidence was adduced to show that a serious evil existed. I myself have ample opportunity for observing the unfortunate results of the present law in the cases which come before the court over which I have the honour to preside. It has been objected that the instances cited come under the head of exceptional cases; but all I can say is that the number of such cases is infinite. The honourable member for Sheffield has stated before those committees that he employed upwards of 2,000 women, 800 of whom were married, and that the *husbands of numbers of the latter lived in idleness upon the earnings of their wives*: that on the Saturday nights, when the wives received their wages, which should have been applied for the advantage of their families, the husbands took all the money away and spent it in drink, and that the husbands were in the habit of taking their wives' earnings out of the savings bank and squandering it in dissipation. The effect upon a married woman of a state of the law which permitted such proceedings was most demoralizing, because the woman said, 'What's the use of a body striving?' and they become utterly reckless when they find that they are unable to have the control of the money for which they have worked hard."

But the most revolting consequence of the subjection of woman by marriage is that which degrades her into being the mere means for satisfying the passions of her master or husband, however degraded he may be. Take those frequently recurring cases of brutal treatment, physically, or of equally brutal treatment from the debauchery and dissipation of her husband, which must of

necessity fill the mind of every pure woman—and many frequently get irrevocably linked in marriage with such men—with disgust. In such a case the wife is in a worse position than a female slave, for “a female slave has (in all Christian countries) an admitted right, and is considered under a moral obligation, to refuse to her master the last familiarity. Not so the wife. However brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to—though she may know that he hates her, and though she may feel it impossible not to loathe him—he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations. While she is held in this worst description of slavery as to her own person, what is her position in regard to the children in whom she and her master have a joint interest? They are by law *his* children. He alone has any legal rights over them. Not one act can she do towards or in relation to them, except by delegation from him. Even after he is dead, she is not their legal guardian, unless he by will has made her so. This is her legal state; and from this state she has no means of withdrawing herself. If she leaves her husband, she can take nothing with her, neither her children nor anything which is rightfully her own. If he chooses, he can compel her to return, by law or by physical force; or he may content himself with seizing for his own use anything which she may earn or which may be given to her by her relations.” Ought not such a state of things as this at once to be abolished?

Happily it is very true this treatment has not to be endured by every woman, although numbers are obliged to submit to it; but I maintain that no laws should be so constituted as to allow of the possibility of such results. “The laws of most countries are far worse than the people who execute them; and many of them are only able to remain laws by being seldom or never carried into effect. If married life were all that it might be expected to be, looking to the laws alone, society would be a hell upon earth. Happily there are both feelings and interests which in many men exclude, and in most greatly temper, the impulses and propensities which lead to tyranny; and of those feelings, the tie which connects a man with his wife affords, in a normal state of things, incomparably the strongest example. The only tie which at all approaches to it—that between him and his children—tends, in all save exceptional cases, to strengthen, instead of conflicting with, the first. Because this is true; because men in general do not inflict, nor women suffer, all the misery which could be inflicted and suffered if the full power of tyranny with which the man is legally invested were acted on, the defenders of the existing form of the institution think that all its iniquity is justified, and that any complaint is merely quarrelling with the evil which is the price paid for every great good. But the mitigations in practice which are compatible with maintaining in full legal force this or any other kind of tyranny, instead of being any apology for despotism, only serve to

prove what power human nature possesses of reacting against the vilest institutions, and with what vitality the seeds of good, as well as those of evil, in human character, diffuse and propagate themselves. Not a word can be said for despotism in the family which cannot be said for political despotism. If the candidates for matrimony were, before they were allowed to enter into that state, compelled to subject themselves to a searching examination before a competent tribunal, and to prove before that tribunal that they were fit to be entrusted with the destinies of a human being, there might, perhaps, be less reason for discontinuing the present legal subjection of woman to her husband; but "marriage is not an institution designed for a select few. Men are not required, as a preliminary to the marriage ceremony, to prove by testimonials that they are fit to be trusted with absolute power. The tie of affection and obligation to a wife and children is very strong with those whose general social feelings are strong, and with many who are little sensible to any other social ties; but there are all degrees of sensibility and insensibility to it, as there are all grades of goodness and wickedness in men, down to those whom no ties will bind, and on whom society has no action but through its *ultima ratio*, the penalties of the law. In every grade of this descending scale are men to whom are committed all the legal powers of a husband. The vilest malefactor has some wretched woman tied to him, against whom he can commit any atrocity except killing her, and, if tolerably cautious, can do that without much danger of the legal penalty. And how many thousands are there amongst the lowest classes in every country, who, without being in a legal sense malefactors in any other respect, because in every other quarter their aggressions meet with resistance, indulge the utmost habitual excesses of bodily violence towards the unhappy wife, who alone, at least of grown persons, can neither repel nor escape from their brutality, and towards whom the excess of dependence inspires their mean and savage natures, not with a generous forbearance and a point of honour to behave well to one whose lot in life is trusted entirely to their kindness, but on the contrary, with a notion that the law has delivered her to them as their chattel, to be used at their pleasure, and that they are not expected to practise the consideration towards her which is required from them towards everybody else. . . . Until a conviction for personal violence, or at all events a repetition of it after a first conviction, entitles the woman *ipso facto* to a divorce, or at least to a judicial separation, the attempt to repress these 'aggravated assaults' by legal penalties will break down for want of a prosecutor or for want of a witness. When we consider how vast is the number of men in any great country who are little higher than brutes, and that this never prevents them from being able, through the law of marriage, to obtain a victim, the breadth and depth of human misery caused in this shape alone by the abuse of the institution swells to something appalling."

Of course the woman, if she feels inclined not to submit without a struggle, can, by making her own life more miserable, retaliate upon her husband, and can do a vast number of things to make him uncomfortable. "But this instrument of self-protection—which may be called the power of the scold, or the shrewish sanction—has the fatal defect that it avails most against the least tyrannical superiors, and in favour of the least deserving dependents. It is the weapon of irritable and self-willed women, of those who would make the worst use of power if they themselves had it, and who generally turn this power to a bad use. The amiable cannot use such an instrument, the high-minded disdain it. And, on the other hand, the husbands against whom it is used most effectively are the gentler and more inoffensive; those who cannot be induced, even by provocation, to resort to any very harsh exercise of authority. The wife's power of being disagreeable generally only establishes a counter-tyranny, and makes victims in their turn chiefly of those husbands who are least inclined to be tyrants."

H. K.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THAT the subjection of woman ought not to be discontinued is self-evident. The two words "manliness" and "womanliness" surely bear incontrovertible evidence against any theory which would make the members of the different sexes rivals. Emulators they may be, each endeavouring after the perfection of the specific nature of each, but not competitors. I take it, that the words and the associations connected with these words which men commonly employ, indicate pretty correctly the habitual tendency of men concerning the things they denote. Now, who among all the attributes commonly signified by the terms "womanly," "wifely," ever has in his mind independence, push, stir, adventure, self-seeking, and insubmissiveness? While if we take "manly" and "husband-like," do we not invariably attach to these the idea of independence, stern perseverance, strong struggle, and intense capacity for endurance and daring? This, to my mind, settles the question, for I cannot believe that in the passage of centuries the world should have consented to fasten these opposite ideas upon the names denoting the individuals of the diverse sex, unless they had found that a difference really existed, and was beneficially maintained—woman is noblest in subjection and man noblest in power.

Co-equality of sex is nowhere to be seen; in the animal creation each sex has its function and place, and rivalry of sex is unknown. In the whole history of man, it has been the experience of the race that life is most advantageously carried on where the proper division of labour is introduced into social and family life; hence we find household and home duties always assigned to women, and active labour, headship, and power conferred on man. It is indubitable that two cannot walk together unless they be agreed, but



it is as undoubted that agreement is only possible under concession, and in all concession there must be yielding. In the points yielded to, there is superiority granted to one, and there is subjection accepted by another. Life is in reality a constant state of yielding, and of being yielded unto; and it is woman's wisdom to accept and to rejoice in the subjection to which she is inclined by nature and inured by habit.

I hold that independence, if conferred on her, would be ruinous to her, because it would tend to destroy those qualities in her which bring so much of the delight of life into the hearts and lives of both sexes. Independence would change and alter all the relations and requirements of life, and would close up all those avenues of pleasure which spring from spontaneous sympathy.

As matters now are, too, other interests are possible than those of mere pecuniary service, but were the subjection of women discontinued, all these transactions would become matters of traffic. Has not mercenariness among us gone far enough without closing up by its influence all the higher and holier affections, and making a constant contest between money and affection? How could a state of things different from this be brought about, if men and women alike competed against each other in the art and means of making money, when women would hesitate to alter their life's course, and man would look upon woman as lessening his chances of making those dependent on him happy? Then it ought to be considered seriously, if there is really room for everybody to work and get wages in the world, and if the increase of the body of labourers would not lower the price labour would fetch. If it did so, and the law of political economy is that plenty deteriorates price, would it be advantageous that two should be working for the same money as one might have been getting? The more this matter is inquired into the more dangerous does it seem to trifle with the age-hallowed and prescriptive subjection of women, and all the associations of grace and love which cluster round it.

Independence would harden the nature of women, and competition would heighten the selfishness of men. Independence would necessitate a new style of training and of life among women, and competition would unsettle all the relations of life between the sexes. There would be introduced into society a hardness, sharpness, and absence of love which could not fail to be disastrous. To acquire and maintain independence, women would require to learn trades and study professions, and that with equal intensity and devotion as men do; having done so, they would acquire the ambitions and interests of their employments, and they would refuse to engage in the loving life of the family; or if they did, the study and acquisition of years would be surrendered and lost. There would in all such cases be a sheer loss of culture and power, and so far as the trade or professional ambition extended there would be all that force to be overcome prior to the engagements natural between the sexes being entered into; but there would also be the difficulty of

any one of the male sex asking the giving up of this training; these prospects, and this independence, that his home happiness might be enhanced. Therefore independence of life would defeat home-life, and destroy it. I am unwilling to press argument on our opponents. Miss Adeline "claims a just equality," and that also we desire to be given. But a just equality must also be an adjusted equality, and that is what has been done in regard to the relations of the sexes. The disabilities of women are the decrees of nature, and man has only recognised them; but man has, by the arrangements entered into in civilized societies, endeavoured to counterbalance these disabilities by the extension of privileges, and the protection of laws, so that while the necessity for subjection exists the reality of protection should be given. She objects also to "the government of the strongest." This objection, we fear, upsets all her argument. Force of some sort or other is the supreme ruler of men, nations, individuals, life, everything. If man has the highest force in anything in that relation, woman must be subject; and if woman has the highest force in anything in that relation, man must be subject. This is a just equality, and this is what society arranges for by accepting the subjection of women in some things, and enforcing the subjection of men in others. For it is not all power on one side and all subjection on the other. The law has made it imperative on man, and the customs of social life have coincided with law, that man should be subject to many things in counterbalance for the subjection required from women. The provisions of society in favour of women ought not to be overlooked in a discussion like this, and both "Adeline" and "Rosalind" should look upon the other panel in the picture. As things are, I think a few adjustments might be revised, but I do not see on any principle how the independence of women is to be secured, unless they insist on the dependence of man. Co-equality in the same things is impossible. A true equality, however, is possible, if it be allowed that what is ground for subjection in one should be counterbalanced by some other ground for subjection by the other. Thus the differences may be brought to tally, and mutual pre-eminence and mutual subjection may produce the best and most effective equality. As I believe this is what society in these days is really and earnestly aiming at, I think it would be unwise to discontinue the subjection of women. Independence and privilege are incompatible, "a fair exchange is no robbery." We commend men to be just and women to be contented, and we counsel each to do the duty and live the life to which Providence has called each.

E. V.

## History.

## WERE THE CRUSADES BENEFICIAL TO SOCIAL PROGRESS?

## AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

IN all debates there is a probability that the minds of some will be deterred from forming a just decision by the operation of prejudice, sentimental feelings, and the distorted appearance which events will always present when persistently looked at from only one point of view; but in considering this subject we are more than usually in danger of arriving at a fallacious conclusion through the influence of a prejudiced mind and of a one-sided view of the subject. There is so much that may be justly advanced on both sides of this question, that we are especially called upon to listen with strict impartiality to the advice contained in the Latin motto, *Audi alteram partem*. We need, like the judge about to sum up a case for the jury, to weigh the evidence adduced on both sides, without taking into consideration the feelings prompted by the personal bias of our minds. Strife, contentions, and commotions are, indeed, much to be lamented; battles are terrible events; but we must not put this horror of war before our eyes, like coloured spectacles, when we examine the Crusades and their effects. Superstition is most degrading to the human mind, and religious enthusiasm is a mighty power, fraught with danger when indulged to excess and uncontrolled by the softening influences of mercy; but we must not, for that reason, close our eyes to the beneficial effects which they may have produced. We will not attempt to justify the passions of those who engaged in the Crusades; and though we would not, under any circumstances, say, "Do ill that good may come," yet we must allow that good results have often followed on or from evil deeds. We would remind our opponents that merely to show that effects were produced by the Crusades which were antagonistic to social progress will not suffice to prove the negative of this question. They must bring forward evidence to show either that the effects adduced by those who advocate the affirmative did not result from the Crusades, that these effects did not further the cause of social progress, or that the influence produced by the Crusades which were prejudicial to social progress counterbalanced those which were beneficial to it. We admit that some of the effects of the Crusades were opposed to social progress, but at the same time we believe that they were more than counterbalanced by those results of this long-continued warfare which were favourable

to it. In dealing with this question we must consider the state of society at the time when the crusading spirit was first kindled in Europe, and must remember that many influences which would in the present day retard the march of civilization would at that period further the cause of social progress. A clear exposition of the state of European society at the time when the Crusades were first projected would be of great value in this debate. We are not qualified to undertake the task, and must leave it for more learned contributors. We will, therefore, confine ourselves to a few observations upon some of the effects which we believe were produced by the Crusades, and which we also believe to have been beneficial to social progress.

I. *The Crusades fostered union, harmony, and peace, amongst the turbulent nations of Western Europe.* Before the Crusades, European society was in a most unsettled state; there was no thorough bond of union, no one aim, no unity of purpose or feeling to hold together the various barons in each country. Each feudal lord was frequently making war upon some neighbouring baron on account of some private grievance, and the monarch was frequently calling in the aid of some of his barons to make war upon some of the other feudal lords who were subject to him. King made war upon king, baron made war upon baron, the clash of arms was almost incessant, there were frequent incursions into neighbouring states for conquest and revenge, and civil wars prevailed to an almost unprecedented extent. The Crusades afforded the first instance of several independent states joining together for the advancement of one cause: the feuds of rival barons were set aside, and, forgetting their former animosities, they all flocked together to follow the national standards to the Holy Land. There were, it is true, jealousies and disputes amongst the Crusaders, but notwithstanding these special disagreements, it is a general fact that the Crusades produced an amount of union and peace amongst the Christian nations of Western Europe such as had never before existed, and they also led to a very large and permanent diminution of the unparalleled evils of civil war.

II. *The Crusades called forth noble feelings, and many of the Crusaders were actuated by noble motives.* It was a righteous indignation roused by the cruelties of the Mohammedans that first excited the crusading spirit. Warriors had hitherto raised the sword against those at whose hands they had themselves endured wrongs and indignities, but the sword of the Crusaders was first wielded against those at whose hands they had received no personal injury, and they took up arms to avenge the sufferings inflicted upon others. Barons and kings had previously waged war from selfish motives, for personal revenge and personal aggrandizement, but the Crusades were undertaken from an enthusiastic and chivalric devotion to an idea which was not of a selfish character. There were some, indeed, who were prompted to take part in the wars from feelings of a selfish nature, but they were the exception.

As a rule, those who engaged in these contests were actuated by higher and more disinterested motives. The Crusades thus tended to the advancement of civilization by calling into exercise the nobler qualities of human nature, and by leading men to act from generous motives in those affairs in which they were generally impelled to action by selfish considerations.

III. *The Crusades led the Western nations to visit Eastern lands.* At that time the priesthood were the custodians of learning in Western Europe. The knowledge of the world, of literature, of the arts, and of the sciences, which they possessed, they kept to themselves. The works of learned authors were written in languages which they only could read. Before the Crusades there was but little intercourse of nation with nation, and but little communication between the various districts of a country. In peace, the baron, leading a life of inactivity, was shut up in his castle with no society but that of his wife and children, and attended by household servants and men-at-arms. The villeins did not travel far from the estate to which they were attached; even in time of war their military operations were generally conducted in districts bordering upon their native soil. Thus their minds were naturally contracted, and as naturally their minds were expanded, their views enlarged, and their knowledge extended, by travelling to and sojourning in distant lands. The Crusaders were in the East brought into contact with people, ideas, natural and artificial productions, institutions, &c., very different from those with which they were acquainted before they left their native land. High and low, rich and poor, visited countries before unknown to them, and both lord and villein became acquainted with countries that knew nothing of feudalism, where every man was equally free, and where the superior was the leader, and not the enslaver, of his dependants. The serf who has been made a free man to induce him to follow the suzerain of his district to the Holy Land, having taken part in the conflict between the Crescent and the Cross, returns to his own country and describes to the wondering villeins who had remained behind in bondage the things which he had seen and heard; he tells them of a people amongst whom villenage was unknown, and all classes were treated as free men; he speaks of liberty, the arts and sciences he has heard of in the East, the serene sky of foreign lands through which he has passed, and the valour of those infidels that had been spoken of with contempt. The baron returned from the Holy Land expatiates upon the splendour of the countries through which he has marched, the magnificence of their buildings, the beauty of the scenery, the fertility of the soil, and the heat of Oriental climes. The lower classes were brought more into contact with the ecclesiastical order, and, being exposed as much as their superiors to the influence of Asiatic lore, knowledge of every kind was more generally spread through the community at large. These effects were most certainly beneficial to social progress.

V. *The Crusades tended to decrease the influence of sacerdotalism*

*and superstition.* There had been many conflicts between the civil power and the Papacy, and the wars which Europe carried on against the possessors of the Holy Land increased the power and influence of the civil authorities. The valiant leaders of the army now received much of the homage which had previously been awarded to the valiant sons of the Church. Those kings and princes who had acquired renown by their exploits in Palestine were more honoured by their subjects than they ever had been before, and being thus enabled to rest more upon the support of their people, they became more unwilling to submit to papal dictation. The writer of a treatise on "Mediæval History," issued by Chambers, says, "As there had never been a time in the history of the Church when there had not been evidences of a dissatisfied and reforming spirit within her own pale, so after the period of the Crusades this spirit became more manifest;" and the same writer also says, "In the end, however, the Crusades weakened the influence of fanaticism and of the Papacy." Contact with the valorous Saracens and with the generous-spirited Saladin, showed that many of the infidels possessed qualities which commanded respect, and at the same time the conduct of the Greek emperors, and of other European sovereigns, proved that Christian potentates were often guilty of most despicable deeds. The selfish motives which prompted some ecclesiastics, &c., to stir up the people to rescue the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels, showed that the pretence of zeal for this good cause was sometimes merely a cloak to hide their efforts for the advancement of their own interests. Thus the Crusades tended, in the end, to decrease the power of priestcraft, and to unloose the chains of superstition with which the minds of men were so thoroughly fastened.

V. *The Crusades undermined the foundations of feudal institutions.* Feudalism had become a great barrier to social progress. The great number of suzerains within each state wielding a despotic authority over their vassals; the petty disputes continually recurring among the feudal lords; their rivalries, animosities, and selfish projects; the isolation and bondage of their vassals and villeins; the restriction of learning, &c., to the ecclesiastical order; and the limits imposed upon the exercise of a central authority, all combined to keep European society in a stationary condition. But by the Crusades the influence of the town population was increased, the position of the rural labourers was elevated, and the power of the great feudal lords was diminished. The barons were often obliged to grant privileges to their dependants, and to mortgage their lands in order to raise men and means for carrying on this series of wars. Gibbon has very forcibly said, "Among the causes that undermined that Gothic edifice, a conspicuous place must be allowed to the Crusades. The estates of the barons were dissipated, and their race was often extinguished, in these costly and perilous expeditions. Their poverty extorted from their pride those charters of freedom which unlocked the fetters of the slave, secured the farm of the peasant and the shop of the artificer

gradually restored a substance and a soul to the most numerous and useful part of the community." By the Crusades feudal tyranny was weakened, baronial authority limited, the general government of each individual kingdom more centralized, commercial intercourse extended, and municipal and rural freedom increased. These effects tended greatly to clear the way for and give impetus to social progress.

M. F. A., speaking of the word Crusade, says that "it has degenerated till it is employed to denote any romantic, hopeless, or foolish undertaking." We know not what authority M. F. A. may have for this assertion; and as we know not but that the initials M. F. A. may belong to some person who is himself a great lexicographical authority, which we do not pretend to be, therefore we will not venture to positively dispute this statement. But really we did not know that the word Crusade was employed to denote hopeless enterprises rather than those likely to prove successful, or that it was more used in speaking of foolish than of wise undertakings. We believe that the word Crusade is employed to denote a contest undertaken for the carrying out of some general idea, as contrasted with those enterprises undertaken merely for the accomplishment of some selfish project, and that it is applied to wise as much as to foolish undertakings.

There is much truth in the arguments of M. F. A., numbered I. and II.; but we think that we may safely affirm that the Crusades were not so much "missionary expeditions to enforce conversion at the point of the sword," as enterprises undertaken to wrest the Holy Land from the infidels. It was a contest, not so much to convert the Mohammedans as to dispossess them, and the crusading spirit was first roused by the cruelties inflicted by the Turks upon the Christian inhabitants of and pilgrims to Palestine. M. F. A.'s third argument is that "the tendency of the Crusades was to build up the Papacy and increase its power." We allow that, at the first, the crusading spirit tended to increase the papal power; but we believe, as previously maintained, that ultimately the Crusades exerted an influence prejudicial to papal supremacy and to the superstitious doctrines proclaimed by Popish priests. M. F. A.'s fourth argument is that "the Crusades distracted the minds of men from the true causes of social improvement," &c. This argument would have great force if the Crusades had been carried on in the present day; but in the time when these contests took place, the minds of men do not seem to have been acquainted with "the true causes of social improvement," nor their eyes opened to discern "those sound schemes of progress and prosperity which alone can lead men to happiness;" and men cannot be distracted from attending to those considerations which have never been set before their minds. M. F. A.'s fifth argument is that "the Crusades have had the effect of greatly increasing tolerance to military licence and mischief;" but we do not think that there was any increased degree of toleration accorded to military licence and mischief after the

Crusades compared with the toleration shown for those evils in the times which immediately preceded the Crusades. M. F. A.'s sixth and last argument is that "the Crusades encouraged a reckless disregard for human life;" but we do not think there is any evidence to show that there was a greater disregard for human life manifested after than before the Crusades.

These considerations lead us to believe that the effects of the Crusades favoured the cause of social progress more than counterbalanced those which were prejudicial to it, and therefore we maintain that the Crusades were, on the whole, beneficial to social progress.

SAMUEL.

## Greek Days and Roman Nights.

### No. I.—PLATO'S PHÆDO.

#### *Analysis of the "Phædo."*

#### ARGUMENT II.

CEBES, reverting to the doctrines of the Platonic Socrates, recalls the peculiar idea of reminiscence, by which it is maintained that—to use Bacon's explanation—"all knowledge is but remembrance, and that the mind of man knoweth all things, and hath but her own native and original notions (which by the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered) again revived and restored," and infers that if learning is only reminiscence it must surely be necessary that the soul must have pre-existed somewhere before it came hither. This doctrine of reminiscence, which regards the soul as a palimpsest on which the hieroglyphics of a past existence have been "scribbled o'er" by the slight consciousness of child-life in the present state, but from which the obscuring matter is discharged when the soul attains its vigour of thought, and the realities of truth are known to be different from the realities of appearance, is a profound glimpse into the nature of thought, though somewhat misunderstood and misapplied. Its real explanation seems to be the Kantian one of "Conditions of Thinkability"—which likens the spirit of man to a flower, that, under the combined and manifold agencies of experience and culture, develops its own specific and predestinated characteristics out of and in accordance with the divine energy and original power who gave the germ its being. Plato regarded science as an awakening of the soul to the truth learned in some past life; Kant ascribed it to the excitement of the principle of thought by the experience of our present state.

As the senses show us things in their phenomenal state, and



in those conditions in which they become the objects of science, so the soul, which can attain unto science, is held to be possessed of a superiority over the things of sense, and must either have possessed a knowledge of science in its essence, prior to our entrance into this world, or have been born with it in us. If these things were so, all men would be able to give a reason for the things they know. But they are not able to do so, Socrates affirms; and Cebes adds sadly, that at least by this time to-morrow there will not be any one in this world who can reason truly on all things. If these things are not so, "when," Socrates asks, "did we receive our knowledge of things in the abstract—in this life? Assuredly not." Then our souls, before they were in human form, existed apart from these bodies, and possessed intelligence! "Unless," Simmias remarks, "we got such knowledge at our birth." As we have not that knowledge when grown up and thinking till we have made an effort to recall it, when do we lose the knowledge—as soon as it is given or afterwards, and if the latter, at what time? Simmias admits that he did not see that he was talking nonsense. Does not the case stand thus then, that if we know prior to birth we must have existed prior to this world-life. Socrates says, and Simmias assents, that this argument tends exactly to prove that our souls must have existed previous to our birth on the earth.

But what does Cebes think of this argument from reminiscence?—for it is necessary to convince him too. Of the probability of pre-existence Simmias supposes Cebes can entertain no doubt, but that, he thinks, cannot prove to him (for he is the most pertinacious distruster of arguments in existence) that when a man dies, his soul is not dispersed, and so comes to an end—what would hinder that it may have pre-existed, and yet now that it has existed in the body it may at death cease to be, and be destroyed? Cebes argues that half only of the argumentation has been made good; but Socrates asks Cebes and Simmias now to connect the previous argument, "that every living thing is produced from that which is dead," with this, for if the dead must produce the living, then the living must die that reproduction may be possible. Is it not necessary then for the soul to exist after death in order that it may be reproduced?

But you, Cebes and Simmias, seem to desire to sift the reasoning more strictly, as you appear, like children, to be afraid that on the soul's departure it may be dispersed and scattered, especially if one should die, not in a calm, but in a storm! Cebes admits that some childishness may trouble them, and asks Socrates to teach them better, that they may not fear death as children do hobgoblins. You must charm the boy within you. Ah! but when you are gone, says Cebes, where shall we find any one who can charm so skilfully? Greece is wide, and there should be many such in it; there are other nations, too, in which wise men may exist. It will become you to seek diligently to get a true charmer—neither toil nor gold should be spared in such a quest, though

you may probably have him among you. [Perhaps a hint in favour of Plato.]

Cebes promises attention to that, but requests a return from the digression. Socrates assents, and resumes with an argument not now peculiarly Platonic but metaphysical :—

#### ARGUMENT III.

It now lies before us to consider, 1st. What sort of things are discernible and liable to dispersion, and for the destruction of which we should be afraid ; and 2nd. What are indiscernible, and therefore not to be feared for. Certainly ! Well ; things compounded are dissoluble, and things simple are not so. That looks like truth to me, Cebes replies, and Socrates continues, Things always the same, and in the same state, are probably simple, while those which are seldom the same, or in the same state, are in all likelihood compound. Things visible are always changing ; essences do not. We consist of soul and body, the latter of these is visible and the former invisible. When it employs the body in investigation, it is brought among changeable things, but when it exercises its own powers it acquires certainty, and exists among that which is immutable and immortal. Hence to these it is most like, and to things which change least like.

"Thou speakest well and truly, even the greatest dullard, from what you have said, that the soul does most closely resemble that which continues most constantly the same, and the body is more like the changeable ;" so says Cebes, and Socrates rejoins :—It is given to the soul to exercise dominion, and to the body is assigned submission. Does it not seem to be more divine to rule than to obey ? Hence the soul must be regarded as immortal, divine, and gifted with intellective power ; simple, indissoluble, and changeless, while the body is quite the reverse. It follows then that the body is fated to dissolution, but the soul is not, at least, wholly so. For even when a man dies it is some time before "decay's effacing fingers" sweep away "the lines where beauty lingers ;" a body embalmed will, even though a "worthless integument," endure awhile ; and some parts of the body—bones and sinews for instance—hold out long against dissolution ; how much more then shall the soul, the uncompounded, indiscernible, unseen spirit, on passing into the world unseen (whither, should the gods will, I shall shortly depart) remain pure, imperishable, and delighted, untouched by the errors, the terrors, the woes, and the desires of humanity, a god-like essence in the society of the gods ! Still, if it departs from life dulled and embroiled by addiction to animal delights, the soul, as it has lost "the divine property of her first being," and "linked itself by carnal sensuality to a degenerate and degraded state," it cannot but be impressed by what it has delighted in, and be contaminated by it. Hence it must be weighed down, kept out of the viewless dwelling of the high gods, and be constrained to hold its life

among things seen and temporal, as sheeted ghosts that haunt the tomb, doomed for a certain time to walk till the foul crimes committed in their day of nature are purged away, or else, by the exceeding carnality of their disposition, their contaminate being unites itself to a gross body again—perhaps those of animals having like habits and propensities in their way of life, as asses, wolves, hawks, kites, &c., according to the pursuits they prefer. This retributive metempsychosis may also operate in regard to those who practise the virtues of civilization and social life instinctively or imitatively, without philosophical culture or reflection, and these may migrate into bees, ants, wasps, &c., or even into human form again, till they *learn* to be thoughtfully moderate. But the virtues of the mass of men and those of philosophers differ in this, that the latter forms a plan of life and acts on it purposely, not for love of property or fear of poverty, but because they determine on purity of life and piety of thought from a sense of its fitness and rightness. They care for their souls as the seat of thought, and so abstain from evil, and strive to live in a wise innocency.

How may that be? Cebes and Simmias exclaim. The truly philosophic mind knows that the body is a prison in which the mind is immured, but in which it too often seeks to bind itself by its desires. The wise man perceives the sophistries of the senses, and collects and concentrates thought on itself, tests experience by intelligence, and resists desire and pleasure as deceivers. For each pleasure or pain acts as a nail to fasten the soul to the body, and so closely do they then become united, that the experience of the body is accepted for true by the soul, and it is thus so intertextured with the corporeal that it cannot get free from earthliness, and so cannot escape into the empyrean unshackled and free, but ever reverts to life and lower forms of being. This makes the true lover of wisdom resolute and moderate, and not merely moved by the common proclivities of men. He knows what philosophy has achieved in setting him free from bondage to the body too well readily to give himself up to bodily indulgence, weaving a web, as Penelope did, only the reverse way; [she wove during the day, but at night undid the day's work to preserve her chastity and honour, whereas such a soul would weave round itself even by day a web of dishonour.] The philosopher's soul calms all passions, follows whither reason guides, contemplates the true and the god-like, and that which is known, not supposed—the unchangeable ideas which form the substance of things. Living in this manner, the soul secures its future, dying is but going amongst its kindred, and being freed from the evils of humanity. Whoso, O Cebes and Simmias, lives according to wisdom, need fear no evil, his existence is secure by its own nature, and his happy existence by Philosophy is made safe and sure.

## Tolling Upward.

THOMAS COOPER: SHOEMAKER, CHARTIST, AND  
POET.

(*Continued from page 146.*)

### CHAPTER IV.

PROMINENT among the facts of Mr. Cooper's life is his religious scepticism, though the character and degree of this have been grossly misrepresented. Parts of the "Purgatory" are doubly valuable to the student, as illustrating and in part explaining the change from the ardent Christianity of the author's early poems to the extremity of agonizing perplexity, thus expressed in an address to the sun:—

"On shadows leaning, these [sun-worshippers] did vaguely urge  
Their dreaming pilgrimage; and, lest I lean  
On shadows too—though thousand lights converge  
To deck with loveliness the Nazarene—  
I hesitate, demur, surmise, and glean,  
Daily, new grounds to doubt the Mythic dress—  
Phœnician woof, once more!—through which is seen,  
I fear, thy ancient face—bright Comeliness!—  
Fabling with future life poor grave-doomed worms to bless!

He whom the Arimathean's tomb enclosed—  
The Toiler blest, who on the vile cross died—  
But, spite of guards, the bonds of death unloosed,  
Scattering the men of iron in their pride  
Convulsed to helplessness, and forth did ride,  
Leading captivity captive! Is he not—  
Magnific beam—thy power personified—  
Night-tombed—and, then, pouring dismay and rout  
On Darkness, while Earth's million morning-voices shout?

\* \* \* \* \*

"Oh! I could brook  
The dungeon, though eterne!—the Priests' own hell,  
Ay, or a thousand hells, in thought, unshook,  
Rather than Nothingness! and yet the knell,  
I fear, is near, that sounds—*To consciousness farewell!*"  
Book iii., stanzas 20, 21, and 24.

And this remark again made in book the sixth:—

"I say not that there is no God, but that  
*I know not.*"—Book vi., Stanza 31.

His mental struggles and questionings reveal themselves repeatedly; yet amid all he could also write, showing what true belief lived on in his soul, while at the same time they point out (in the existence, so dread and strange, of pain and evil in nature itself, and in the supposed teaching by Christianity of the eternal continuance of woe and hate) the main sources of his doubts, the ardent lines—

"And this, in humbleness I would declare,  
And yet with courage, is my only Faith :  
Goodness alone, with its blest, yearning care,  
Is worshipful; for Goodness only hath  
Power to make good and happy things of breath  
And thought. If Man can be transformed  
Wholly to virtue,—punishment and wrath,—  
Taught by all priests that on the earth have swarmed,  
Must be untaught; and Man by Love to Right be charmed.

"Goodness alone is worshipful. Not what  
Gives life, but what gives happiness is good."—Book vi., 28, 29.

And these fervently thrilling words,—

"Forgive them, for they know not what they do !"—  
O Christ ! how worshipfully great thou art  
Uttering such dying breath ! . . .  
. . . . If not Divine  
Thou wert—thy self-born light and love is more  
Miraculous than aught by all the line  
Of the heart's precept-makers writ in page benign."—Book vi., 10, 11.

And still more tenderly even in the following stanzas :—

"I love the Galilean; Lord and Christ  
Such goodness I could own; and, though enshrined  
In flesh, could worship; If emparadised  
Beyond the grave, no Eden I could find  
Restored, though all the good of humankind  
Were there, and not that yearning One, the Poor  
Who healed, and fed, and blest ! Nay to my mind,  
Hell would be Heaven with Him ! Horror no more  
Could fright, if such benignant beauty trod its shore !

"I love the sweet and simple narrative,  
With all its childlike earnestness—the page  
Quadruple where those love-wrought wonders live :  
I would the tale were true : that heritage  
Of immortality it doth presage  
Would make me glad indeed. But doubts becloud  
Truth's fountains as their depths I seek to gauge,—  
Till with this trustless reckoning I am bowed—  
Man's heritage is but a cradle and a shroud !"—Book iii., 22, 23.

If Mr. Cooper is ever able, as we hope he may be, to write an autobiography—intellectual, political, and religious—the chapters which will trace the transition of his thoughts towards God and Christ, from fervent worship to despairing fear, and from unbelief to stronger faith again, will be important and attractive. There is a sketch in "Wise Saws and Modern Instances," entitled "Dame Thumpkinson and her Orphan Apprentice Joe," which is supposed to be drawn in part from the writer's own experience. It details the religious history of a self-cultured and thoughtful mind, which passes through methodist excitement and conversion to exhaustion of feeling, and thence by a subtle process to a rationalist explanation, first of its own emotions, and then of Christianity; until all belief is unsettled, and the thinker finally rests in the simple faith and practice of benevolence. But if this was intended to represent fully the stages of Mr. Cooper's own thought, it clearly does injustice to the intelligence of his earlier religiousness. "Joe" is described as attaining to an apparent consciousness of divine forgiveness through sheer force of believing that he *is* forgiven—in short, through a simple process of self-persuasion. But the spiritual poems of the collection published in 1833 show that Mr. Cooper had a much firmer hold than this upon the common sense and consistency, as well as loftiness, of Christian truth—a much clearer conception of the glorious divine plan for the reconciliation and redemption of the world. It must be remembered that his religious culture was not merely that of the mystical and enthusiastical kind which might be supposed to prevail among partially educated Methodists in his day, but that he had derived strength of intellectual and spiritual comprehension from intimate communion with Hooker, and South, and Jeremy Taylor, and all the greatest divines of the English Church.

Probably the seeming and real apathy of the professing church to the condition of the poor—which the Rev. Charles Kingsley has truly said to be the great Christian problem of the age—had something to do with the commencement and progress of Mr. Cooper's scepticism. This seems the more likely from the determined hostility to the "priests" (used as a generic term for all religious teachers attached to an outward organization) which breathes through his "prison-rhyme" and all his lectures; though when ministers of religion did give sympathy and help to the suffering and oppressed their services were heartily welcomed, appreciated, and extolled by him, as in his glowing, loving, reverent portraiture of Robert Hall.

The "Chartist Hymn Book" has been quoted as exhibiting a deep religiousness; and a lofty trust in a guiding and guarding Providence was expressed in Mr. Cooper's great trial speech at Stafford. But these seem animated by a deistic rather than a Christian faith, and from Deism, amid the broodings of his prison solitude, the descent to the hopeless, torturing questionings shown in the "Purgatory" would be natural and rapid. Notwithstand-

ing all his expectations of annihilation, and negations of the proof of a divine Creator and Controller of the universe, Mr. Casper has been wholly free from the atheistic propagandism to which faith is hateful, and unsettlement a pleasure. He has never tried to lead men from God and Christ; his doubts have been those of the understanding, not of the heart,—perplexities rather than unbeliefs.

Shortly after the publication of his great poem, Mr. Casper's "Wise Saws and Modern Instances" appeared—two volumes of sketches from life, both grave and humorous. These are full of broad kindly sympathy with men, and show a keen eye for characteristics and peculiarities, especially of the old Lincolnshire life, and the quaint, homely characters it produced. The stories were written as a relief from the more strenuous toil involved in the composition of the "Purgatory." They are told simply, without striving for effect, and are hence full of truth and interest. Some are more than descriptive, being based upon portions of the author's own history; to these various references have been already made. "Kucky Sarson, the barber, or the Disciple of Equality," is a lesson for hot levellers, on their own application of the principle. Then come "Raven Dick, the Poacher; or 'Who scratched the Bull?'" "Tim Swallowwhistle, the Tailor; or 'Every Dog has its Day:,'" "Davy Lidgitt, the Carrier; or, 'The Man who brought his Ninepence to Nought,'" with many more. "Master Zerubbabel, the Antiquary, and how he found out the 'Noose-larning,'" is especially delightful for its quiet fun and satire. Darker pictures are not wanting,—of Leicester distress, for instance, but even this is relieved by the noble figure of Robert Hall, as "The Minister of Mercy." "The Old Corporation" is on a favourite theme; we shall meet with it again in "Alderman Ralph."

In January, 1846, "The Baron's Yule Feast" was issued. The author describes it as "a metrical essay, composed chiefly of imperfect and immature pieces," and excuses its publication by "the ambition to contribute towards the fund of Christmas entertainment, in which agreeable labour I see many popular names engaged."

"It is the season when our sires  
Kept jocund holiday;  
And now, around our charier fires,  
Old Yule shall have a lay:  
A prison bard is once more free; \*  
And, ere he yields his voice to thee [the grave],  
His song a merry song shall be."

The book, which is dedicated to the Countess of Blessington, describes a "Yule Feast" at Torksey's Hall in the olden time, when lord and serf lived in rough brotherhood, and the rich pro-

\* In chapter I., page 218, this has been erroneously termed a "prison rhyme."

vided without stint for the wants of the aged and the poor. This looking back to the past, to a supposed "golden age," in protest against an age of iron, workhouse "bastilles," and niggardly parochial relief, is continually expressed in the Chartist literature. In Canto iii. the bard is supposed to be chidden by his fellows for singing a song of plenty and good cheer, making their want more bitter, and he replies,—

"My rhymes are trivial, but my aim  
Deem ye not purposeless ;  
I would the homely truth proclaim,—  
That times which knaves fall loudly blame  
For feudal haughtiness,  
Would put the grinding crew to shame  
Who prey on your distress."

The "Minstrel's Song" and "Woodman's Song"—included in this poem—were written to airs *previously* composed by Mr. Cooper, which were afterwards published, and are declared to prove his possession of a genius for harmony as well as a passion for "sweet sounds."

The concluding portion of the work illustrates the perpetuity of the author's confidence in the final victory of goodness:—

"Right, glorious right, shall yet be done !  
Wrong from its fastness shall be hurled—  
The world shall be a happy world !  
It shall be filled with brother-men—  
And merry Yule oft come again !"

During Mr. Cooper's imprisonment, the chief energy of the Chartist leaders had been expended in differences and quarrels. The only point of interest in connection with their movements was the hostility avowed to the principles and supporters of the Anti-Corn Law League, which showed itself, among other manifestations, in a public discussion between Cobden and O'Connor.

Prominent among the subjects which engaged the attention of that body in the first months of 1846 were those of the Militia and the liberation of Frost and his fellow-prisoners. Induced by the proposals concerning these which some of his associates advocated, Mr. Cooper delivered "Two Orations against taking away human life under any circumstances, and in explanation and defence of the misrepresented doctrine of non-resistance." These were at once printed, with the dedication—"To the Working Classes, before whom these Orations were delivered, the following pages are inscribed, with every sentiment of devotion to their truest interests, by one whose heartfelt pride it is to be—One of their Order." He avowed in these that his opinions respecting the employment of physical force had, during the past three years, undergone a total change, and that, from declaring, at the Manchester Conference, ":



readiness to fight, he had come to "the conclusion—the clear and conscientious conclusion—that all wars and fightings were wrong, even the taking of human life in self defence." The addresses are remarkable for philanthropic fervour and oratorical force; they are heart-full of the "enthusiasm of humanity;" but the speaker seems to have been dazzled by the glory of the final vision and jubilant end of his "Purgatory," and in the faith of their early realization to have somewhat overstepped the boundary of calm judgment and cogent reasoning. His last words are—

"If unsuccessful—if life itself is forfeited in the cause, there have been glorious martyrdoms ere now! Cleave to the truth: we shall be instrumental in making the world a happy world—a world of brothers!"

Mr. Cooper has, we know, modified the extreme position taken up in these orations.

O'Connor was again offended by his former adherent's refusal to support a scheme for placing the working classes, as owners, upon the land,—of course with ultimate political intentions. The advocacy of non-resistance was a further rebellion against his authority, and he denounced it in unmeasured terms. The breach was thus completed, and Mr. Cooper finally quitted the section of the Chartist body which, as we have seen, he at Leicester so ardently assisted.

Another People's Convention was about to be held in Leeds, to which he was appointed a delegate by the City of London adherents to the Chartist movement. He gave preliminary notice of a series of resolutions, repudiating physical force doctrines, demanding publication of the proceedings of the Executive, condemning O'Connor's Land Society, and censuring him for holding in his own name an estate purchased with its funds. He asked O'Connor to meet him before the Conference to rebut the accusation of untrustworthiness, but the challenge was not accepted.

This expression of lack of confidence in the Irish leader, and call for publicity of action, exposed Mr. Cooper to rough treatment from many of his former friends, who not only refused to suspend judgment until he and O'Connor met before them, but assailed him with many opprobrious epithets.\* He was charged with wishing to destroy O'Connor's "Northern Star," in favour of "Douglas Jerrold's Weekly Newspaper," established in the summer of 1846, for which he was now, during a tour in the manufacturing districts, collecting materials and writing articles to illustrate "the condition of the people of England."

Mr. Cooper, in consequence, resigned the secretaryship of the "Exiles, Widows, and Orphans Fund," and also wrote, through *Lloyd's Newspaper*, two letters to the members of the Land Society, explanatory of his case.

When the Conference assembled at Leeds on the 3rd of August,

\* Gammage's "History," page 498.

and the preliminary formalities had been attended to, he moved for a report of the condition, resources, and prospects of the movement, but neither secretary nor chairman could afford any information. As he attempted to speak further, his voice was drowned by insulting shouts. Ernest Jones, a three months' Chartist only, then moved Mr. Cooper's expulsion on the ground of malicious resistance to their proceedings. The proposal was carried by a partial but unopposed vote, and, as Mr. Cooper refused to leave the room, the meeting was adjourned to the following morning, when his entrance was forcibly prevented.\*

Under the date of August 8, 1846, there is an interesting passage in Montgomery's "Life." The Rev. Mr. Holland informs his Sheffield friend that he had been introduced to Mr. Cooper, whom he describes as "a frank, well-behaved, strong-minded, clever-spoken man, full of poetry."

"Cooper wished me to present to you (Montgomery) this copy of his two Orationes, against taking away human life under any circumstances. I told him I would gladly do so, *although I was apprehensive you might think I had been keeping very strange company—that of an avowed Chartist*, who was on his way from the Convention of Delegates at Leeds. Cooper replied that he was no longer a Chartist; he and his old friends had parted company the day before; they denouncing him as timid and infirm in a cause for which he had suffered so long and so much; and he determining to have nothing more to do with them, unless they would at once repudiate Feargus O'Connor, and openly renounce the doctrine of appeal to physical force under all circumstances."

Montgomery took the book, "evidently pleased to have heard this concerning its author."

This was the end of Mr. Cooper's definite connection with the Chartist body, though somewhat later (1849) he, forgetting his former ill-treatment, gave four lectures, and presided at a public meeting, in aid of the Victims and Defence Fund, when money was urgently needed in consequence of renewed arrests and Government prosecutions.

Henceforth the history of Chartism has little connection with our subject. O'Connor continued for a time to be the idol of the body. His land scheme made some progress.

"The plan was fascinating; a beautiful cottage and four acres, with £30 to work it, by a prepayment of £5 4s.,—how easily they might reach a social paradise! Men who had been vegetating with their families on 9s. or 10s. per week were enchanted. It had taken a life of hard labour to enable them to raise £5; away went the poor result of this labour into the Land lottery, in exchange for which they hoped to grasp the millennium."†—

In August, 1847, another effort was made, by means of radical candidates at the general elections, to bring the principles of the

\* Gammage's "History," page 300.  
1870. X

† *Ibid.*, page 307.

Charter distinctly before the public mind. In some instances these candidates went to the poll; in a few they were successful,—W. J. Fox, George Thompson, and O'Connor being amongst those returned to Parliament. The movement seemed to take a fresh start, and the Land Fund reached fifty thousand pounds, notwithstanding repeated expressions of distrust from various quarters towards its founder and chief. Renewed wide-spread and deep distress enabled the agitation once more to assume a formidable appearance, and extreme counsels again got the upper hand, in spite of urgent remonstrances from Bronterre O'Brien, and others of the more moderate section.

In 1848, the Repeal movement, headed by Smith O'Brien, Meagher, and John Mitchell, arose in Ireland, and was favoured by the English Chartists. The Revolution in France also gave a further impulse to democratic feeling.

Another "National Petition" in favour of the Charter was prepared, which O'Connor asserted to contain 5,700,000 signatures. He was to present it to the House of Commons on the 10th of April, the whole body of London Chartists intending to accompany it through the City to Westminster; while in the provinces the same day was to be devoted to mass meetings in its support. The Government took extraordinary precautions against an outbreak. Nearly 10,000 troops were posted in and about London, with 70,000 special constables. The Tower, the banks, and other public buildings, were defended by barricades. A large meeting was held on Kennington Common, but the authorities were firm in disallowing the procession, and by the advice of the leaders it was abandoned, so that the much-dreaded day closed in peace, the petition being quietly presented by O'Connor in the ordinary course.

Large gatherings, however, continued to be held, and in some towns the Chartists formed themselves into armed companies and met regularly for drill.

Great excitement was caused by the news of John Mitchell's arrest, condemnation, and transportation, resulting in some slight disturbances. Smith O'Brien, Meagher, and O'Donoghue headed an Irish rising,—speedily terminated by their capture, trial, and death-sentence—the latter, however, being commuted to transportation. This contributed to the great uneasiness in England; arming went on rapidly, and at Bingley and Ashton there were conflicts between the Chartists and the police and military. Fresh arrests were made, and prosecutions were more numerous even than in 1842. Ernest Jones, R. G. Gammage, the future historian of the movement, Joseph Barker, and scores of others were committed for trial. The case against Gammage was not proceeded with, Barker was discharged, and Ernest Jones was condemned to imprisonment for two years. Many less known agitators received similar sentences, while those concerned in the actual outbreaks shared the fate of Smith O'Brien and his colleagues.

These demonstrations of the futility of an appeal to force helped

materially to check the action of the more violent supporters of the Charter. O'Connor and the other physical force leaders lost influence, and their demands were gradually modified. Renewed quarrels injured their power and wasted their energies. The Land Scheme broke down, its author was deserted by those whom he had, however unwisely, tried to serve, and he became insane. Ernest Jones, Thomas Cooper, and R. G. Gammage attempted to reorganize the party in 1852 and 1853, but failed; and soon the "National Charter Association" ceased to exist, except in so far as it may have been represented by the numbers of local democratic societies, unconnected by any general organization, which had already been established. These, with a large number of progressionist newspapers which the stirring months of 1848 had called into existence (among which may be named Bronterre O'Brien's *Reformer*, published in the Isle of Man; Gerald Massey's *Spirit of Freedom*, started at Uxbridge; Reynolds's *Political Instructor*; Cassell's *Standard of Freedom*; and Cooper's *Plain Speaker*), conducted a much more guarded and judicious agitation, which doubtless, like Chartism itself, has contributed largely to the formation of that public opinion which is quietly adopting and carrying out in legislation all the really important points which the Charter embodied and its supporters attempted forcibly and prematurely to secure.

Returning to Mr. Cooper's personal history, he continued for some time to travel through the provinces, lecturing on political and other subjects. Being at Carlisle, he was able to spend four days on a pedestrian excursion through the glorious scenery of the Lake district, reaching Rydal on the afternoon of the third day. In his dusty condition, without an introduction, and thinking, too, that his Chartist "rhyme" would be little recommendation to the patriarchal laureate, he hesitated much as to calling upon Wordsworth, but his desire to see the poet of the "Excursion" and the "Ode on Immortality" overcame his diffidence, and he went to Rydal Mount in the hope of securing a short interview. "In another half-minute" (after sending in his name) "I was in the presence of the majestic old man, and I was bowing with a deep and heartfelt homage for his intellectual grandeur." The interest of the occasion was increased by the presence of Mrs. Wordsworth, and the subsequent entrance of Mrs. Arnold, widow of the great master of Rugby School.

"Nothing struck me so much in his conversation as his remark concerning Chartism after the subject of my imprisonment had been touched upon. 'You were right,' he said, 'I always said the people were right in what they asked; but you went the wrong way to get it.' I almost doubted my ears, being in the presence of the 'Tory' Wordsworth. He read the inquiring expression of my look in a moment, and immediately repeated what he had said,—'You were quite right; there is nothing unreasonable in your Charter; it is the foolish attempts at physical force for which many of you have been blameable.'

"I had heard that Wordsworth was very vain and egotistical, but ha-

always thought this very unlikely to be true in one whose poetry was so profoundly reflective; and I now felt astonished that these reports should ever have been circulated. To me he was all kindness and goodness, while the dignity with which he uttered every sentence seemed natural in a man whose grand head and face, if one had never known of his poetry, would have proclaimed his intellectual superiority."

The talk also turned upon Byron, Tennyson, and French politics. During part of the conversation they were walking up and down the charming terrace in front of the laureate's home, and Wordsworth introduced Mr. Cooper to his aged sister, then being drawn about the courtyard in a wheeled chair, "as a fellow-poet."

"I left him with a more intense feeling of having been in the presence of a great and good intelligence than I had ever felt in any other moments of my life."\*

Towards the end of the year Mr. Cooper returned to London, and commenced speaking at the National Hall, Holborn, and at the John Street Institution, on various attractive and important topics, conducting classes gratuitously, and joining in an attempt to establish a people's college. Early in 1847 the "Reasoner" began to supply partial reports of his "orations" (Mr. Cooper's favourite word, as simply meaning "talks" by its etymological derivation). From its lists of lectures at the various free-thought and democratic London institutions, we find that Mr. Cooper usually lectured once—frequently twice or even three times—weekly, discoursing upon a singular variety and range of subjects, social, literary, historical, political, philosophical, scientific, and religious. Though he became thoroughly identified with the cause of (so-called) free thought, themes bearing upon the questions in debate between sceptics and Christians had little prominence among those selected for his disquisitions, and when they were chosen, it was more for the development and establishment of a definite though limited faith than for the attack and overthrow of generally received opinions. Towards the end of 1847 the following subjects were treated of in this manner:—"The Real as Separable from the Symbolical Character of Christ," "The Superiority of Christ," "Humanity the Highest Form of Divinity," "Man's Office—the Subjugation of Nature and the Advancement of Mind," "Duty of Man—the Perfectibility of Moral Character," and "Veritable Religion, and the Bliss which will accompany its Universal Diffusion." During the first twelve months alone Mr. Cooper delivered the following among many more orations; the list bears emphatic witness to the extent and scope of his reading, and to the immense activity of his appreciative, assimilative, and reproductive powers:—"Luther," "Tell," "Mahommed," "Howard," "Paine," "Cobbett," "Rienzi," "Washington," "Chivalry," "Superstitions of the Middle Ages," "Taxation and the National Debt," "Ham-

\* *Cooper's Journal*, May, 1850.

let," "The Swiss Question," "The French Revolution of 1789"—a series, "The Peculiarities of Men of Genius," "Oberlin, Neff, and Bernard Gilpin," "The Peculiar Features of the Age we live in," "Poland, Sobieski, and Kosciusko," "Dignity of Character as exemplified in our English Forefathers," "Athens under the Administration of Pericles," "Origin and History of the Gipsies," "Ancient Egypt," "Reign of Anne," "Soul-Words of the Dying—Keats, Canova, and Mozart," "Slaves, Serfs, and Servants," "Masaniello," "George Fox," "Poetry of the Old Testament."

The following three or four years saw an equal variety ("delivered," says *Howitt's Journal*, "to crowded audiences"), in which the vindication of socialist, anti-supernatural, and pantheistic principles became more continuous and prominent. All were animated by earnest purpose to quicken, elevate, and ennoble the moral and intellectual life of the speaker's auditory, and were charged with his ever-present faith in the ultimate triumph and permanence of goodness, freedom, truth, and love. W.

## The Reviewer.

*The King and the Commoner: an historical play.*

BY JOHN ALFRED LANGFORD, LL.D.

(Printed for private circulation.)

THE modern historical drama has not been remarkable for the number of its successes. An attempt at the revival of the Shakspearean form of drama was made by M. G. Lewis, J. S. Knowles, E. B. (now Lord) Lytton, R. C. Maturin, D. W. Jerrold, S. N. Talfourd, Henry H. Milman, Byron, W. Procter (Cornwall), Richard Lalor Shiel, J. H. Payne, T. L. Beddoes, and a few other double-named playwrights, besides Mary Mitford, Joanna Baillie, and Maria Edgeworth. But it did not last long, and only a few of the plays produced by these *revivers* have been retained upon the list of the acted drama. Leigh Hunt, Henry Taylor, and William Smith have more recently written dramas of a historical cast, but they have been, avowedly, less intended for the stage than for the closet—with the imagination of the reader for the stage-manager, and the variously touched emotions as the vitalizers of the "airy nothings" to which they have striven to give "a local habitation and a name." The public has, however, been slow to cry out "the play, the play's the thing!" and the novel has outdone the drama. Yet the play is really a form of literature which has a peculiar province of its own, and has a function in intellectual economics to fulfil which no other possible form of literature can really supersede.

It is of importance to note the distinctive element of excellency in the drama which makes its supercession improbable, nay im-

possible. It appeals to the love of plot-interest in the most pertinent and concise manner. The author supplies plot, thought, speech, but action, scenery, and circumstance are *seen*, the thought is spoken while the act is in progress, and the intervals of incident are supplied by the suggestions of the imagination. There is thus the nearest approach to visible reality and personal experience presented to the emotions to awaken and quicken them. There is economy of intellectual activity with intensity of emotional strength, concentrated and combined so as to make it the very essence of experience presented to the soul. Bacon rightly says, therefore—with an allusiveness to Shakspeare's historic plays which is unmistakeable,—“Dramatic poetry is history made visible.” Similarly, Lord Lytton calls it “the concentration of historic events;” while Coleridge more philosophically describes it as “a collection of events borrowed from history but connected together in respect of cause and time, poetically and by dramatic fiction; and thus while the unity from mere succession may be destroyed, it is supplied by a unity of a higher order, which connects the events by reference to the workers, gives a reason for them in the motives, and presents men in their causative character.” The great chief of dramatic poetry has, however, himself affirmed of “the purpose of playing,” that its “end, both at the first and now was, and is, to hold as ’twere the mirror up to nature; to show virtue his own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the his form and pressure.”

In this play Dr. Langford has worked upon a good plot, and he has been very successful in realizing the times, the feelings, and the characters; while his “concentration” of the events is really such as to justify much praise. We note, however, that setting his mind perhaps upon the idea of the dignity of modern tragedy, he has not furnished his play with an under-plot—that which in Shakspeare almost always follows as the shadow of the great events of the play. This might, we think, even yet, be inwrought with the texture of the history, by giving *Judith* a lady's maid or humble attendant, and *Hubert*, the archbishop, a jester or henchman with wit,—of which an example may be found in Jerrold's *Thomas à Becket*. The plot might also have been interwoven by bringing *John's* character, on its treacherous side, into greater activity in fomenting the civic troubles of his brother's kingdom. The scene with which the play terminates might be made grandly sensational by bringing the mob of London on the stage at the closing catastrophe, at the crash and fall of the tower, while the fire leaps up into the night sky, and the hero dies amidst the flames of the conflagration.

Here is the author's account of the foundation of the plot:—

“The play of *The King and the Commoner* is founded on the following passage in Dr. Lingard's History of England:—

“William Fitz-Osbert, equally distinguished by the length of his beard and the vehemence of his eloquence, professed himself the advocate of the people, but at the same time was careful to flatter the wishes of the Prince.

He did not deny that war was just and necessary, or that the nation was bound to furnish supplies to the sovereign; but he contended that the rich and powerful had contrived means to shift the burden from their shoulders and to impose it on those who were least able to bear it. He crossed the sea to lay his sentiments before the king, by whom he was not unfavourably received; returned in haste to London, and by inflammatory harangues from St. Paul's Cross, threw the whole city into a ferment. Associations were formed; fifty-two thousand persons bound themselves to obey the orders of their advocate; and the more wealthy inhabitants trembled for their lives and fortunes. Archbishop Hubert thought it his duty to oppose the demagogue; and, in a meeting of the citizens, by his mild and persuasive eloquence, induced them to give him hostages as securities that they would keep the king's peace. Fitz-Osbert saw the storm that was gathering. With an axe he clove the head of the officer sent to arrest him; and, fleeing to the church of St. Mary of Arches, fortified it and the tower against his opponents. But the people, separated from their leader, remained quiet. On the fourth day the church was, by design or accident, set on fire; and Fitz-Osbert, as he attempted to escape in the confusion, was stabbed in the body by the son of the officer whom he had murdered. The wound did not produce instant death. He was hastily tried, condemned, dragged at the tail of a horse to The Elms, at Tyburn, and hanged in chains with nine of his followers. His friends pronounced him a martyr; and a report was spread that miracles had been wrought at his grave. Some examples of severity dispersed the enthusiasts that collected round it; and in a few weeks the doctrines and the name of Fitz-Osbert were forgotten!"

As a specimen of the Massinger-like verse, we give this legend of Richard Cœur de Lion at Naples:—

"Impatient at confinement in his ship,  
Our restless king at Naples went ashore.  
He lingered there a day or two, and thence  
Rode on to Mileto. A single knight  
Was his companion. Some few leagues beyond,  
They reached a village, in which the king was told  
A peasant lived who owned a hawk—a bird  
Your peasant must not keep;—a noble bird  
Fit only for the noble, not the serf.  
Indignant at this wrong to chivalry,  
The passionate king sought out the peasant's home,  
And, like a mere marauder, stole from thence  
The poor man's favourite bird. Then laughed at him,  
And jeered and mocked at his presumption—he,  
A peasant, dared keep, for his own use,  
A bird created but for lords! this roused  
The wronged Italian; drawing from his belt  
The long and sharp-edged knife all carry there,  
He roused his fellow-peasants with his cries.  
And they, with curses loud, and shouts, and stones,  
And imprecations wild pursued the king,  
Who thus from peasants fled. The injured man,  
With speed by insult spured, outstripped the rest,



And Richard, turning, struck him with his sword.  
 The weapon broke, and then, but for his horse,  
 The battle had been hand to hand—the serf  
 Against the king, who then in truth had found  
 The peasant's arm as strong, his blade as keen,  
 His blow as sure, as that of any knight,  
 However nobly born. The crowd came up,  
 The monarch fled; fled from them for his life.  
 A priory ope'd its welcome gates, and gave  
 A refuge to the fugitive, or else  
 This peasant-scoffing, serf-insulting king,  
 Had fallen by a peasant's hand."

I. ii.

This is well told, brief, effective, and pointed, illustrating the character at once of the king and the feelings of the speaker Fitz-Osbert. In the first scene of the second act a very fine descriptive passage occurs—emotional, yet impressive, merely as a sketch of the singular structures of Stonehenge, about two miles from Amesbury in Wiltshire, the seemingly confused piles of whose moss-covered monoliths, as they show their unhewn granite to the traveller's eye, excite interest, and grow into a puzzle for the archæologist. The scene is dextrously touched into illustrative effectiveness, and has in it the splendid appositeness—as it appears in the drama—which much of Shakspeare's apparent surplusage is found, on consideration, to have. We must divorce it from its context, but even so it seems to us a passage of a noteworthy sort:—

"All evil, love, may be subdued by faith,  
 Faith in oneself, faith in the work we do,  
 And faith in God. Oh, I remember, wife,  
 How in the wild and wandering days of youth,  
 When the green fields, the rarely-peopled woods,  
 The rolling rivers, the aspiring hills,  
 The thunder, and the tempest, and the clouds  
 Were dearer, nearer to my heart than man—  
 How then across a wild and barren height,  
 With silent desolation all around,  
 I rambled on, my heart and brain a-fire,  
 With keen and thrilling rapture, every pulse  
 Responsive beating to that exquisite bliss.  
 Far as the eye could reach huge stones were seen  
 In wild disorder scattered, as if flung  
 By giant slingers of an early race  
 In frolic play. Even these the hand of time  
 Had touched; and winds and rains working their will  
 Through immemorial years, had fashioned there  
 Such antic shapes as fancy in her dreams  
 May conjure up to terrify or charm.  
 There some, like monstrous dragons, lay i' the sun,  
 Their long and scaly tails, with many a fold  
 Extending to a point; like lions, some;

And some like the leviathans, which roll  
 Their vast forms through the troubled sea; while some,  
 Like towers erected to defend a home  
 No longer there. Cyclopean pedestals  
 Raised here their painted summits, bearing there  
 A boulder so immense you feared 'twould crush  
 The pillars which upheld it; and so poised  
 Upon the delicate-pointed tops, it seemed  
 A word too loudly spoken, or the breath  
 Of Summer's lightest breeze, would cause its fall.  
 Yet there it stood, defying all the storms  
 Which winter's rage against it daily poured,  
 The winds which o'er that lofty region swept  
 With uncontrolled indulgence. Yet was time,  
 With his resistless fingers, crumbling down  
 These else imperishable records; and,  
 Even as I watched, the ceaseless work went on  
 Upon their adamantine forms."

With these specimens of the historical play now before us we must close our notice. The drama has not yet, so far as we know, tempted representation. We believe that, if judiciously placed on the stage, it would gain a favourable hearing—especially if an actor versed in stage economics could be got to make it a study. The language of the play is modern, pure, and chaste; there are in it no rhapsodies and no fustian speeches. Dr. Langford has no need to "bombastort" his blank verse. It takes form from the shaping spirit of imagination, and is compact.

## Our Collegiate Course.

### THE PROGRESS OF POESY.

A PINDARIC ODE.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

[The progress of poetry from Greece to Italy, and from Italy to England. Chaucer was not unacquainted with the writings of Dante or of Petrarch. The Earl of Surrey and Sir Thomas Wyatt had travelled in Italy, and formed their taste there; Spenser imitated the Italian writers; Milton improved on them; but this school expired soon after the Restoration, and a new one arose on the French model.]

### EPODE II.

Woods that wave o'er Delphi's steep,

69

Forests, which flutter your branches over the cliffs of Delphi; islands

(66) Delphi (now *Castri*), an ancient town of Phocis, in Greece, in (

Isles that crowned the Ægean deep,  
Fields that cool Ilissus laves,  
Or where Mæander's amber waves

which lie like set gems in the surface of the Ægean Sea, cultured plains which are loved by the Ilissus, or along which, in speed-delaying mazes,

vale of the Pleistus, with two lateral spurs of Parnassus for its background. Here the famous oracle of Apollo was situated, as Strabo says, on the southern side of Parnassus, in a natural amphitheatre formed of mountain crags and difficult of access, from a deep cavern, in which, a powerful vapour issued; over this, a temple sacred to Apollo, the god of poetry, was erected; and here the Pythian games, which gave occasion to many of the odes of Pindar, were celebrated. Delphi is not mentioned by Homer or Hesiod; it is named and alluded to by many periphrases by Pindar; Milton mentions the "Delphian cliff" in "*Paradise Lost*," i, 517, and Byron has "sighed o'er Delphi's long-deserted shrine." On account of the relation between Apollo and the oracle, the highest kind of poetry came to be denoted by an adjective, formed from its name; so that Milton calls *Shakspeare's* poetry "Delphic lines."

(67) The Ægean, anciently called the Hellenic Sea, divides Greece from Asia Minor. It derived its name either from (1) Ægeus, the father of Theseus, who threw himself into it; (2) Ægea, a queen of the Amazons, who was drowned in it; (3) Ægean, the giant who, according to Hesiod, was the son of Uranus and Terra; or (4) *aigeios*, the Greek word for a goat, from the number of its "isles," assuming the appearance of a scattered herd of goats. These "Isles" form two groups: (1) the Cyclades, which are arranged in a somewhat circular form, and now belong to Greece; (2) the Sporades, which lie in an irregular line, and now belong to Turkey. Those are, to quote Byron,—

"The isles of Greece, the isles of Greece,  
Where burning Sappho loved and sung,  
Where grew the arts of war and peace,  
Where Delos rose, and Phœbus sprung;  
Eternal summer gilds them yet,  
But all, except their sun, is set:  
The Scian and the Teian Muse,  
The hero's harp, the lover's lute,"

gave them glory in ancient days. Homer was—

"The blind old bard of Soio's rocky isle."

"Anacreon's song divine" was chanted under the auspices of Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos. Sappho was born at Mitylene, and snow-crowned Leucade is thus known as—

"The lover's refuge, and the Lesbian's grave."

Alcæus also was born at Mitylene, in Lesbos, and both Simonides and his nephew Bacchylides were natives of Cos. These islands are besides the scenes of much that is mythological and poetical

(68) The Ilissus is a small river, which flows along the east and south of

In lingering labyrinths creep, 70  
 How do your tuneful echoes languish  
 Mute, but to the voice of anguish!  
 Where each old poetic mountain  
 Inspiration breathed around:  
 Every shade and hallowed fountain 75  
 Murmured deep a solemn sound:  
 Till the sad Nine, in Greece's evil hour,

the lion-brown waters of the Mæander proceed slowly; sadly indeed do your musical resonances grow fainter, and indeed become silent except to tones of sorrow. Places in which the suggestions of imagination surrounded every ancient verse-consecrated hill, and each sheltered retreat or holy well of water uttered a loud, serious, melancholy tone; till the grieving Nine Muses, at the period of the misfortunes of Greece, forsook their beloved home

Athens, the metropolis of art, philosophy, and letters in Greece. As it ran by the scene of the Dionysiac festivals, at which the contests for dramatic honours took place, the allusion in the lines seems to be to dramatic art.

(69) Mæander, a river in Asia Minor, celebrated for its sinuosity. It rose in Celsæne, in Phrygia, in Asia Minor, and flowed into the Ægean, near Miletus, in Ionia. It formed the boundary between Lydia and Caria. It has now become a synonym for wandering diffuseness, tortuosity, and vague inappositeness. As it was the most remarkable river in Ionian Asia, which laid claim to being the birthplace of Homer, the allusive force of these lines refers to epic poetry.

(72) In Thomson's "Castle of Indolence" we read that—

"It was not by vile loitering in ease  
 That Greece obtained the brighter palms of art,  
 That soft yet ardent Athens learned to please,  
 To keen the wit, and to sublime the heart,  
 In all supreme! Complete in every part:  
 It was not thence majestic Rome arose,  
 And o'er the nations shook her conquering dart;  
 For sluggard's brow the laurel never grows;  
 Renown is not the child of indolent repose."  
*Thomson's "Castle of Indolence."*

(77) Horace points out this fact in his Epistles:—

"Græcia capta ferum Victorum cepit, et artes  
 Intulit agreste Latio," &c.—II., i., 156—167,—

a passage which may be translated thus:—"Captive Greece captivated her fierce conqueror, and brought her arts into uncultured Latium. Thus that frightful Saturnian metre passed away, and elegances superseded rough virulence; for a long time, however, traces of rusticity remained, and even to this day remain; for it was late when the Romans applied their sharpened minds to Greek literature, and having repose after the Punic

Left their Parnassus for the Latian plains.  
 Alike they scorn the pomp of tyrant power,  
 And coward vice, that revels in her chains. 80  
 When Latium had her lofty spirit lost,  
 They sought, O Albion, next thy sea-encircled coast.

in Parnassus for the level lands of Italy. They condemn in a similar manner the magnificence of the despot's might, and base-hearted Fear, who delights in her bonds, so that when Italy had degenerated from her state of nobleness, they proceeded to thee, O Britain, thereafter, and came to thy shores safely girded and guarded by the ocean.

Wars, began to inquire what value Sophocles, Thespis, and Æschylus possessed. They tried, also, if they could do justice to them in translation, and satisfied themselves—being naturally lofty and spirited; for they possess enough of the inspiration of tragedy, and have been successful in their endeavours, but they erroneously scorn and fear revising and deletion."

Nine, the Muses—to whom Parnassus was sacred; the inspiring goddesses of song—Byron calls them in "The Waltz," "the virgin Nine." Milton calls his "heavenly-born" instructress Urania, and places her higher than "the Muses nine."—" *Paradise Lost*," vii., 1—12.

- (80) "Had unambitious mortals minded nought  
 But in loose joy to wear their time away,  
 Had they alone the lap of dalliance sought,  
 Great Homer's song had never fired the breast,  
 To thirst of glory and heroic deeds;  
 Sweet Maro's Muse sunk in inglorious rest,  
 Had silent slept amid the Mincian reeds;  
 The wits of modern times had told their beads,  
 And monkish legends been their only strains;  
 Our Milton's Eden had lain wrapped in weeds,  
 Our Shakspeare strutted stout and laughed with Warwick swains,  
 Ne had my master Spenser charmed his Mulla's plains.  
*Thomson's "Castle of Indolence."*

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

908. Manchester has been engaged of late in extending Owen's College, and laying the foundation stone of a new building for its permanent residence. Is there any biography of Mr. John Owen, who,

we believe, died only about twenty years ago? If so, can anybody tell where it is to be had; if not, would it not be well that one should be prepared, that in after days the benefactor of Manchester should be properly known, and have his memory duly separated from the many

remarkable Owens of the early part of the present century?—P. E. S.

909. Has the Slave Trade ceased on the east coast of Africa? or what steps have been taken, and with what success, to abolish the East African Slave Trade?—R. F. D.

910. What is the precise nature, mission, and mode of operation of the Peace Society?

911. What is the proper meaning of the phrase, so common in our newspapers just now,—“Technical Education”?—A LEARNER.

912. In his work entitled, “The Gay Science,” E. S. Dallas says, p. 13, “Hissing is the only sound in nature that awakes no echo.” Is this a physical fact, and if so, how is it to be accounted for? That it is not a metaphorical fact is patent to any one who has ever attended a public meeting where contending orators hold forth, or been present at the doom of a new play.—P. K.

#### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

864. MR. PETERSON, of Philadelphia, has just published a “Life of Charles Dickens,” by Dr. Shelton Mackenzie, from which we take the following, in answer to query 864.

While “Oliver Twist” was in course of publication, the senior magistrate of Hatton Garden Police Office was a certain A. S. Laing, Esq., barrister-at-law, notorious at the time for his discourtesy and coarseness to all persons—prisoners, policemen, witnesses, complainants, lawyers, and reporters—who came before him. At that time Lord John Russell was Home Secretary, with direct official supervision of all the London police officers. Not only the shortcomings, but the overdoings and the unwise sayings of Justice Laing had repeatedly been severely criticised in the newspapers, but wholly without effect, for Laing held his place, and boasted that he would continue to hold it, whatever

might be said or done about him. Whereupon Charles Dickens came to the rescue. The eleventh chapter of “Oliver Twist” treats of Mr. Fang, the police magistrate, and furnished a slight specimen of his mode of administering justice. Oliver, charged with picking a handkerchief in the street from a Mr. Brownlow’s pocket, is brought before this worthy, who is thus described:—

“Mr. Fang was a middle-sized man, with no great quantity of hair, and what he had growing on the back and sides of his head. . . . His face was stern, and much crushed. If he were really not in the habit of drinking rather more than was exactly good for him, he might have brought an action against his countenance for libel, and have recovered heavy damages.

“The old gentleman bowed respectfully, and, advancing to the magistrate’s desk, said, suiting the action to the word, ‘That is my name and address, sir.’ He then withdrew a pace or two, and, with another polite and gentlemanly inclination of the head, waited to be questioned.

“Now it so happened that Mr. Fang was at that moment perusing a leading article in a newspaper of the morning, adverting to a recent decision of his, and commending him, for the three hundred and fiftieth time, to the special and particular notice of the Secretary of State for the Home Department. He was out of temper, and he looked up with an angry scowl.

“‘Who are you?’ said Mr. Fang.

“The old gentleman pointed with some surprise to his card.

“‘Officer!’ said Mr. Fang, tossing the card contemptuously away with the newspaper, ‘who is this fellow?’

“‘My name, sir,’ said the old gentleman, speaking *like* a gentle-

man, and consequently in strong contrast to Mr. Fang—'my name sir, is Brownlow. Permit me to inquire the name of the magistrate who offers a gratuitous and unprovoked insult to a respectable man, under the protection of the bench.' Saying this, Mr. Brownlow looked round the office as if in search of some person who could afford him the required information.

"'Officer!' said Mr. Fang, throwing the paper on one side, 'what's this fellow charged with?'"

"'He's not charged at all, your worship,' replied the officer. 'He appears against the boy, your worship.'"

"'His worship knew this perfectly well; but it was a good annoyance, and a safe one.'"

Before taking the oath, Mr. Brownlow was again insulted, and asked what he meant by trying to bully a magistrate? There is no evidence against Oliver, who faints, and thereupon is committed for three months' imprisonment with hard labour. But as witness appears a determined man, who proves the innocence of the accused, he compels Mr. Fang to discharge the boy, which he does reluctantly, at the same time suggesting that the old gentleman was himself a thief. This appeared in *Bentley's Miscellany* in 1837, and every one recognised the identity of Fang and Laing. The result was, that even the Home Secretary was compelled to do the same, and, as a matter of course, to remove Mr. Laing from all further official cares, duties, and emoluments. Dickens could say, in the words of Coriolanus, "Alone I did it," and he obtained no small degree of popularity by the directness and successful result of his sketch. From that day London police magistrates have generally been impressed with the conviction that civility was what they were bound to dispense to, as well as receive

from, such of the public as appeared before them.

In "Barnaby Rudge" we meet Sir John Chester, said to have been meant for the late Sir William Henry Maule, one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas. There are a few points of resemblance, but the sketch is not good. Maule was neither a selfish nor a heartless man. A recent editor of Lord Chesterfield's "Letters to his Son" suggests that Sir John Chester was a pseudonym of the gallant Earl who died as far back as 1773, seven years before the Gordon riots took place.

Sir Peter Laurie, a Border Scot, who had built up a great business in London as a saddler, and for many years had been a principal contractor for the East Indian army, was the original of Alderman Cute in "The Chimes." He had served as Sheriff of London and Middlesex in 1823-4, on which occasion he was knighted, was chosen alderman in 1826, and was Lord Mayor of London in 1832-3. He was very hard, or rather harsh, with the poor, and had aroused Dickens's indignation by saying, one day, when he was acting magistrate at Guildhall police office, and a wretched woman of the town was before him, charged with attempting to drown herself, that he "would soon put down suicide." He carried out his intention by committing for imprisonment and hard labour in "Bridewell," of which hospital he was president, all persons placed before him charged with such attempt.

In "Dombey and Son," several characters are said to have been drawn from life. Mr. Dombey is supposed to represent Mr. Thomas Chapman, shipowner, whose office were opposite the Wooden Midshipman. I had the honour of meeting Mr. Chapman at dinner (at Lough's, the sculptor), and the rigidity of his manner was only equalled by

that of his form. He sat or stood, as the case might be, bolt upright, as if he knew not how to bend—as stiff, in fact, as if he had swallowed the drawing-room poker in his youth, and had never digested it. As if to make Mr. Chapman undoubtedly identical with Dombey, we have, as messenger of the commercial house of “Dombey and Son,” one Perch, actually taken from a funny little old chap named Stephen Hale, who was part clerk, part messenger, in Mr. Chapman’s office. Old Sol Gills was intended for a little fellow named Norie, who kept a very small shop in Leadenhall Street, exactly opposite the office of John Chapman & Co., in which the “stock-in-trade comprised chronometers, barometers, telescopes, compasses, charts, maps, sextants, quadrants, and specimens of every kind of instrument used in the workings of a ship’s course, or the keeping of a ship’s reckoning, or the prosecuting of a ship’s discoveries.” In front of this small shop stands a figure, carved in wood and curiously painted, of a miniature midshipman, with a huge quadrant in his hand, as if about taking an observation. What is more, the little shop and the wooden midshipman may be seen by the curious adorning the Leadenhall Street to this very day. I speak of the wooden midshipman as I saw him in 1852. He may have been swept away by what is called “improvement.” Captain Cuttle was one David Mainland, master of a merchantman, who was introduced to Dickens on the day when, with Thomas Chapman, Daniel Maclise, John Leech, Thomas Powell, and Samuel Rogers, he went to see Crosby Hall, Bishopsgate Street, the restoration of which had then (1842) been completed with great taste and skill. This is all that remains of the dwelling of Richard

III., repeatedly mentioned by Shakespeare. The bay-window, or oriel, is the *chef d’œuvre* of the domestic architecture of Old London, and the stone carving is as sharp as when first cut, four centuries ago. The party, my exact informant tells me, proceeded from Crosby Hall to the adjacent London Tavern, also in Bishopsgate Street, where, at the proper charge of Mr. Thomas Chapman, Bathe & Breach supplied a lunch. Of the six who constituted that social party, only one survives. On that day, however, Dickens “booked” Captain Cuttle, though he did not appear in “Dombey & Son” until five years later.

In “David Copperfield,” the striking character of Wilkins Micawber, who was always waiting “for something to turn up,” was believed by many who thought themselves competent to decide to have been the author’s attempt to represent his own father! It was said that the elder Dickens knew and did not wholly disapprove of the sketch. It will be remembered by the readers of “David Copperfield,” that though Mr. Micawber is represented as careless in money matters, apt to get into debt, and addicted to get out of it by means of bills and notes-of-hand, he never says or does anything at variance with morality and probity. He is eternally waiting for “something to turn up,” and shifting, as best he can, in the meantime. But he is never mean, false, nor dishonest, and it is his keen sense of the right that eventually places him in triumphant antagonism with that precious limb of the law—a disgrace to an honourable profession—Mr. Uriah Heep.

In “David Copperfield,” Mr. Traddles, the hero’s youthful friend, who finally is spoken of as the next judge, is supposed to have been intended for the late Sir T. N. Tal-



found, the author's oldest and truest friend. The sketch is scarcely complimentary.

In "Bleak House" at least three characters are said to have been drawn from real life. These are Esther Sommerson, Boythorn, and Harold Skimpole. *Place aux dames!* Therefore we begin by stating the belief, among parties

who ought to have known, that Esther Sommerson, who tells so much of the story of "Bleak House," is believed to bear a great resemblance to Miss Sophia Iselin, author of a volume of poems published in 1847. Sophia Iselin has no cause to complain of her full length in "Bleak House."

## Literary Notes.

THE *Morale Indépendante* has offered a prize of 1,000 francs for the best written essay on rather a strange subject. The essay is to comprise biographies of Confucius, of Buddha, of Socrates, and of the Saviour of the World; with a complete analysis of their respective doctrines, an account of their relations to the times and societies in which their teachings were publicly made known, and a comparison of their respective influence on their own times and on posterity. The different compositions are to be sent in to the editor of the *Morale Indépendante*, in Paris, before the month of December of this year, and the prize is to be awarded in January, 1871.

Amongst other curiosities at the Exhibition of Antiquities and objects of Art belonging to the Siennese province, held at Siena on the 15th of August, under the direction of Prof. Carlo Livi, was the autograph will and testament of Boccaccio.

The Military Articles in the *Saturday Review*, entitled "The War of 1870," criticising the strategical movements of the armies, are said to be from the pen of Lieut.-Colonel Chesney, R.E.

J. S. Lacordaire, elder brother of the famous preacher, Professor of Comparative Anatomy at Liege,

author of "A History of Insects," is dead.

D. Laing is editing a cheap edition of the "Works of Sir David Lindsay."

R. H. Smith has the Poems and Songs of Sir Alex. Boswell under editorial care for early issue.

"Critical Studies on Lucretius," by Prof. G. Trezza, are to be issued at Florence.

Of Whately's "Peculiarities of the Christian Religion," a seventh edition has been issued in America.

The "Canti" of Signor Mercantini, the Korner of Sicily, Professor of Italian Literature at Palermo, have reached a second edition.

The Letters of Massino d'Azeglio, 1838—1865, have been edited by Signor G. Carsano.

Dr. Mathiessen's "Researches on Vegetable Poisons" are to be made public.

Of "The Life and Times of the Rev. John Wesley, M.A., Founder of the Methodists," by Rev. Luke Tyerman, vol. 1 is promised early.

Dr. Schwartz, editor of "The Scattered Nation," is dead.

Gustav von Struv, German historian, is dead.

A posthumous novel, from the pen of Mark Lemon, entitled "Blue Petticoat," will appear in autumn.

## Modern Metaphysicians.

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JOSEPH HENRY GREEN, F.R.S., D.C.L.:—

*The Coleridgean; Author of "Spiritual Philosophy," "Mental Dynamics," "Vital Dynamics," &c.*

"SPIRITUAL philosophy purports to be the right interpretation of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and of the universal rational instincts of mankind;" and it professes to unfold that new method of reconciling faith and philosophy, science and religion, which Coleridge has had the credit of conceiving in thought, and of, in part, elaborating in actual composition. This *Eirenicon* was to gather into one unity the precepts and histories of the creed of Christendom with the deductions, principles, and facts of science, as a reasoned critique of experience, so proving them to be kindred, and thus bringing opinions the most widely separated, and seemingly the most hostile, into the harmony of an all-embracing Catholicon—a system of pure truth. It is well known to all who take any interest in speculative thought, that while Coleridge possessed perhaps the most powerful constructive intellect of his age, he was unfortunately possessed by the most destructive habits of any time,—opium-eating, day-dreaming, and procrastination. Hence his published writings are a great jumble of suggestions, promises, and glimpses, hallowed by being seen in a dim religious light; a collection of fragments showing the transfiguring touch of lofty and glorious abstraction, but exhibiting also the disfiguring incompleteness of slothful but ambitious distraction. They are the least systematic of any of the productions of the great thinkers who have attempted to settle the problems of the century. And yet the claims of Coleridge as a philosopher come before us as those of a suggester and inspirer of a methodology so superior to all others, that it included and unified all the possibilities, probabilities, and actualities of human thought and experience into one constellation of light, before whose radiancy all mysteries become plain. He exercised a centralized imperialism over "all thoughts, all passions, all delights," whatever stirs the heart or brain, such as could reduce all life to law and all thought to truth. This upgathering of all knowledge into one system gave him power over the expectant and hopeful men of his age. Death, however, found him with his work unaccomplished, and—as the sceptre of the Tudors was passed into the hands of the Stuarts—the system of Coleridge was bequeathed to Green. (

1870.

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this thinker, who not only was thought, but who esteemed himself, capable of presenting the philosophic views of that great master in a systematic form of unity, such as he would have desired, we proceed to give some account.

Joseph Henry Green was born at 11, London Wall, 1st November, 1791. He was the only son of Joseph Green, merchant there, and of Frances Clive, his wife, the sister of the celebrated surgeon of St. Thomas's Hospital, Henry Clive, who had married the half-sister of Mr. J. Green. He was, as a boy, of delicate constitution, and for the sake of his health he was sent to Ramsgate to receive the rudiments of education. He was subsequently placed under the care of Dr. George Attwood, at Hammersmith. Having here made considerable progress in classics and mathematics, he went for further instruction to Germany, where for about three years he pursued his studies in different cities; his mother exercising a diligent supervision over him. On his return, when about eighteen years of age, he was apprenticed to his uncle, Henry Clive, who put him under the express care of a trustworthy pupil, Wm. Hammond. A rare friendship sprang up between the two young men, and this was ultimately cemented still more by the marriage—25th May, 1813, while his term of apprenticeship was only half served—of the young student of the College of Surgeons, with Miss Anne Eliza Hammond, the sister of his friend. For two years or so after this marriage the young couple resided with the bridegroom's father at No. 6, Martin's Lane, Cannon Street, where the business house of Messrs. Green and Ross was then situated. On 1st December, 1815, J. H. Green obtained his diploma from the college, and commenced the practice of his profession in Lincoln's Inn Fields; and in 1816 he was appointed (unpaid) Demonstrator of Anatomy in the School of Surgery attached to St. Thomas's Hospital. In this office it was his duty to attend in the wards of the hospital, or in the operating theatre when any of the surgeons were absent, to give demonstrations in anatomy to the students, and to take part in the delivery of a course of systematic lectures on anatomy and surgery.

Coleridge, who had in 1810 taken up his residence in London, had already acquired an extraordinary reputation as a thinker and conversationist, who displayed in singular union the highest philosophy, the noblest poetry, and the fullest knowledge of special facts. He had become a fame. He had planned the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*, was engaged in the study of modern German metaphysics, and was the mighty monologist of Highgate, where, in the house of Mr. Gilman, surgeon, Green, in 1816, met him at those weekly *conversazioni* in which he scattered the seeds of thought and the flowers of rhetoric among his admirers. Green became at once fascinated and disciplined, and under this influence he became ardent in the pursuit of philosophical speculations, and began to take great interest in German metaphysics. Having had the opportunity in Highgate and elsewhere of intimate intercourse with Ludwig Tieck,

Green's "noble eagerness for knowledge," inspired by Coleridge, was so stimulated by that famous Romanticist that he resolved on putting himself under a course of training in the philosophy of Germany during the summer of 1817. By Tieck's advice he proceeded to Berlin, and took private instructions from Karl W. F. Solger—whose "Philosophic Conversations" had just then been published, and were exciting considerable interest. Solger was a "Natur-philosoph," though not precisely a follower of Schelling; and he was distinguished for originality, perspicuity, and curiousness of speculative power. His influence was great in matters of æsthetics and taste, and his early death in 1819, aged 40, was much regretted by those who delighted to trace the working of God upon all the aims and ends, the thoughts, purposes, and actions of men.

Solger greatly admired Green, and apparently found him an apt disciple; and this summer tour, in which Green was accompanied by his wife, seems to have been emotionally pleasant, and intellectually profitable.

Mr. Green's cousin, Henry Clive, died suddenly when only 39. He had been for eight years successor to his father, as surgeon of St. Thomas's Hospital, and had contributed several able papers to the literature of his profession. Green, who had previously published "Outlines of a Course of Dissection," was elected to the surgeons'hip thus left vacant, and so became coadjutor with Sir Astley Cooper in the lectureship of anatomy and surgery, 27th May, 1820. His former work, revised and improved, was published as "The Dissector's Manual," and in 1824 he was appointed Professor of Anatomy to the Royal College of Surgeons, and in that capacity delivered twelve lectures on "the Comparative Anatomy of the Animal Kingdom," a portion of a course which was planned to extend over four years. In 1825 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of London, for the improving of natural knowledge; and having been appointed Professor of Anatomy to the Royal Academy of Arts in London, had commenced in Somerset House a series of six discourses, which he continued annually till 1852, on "Anatomy in its Relation to the Fine Arts." The MSS. of these lectures still exist. Abstract reports of most of them have been published. In the *Athenæum*, December, 1843, two of them were issued *in extenso*, on "Beauty" and "Expression." The author contemplated a revised and completed publication of them as a "System of Artistic Anatomy," or Anatomical Æsthetics. These lectures combined an extensive range of thought and culture, literary, philosophical, and artistic, in its great departments, painting, sculpture, modelling, &c. The lectures in the Royal College of Surgeons were most strictly professional, and more exact than literary. In them he stepped beyond the limited scope of John Abernethy and Sir Anthony Carlisle, his predecessors, and reverted to the splendid philosophical conception of zootomy, formed by John Hunter as a "Science explanatory of all the gradations which nature follows, from the simplest state of life to the most perfect

—man." Enlarging the conception by the suggestive systematization of Lorenz Oken—founded on the *Natur-Philosophie* of Schelling's earlier thoughts, and by the researches regarding the typical forms of animal life, due to Karl Gustav Carus,—whose Comparative Anatomy he employed as his text-book,—he strove to produce a "Philosophy of Anatomy" which should link the whole multiplicity of facts into one ideal unity and totality, reaching from embryology to maturation, begetting, birth, form, life, and death. During the same year, 1825, Green was engaged in a paper-war, conducted by pamphlet-letters, with Sir Astley Cooper, concerning a proposal to remove half of the Museum of Anatomy from St. Thomas's to Guy's, a proceeding which Sir Astley Cooper was inclined to adopt as a retaliatory measure on the governors of the former hospital for refusing to accede to a request of his in favour of his nephew. Green resisted the attempt as unlawful, and succeeded. The ill-feeling thus occasioned lasted for two years.

When in 1825 an agitation arose for the establishment of a university in London, great discussion was occasioned by the proposal to omit theology from the course of study to be pursued in it. The disputants formed two parties, and two proprietary institutions were established in 1828, the former as University College, London, disconnected with any religious body, and free from any restraint in regard to creed; and the latter as King's College, London, holding as a fundamental principle that "instruction in the Christian religion ought to form an indispensable part of every system of general education for the youth of a Christian community." Dr. J. H. Green adhered to the latter party, and in 1830 was appointed Professor of Surgery in King's College. On receiving this appointment he resigned his lectureship on surgery at St. Thomas's, and he began his duties as professor in 1831, with a new course of lectures. In 1832 he delivered the introductory lecture in the Medical Faculty. At this time Green was entirely under the dominion of the philosophical views which Coleridge had in some measure organized out of the ideas to which his studies in German metaphysics had given the initiative, and he was then enamoured of the suggestion of a Clerisy or body of learned men—poets, philosophers, and scholars,—forming into a unity the members of the several professions, as common branches of the one root—philosophy, and constituting not only a true university, but a national church or "universal organ, according to the *idea*, for enduing, harmonizing, and applying all those elements of moral cultivation and intellectual progress of which religion prescribes the aim and sanctifies the use." Inspired by this idea Green's lecture was employed in enforcing it on the minds of the hearers as a pressing requirement of the age, that the whole learned class in the nation should fraternize and co-operate as a brotherhood—a reunion of intelligence. In the lectures on surgical pathology and practice, which he delivered during the years 1831—1836, he systematized the technical teaching which he gave upon the prin-

ciples of the Coleridgean *idea*, and brought philosophy down to be the handmaid of utility, charity, and mercy, a genuine nursing-mother of the arts and sciences. He was an able, impressive, and effective speaker, and possessed a fine *suave* nobleness of manner which greatly commanded his views to the members of his classes.

Green was an earnest advocate of medical reform. On this topic he issued many pamphlets; among these may be mentioned the following:—"Distinction without Separation,"—a letter to the President of the College of Surgeons, 1831; "Suggestions respecting Medical Reform," addressed to the Legislature and the members of the profession, 1834; the "Touchstone of Medical Reform,"—three letters addressed to Sir Robert Harry Inglis, M.P. for the University of Oxford, 1841. The suggestions made in this pamphlet were adopted by the College of Surgeons, into the council of which he had been voted in 1835.

In 1840 he was appointed to deliver the Hunterian Oration. This production, with prefaces and appendices, was published under the title of "*Vital Dynamics*." Its chief aim was to consider and explain what processes of thought are employed in scientific discovery, and to hold up pure reason as the light by which nature is explored and understood. It was based upon the philosophy of Coleridge, which he characterized as a system of thought which "pre-eminently, if not alone, gives life and reality to metaphysical pursuits, by showing their birth, growth, and requisite foundation in the whole man, head and heart;" and in it he expounded the Coleridgean doctrine of *ideas*, "those energetic acts of omnipotent wisdom which, as laws of nature (*formæ formantes*), are at once creative and conservative, of a nature ever changing and yet ever essentially the same," "the downshine of a light from above which is the power of living truth," and which, in irradiating and actuating the human mind, becomes for it reason; "yea, which is the revelation of those divine acts, at once causative and intelligential, which he recognises as first principles, ultimate truths, as ideas for the human mind, and constitutive laws in nature." His arguments he illustrates by references to the history of science; and he claims for Hunter "the high merit of being at least the Kepler of his science, which only awaits its Newton in order to complete the scientific unity already instinctively anticipated by Hunter's genius." To the oration itself there are added disquisitions on the Evolution of the Idea of Power, Transcendental Anatomy, the Gradation of Animal Life, the Characteristics of Man's Bodily Frame, the Spirit of Hunter's Pathology, Instinct, and a Recapitulatory Lecture giving a *Vidimus* of the author's views on Physiology, which he had delivered at the College of Surgeons.

In 1841 Green was appointed Trustee of the Hunterian Museum; in 1842 he was made a Royal Commissioner to inquire into the state of the prisons of North Leach and Gloucester; in 1846 he was chosen one of the Governors of Pentonville prison, and a member of the Board of Examiners in the Royal College of Surgeons.

In February, 1847, he was called by the college to deliver a second Hunterian Oration. He chose for his subject "Vital Dynamics, or the Groundwork of a Professional Education." In this he strove to give a distinct basis to spiritualism in England, while he endeavoured to urge on his hearers as a fact that by culture and discipline "we may preserve the freshness, improve the vigour, and favour the originative faculties of the mind." Genius he defines as "the healthy balance and proportionate development of all the powers and faculties that are essentially human." "Individuality," "that union of free will and reason by which man consciously affirms his personality," "a higher potentiation and happier combination of the human powers, intelligent and active, by the animating, modifying, and intensive energy of the sole font of original power within us, which we name free or moral will." He traces the influence and power of generalization and abstraction as factors in thought, in natural and civil history, mathematics, languages, logic, literature, and philosophy, and in an appendix gives an able classification of the faculties of man, and points out with great skill the need of a philosophy of *Self-Consciousness* as the groundwork of a true and reasoned science of morals and of mind. This work possesses considerable value as a treatise on the objects of training, and the utility of clear thought and methodical observation.

During 1849-50 Green was President of the College of Surgeons, an office to which he was again called in 1858-9. At the Exhibition of 1851 he was chairman and reporter of the Jury on Surgical Instruments. In June, 1853, he relinquished his professional connection with St. Thomas's Hospital, and he was then nominated one of the Governors of that Institution. In 1858, when (the late) Lord Derby was installed as Chancellor of the University of Oxford, J. H. Green had the honorary degree of D.C.L. conferred on him. In the same year he was elected representative of the Royal College of Surgeons, in "The General Council of Medical Education and Registration," then instituted by Act of Parliament; and of this council, in 1860, he was, in succession to Sir Benjamin Brodie, appointed the second president.

All the while that he was thus advancing steadily to the headship of his profession, and was pursuing it with the zest and eagerness of a student spirit, he was intently engaged in attempting to fulfil his part, in the bequest of Coleridge, to be the "inheritor of his unfulfilled renown," by the concatenation and completion of the methodized philosophy by which he anticipated he would have reconciled the rational conclusions of experience, resulting in Science, with the superrational acceptances of faith, constituting Religion. In 1836 he relinquished his private practice, and retired from residence in London—only reserving chambers for occasional use,—and took up his abode at *The Mount*, Hadley, on the line of the Great Northern Railway.

These years of "devoted studentship in fulfilment of his adopted

duty" resulted in the accumulation of a vast mass of almost encyclopaedian writings—dealing, in a vain endeavour to subdue to himself every domain of thought and acquirement, with logic, ethics, politics, civil history, æsthetics, psychology, ethnology, language, biology, pathology, physics, mathematics, metaphysics, and theology. Out of this great *débris* of sedulous preparation for upwards of a quarter of a century, only this book, "Spiritual Philosophy," has been rescued, and that, even in an incomplete state, has only been issued posthumously.

It professes to be a system of Coleridgean philosophy in its most rigid, "exactive, and obligatory sense." Our own opinion, however, is that the ready deceptiveness of the human mind has duped the author into a belief which is scarcely sustainable by a comparison between the published writings of Coleridge and the opinions attributed to him by his disciple. We doubt that in the long progress of effort a sense of possession was generated in the author's mind, and that he, perhaps unconsciously, by the very continuity of his efforts to complete his master's system, changed many of the vital factors of the Coleridgean treaty of peace between the science and the faith of our times. "I have," he says, writing in reply to Dr. C. M. Ingleby in 1854, "devoted more than the leisure of a life to a work in which I hope to present" the views of Coleridge "in a form which may best concentrate to a focus and principle of unity the light diffused in his writings, and which may again reflect it in all departments of human knowledge, so that truths may become intelligible in the one light of divine truth." The work which was entered upon with such aims, and pursued with such diligence, is that "Spiritual Philosophy" to which we have already in part directed the attention of our readers (pp. 81—95), and to the further analysis of which we now return.

In our previous paper we presented a *vidimus* of the main points and peculiarities contained in the first volume of Dr. Green's reproduced report of the philosophy of Coleridge in regard to reason and faith. In that analysis we quoted the most important passages referring to the intellectual faculties and the processes concerned in the investigation of truth, made jottings on his views on the first principles of a philosophy which lead up to the idea that the soul, as the total sphere of being, is the will. We now go on to epitomize. The second volume applies the philosophy of its predecessor to the exposition and confirmation of a *rationale* of the evidences of Christianity in its doctrines and its history.

The third book of the "Spiritual Philosophy" deals with "The Truths of Religion." It commences by tracing the "development of spiritual individuality, or the main truths of ideal integration;" and it opens with the affirmation that "in the preceding part of this work the Will has been shown to be the true base of a philosophy of realism"—"the *ideal* will in whose light all actual wills are to be contemplated; and actual Will evincing its declension from the ideal condition." Of the thoughts by which the author



endeavoured to lead up to this point we presented our readers with an analysis and epitome in our previous paper, and we now purpose to give a brief abstract of the leading ideas contained in the closing portions of this book; such an abstract as may place before the reflective student a concise outline of the material elements of the contents of the book if he has not read it, and if he has read it, such as may enable him to recall and reproduce the chief matters of the "high argument" the author professes to hold.

He proceeds (1) "to explain *the growth of the soul*," and (2) to assign the cause which leads to the integration of its spiritual state, namely, *the idea of God*. The main truths of ideal integration, he contends, "are revealed in and through our spiritual nature."

"By 'spiritual nature' I mean the will more or less enlightened and potentiated by the reason. I call ideas *truths of ideal integration*, because by them whatever is, tends to attain its highest state of being, its consummate excellence, and most perfect realization." This tendency to absolute integrity of being is derived from the Absolute Will, who alone eternally realizes "the idea."

"Reason is the one universal power and light of integration; objectively operative to realize in all and each the highest excellence of being; and subjectively operative to potentiate every conscious intelligence to the apprehension and conception of the idea by which that reality is attained. Nothing deserves the name or vindicates the character of spiritual life and being, unless it partakes of the tendency to and is animated by the idea of spiritual integrity. We may now unfold in successive propositions the main truths of ideal integration. . . . Prop. i. Will, by its very nature, is the inherent and inalienable tendency to be absolute; . . . the *view* of the will to will itself as absolute becomes in the enlightened will the moral purpose of absolute spiritual self-integration. . . . Prop. ii. Man, whose essential nature as we have seen is will, awakes to the sense, and more or less consciousness, of this his spiritual nature, with, and indeed by, the tendency to be absolute. . . . Prop. iii. Man, under the sense of his utter spiritual inadequacy to realize as absolute his own will in any form of selfish particularity, . . . feels, or is more or less brought to recognise, the indispensable need of a spiritual integrity, which his own will must ever crave, and yet can never supply. Prop. iv. The spiritual development of man . . . depends upon the revelation to him of, and his actuation by, the idea of the absolute spiritual integrity. . . . Prop. v. The conditions under which man receives effectually the revelation of the idea of God . . . are primarily moral, and belong to the conscience. . . . Taking, then, the principle of ethics and morals to be reason enlightening and enlivening the soul or will of man, it follows that moral truth, as far as the will is so actuated, is intuitive, universal, and self-evident. . . . i. Every individual will seeking the supplement and complement of its spiritual needs, as far as it is enlightened and enlivened thereto, recognises the idea of God (in whatever degree attained) as the idea of absolute spiritual perfection, as the power, process, and paradigm of integrity. . . . ii. Every will cannot but seek what it deems its supreme good, and cannot but aim at that in which it imagines its greatest happiness and highest beatitude to consist. . . . iii. Recognising its own pravity as a fallen creature, every

creaturely will so fallen, but enlightened by reason, . . . will hence recognise the obligation of conforming itself to . . . the rule, 'Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.'  
 iv. Recognising the selfish-particularity of the fallen will, and the self-contradictory impossibility of rendering itself absolute in its own particularity, in the false striving to which selfishness essentially consists, . . . the creaturely will acquires the consciousness of himself as a conscience. . . .  
 v. Every violation of the moral law, which selfishness prompts under the various forms of inordinate concupiscence and unholy desires, betrays its immoral character by inherent self-contradictory absurdity. . . . To a conscience (that is, a will enlightened by reason) the law of righteousness is the truth, intuitive and immediate, that what is willed must be universal. . . .  
 . . . vi. It will be observed that the argument here employed implies man in a state of social community; . . . it is selfishness and selfish particularity which loosen, and self-denial and charity which bind and enduringly strengthen, the foundations of human society. vii. and last. Recognising the truth that every will is to be integrated as will, . . . it follows unavoidably that every creaturely will must be submitted to a temporal state of probation, must be tested and tried as metal in the fire, must undergo the probation necessary to vindicate the conformity of its spirit to its spiritual destination, and to the reality of will striving Godward.

"God actuates man by a real and indwelling presence, . . . even the downshine of the true light of Him who is ever life and light to His creatures. . . . But the intellectual and conscious possession of this divine idea is the work of the speculative intellect, when, quickened by the divine reason, it is inspired to contemplate the idea in all the fulness and charity of its sublime features, and in all the distinctness of its majestic proportions. . . . First, it is the revelation to man of an idea of spiritual integrity. . . . In order to be a will, in any proper sense of the word, the will must will, what it cannot do otherwise than will, its own being as one undivided will,—it must will itself continuously, permanently, invariably, self-consistently;—and this is what we mean by an individual will or a person. . . . Even the notion of absolute will would escape us under the conception of personality. The absolute will causative of all reality, and therefore of its own, is the eternal act of self-affirmation or self-ponency; . . . is the essential act of personity, and may be designated *deus subjectivus* ipseity, the absolute subject, 'I am.' . . . A will, in order to be causative of reality, in order to predetermine acts necessary thereto, in order to have any definite aim or purpose, any will, I say, and even the Absolute Will, cannot be otherwise conceived than as *se finiens*, or so far finific and finite as by its own will it determines itself to be. . . . 2. We claim, then, for the character of the idea of God . . . that it is a truth revealed by the light of its own self-evidence, . . . as much so as a truth of sensible experience, . . . not only a truth containing its own evidence, but an objective verity and a power—a power acting in and upon the inmost and very spiritual principle of the soul, namely, the will, by infusing into it light and life, and by quickening it to its spiritual self-integration. . . . What, then, more appropriate than to designate this unique power, this moral causator and quickening supplement of his spiritual being, by some name which is equivalent to 'God'?

"But in order to arrive at a just conception of the nature of ideas he mu—"

meditate further on the idea of God, who is at once the origin and the archetype of all ideas, and contemplate deity in the three relations, which are essential to the idea of the triune God. . . . As a doctrine of spiritual philosophy, as a truth of reason, . . . we might express the relations in the divine instance as *deus subjectivus* and *deus objectivus*; that is, the absolute subjectivity or supreme will, uttering itself as, and contemplating itself in, the absolute objectivity, or plenitude of being, eternally and causatively realized in His personality. . . . That which is subjectively affirmed in the paternal relation is uttered and objectively realized in the filial alterity. . . . If we have succeeded in securing the distinctions of ipseity and alterity, we have now to contemplate in the distinctions that which, whilst it preserves the distinctions, affirms their eternal unity. We may call this third relation the *community*. . . . And the third relation as inevitably 'personal,' since, as in the former instances, it is the self-affirmation of absolute will, though here combining the relative distinctions in that of the eternal life of the one invisible Godhead. . . . The filial alterity is *the man*, the absolute exemplar of human perfection, the power of the humanity, and its eternal realization; the necessary pre-conception for founding philosophically the idea of Jesus Christ, as mediator and Saviour; that is, as eternal idea, and implied already in the idea of will and spiritual regeneration. . . . Reason, considered always in inseparable union with will, is the causative and genetic in all ideas; and that *the idea*, and thence all derivative *ideas*, are the *acts* and *process* by which reason is manifested. . . . The mind of man comes to apprehend reason as truth, even as the personal reality of the Logos, the living truth, and only differing from reason as light may differ from its luminous cause:—truth real and objective, and recognisable as of divine source by the attributes, universal, immutable, intuitive, self-evident, absolute; truth which enables man to behold a One in the infinitude of its relations and distinctions, and to reduce the infinite to the unity which preserves their totality. . . .

"Religion must be both idea and fact. It must be eternal verity, and this verity must be realized in history, and revealed as actual fact. . . . The secure standing-point from which all other religious truth may be profitably surveyed is redemption and the salvation of man; and hence the fundamental idea of Christianity is the salvation of the world by the Logos in Christ. Man comes to the knowledge of himself as a will, under the insatiable desire of securing his sphere of spiritual being by absolute self-poenency, but under the predicament of a divided will. . . . Under the goading impulse of his craving for spiritual being, man cannot satisfy himself with less than that which may be the absolute fulfilment of his desires. . . . He, indeed, knows God; but he knows Him only so far as He acts on his soul, and his soul is a willing and enlightened recipient of the divine agency; . . . he will—even though unconsciously, possessed by the idea—strive to know and hold communion with that source of life and light which offers itself as the supplement to all the needs of his sinful nature, and as the gracious though indispensable help to the attainment of his humanity. And we have found that the idea of God implies the blessed Trinity. . . . (1) God, as absolute will, causative of all reality, . . . the absolute will and self-constituted sole author of all being, containing subjectively all the perfections of deity, and in respect of spiritual integrity eminently claiming the attribute of *holiness* and the title of the

*Holy One.* But (2) in the very act and moment of self-ponency; God can only be contemplated as manifesting Himself in alterity. . . . In the *deus alter* God beholds Himself as the *alter ego*, as the 'show' who is . . . the declared exemplar of divine righteousness. . . . And (3) we venture to call this sympathetic unity of the personal relations of the Trinity, the union and communion of two persons who seek and find in the other the complement of their being, and therein disclose the idea of that transcendent life which in every living form of nature is the perpetual revelation of the same in alterity, and the permanent reciprocation of *idem et alter*. . . . And thus there can be, as the work of one Spirit throughout the universe, spiritual and physical, but one truth, one righteousness, one law, one spiritual integrity; one love, one source and cause, even the absolute will, self-affirmed as the one living God. . . . The only begotten Son . . . is the exegesis of the fulness of the Godhead; but with the full and unabated power of Deity He becomes the author and progenitor of the heavenly community of those whom we have been accustomed to hear called 'angels,' 'angelic beings,' and the 'children of God;' . . . a spiritual community essential to the conception of Christ's kingdom as at once temporal and eternal. . . . We refer evil and its origin to the necessary postulate of the possibility, in a non-absolute will or spirit, of willing in contrariety to the divine will; nor can we avoid the consequence of such contrariety when willed, namely, that the disobedient spirits were the 'angels which kept not their first estate.' . . . In this fatal severance of their necessarily derivative and communicated being from the source of true being and the sole font of life, the angelic spirit died a spiritual death, and lost a self wherein to be;—a death, or perpetual dying under the false, self-contradictory, and impossible condition of being at once an absolute and a particular will. . . . The doctrine of the 'devil and his angels' . . . is made to have its ground in a truth of reason, founded on the necessary postulate that, while a will, in order to be a will, must willingly elect to be concurrent with the absolute or divine will, it may possibly choose to be contrariant and hostile to the divine will; . . . it explains evil as an invasive alien to the proper humanity. . . . In accounting for the origin of evil we find an adequate solution of the problem of a fallen and corrupt nature, as originating in the supra-mundane condition of the angelic fall, and as the explanatory pre-condition of what in man is called *original sin*, that is, of the *proneeness* to sin, and to disobey God's commandments, which constitutes what we have called 'the natural man.' . . . We have thus had incidentally brought before us the issues of *life and death*—that is, of spiritual life and death. . . . Spiritual life can mean only union and communion with God, and in respect of all subordinate and derivative spiritual beings is their participation in the spiritual integrity of the divine life, and the unchangeable beatitude which it ever and eternally bestows. . . . A spirit who, in asserting its self in contrariety to the divine and absolute will of spiritual integrity, is creating itself to evil, and taking the easy road to death and hades. . . . No Saviour can help a will that obstinately refuses His proffered aid; and the reprobate and unrepentant sinner already dying and perishing spiritually in this state of being, must inevitably lapse into the spiritual state, where there is no place more, and where there only remain for his self-pronounced doom the anguish of bewailing what is lost, and the fiery thirst of craving for what it loathes. . . . The conquest of evil was

to be the appointed work of a Redeemer; and the long-promised and long-anticipated Saviour was, in the fulness of time, revealed in the person of the incarnate Christ, in whom 'all shall be made alive.' . . . Redemption is a doctrine which is founded on, and immediately flows out of, the *idea of divine love*. . . . Christ was so far a sacrifice for sin that He consecrated Himself by His sufferings and death, in order to the salvation of mankind. . . . If it be assumed that God is the absolute good, and that nothing evil can be derived from Him; and yet that evil is a fact only to be accounted for by a power or principle of evil throughout the world; it necessarily follows that the origin of evil is a lapse from that which God wills, and no less that God of His absolute goodness and infinite love cannot but will to transmute evil into good, and to reintegrate that which had elapsed from its original integrity. But whatever transmutes evil into good is a redemptive process; and therefore the work of divine Providence in the creaturely which is at issue with evil, being the transmutation of evil into good, is a redemptive process. . . . The Logos or divine Word must have been from the beginning the pre-ordained and self-devoted restorer of the fallen spiritual race, and His appointed work is that of creation and redemption. . . . The *Logos in Christ* was, and is, the *divine humanity*. . . . The *Logos in Christ* was, and is, the *light*, the *truth*, the *law*, and very *righteousness*. . . . The *Logos in Christ* was the *light*, but he was also the *life* and the *way*.

"We have now to contemplate the *Logos in Christ* under the aspect of the *crucified Saviour*. . . . It was necessary for any effectual redemption of a will that He should act in and with it in order not simply to change it, but to convert, transmute, regenerate, create it to a new spirit, accepting willingly the gracious offer which it loathed. . . . It was necessary for the conquest and extinction of evil that the world should have the spiritual aid and personal presence of the Redeemer. . . . He is in truth both agent and patient, and all that the human individual can contribute to the process of his own redemption is the concurrence of his will with the gracious operance and the "prevenient" grace of the Redeemer. . . . His passivity is real, but self-originated, and His own act.

"As religion must be both idea and fact," we have now "to investigate how far the ideas already contemplated have been revealed and realized in the facts of history. But we ought to remember that facts are ever to be regarded as exponents of higher truths, which have their own spiritual evidence; that we cannot attain to the idea by means of the fact; but that we assure ourselves of the significance of the fact by the possession of the idea." . . . "Our philosophy is now called upon to give a sufficient reason for the *incarnation*, for the recognition of Jesus of Nazareth as the Lord and Saviour already known as the Logos, and for our belief in His full and perfect efficiency to perform the offices assigned to Him in the economy of human redemption." "The *necessity of the incarnation*, of the Logos assuming the manhood and of becoming truly a man, will be at once apparent when we consider that under no other condition could the idea of a Redeemer and of redemption become historical, that is true in fact, and actually realized for the apprehension of mankind. It is also evident that under no other condition could the Son of God have become the pattern and exemplar of the holy life which He came to enforce by His teaching, and which, confessedly obligatory on all men, still needs the

shining example which He alone could furnish, for the imitation of those who aspire to spiritual integrity, and acknowledge Him as the leader and captain of their salvation. And it is evident, too, that if, according to the idea, He was the truth, the sole universal light of the world, He should have the opportunity of attesting it personally to human hearers, by proclaiming with the self-derived authority of reason—and not as the scribes with the borrowed authority of written statutes—the eternal laws of righteousness.

"It is no less evident that if, according to the idea, He was the Lord of life, the universal principle of spiritual life, He should prove by a fact intelligible to all that He bore within Himself the life-giving power of resurgency from the vain terrors of the grave. But He came also, as the idea of a spiritual order of the universe requires, to found amidst the degeneracy and corruption of the kingdoms of the world an everlasting kingdom; a kingdom of heaven; which under the reign of the Lord our righteousness, should renew the idea of a theocracy; and which, banding together His faithful followers, should wage unceasing warfare until the enemies of God should be destroyed."

He next proceeds to examine "the credentials of Jesus of Nazareth as a divine envoy, armed with full powers from heaven,"—in His sayings and His doings—that is, in His character as a teacher, and in His "works and the marvels attached to His history;" he finds it good to consider miracles as "acts for the purpose of showing the primacy of will in its function of vindicating the governance of a moral or spiritual principle in human affairs,—"immediate acts of will divinely empowered for moral purposes." He directs attention to His great work in founding the kingdom of God, and announcing "Himself as the Head and King of this spiritual empire amid the nations of the world." He notices the resurrection of Jesus as the "demonstration, and by a prerogative instance, that there is a life beyond the grave, nay, a resurrection of the same individuality," and he regards immortality as "the corner-stone and foundation of the spiritual philosophy," and he thereafter supplies a theory of the redemption, and the benefits of Christ's death.

(1.) "He had to *re-individuate* the spiritual chaos, or *hades*, into which 'the children of God' had been disintegrated, or in which they were perishing." (2.) The *Logos* in Christ must need *suffer*, by defacement of the plenitude of the divine life; by voluntarily partaking of the self-inflicted penalty of the fallen spirits; (3.) and this He did as "a work of spontaneous love, of self-denial for others; and in *reality* by His sublime act of self-sacrifice. He not only offered Himself for the sins of the world, by taking on Himself their grievous burthen, but at the same time destroyed the very ground of sin, and became Himself the 'Way' to eternal life, for all such as willed to be regenerate in Him by reliance on His grace and power. (4.) Christ's sacrifice may be rightly deemed to be *expiatory*, since it was offered in order to avert from the transgressor the just penalty which he had incurred; and so, also, it may be called *propitiatory*, since it was to remove the bar to God's power, which cannot consist with evil." (5.) He acted for and instead of man, fulfilling the conditions which just-

required of man. He so far acted *vicariously*. "Christ is the sacrificial victim, by the shedding of whose blood our offence is condoned, the offender pardoned, and reconciled with God." The redemptive act itself, though a transcendent mystery, is a sacrifice; indeed, the most real of sacrifices, namely, self-sacrifice; and the divine agent is the "quickening spirit," who, in and by that redemptive act, "infused life and light into His fallen creatures, in order to their regeneration as the children of God."

The fourth part of the book deals with "the idea of Christianity in relation to controversial theology," and contains many remarks of considerable importance and value, such as:—

"The principles of Christianity are essentially part of the original constitution of the human mind, and are implied in the gift of reason, considered, as has been throughout inculcated, as the divine Logos, who, in revealing Himself, enlivens and enlightens man to the apprehension of those eternal truths which are essential to his spiritual integration, according to that idea of spiritual integrity, of which the Logos is the eternal pattern in the heavens." . . . "The end and aim of the Christian religion—and that is of religion in the only proper sense of the word—is to promote the spiritual integration of mankind, individually and collectively. . . . Man attains to his proper dignity by the influx of the light and life of the divine reason. . . . The doctrine of the Trinity 'is a truth which contains its own evidence, when contemplated by the light of reason, as the transcendent height and fulness of spiritual integration, and the absolute integrity of will.'"

But we do not venture now on any further quotations from this part which treats of "the Trinitarian Controversy," "the Fall of Man, the Origin of Evil, and Original Sin," "The Means and Measure of God's favour," &c. These questions are handled with considerable skill and ability.

The book concludes with *Appendices*, the first of which is the third chapter of *Religio Laici*, on the disease and its remedy, the origin of evil and redemption; the second an extract from the first book of "Spiritual Being," works which Dr. Simon informs us exist in MS. partly written, though not prepared or completed for publication; both of these seem to be workings-out of the Cole-ridgian ideas in explanation of the mystery of sin. In these appendices perhaps the acuteness and the strength of speculation appear more than in the work itself. Indeed, Green, like Cole-ridge himself, seems to have worked fragmentarily, doing here a little and there a little, accumulating distinction upon distinction, and adding qualification to qualification, and opinion to opinion; holding a dream of universality always before the mind, but failing to perfect and thoroughly acquire the greatest conquest of a spirit—the systematic mastery of the will to duty, and the determinate out-working of the powers of thought implanted within the soul by nature and circumstances, life and experience, reason and religion. Even this spiritual philosophy upon which the labour of more than

a quarter of a century had been expended, is an incomplete and unrevised work, and forms but a scantling of the immense preparations Green had made to embody a digest of the philosophy of Coleridge, in the radiant light of a complete and full-orbed system, and an encyclopædic entirety.

Among the unfinished and incompleated works of Dr. Green—besides the *Religio Laici*, a *provisional* compendium of Coleridge's "Assertion of Religion, as necessarily involving Revelation; and of Christianity, as the only Revelation of permanent and universal Validity," and the large theological treatise entitled "Spiritual Being,"—there exists a criticism of the life and genius of Coleridge. This, it seems to us, would most probably have been of some value, as indicating the view taken of his master by the disciple who aspired to be the Plato of such a Socrates, or the Theophrastus of such an Aristotle. It is lamentably true that discipleship does not always imply clear and full perception of the character, aim, and method of a master; but it should at least imply sympathy, and some heart-knowledge of the man. But mere discipleship almost always implies second-rateness in the character of the taught as compared with that of the teacher. In Green's case, however, it seems to us that distance of time and independence of labour early broke down the enchantment of Coleridge's personal presence, and that, in the long run of the years, the self-assertion, in which he was not deficient, induced him to hesitate to declare himself, by publication, the mere philosophic Boswell for Coleridge, the encyclopædist, and to determine to build for himself, and by himself, an edifice of speculation on the foundation, perhaps with the materials, of Coleridge—being himself the Solomon of the temple in relation to which Coleridge was the David—the designer and the purveyor. Dr. Ingleby deserves the gratitude of the philosophic world for his persistency in inquiring after and searching for the unpublished manuscripts of Coleridge; and we sympathize in his regret that his executor did not give us Coleridge *per se*, without the Green precipitate with which it is in this work alloyed; for we cannot help thinking that the original Coleridgean colours have not been so much developed as obscured by the process to which they have been subjected. Still, failing the reflections, "native and endued," we think it is an advantage to have a sort of authorized report of the ideas of Coleridge on the philosophy of religion.

We have little farther to record of our author. He had attained the age of seventy-two, and felt that his working power was exhausted, and that his work was nearly done. On his birthday he was seized with acute illness, and suffered severely; he rallied, and hopes began to be entertained of him, but he relapsed again. During his illness, acute though it was, he bravely and serenely watched the progress of the malady. "Congestion," said he to his pupil and medical adviser. Feeling his own pulse calmly, he suddenly uttered the word "stopped," and thus the end came, on the evening of 18th December, 1863.



## Religion.

### IS THE GOSPEL ADAPTED TO MODERN LIFE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

By the term Gospel I understand the religious system instituted by Jesus Christ, and promulgated by His disciples, and I affirm that this system, Christianity, is adapted to modern life. Notwithstanding the assertion made by some, that all religious feeling has its root in fear or superstition, the fact that no nation has as yet been discovered entirely destitute of some religion, proves that it is a necessity of the human mind. Man is essentially the same in all ages; the passions that stir him, the motives by which he is actuated, and his wants, are the same in this modern life as they were when Christianity was first given to the world. The differences and diversities that have prevailed and do prevail among men, are not of an essential, but of a superficial nature. For example, in the matters of food and dress, the fashions and customs of society have always been changing, but the time will never come when the race will dispense with bread or with clothing. Again, with respect to poetry and music, great variety has ever distinguished composition in these arts, but men will never cease to delight in impassioned rhythm, or become deaf to harmonious strains.

Jesus is not only the Messiah of the Jews, he is the Christ of mankind; and a religion that comes to man with a faith, a law, a hope, and a spirit like those of Christianity, can never be superseded or abolished, but will be enduring as the race of man on the earth. It is quite as improbable that Christianity will be supplanted by some other religion as it is that something will be invented to take the place of bread or of fire. By the faith of Christianity is not meant that voluminous fabric of creeds and confessions which the Church for eighteen centuries has been spinning silkworm-like from her own body. The faith of the gospel is summed up in one word—God. Jesus Christ, in announcing to the world the supreme object of faith, does so without urging any arguments from design or *à priori* reasonings. His gospel was for all men, and not for the argumentative and metaphysically inclined alone. He speaks of God simply as "your heavenly Father," thus indicating that all men are members of one family—are brothers; that the great household of the world is presided over by a Being who is possessed of the care, solicitude, and love of a father, who is entitled to the reverence, gratitude, and obedience due to a father by his children, and that men's happiness depends on their observance of the laws He has established for the regulation of His great

family. No religion could present a faith surpassing this of the gospel; it says, "God so loved the world," "God is love." Is it possible to conceive of an age, ancient or modern, to which such a faith as this is would not be adapted?

The second feature of the Christian system noted above is its law. Some of the rules by which it enjoins men to regulate their individual conduct are, "Keep yourselves unspotted from the world," "Be temperate in all things," "Keep thyself pure," "Live soberly, righteously, and godly," and the great law by which men are to be guided in their dealings with each other is one which embraces the sense of all social virtue, and which can be mistaken by no man, "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you." This law has been embodied in the modern positive philosophy, which fact is of itself an indirect acknowledgment that Christian ethics are adapted to modern life.

Let us now notice the hope Christianity offers. The idea, more or less definite, of a life hereafter has always prevailed among men; accordingly, we find the idea included in all the principal forms of religious belief. The Brahmin is consoled with the hope of an existence of repose and rest after death; the Greek polytheist expected to find an elysium beyond the grave, where he would dwell with the shades of the heroes of his country, and the Mohammedan is promised the delights of a voluptuous paradise, where the rose never fades from the cheek of beauty. The hope, however, which Christianity presents transcends that of all religions. It alone "has brought immortality to light," assuring men, in general but distinct terms, that there is reserved for them after death a life everlasting, in which they shall grow in holiness, knowledge, power, and happiness. And this assurance increases with the spiritual growth of man, becoming stronger as he renders himself the more worthy of deserving so glorious a destiny.

One word in conclusion on the spirit of the gospel. It is impossible to calculate the benefits Christianity has bestowed on the world. Its spirit has permeated with its benign influence our laws, national and international, and elevated our manners. It has also paved the way for the progress of science and art, and has softened the violent, inflexible and imperious tempers of men.

Would that person be listened to for a moment who should say he is none the better that a spirit like Christ's has appeared in the world? I think not. St. Paul, in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, gives an appalling description of the state of the heathen world at the time of the introduction of Christianity, and his account is verified by contemporary writers. Had the regenerating influence of the gospel been then withheld, I can only conceive of the world as being quickly overtaken by a doom of dark desolation and eternal silence. As it was adapted to reform ancient life, so it is adapted to conform modern life to that mind which was in Christ Jesus.

CALEDONIUS.

## AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

THE question, "Is the gospel adapted to modern life?" is one of paramount importance—of importance which is intensified by its personality; for no one who hears or reads the question, and knows, or thinks he knows, what the gospel is, can reply to it without answering another query, not expressly put, but implied, viz., "Is the gospel true to me as an individual?" By the phrase "gospel" I shall understand not the Bible, though in a sense it might be so termed, as containing a transcript of the gospel, and designed from beginning to end to illustrate it by history and biography, by doctrine and by precept. The gospel in the special sense is the revelation of the divine scheme of redemption through the atonement of the Son of God, the acceptance of which secures the believer not only from the penal consequences of past and future sin, but brings him into new relations with the Being he has offended. Henceforth this gospel is (or should be) to him a constant motive power, changing his feelings, his inclinations, his purposes, and leading him to pure and lofty aims. He is not insured from lapses even of a lamentable kind, yet he can never be again as he once was, or as those around him are, to whom the gospel is a name merely. This magnificent scheme, let it be added, though extending its power, by anticipation, to the very earliest epoch of man's life on the earth, was actually consummated about 1,800 years ago; at which time its principles and facts began to be fully set forth by those ordained to be the prophets of Christianity; and from which date it has never ceased to work in the hearts of men, many of whom have proved their attachment to it by their endurance of privations and positive sufferings the most severe. From age to age this gospel has lived, causing the decline of various false creeds, and witnessing the rise of others, hereafter to succumb to its influence. Numerous have been the pseudo-gospels, and whatever mischief they may have produced, they have at least served to exhibit with greater lustre the effulgence of that abiding star of hope for humanity, beside which they appear but as *ignes fatui*, or illusive meteors. Can it be seriously asked by any thoughtful person whether this gospel can be indeed as adapted to man in the nineteenth as it was in the first century?

We are not now arguing the question with those who doubt whether the gospel ever was a true and a real thing; we suppose that the majority, if not the totality of those who would have us believe that the gospel has no adaptability to the varied phases of modern life, are willing to admit that it was a divine revelation, and once exercised a potent force upon the minds and lives of millions of men. This point fairly conceded means a great deal. For, as Carlyle remarks in an exquisite passage, too long to quote, humanity has been the same from age to age in all its essentialities, however its outward circumstances may have varied, and though apparently new developments have shown themselves at

different periods. The seeds of all virtues and all vices lay hidden in the breasts of the primeval pair, who first went forth together over the face of our earth. Therefore, whatever may be said of thought of modern life as exhibited in our land, and in others occupying a high status of civilization, we may rest assured of the fact that the men and women around us, the offspring of an era rich in its newly discovered lore, and rich also in all the experience that the records of well-nigh six thousand years of human history ought to bring—these are, however different in their outward aspect, swayed by similar feelings and passions and principles (substantially) as those living at other periods.

There are modifications and changes due to various agencies; let us thankfully say that, on the whole, the human race is living upward, through the effects of these, not the least of which has been and is this very gospel we are discussing; yet, on the whole, we see clearly enough, as we compare modern life with bygone life, that man, under all his disguises, is essentially the same. Take the average human being of our country and day (let him be one to whom Christianity is not a life-power, but merely one of the creeds), and you will find, if you turn him inside out, that he is neither much better nor much worse than the denizen of the dark ages, the citizen of the realms renowned in classic story, or the wild wanderer at an early period over a sparsely inhabited earth. Custom and usage fix him in by certain boundaries peculiar to his day, but radically he is the same as those before him. Asserting, therefore, that "modern life," with all its real or supposed advantages and disadvantages, leaves man still man, and raises him neither to angelic heights, nor casts him down to demoniacal depths, it follows that the gospel which so largely benefited him when it was first fully revealed, and was capable subsequently of exerting a continuous influence upon the race, and of producing, under special circumstances, such grand displays of its power as we have in the Reformation and the Puritan periods, this gospel cannot be less applicable *now* than formerly, in all the conjunctures we may imagine arising in our modern life. Granted that it did in former times what is matter of history, there can be no reason for regarding it as effete or useless in this era, since it addresses itself to the human race, and claims their regard, because it appeals to those characteristics of that race which are almost unchangeable, if not entirely so. Moreover, the verity of the gospel being admitted, we are bound to accept the statements propounded by its credentials with reference to its aims and intents. And we find assertions the most positive and indubitable, which interweave themselves with its integral structure, and bear the divine impress, from which we learn that the whole human family are interested in its plan, and are invited to share its benefits. With reverence we may say that it would have been unworthy of the Author to have made it temporary, and therefore imperfect. The Jewish ritual, indeed, was a divinely appointed thing, and yet fugacious—its structure

showing that it was a series of symbols, the precursor of another system more glorious and earth-wide in its adaptations. That ritual was (though a part still lingers on in a fragmentary life) only suited, in most particulars, for a certain era, for a special nation, and for an Eastern clime; while the gospel, with no such restrictions, seeks out the man, in every epoch, and is regardless of his nationality and his locality.

An examination of the gist of the primary arguments on which F. F. A. relies in order to prove his point leads us to the conclusion that his judgment regarding the efficacy of the gospel in modern civilized life, by the results as computable by human eyes, is an unfair one. We do not condemn a medicinal remedy which has already cured hundreds of a disease, because another hundred who suffer from that same disease refuse to take it, and die of their malady. The maker of man deals with him as a free agent; nor does he force any either to accept the gospel he has revealed, or to follow out its dictates when it is believed. Obedience based upon love and gratitude is all he demands; and this every sincere follower of the gospel will strive to render. In those things which have to do with the will of man we meet with acknowledged difficulties in ascertaining the results which may be expected to flow from certain causes. The question F. F. A. suggests might have been better put in this form, "Do men's deeds harmonize with their creeds?" and there are no doubt plenty of instances in the negative, even when we look amongst those whose profession of Christianity is no mere form. This need not stagger or shock us. In this state of existence the best of us are fallible, imperfect, and contradictory in our actions. The gospel is not chargeable with the errors of its disciples. We find continually in the every-day events of life that men transgress the rules of health, and in various ways subject themselves to immediate penalties in consequence of their falling into errors which they know to be such, and which they have determined to avoid. Though, as it has been truly said, "what men believe they will generally do," this must not be pressed too far. No one will be found to be acting rightly unless he believes rightly; yet, on the other hand, there are many instances adducible of those who have a right belief, whose deeds are far from being correspondent thereto. Nor must it be forgotten, in our judgments upon our fellow-men, that though we examine their actions and their words, the power to ascertain exactly what motives and impulses prompt these is not given to us. Nor, again, as Burns has put it, should we forget that though we may compute the evil a man does, we cannot tell what he resists. Bad as our modern life is in its externals, we know not how much worse it might be without the ameliorating influences exercised by the gospel, which do in some degree touch those even who cannot be said to be its sincere followers.

But really the summary which F. F. A. gives of the most obvious incidents of our modern life, which show that the gospel has lost its

power, is almost amusing. The tissue of absurdities and lies which a petty sect such as the Mormons have chosen to adopt as their standard stands first—an important proof of the unfitness of the gospel for our time! We are told next that the Catholics are “eagerly engaged” in an attempt to get the Pope proclaimed an “infallible dictator,” that thus they may obtain the great desideratum, an adaptation between our own time and the Scriptures.” That this is actually the desire of the preponderance of Roman Catholics has not been proved, the reverse being thought to be the case; but how this at all effects the question at issue is difficult to say. No man, infallible though he be, can reconcile things which in their essential characters are not reconcilable, which F. F. A. asserts is his belief regarding our modern era and the gospel. The examples of spiritualists and free lovers cited only prove into what delusions and vices those are betrayed who reject this gospel, and follow phantoms of their own imaginations, or put on the iron chains forged by their own lusts. That Parliament should deal with such questions as marriage and education is not unnatural in a land professing to receive the gospel. There are points concerning both which the Bible, dealing as it does in general principles, leaves to be settled by the intelligence and common sense of man, though giving hints as to how such points should be decided. There are many secularists, too, adds F. F. A., and “they recognise no fitness in the Bible to them and their requirements.” We suppose not. The thief, we are convinced, “recognises no fitness” in the existence of a stout bar which prevents his gaining access to premises which promise to yield him spoil. Such secularists, we believe, may be divided into two classes. There are those who object to the restraints of Christianity, and therefore to its doctrines, because, if true, it would interpose a barrier between themselves and the gratification of appetites which are immoral or base. And there is another class of men, in a measure sincere in their denunciations of the Christian creed; men crotchety and peculiar, who, coming to the Bible with heads full of crude notions and one-sided ideas, fail to accept its truths merely because they have predetermined what they think should be found there. But, last of all, we have it alleged that the “gospel according to Comte” contains the crowning proof that a new system of things needs to be inaugurated, and that, as Cowper put it in satire a hundred years ago;—

“Common sense diffusing real day,  
The meteor of the gospel dies away.”

The argument on which F. F. A. lays so much stress, namely, that in trade and in social life we have sunk to so low an ebb that the gospel cannot elevate us, is futile indeed. The general maxims and precepts of the gospel fail to touch the peculiarities of our present circumstances; therefore these laws are useless. It is not so. They do not fail, but men shrink from making the application, and the fault is theirs. A new code of morals and ethics, were such

supposable, would doubtless prove as inefficacious in certain instances. A broad precept may be so constructed as to cover a multitude of minor details, which no legislator would think of enumerating *seriatim*. Thus there exists an Act of Parliament against cutting or maiming any one; and we should only laugh at a criminal who, when brought up for trial, alleged in his defence that he had only cut off a man's finger, and there was no law prohibiting cutting fingers! We are rotten to the core, says F. F. A., and perhaps we are, but could matters be worse than they were in the highly cultured nations of Greece and Italy when the apostles first commenced their mission? It is the presence and power of the gospel which has rendered our faculties acute to those things which men in other days did without a blush. Granted that we are the slaves of mean and petty vices, the gospel which could deal with those who with the greatest effrontery committed crimes which blacken history's page, cannot fail to exert as great or a greater influence now, and so assuredly it does. The picture F. F. A. draws of modern life is incorrect without its counterpart. There is another side; which he has not brought into view, and there are other aspects of modern life, which would show that, despite of fluctuations and occasional depressions, which must occur, the gospel is steadily extending its influence over the human race, until at the close of the six thousand years the glory of the millennial period shall be ushered in, and men shall no longer need to say to each other "Know the Lord," for this divine knowledge shall be universal.

J. R. S. C.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

"The peculiarity of religious life in this age is not that overwhelming sense of personal danger and necessity for deliverance which inspired the sixteenth century. It is not judgment to come which appals us, nor hell and the lake of brimstone, nor the hideous demons with their awful claws. Even the Celestial City, with its streets of gold and gates of pearl, is a dim imagination to us, at once material and unreal. We are capable of looking at Satan's hoofs all cloven and harmless, and saying, like the philosopher, Graminivorous! I am not afraid of you!" . . . (Modern society) "has no fear of judgment to come, nor any deep sense of its own ill-doing; but only a weary, restless, painful consciousness that things are not well, either with itself or its fellow-creatures; that the life it is leading is not justified by truth and nature, and cannot be in accordance with the purposes of God. . . . The people who are disgusted with civilization, disgusted with progress, sick of the hubbub of pretended benevolence, pretended freedom, pretended righteousness, and feel life to be all wrong and out of harmony, without knowing how to put it right, are countless in number."—*Blackwood's Magazine*, article "Piccadilly," October, 1870, pp. 404-406.

It is asserted by the writers on the affirmative of this question that the gospel is adapted to modern life; but these writers give no explanation of the palpable fact that in this age the gospel is greatly doubted—that, in fact, infidelity is rampant. There is the

practical infidelity of those who never darken a church door, but make the Sabbath a lounge or a Saturnalia; there is the professed infidelity of those who attend the halls of science, listen to the harangues of the Socialists and the Secularists, and are the advocates of Sunday enjoyments by day trips to the sea-side, bands in the parks, and the Sunday opening of the museums, picture galleries, and the Crystal Palace; there are the real infidels who pursue their avocations and their pleasures on the Sabbath of the Lord without let or hindrance from the compunctions of their consciences; there are the scientific infidels who provide Sunday lectures for the people on science, art, literature, and music; there are the speculative infidels who have adhered to positivism and worship humanity; and there is the hidden infidelity of formalists and hypocrites, of church-goers who care for none of the things of God, of the respectables who love to be seen of men in the best pews of the churches where the largest companies congregate; besides the infidelity of the merely imitative throng who attend upon divine ordinances without any (or but little) holy thought, following the multitude because it is the way of the world in which they move. Were the Gospels adapted to this age, they would change all this faithlessness, sinfulness, doubt, and misbelief; the hearts of men would be touched as with a live coal from off the altar of God, and the glow of true piety and fervent holiness would be felt in the hearts of those who now hold the faith of the Gospels apart from the sympathy of their spirits. It is the express purpose of the Gospels to awaken faith in the souls of men; and if we see that in the vast masses of our population a latent, a professed, and a practical faithlessness reigns, we cannot but conclude that the Gospels are not adapted to the age of which such a statement may be predicated. That infidelity is a great fact in this age I gather from the lamentations of all churches concerning men's carelessness regarding the call of the gospel; from the scenes witnessable in any and every large town in the country, and many too of the villages of the land; from the number of tracts, periodicals, and publications issued in opposition to and in deprecation of infidelity; from the popularity among certain sects of what are called Revival Meetings; from the Monday morning records of the police courts, and from the number of professed infidel works published, sold, and perused,—not to speak of those the infidelity of which is but thinly disguised.

Whatever definition of "adapted" may be chosen, we contend that there can be no doubt as to the meaning of our proof that in the power and prevalency of infidelity the Gospels are shown *not* to be adapted to modern life.

Of course it is not our concern at present to determine *why* or *by whom* they are not adapted; we have only to show that they are not adapted. It is quite a different question, and one which we are not here called upon to discuss, what is the reason,—on what account is it, how comes it that the Gospels are not adapted to



modern life? Their non-adaptation may be accounted for in several ways: perhaps the *form* of their teaching is not calculated to impress modern minds; perhaps the *matter* of their teaching is repugnant to men's ideas; perhaps the *links* of association by which they might have been effective have been broken, but with these as *reasons* we have nothing to do; we have only to establish our statement of fact by a sufficient induction. Again, it is no part of our argument to tell *by whom* this adaptation has been interrupted. It may be that the expositors, as professional advocates, have failed in bringing their solemn truths into effective relationship with the minds of men, that State churches have crippled the march of Christianity, or that Dissent has broken its force into fragments; but with this again we have nothing to do. S. S. asserts that it is impossible that the Gospels can fail to be adapted to modern life, because they possess the power of God within them; and "Diamond" believes that the hardness of human hearts ought not to be blamed on the Gospels. But we are not, as S. S. seems to suppose, debating about the capability of the Gospels being adapted to modern life; nor, as "Diamond" appears to think, concerning the power of the gospel on hearts prepared to receive its influences; we are asking if a certain thing is a fact, and we give the undeniable proof of the prevalence of infidelity of different sorts, to show that the Gospels—whatever be the reason—are not adapted to human life.

Now, be it observed, the prime purpose of the Gospels is to produce faith in Jesus Christ, repentance for sin, reform of life, and activity of moral effort to follow the example of the Saviour.

But the foregoing has been an argument referring almost wholly outside of the church. The church itself bears witness to the fact that the Gospels are not adapted to modern life. Is not formalism—the possession of a mere form of godliness—the crying sin of the church, the sin under which the church is dying? Formalism has all but expelled Christianity in its power and influence from the churches. If this is so, does it not show that the Gospels are not adapted to the life of modern times?

S. S., by skilfully shifting the word from "adapted" to "suitable," manages to make an apparent point in favour of the affirmative, but it is not quite so conclusive as he imagines. He examines (pp. 110, 111) several of the precepts of the gospel, and after showing their suitability he claims that he has proved their adaptedness to modern life. But were S. S. asked what is the law of honesty adapted to our modern life, would he seriously direct us to the eighth commandment, whose words are, "Thou shalt not steal"? These are words which are suitable enough for general guidance, but not for particular adaptation. This general law has been adapted to modern life by definition, distinction, classification, and by the affixing of specific punishments to specific forms of larceny,—larceny with aggravation, larceny by implication, as the procuring of goods under false pretences, burglary, robbery, poaching, shoplifting, pocket-picking, &c. The commandment is

admittedly suitable to any condition of civilization, for honesty is right and proper in each; but it is not adapted to any condition of civilization, for the varieties of it must be discriminated, and the penalties applied must be apportioned and proportioned. This is an instance in which suitability is not synonymous with adaptation. So that S. S. does not quite carry his point by his illustrations.

"Samuel," in his remarks on modern life, does all that is required to prove that the Gospels are not adapted to modern life; for he affirms that modern life is not the life which the Gospels advise and require. For eighteen hundred years—to take the New Testament times only—the gospel has been acting as the moulding power over human life, and according to "Samuel" it has failed to make men good, true, honest, and holy. Had it been adapted to its end, could it have so failed? Would "Samuel" be regarded as being adapted to hold office, say in Somerset House, if, after long and due trial, he had failed to perform the duties he had undertaken and been appointed to? His observations on the gospel have only one fault—they are utterly irrelevant to the question. Equally so is his sketch of the influence of the gospel in past times. On *the* question he gives us but a few remarks, in which he rather tries to prove that the gospel is better than some other things, and that something else would be worse than the gospel. But these two theses, though ever so amply proved, would *not* at all enable us to decide *the* question, *Is* the gospel adapted to modern life? Neither man's degeneration nor his regeneration are involved in the discussion. Do the teachings of the gospel actually apply to and exert effect upon men in the condition of mind which modern civilization placed them? We certainly think that "Samuel" has failed to do this; and failure in this is fatal. We almost everywhere see professions of Christianity; we have named our modern civilization Christian, but is it so? Where is Christian practice, and where do men manage in every-day life and society to stow away their Christianity? I cannot believe that the gospel is adapted to modern life until I see Christian life in the churches, in public life, in society, at the fireside, and in the streets.

G. W. N.

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"SELFISHNESS, when it is punished by the world, is mostly punished because it is connected with egotism. A man may help himself to an exorbitant portion of the good things of this life, if he will only keep quiet about it, and not obtrude himself upon people's notice. The cat takes the best place in the room, and nobody grudges it to her, because her purring satisfaction is not loudly obtruded on the company. But to bark like a cat in the warmest place, and scream like a parrot, will never do."—*Arthur Helps*.

## Social Economy.

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### OUGHT THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO BE DISCONTINUED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV. (*continued.*)

It is asserted that no marriage could be happy unless the law pronounced the husband to be the absolute master of his wife.

This assertion, which is of course quite incapable of proof, from the fact that it should be based upon experience, and that there has, as yet, been no experience of the equitable and just system that the wife should be the equal of her husband and not his bond-servant, Mr. Mill meets in the following unanswerable manner:—  
“It is not true that in all voluntary associations between two people one of them must be absolute master; still less that the law must determine which of them it shall be. The most frequent case of voluntary association, next to marriage, is partnership in business; and it is not found or thought necessary to enact that, in every partnership, one partner shall have entire control over the concern, and the other shall be bound to obey his orders. No one would enter into partnership on terms which would subject him to the responsibilities of a principal, with only the powers and privileges of a clerk or agent. . . . Yet it might seem that the exclusive power might be conceded with less danger to the rights and interests of the inferior, in the case of partnership, than in that of marriage, since he is free to cancel the power by withdrawing from the connection. The wife has no such power; and even if she had, it is almost always desirable that she should try all measures before resorting to it.”

It seems to me that Mr. Mill gives a true sketch of what a family needs to be, and what it would become under a different state of the law, and of the happy consequences which would arise to all the members of the family, when he says, “What is needed is, that it should be a school of sympathy in equality, of living together in love, without power on one side or obedience on the other. This it ought to be between the parents. It would then be an exercise of those virtues which each requires to fit them for all other associations, and a model to the children of the feelings and conduct which their temporary training by means of obedience is designed to render habitual, and therefore natural to them. The moral training of mankind will never be adapted to the conditions of the life for which all other human progress is a preparation, until they practise in the family the same moral rule which is adapted to the

normal constitution of human society. Any sentiment of freedom which can exist in a man whose nearest and dearest intimacies are with those of whom he is absolute master, is not the genuine or Christian love of freedom, but what the love of freedom generally was in the ancients and in the Middle Ages—an intense feeling of the dignity and importance of his own personality; making him disdain a yoke for himself, of which he has no abhorrence whatever in the abstract, but which he is abundantly ready to impose on others for his own interest or glorification." Another, and not by any means the least powerful reason, that the subjection of woman to her husband should be discontinued, is that the fact of such subjection works with the greatest force, and causes the greatest evil, amongst the lower classes, consequently demoralizing both husband and wife. Any observer can bear his testimony to the truth of the statements contained in the following quotation:—"In the most naturally brutal and morally uneducated part of the lower classes, the legal slavery of the woman, and something in the merely physical subjection to their will as an instrument, causes them (the men) to feel a sort of disrespect and contempt towards their own wife which they do not feel towards any other woman, or any other human being with whom they come in contact; and which makes her seem to them an appropriate subject for any kind of indignity. Let an acute observer of the signs of feeling, who has the requisite opportunities, judge for himself whether this is not the case; and if he finds that it is, let him not wonder at any amount of disgust and indignation that can be felt against institutions which lead naturally to this depraved state of the human mind."

No derangement of the present relative positions of husband and wife need be feared from the putting of the wife into her proper station of equality with her husband; for it is evident that the wife bears the larger portion of the labour in the conduct of the household, even though the husband earn the money necessary for the subsistence of the family; the wife undertaking the superintendence of the domestic expenditure; for "if, in addition to the physical suffering of bearing children, and the whole responsibility of their care and education in early years, the wife undertakes the careful and economical application of the husband's earnings to the general comfort of the family, she takes not only her fair share, but usually the larger share, of the bodily and mental exertion required by their joint existence."

But, at the present time, the woman has no power to earn money; and the possession of this power I hold to be essential to her. The fact that she has not this power is the reason of the poverty and degradation very prevalent amongst women. The male sex need not fear that she would wish to follow occupations for the purpose of earning when married, unless it should be necessary for the welfare of herself and family, which, even in that extreme, she cannot now do; for "if marriage were an equal contract, not implying the obligation of obedience, if the connection were r-

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longer enforced to the oppression of those to whom it is purely a mischief, but a separation, on just terms (I do not now speak of a divorce), could be obtained by any woman who was morally entitled to it, and if she would then find all honourable employments as freely open to her as to men, it would not be necessary for her protection that, during marriage, she should make this particular use of her faculties. Like a man when he chooses a profession, so when a woman marries, it may in general be understood that she makes choice of the management of a household and the bringing up of a family as the first call upon her exertions during as many years of her life as may be required for the purpose, and that she renounces, not all other objects and occupations, but all which are not consistent with the requirements of this."

The question now arises, why should women not be admitted to functions and occupations monopolized now by men?

The only reason as yet given for their exclusion is the simple fact that they are women. It is not said that they are stupider, or worse naturally than males. The reason given by Mr. Mill is, that men cannot as yet tolerate the idea of their wives being their equals. He says that, were it not for this, he thinks that "almost every one in the existing state of opinion in politics and political economy would admit the injustice of excluding half the human race from the greater number of lucrative occupations, and from almost all high social functions; ordaining from their birth either that they are not, and cannot by any possibility become, fit for employments which are legally open to the stupidest and basest of the other sex; or else that, however fit they may be, those employments shall be interdicted to them, in order to be preserved for the exclusive benefit of males."

Now, in order to justify the present exclusion of women from the performance of the functions and the filling of the occupations alluded to, it must be shown that no woman can ever be fit for them, and that the most eminent and clever women are mentally inferior to the most inconspicuous and stupid men to whom they are now open. But if the filling of these functions be decided by competition, or any other mode of securing regard to the public interest, it need not be feared that any such employment will be filled by a female inferior to her competitor of the opposite sex; and if, because she is a woman, the man is preferred, although her inferior, then the public suffer.

As to the presumed inability of women to fill these occupations, it may be said that history shows us that women have acted in many exalted spheres of life satisfactorily, and that which they have done, notwithstanding a defective education, they could decidedly perform were they educated suitably for it.

"When we consider how sedulously they are all trained away from, instead of being trained towards, any of the occupations or objects reserved for men, it is evident that I am taking a very humble ground for them

when I rest their case on what they have actually achieved. For, in this case, negative evidence is worth little, while any positive evidence is conclusive. It cannot be inferred to be impossible that a woman should be a Homer, or an Aristotle, or a Michael Angelo, or a Beethoven, because no woman has actually produced works comparable to theirs in any of those lines of excellence. This negative fact at most leaves the question uncertain and open to psychological discussion. But it is quite certain that a woman can be a Queen Elizabeth, or a Deborah, or a Joan of Arc, since this is not inference, but fact. Now it is a curious consideration that the only things which the existing law excludes women from doing are the things which they have proved that they are able to do. There is no law to prevent a woman from having written all the plays of Shakspeare, or composed all the operas of Mozart. But Queen Elizabeth or Queen Victoria, had they not inherited the throne, could not have been entrusted with the smallest of the political duties, of which the former showed herself equal to the greatest."

There is a prevalent idea that women are only fit for certain defined occupations, and that they would be quite unfit to enter upon any serious function,—for instance, the direction of important affairs. The absurdity of this idea can at once be shown by history, which proves that women have been remarkable both for the vigour of their rule when they have been required to assume the governing function, and for their intelligence. Amongst the most eminent rulers of mankind will be found queens and empresses, female regents and viceroys of provinces.

It has been said that queens have displayed greater ability than ordinary kings in the selection of ministers and administrators; and what does this prove, but "that the administration is in the hands of better men under a queen than under an average king? It must be that queens have a superior capacity for choosing them; and women must be better qualified than men both for the position of sovereign and for that of chief minister; for the principal business of a prime minister is not to govern in person, but to find the fittest persons to conduct every department of public affairs. The more rapid insight into character, which is one of the admitted points of superiority in women over men, must certainly make them, with anything like a parity of qualifications in other respects, more apt than men in that choice of instruments which is nearly the most important business of every one who has to do with governing mankind."

What is meant by women's practical nature, and what is the conclusion to be drawn from the fact of their superior practicality? Mr. Mill accepts this generalization as to their possession of the quality named as true, and says that it "is conformable to all the public history of women in the present and the past. It is no less borne out by common and daily experience. Let us consider the special nature of the mental capacities most characteristic of a woman of talent. They are all of a kind which fits them for practice, and makes them tend towards it. What is meant by a woman's

capacity of intuitive perception? It means a rapid and correct insight into present fact. . . .

"What is called their intuitive sagacity makes them peculiarly apt in gathering such general truths as can be collected from their individual means of observation. When, consequently, they chance to be as well provided as men with the results of other people's experience, by reading and education (I use the word chance advisedly; for, in respect to the knowledge that tends to fit them for the greater concerns of life, the only educated women are the self-educated), they are better furnished than men in general with the essential requisites of skilful and successful practice."

The benefits which a man would derive from the companionship of a well-educated and superior woman are incalculable, and it is much to be lamented that those women are comparatively few, in consequence of the mean education and cramped notions to which they are subjected; but there can be no doubt—and the writings of our greatest thinkers bear out the view—that "hardly anything can be of greater value to a man of theory and speculation, who employs himself not in collecting materials of knowledge by observation, but in working them up by processes of thought into comprehensive truths of science and laws of conduct, than to carry on his speculations in the companionship, and under the criticism, of a really superior woman. There is nothing comparable to it for keeping his thoughts within the limits of real things, and the actual facts of nature. A woman seldom runs wild after an abstraction. The habitual direction of her mind to dealing with things as individuals rather than in groups, and (what is closely connected with it) her more lively interest in the present feelings of persons, which makes her consider, first of all, in anything which claims to be applied to practice, in what manner persons will be affected by it,—these two things make her extremely unlikely to put forth in any speculation which loses sight of individuals, and deals with things as if they existed for the benefit of some imaginary entity, some mere creation of the mind, not resolvable into the feelings of living beings. Women's thoughts are thus as useful in giving reality to those of thinking men, as men's thoughts in giving width and largeness to those of women. In depth, as distinguished from breadth, I greatly doubt, if even now, women, compared with men, are at any disadvantage."

The capacities of women have been largely shown in literature. Some of our most eminent writers, notwithstanding their numerous disadvantages—are, and have been, women. And "if we go back to the earlier period, when very few women made the attempt (in literature), yet some of these few made it with distinguished success. The Greeks always accounted Sappho among their great poets; and we may well suppose that Myrtis, said to have been the teacher of Pindar, and Corinna, who five times bore away from him the prize of poetry, must at least have had sufficient merit to admit of being compared with that great name. Aspasia did not

leave any philosophical writings; but it is an admitted fact that Socrates resorted to her for instruction, and avowed himself to have obtained it."

It may be asked what advantages or benefits those who advocate this side of the question expect to accrue from the discontinuance of the subjection of women.

The immense advantages which would arise, first of all to married women, from the abolition of their subjection, are almost beyond calculation, but must be perceived, to some extent, by any person.

"The sufferings, imageralities, evils of all sorts, produced in innumerable cases by the subjection of individual women to individual men, are far too terrible to be overlooked. Unthinking or uncandid persons, counting those cases alone which are extreme or which attain publicity, may say that the evils are exceptional; but no one can be blind to their existence, nor, in many cases, to their intensity. . . .

"The law of servitude in marriage is a monstrous contradiction to all the principles of the modern world, and to all the experience through which those principles have been slowly and painfully worked out. It is the sole case, now that negro slavery has been abolished, in which a human being in the plenitude of every faculty is delivered up to the tender mercies of another human being, in the hope, forsooth, that this other will use the power solely for the good of the person subjected to it. Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law. There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house."

It may also be asked, what would be the advantage of opening all honourable employments to women, and of their consequent training and education to fit them for such employments? The first answer which Mr. Mill gives to this objection is incontrovertible, and would be sufficient, if even there were no other advantage attainable than that which he points out. He says,—

"Let me first answer, the advantage of having the most universal and pervading of all human relations regulated by justice instead of injustice. The vast amount of this gain to human nature it is hardly possible, by any explanation or illustration, to place in a stronger light than it is placed by the bare statement to any one who attaches a moral meaning to words. All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind, have their source and root in, and derive their principal nourishment from, the present constitution of the relation between men and women."

The foundations of domestic existence are at present laid on a relation, which is contradictory to the first principles of justice, and this fact must pervert the mind of the man to such an extent that we cannot conceive what a beneficial change would be wrought by its removal. This relic of the law of force we should do our utmost to substitute by principles of justice.

Who can say the immense amount of good which must necessarily result from the widening of woman's sphere of action, and the raising of the level of her education to that of man? But besides this.



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"the mere breaking down of the barrier would of itself have an educational virtue of the highest worth. The mere getting rid of the idea that all the wider subjects of thought and action, all the things which are of general and not solely of private interest, are men's business, from which women are to be warned off—positively interdicted from most of it, coldly tolerated in the little which is allowed them,—the mere consciousness a woman would then have of being a human being like any other, entitled to choose her pursuits, urged or invited by the same inducements, as any one else to interest herself in whatever is interesting to human beings, entitled to exert the share of influence on all human concerns which belongs to an individual opinion, whether she attempted actual participation in them or not,—this alone would effect an immense expansion of the faculties of women, as well as enlargement of the range of their moral sentiments."

Her present position of dependence vitiates the woman's notion of true charity to the poor. She is not self-dependent, she never has been,—she has never been taught that best of all lessons, self-dependence. She has been told that her lot will be to receive all from others. The fact that the reception of gifts from others above them grates upon the feelings of the poor, astounds her. "She forgets that she is not free, and that the poor are."

But what is the almost fatal consequence to the man, of being tied for life to a being of inferior intelligence? "A man who is married to a woman his inferior in intelligence finds her a perpetual dead weight, or worse than a dead weight, a drag upon every aspiration of his to be better than public opinion requires him to be. It is hardly possible for one who is in these bonds to attain exalted virtue. If he differs in his opinion from the mass—if he sees truths which have not yet dawned upon them, or if, feeling in his heart truths which they nominally recognise, he would like to act up to those truths more conscientiously than the generality of mankind, to all such thoughts and desires marriage is the heaviest of drawbacks, unless he be so fortunate as to have a wife as much above the common level as he himself is."

But what ought a man to acquire with his wife? A constant stimulus to exertion, a strengthening of his principles if ever they should be like to fail, some one to join with him in or suggest to him, noble thoughts, to urge him to action even after a temporary defeat, to insist on his not being content with mere pecuniary gain. And I ask, can a wife of this description be frequently obtained in the present state of female subjection?

Is the subjection of the wife the man's ideal of marriage? I pity him if it be. Who cares for a wife who acquiesces without question in everything her husband does and says, who cannot maintain her opinions in politics, or on any other subject, nor either convince or be convinced by him?

In the case of subjection in marriage, what advantage does a man gain by marriage? what does he obtain "expect an upper

servant, a nurse, or a mistress? On the contrary, when each of two persons, instead of being a nothing, is a something; when they are attached to one another, and are not too much unlike to begin with, the constant partaking in the same things, assisted by their sympathy, draws out the latent capacities of each for being interested in the things which were at first interesting only to the other, and works a gradual assimilation of the tastes and characters to one another, partly by the insensible modification of each, but more by a real enriching of the two natures, each acquiring the tastes and capacities of the other in addition to its own. This often happens between two friends of the same sex who are much associated in their daily life; and it would be a common, if not the commonest case in marriage, did not the totally different bringing up of the two sexes make it next to an impossibility to form a really well-assorted union."

If a man of superior intellect connect himself with an inferior for his only completely intimate associate, the former's mind must suffer, and increasingly so the closer the nature of the association. And hence we often see that men who before marriage displayed intellectual qualities, after that event become trivial, insipid, and almost devoid of mental exertion.

"What marriage may be in the case of two persons of cultivated faculties, identical in opinions and purpose, between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity of powers and capacities, with reciprocal superiority in them—so that each can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately the pleasure of leading and of being led in the path of development—I will not attempt to describe. To those who can conceive it there is no need; to those who cannot, it would appear the dream of an enthusiast."

Eloquent authors have descanted on the benefits which freedom confers, usually, however, leaving women out of their calculations; but I fully believe with Mr. Mill, that—

"Whatever has been said or written, from the time of Herodotus to the present, of the ennobling influence of free government—the nerve and spring which it gives to all the faculties, the larger and higher objects which it presents to the intellect and feelings, the more unselfish public spirit, and calmer and broader views of duty that it engenders, and the generally loftier platform on which it elevates the individual as a moral, spiritual, and social being—is every particle as true of women as of men. Are these things no important part of individual happiness?"

A great many of the flagrant evils of the present day may be traced to their want of freedom, and hence women grasp at power at all hazards, for "where liberty cannot be hoped for, and power can, power becomes the grand object of human desire; those to whom others will not leave the undisturbed management of their own affairs will compensate themselves, if they can, by meddling for their own purposes with the affairs of others. Hence also women's passion for personal beauty, and dress, and display, and all the evil

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which flow from it in the way of mischievous luxury and social immorality. The love of power and the love of liberty are in eternal antagonism."

Does not history show us that all over Europe the most eminent of men have frequently sought with advantage the help of women in attaining their objects? and it is a fact that there are most important matters of public administration wherein such women would excel most men, and conspicuously the detailed management of monetary matters. The public would therefore gain, in this respect amongst others, by the discontinuance of female subjection.

In conclusion, I venture to make another quotation from Mr. Mill's work—a work which should be read by all—on the "Subjection of Women."

"What, in unenlightened societies, colour, race, religion, or in the case of a conquered country, nationality, are to some men, sex is to all women—a peremptory exclusion from almost all honourable occupations but either such as cannot be fulfilled by others, or such as those others do not think worthy of their acceptance."

"When we consider the positive evil caused to the disqualified half of the human race by their disqualification—first in the loss of the most inspiring and elevating kind of personal enjoyment, and next in the weariness, disappointment, and profound dissatisfaction with life which are so often the substitute for it—one feels that among all the lessons which men require for carrying on the struggle against the inevitable imperfection of their lot on earth, there is no lesson which they more need than not to add to the evils which nature inflicts by their jealous and prejudiced restrictions on one another. Their vain fears only substitute other and worse evils for those which they are idly apprehensive of; while every restraint on the freedom of conduct of any of their human fellow-creatures (otherwise than by making them responsible for any evil actually caused by it) dries up *pro tanto* the principal fountain of human happiness, and leaves the species less rich to an inappreciable degree in all that makes life valuable to the individual human being."

H. K.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

In the October number of this Magazine H. K. has very considerably yet delicately aided the negativists much, while managing at the same time to make it easy for himself. A little inconsistency or want of tact has, however, been shown by him in the course he has pursued. It is well known that J. S. Mill holds the highest reputation in this country for logical acumen and argumentative skill. It is equally well known that J. S. Mill has written upon, has, in fact, almost brought forward, the subject of this debate. He has begun on the male side what Mary Wollstonecroft (Godwin) had long before commenced on the female side—a crusade for the independence of women. Had H. K. been content to speak first of the logical reputation, the high character, and the nobility of nature for which J. S. Mill is known, and had he then stated that

after full consideration that great thinker had issued his work on "The Subjection of Women" to advocate its discontinuance, many people would have thought that a very heavy and solid argument against the continuance of the subjection of women. But H. K. has quoted the arguments and abridged the work, and has thus given us a means of judging of the weak points in the arguments employed by J. S. Mill.

We wish, for the argument's sake, that there had been more of Mill and less of H. K.; and yet we are glad, for the sake of our own modesty, that H. K. has written his paper, as it enables us in some measure to shield ourselves against the charge of offensive self-esteem which we might have incurred had we ventured to enter into the arena against J. S. Mill. H. K. indeed equipped himself in the harness and with the weapons of the argumentative armory of J. S. Mill; but we are privileged to contend against the armour-bearer, or wearer rather, and may do so with less fear as well as with less egotism than if we were engaging with the great original.

H. K. commences his paper by a denial that "the grand climax and ultimatum of woman's life is marriage." Nature, it seems, has made a mistake. H. K. knows that Nature did not intend what she has done. She formed women marriageable, but she did not mean them to marry. They were intended to live a nobler life than that of marrying or being given in marriage. They were formed to be earth's angels, and they attain that eminence in the highest degree when they resist and oppose the very design of Deity in their creation. He instituted *sex*, but women, according to H. K., have been made for higher ends and with a nobler design than God gave any token of when He at first made mankind male and female—that they might marry. If then we admit H. K.'s denial, we must go a good deal further and make a denial of the wisdom of God and the beneficence of His designs in the creation of one half of the human race. We prefer to doubt the wisdom of H. K., to having any doubt about the wisdom and goodness of God in any of His works, because "we ought to fear God rather than man."

Birth does not fix position, H. K. following suit on J. S. Mill argues (p. 279). It certainly does not. But "to be born a girl instead of a boy" fixes duty, and by the duty we have power to perform, our position in life is fixed. Both J. S. Mill and H. K. are guilty of using a fallacy here. They employ birth in one premise as the mere accident of birth as regards higher and lower position in the social scale, and they refer to persons passing from grade to grade in the same sexual plane; but in the other premise they employ birth to signify the mere fact of being born. Two different terms are thus used, and no true conclusion can follow from a syllogism having such a flaw.

The argument from experience (p. 279) is not valid. All experience is in opposition to the proposed release of women from

the subjection on certain points which they are under to the male sex; and here the analogy between the disqualification prevalent on account of religious opinions does not hold; for sex is not an opinion, but an unobliterated and undeniable fact.

J. S. Mill spoke in May, 1867 (as quoted by H. K., p. 280), much less like a logician than he should, for his speech implies that women who have no votes are in one or other of these three circumstances:—(1) perfectly isolated, and so having none to look after their interests—which few women are; (2) quite opposed in feeling, sentiment, and opinion, from those who are related to them—which few women are; (3) having special interests from the other sections of society, so that what is determined as best for others is not so for them—which no women have or ought to have. Hence the incapacity to vote is no grievance to the large majority of women; while the capacity to vote is a grievance to a large majority of men. Women are truly regarded by law as in their normal condition subject to men, and protected by them, and the law looks upon their natural guardians to fulfil their natural duties. Were the political franchise to be given to single women, would not the advocates for the independence of women shortly cry out, Is not one woman as good as another? And if a man replied, Yes, and a great deal better too, else why has one been taken and the other left?—would they not be apt to set furiously upon the folly of giving the political franchise to the worse women, and depriving the best of them of it? What says H. K. to this?

But is the case quite so bad as H. K. represents it to be, even concerning those who require to pay taxes without (personal) representation? Being unprotected, do they not require a larger measure of protection from the State, and are they not also exempted from many public duties, which, by being left undone by them, fall more severely upon those who have undertaken the protection of female relatives? Might not a grievance-monger make a good case against the clients of H. K., that they sit at home at ease while they require to plough the seas; that they require as regulars or volunteers to come to drill or battle at the loud-heard rolling of the drum; that they must leave their businesses to sit upon a jury, while they can go to ball, or opera, or Drury; that they in common council sit, and in church-rate commissions, while from such dismal tasks the ladies gain remissions? So that the loss of franchise rights to them may be endurable, and they should keep the ills they have, nor seek others less curable. But women know there is a way, wherever there is a will, of gaining mastery without H. K. or J. S. Mill.

A long passage occurs in H. K.'s paper, which is apparently intended to trade on the ignorance of the reader. That passage extends over two pages, 283 and 284, and yet recent legislation has made it quite inapplicable to "the *present* laws." \* This, I think,

\* In proof of the above statement we make the following extract on "Married Women's Property," from the *Englishwoman's Review*:—"The

shows badly for H. K.'s cause. Whenever men are found "making a case," it excites a doubt as to their having a good one, and this we opine or surmise is H. K.'s condition. Having taken upon himself to be woman's advocate, he should have avoided the tactics of the *advocatus diaboli*.

I do confess that H. K. has justice on his side when he complains of the treatment to which many women are subjected by their husbands. This, I suspect, arises from the increasing frequency with which *marriages des convenances* are entered into instead of marriages of affection. And this again results from the superabundance of women under our present exceptional circumstances, as large exporters of male muscularity. To this also we refer a large portion of the female depravity or weakness which abounds. I am quite of opinion that if it is the law that all legitimate children should be regarded as the father's, every illegitimate child should also be regarded as the father's, and should not be left as a burden on the mother, wherever the proof of paternity is clear. But surely women would not so frequently be victims if they did not in many cases attempt to victimize!

I have now gone pretty fully over H. K.'s arguments, and I think I have rebutted most, so as to show that "the subjection of women should be continued."

One argument we must now give against H. K. as the crowning one of all—an argument entirely irrefragable, of which no logic—J. S. Mill's or any other—can possibly obtain advantage; in fact, a final and clinching proof. Each key in the possession of H. K. will fail to unlock the wards of this conclusive argument. It is this:—

During all ages woman has possessed and exercised the educating and moulding of the race. Under her charge the opening mind has been unreservedly placed, like a clean sheet of paper, to write upon it whatever she chose. This gave her the vast advantage that anything she was specially interested in inculcating she could teach, insist on, and enforce.

"Tis education forms the common mind;

Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclined."

If, then, women had been the equals or the superiors of men, then

most satisfactory clauses in the Married Women's Property Act are the first and second; and it is to be regretted that the principle which runs through them does not extend into other clauses. It is a happiness to think that the poor wives and mothers who are forced to maintain their families by working in cotton factories and elsewhere will no longer be met at the factory gate on pay-days by their husbands, and compelled to give up a portion of their earnings. Drunken husbands and fathers will still be able to spend the whole of their wages on their own gratification, but they will no longer be able to possess themselves of any portion of their wives' earnings. Whatever the wife and mother earns may now be spent, without deduction, for the benefit of the family. This is a great victory."

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must long before this time have felt and learned that it was so; and knowing this, they must have inculcated it on the boys as a mother's early and ineffaceable lesson, and on the girls as the secret of their being; but we find it quite otherwise. They have not taught the supremacy of their own sex, either to their daughters or to their sons; all their teaching has been in the opposite direction. They have instructed their daughters to be subservient, and have encouraged their sons to be masterful and independent.

How could such a golden opportunity for training the boys to docility, and the recognition of the equality of their sisters, and for the upbringing of girls to claim and obtain, to assert and to show, to display and demand equality with their brothers be lost? All the gentle suaveness of their agency has not surely been cast off by their sons, when they have been trained to respect, esteem, value, and reciprocate equality and independence in the female portion of the race. Surely their daughters, after being taught to be jealously independent and prudently careful of equality, have not degenerated and succumbed so easily. Either, then, nature has been too strong in them to make it possible for them to ignore their necessary subordination; or nature has been too strong in their sons to suffer them to agree to the claimed equality. And in which way soever H. K. may account for it, it will prove that the subordination of women ought to be continued. If they did not teach it because it was felt to be untrue, then they confess that subjection should continue, and they are the best judges of that. If they could not teach it because the facts of nature could not be ignored, then again subjection must be continued, for nature is the best judge of that side of the question. The fact is that this question of "the subjection of women" is not one of the practical difficulties of our times. It is a matter of theoretical Radicalism. Universal suffrage has been so bandied about that Radicals have been compelled to acknowledge a *reductio ad absurdum*; that if manhood is a ground for giving the franchise, then womanhood is an equally good ground. Rather than resile from their false position, they have gone into the quagmire of an indefensible theory; and while their opponents have twitted them that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, they have claimed the sauce for the goose that it may be conferred on the gander—they have been forced, that is to say, to take the goose side of the question. This, with the dreams of Comte about women-worship, seems to have turned the heads of many of the political thinkers of our day. I do not think that woman will be tempted by heathen positivism or socialistic radicalism to relinquish the genuine and true conservatism of her nature, and to hunt for political franchises abroad, when she may secure happiness at home in a trustworthy surrounding of husband, children, and friends, to whom she is willingly subject through the high law of love, and over whom she bears masterful sway by the same subduing law. C. H.

## History.

### WERE THE CRUSADES BENEFICIAL TO SOCIAL PROGRESS?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WE have brought before us in this debate one of the most commonplace of those subjects on which members of discussion clubs engage in the hot contest of wordy conflict. Though a commonplace topic it is not an unimportant one, and we hope that it may be treated in such a manner in these pages as may show those who do battle hereafter on this topic how to apply thought as well as research to the consideration of questions which have appeared upon debaters' programmes with almost wearisome frequency and iteration.

Our business is, not to rewrite, but to reconsider the history of the Crusades. This debate requires three matters to be clearly before the mind: (1) what the Crusades were; (2) what beneficiality signifies; (3) what social progress is, or ought to be.

1. The Crusades were holy wars, originated for the suppression of Mohammedanism and the establishment of Christianity, and originating in the desire to promote the civilization of the earth by the Christianization of its nations. The Crusades are to be looked on as a whole, and as a whole they form a long-continued series of struggles in favour of the pure and radiant gospel of Jesus Christ, and against the distorted and dangerous Koran of Mohammed. Accidentally and incidentally they had other purposes and effected other ends, but essentially they were a European protest against the gross superstitions of the Saracens, and a gathering up of religious feeling and enthusiasm into the hearts of men in the mass to diminish and put down the power of those who had attempted to tread down the Holy Land under a tyranny too weighty to be borne. The fervid eloquence and the fervent spirit of Peter the Hermit, glowing with heavenly desire for the extension of Christian civilization, impressed on men's minds the contrast between the benignity of the Christian faith and that of the Mohammedan delusion, and his pictures of the griefs borne under the Saracen yoke augmented, by their reality and vividness, the sense of the evil always resulting from false doctrines. He enlisted the glory, the chivalry, the enthusiasm, and the ambition of men upon the side of righteousness, truth, and peace; and excited by holy zeal they assembled in their tens of thousands to vindicate the rights of individual Christians, and to labour for the extension of the kingdom of the Messiah. Nor were these holy wars a mere casual excitement and flash of religious courage. For two centuries they toiled



at their difficult task, under untold disadvantages, but sustained by an abiding faith that they were gone forth to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty, and that they were fighting the battles of the Captain of man's salvation.

2. By "beneficial" we understand advantageous, favourable to, promotive of, being helpful in. This word is of course connected with *benefit*, and has, in its signification a reference to the conferring of a benefit, or tending to such a condition of affairs as would be likely to result in the aim being successfully carried out on which men were intent.

3. Social progress means the amelioration or improvement of society. The proper function of civilization is the softening down of our animal and selfish desires, the subjugation of our gross and earthly passions and appetites to the loftier and nobler characteristics of our minds, and the increasing development and exercise of all the moral, intellectual, and spiritual activities of our nature. It is the ripening of our humanity; the raising of man to the healthiest height of manhood, and the diffusion of that personal excellence through all ranks of society which shall lead to the general betterment and gradual perfectness of the greatest possible numbers.

What we have then to consider is, were the holy wars of the eleventh and twelfth centuries calculated to be helpful in raising the characters of men in general, and in giving a zest for higher aims in life, a taste of purer joys and better habits of living?

I do not think we can hesitate, after reading the able paper furnished by "Samuel," to acknowledge that the question as here put should be answered in the affirmative. In comparing the remarks of M. F. A. with those brought before us by "Samuel," we cannot fail to notice that those objections which M. F. A. takes to the Crusades are to things which may be reckoned accidents of these wars, while "Samuel" calls to our minds real and permanent gains; and that the replies which have been given by "Samuel" seem to be very conclusive. I think that the first objection may be seen to have little force when we consider that human progress is from error to less error—as witness the progress of every science and art; hence, though the opinions entertained by the Crusaders on Christian faith were relatively false, they were really nearer the truth than the Mohammedan delusions to which they were opposed. To the objections made in the second place, regarding the idolatrous reverence for the Holy Land encouraged by the Crusades, we may remark that men's highest enthusiasms are sustained by associations, and that if these associations elevate and ennoble men's characters and actions they are helps to social progress, and for their own time and purpose beneficial. The third objection, as to their building up the papal power, has the sting taken out of it by remembering that in its own day the papal power was advantageous as the central power of Christian civilization before social progress had advanced so far as to consider individual responsibility superior

to corporate religion. Again, concerning M. F. A.'s fourth objection, we remind the reader that human progress is a passage through errors renounced. It was doubtless of great advantage to social progress to have it proved by the experience and endeavours of two centuries that faith is not the creature of force, and that the weapons of carnal warfare cannot be successfully employed to change the mind's inner convictions. I do not see the point of objection fifth. A celibate soldiery has many arguments to be used in its favour, and the debauchery attendant upon war can, we should think, hardly be charged against the general purposes governing its origin. This, therefore, appears to me to have no hold on the question. Objection five holds against all war, even the holiest, and would oppose all maintenance of right by force of arms.

I venture to add to the reasons for believing that the Crusades were beneficial to human progress the two following items:—

The Crusades induced men to co-operate together, not by force or through interest, but for an "idea."

It was a great thing to introduce into human life a high and noble principle of action, and especially of co-operative action. Hitherto the masses had been ruled by force and moved by might; or they were stimulated to fierce fury or energetic action by bribes of some sort or other appealing to their special selfishness. In warfare booty was freely connived at, and plunder, pillage, and rapine were not unfrequently encouraged; even worse forms of embroiled gratification were held out as inducements to action of the sort required, and the most obnoxious tyranny was exercised over nations under military rule. The Crusades introduced a higher principle of action. They gave men an object to achieve which had an ideal charm rather than real rewards to excite by. They placed before the mind an ambition which could not personally benefit them. It was a high imagination to fight not for the gains by pillage war afforded, but for the lofty delight of freeing the land of the most glorious Sovereign and Saviour from the desecration of a Saracen foot; it was a noble thought to act upon and to take part in the realizing of. To band men together less by the hire their swords would bring, or the personal advantages to be gained, than by a common design in the accomplishment of which leaders sought other honours than tempted them on other fields, and soldiers engaged in submission to other aims less tangible than those which brought them under the banners of sovereign warfare, —to rally men under the cry of Christ, His cross and His crown, must surely have exerted a nobler influence upon the minds of those who acted under its inspiration, than those more sordid and besotted cries which resounded on early European battle-fields. I cannot help thinking that the heightening of the aims of men, the elevating the standard of their activity, was a great matter to accomplish. But then let us add to this that the idea which it was sought to excite was that of the Christianizing of the wr-

earth. Here was a thought with a reflex power,<sup>3</sup> and doubtless upon many minds it must have wrought so as to effect great personal change as well as wonderful energy of courage. To bring men to act on a lofty ideal, and to strive for the achievement of noble ends, is the best way of elevating them, and this, in a great measure, the Crusades tended to do.

The Crusades purified warfare from the selfishness and worldliness which previously distinguished it.

Kings and generals, prior to the Crusades, commonly fought for the attainment of some increase of territory, extension of power, or widening of renown. Soldiers, in general, took service by enforcement to carry out the designs of those who held superiority over them. I do not think much enlargement on this topic necessary. If the definition given of the Crusades is correct, then it is easily seen that the mainspring and moving cause of the war was free from the sordid aims and selfish regards which have operated in almost all wars—at least all wars for conquest and enforcement of power. The high civilization implied in bringing men together to fight for such a cause is to my mind a great evidence of the utility of the Crusades.

I shall only add that the Crusades have commended themselves to many thinkers as the means of causing great good, and I would refer the reader of this paper to Guizot's "Civilization in Europe," Lecture Eighth, for further proof of the affirmative side of this question.

L. A.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

The poet of the Crusades—Tasso—has thrown the witchery of his genius over the holy wars of the Catholic Church in Christ's own country, and given them the *eclat* which cannot fail to attach itself to any series of events on which one of the poems of the world has been written; and men are so governed by associations of this sort that it is difficult to dispel the glamour of the poet's imagination from the actuality around which it has been cast. Of all exorcisms, that of the imagination is the most tasking and taxing. "The 'Jerusalem Delivered'" —says an unexceptionable authority, Leigh Hunt—"is stately, well-ordered, full of action and character, sometimes sublime, always elegant, and very interesting;" and there is a marvellous music in the tones in which he sings the daring and the deeds of those—

"Who freed  
The sepulchre of Christ from thrall profane,"

which affects men's thoughts and infects their imaginations whenever they begin to think of the theme upon which "Tasso writ with pen inspired." But our debate is a crusade in which the weapons employed must glow in the steel-bright radiance of reason and truth, not in the glittering haze of what Boileau has called "Tasso's tinsel." Controversy is the contest of reason, not of sentiment;

and though our prejudices often interfere with our impartiality, it is our duty to endeavour to cast off from our minds the besetting sins of our inclinations, and to look at the topics placed before us as nearly as possible in the light of reason and of truth, rather than under the hazy glow of poetry and sentimental prejudice. We intend to notice one or two of those arguments which "Samuel" advances in favour of the Crusades, and to show that they do not quite accurately state the case as it was, nor do they bear the applicability to the question which he attributes to them.

1. He asserts that "the Crusades fostered union, harmony, and peace among the turbulent nations of Europe" (p. 291). This is a profound mistake. They engendered great jealousies, fomented high quarrels, and led to serious European fightings. The Assizes of Jerusalem constitute historical evidence of the self-seeking of the leaders of the Crusades, and of the difficulty of regulating their assumed or asserted rights. Again, we have the rise of the military orders, each with different aims and differing interests and claims. The quarrels of the sovereigns of England and France are notorious. The shame, the defeats, the repulses, the losses, the reverses the sovereigns endured, the contests between them and the Popedom, the great severities of taxation and conscription to which nations were exposed, were sources of disunion and strife, hatred and turbulence woes and wretchedness,—not of peace, concord, and unity.

2. That "the Crusades called forth noble feelings" (p. 291) in individual cases we should be loth to deny; but that the noble feelings excited by the Crusades were generally felt we very much doubt. When sovereigns required to be coerced to undertake crusades under penalty of excommunication; when bribes of kingdoms and lordships in the Holy Land required to be offered to induce by interest those who could not be influenced by fear; when kings quarrelled, and generals fought duels; when men were kidnapped for service, or cheated into warfare unwillingly; when petty squabbles about precedency and plunder brought disaster upon great multitudes of men, and when the fierce hatred of religious warfare was evoked to set men's hearts against each other, I do not readily see that there was much place for noble feelings and praiseworthy doings. I think there is pretty good evidence to show that the Popes used the Crusades to impoverish, weaken, and employ those who were likely to impede or disapprove their course; and that the sovereigns cajoled or coerced their feudatories to go to the Crusades to find a means of thinning the population, depleting and depopulating their lands of their most fiery spirits.

3. That "the Crusades led the Western nations to visit Eastern lands" it would be impossible to deny; but what "Samuel" wishes to make of this argument (p. 292) does not very well appear. That it extended their experience there is little doubt, and that it showed them that men were very much alike wherever they were found may be admitted; but that these things were among the advantages of the Crusades does not appear very clear. This does not s

to be a great benefit, compared with what might have been accomplished by the culture of home lands, the building of cities of commercial importance, the encouragement of mercantile transactions, and of the pursuits of peace, attention to the arts of government, and the methods of statesmanly rule. He changes the sky, not the mind, who travels, unless he carries a purpose with him fixed enough to lead him to observe and learn, and a determination to use his opportunities aright. We do not know that the Crusaders went from the West to the East as to a school whence the magnificent object-lessons of experience were spread out before them; we do know that they went to enforce their crude and incorrect notions of Christianity at the point of the sword upon the people of the East.

4. "Samuel," in his fourth argument (p. 292), asserts that "the Crusades tended to decrease the influence of sacerdotalism and superstition;" while M. F. A., in his third argument, avers that "the tendency of the Crusades was to build up the Papacy, and increase its power" (p. 131). Here is a direct and express opposition, and who shall decide which is right? Both parties, too, make quotations in their favour as to the statement they make. I shrewdly suspect that in this matter the tendency was as M. F. A. explains it, and that what "Samuel" asserts was but the accidental, and far from intended result. I ground this opinion, first, on the fact that the Crusades were an idea primarily conceived by Gregory VII., who had a far-sighted system to inaugurate, and who knew that nothing was better for the upbuilding of a policy than a distraction of the attention of the people, or those interested in it; and though the project was not actually realized till the Popedom of Urban II., yet, as Urban was Gregory's friend, and aware of the plan and its purpose, I believe the Crusades were planned by Gregory to secure the stability of the Papacy. I argue this, in the second place, from the interest the Popes took in getting others to engage in the Crusades, especially those who were growing great near themselves, or were becoming refractory; and in the third place, from the submission yielded by many sovereigns and nobles to the commands of the Pope to undertake, prosecute, or take part in the Crusades. So much good blood and costly treasure would scarcely have been spent in the later Crusades had not the power of the Popedom been so increased by the impoverishment in men and money brought on by the earlier Crusades that he was able to enforce attention to his commands with power. Two millions of Europeans shed their blood during two centuries in the East, and this could not but bring under papal influence many families who had lost their natural protectors, many females who had inherited wealth, and many contenders for lordships and kingdoms rendered doubtful in their succession by the demise of their lords in the holy wars. In the uncertainties and amid the planlessness of European affairs during the Crusades, the Popes, having a plan laid, could scarcely fail to perfect their strength in the weakness of

those who surrounded them. That this self-seeking created a reaction, and that many felt their gorge rise at the papal greed and organization for taking, is very likely, and so far "Samuel" may be right. Still this was not a tendency of the Crusades, but a result flowing from them.

That "the Crusades undermined the foundations of feudal institutions" (p. 298) I, in part, assent to. The institution of chivalry, the rise of towns, the extension of the papal claims to power, all aided in their turns and ways; but perhaps the right of investiture held by the pontiff as giving him the casting vote in disputes, had a greater influence than the Crusades.

"Samuel" may very justly demand that I should give him opportunity for dealing with me as I have done with him. I shall not deny him the gratification to be found in advancing on his enemy's forces full tilt; although, properly speaking, I have only to negative or attack and besiege while he should affirm and defend himself against all comers. My first argument in opposition to the Crusades is this:—

The Crusades diverted men's minds from the principle of personal faith to that of mere external profession. This is a most important point. Personal faith is not only the true ground of Christianity, but the single means of justification. Such is the great doctrine of the Reformation. The Crusades, however, were an armed enforcement of Christianity, and were a degradation of Christianity to a level with the religion of Mahomet—a propagation of faith by the sword. This was twofoldly wrong—wrong to those who were forced to make a profession—wrong in teaching men to enforce a profession. On such grounds the Crusades became in reality the forerunners of the Inquisition. The remainder of this argument would be similar to that of M. F. A. (p. 130).

The Crusades affected social progress evilly, by exciting to wasteful habits of splendour and inducing extravagance; thus the nobility was impoverished and the church was enriched, the aristocracy was crippled and the Papacy strengthened; and many hereditary monarchies became electoral appendages of the church.

The Crusades increased and encouraged conventual institutions professedly for the protection of women bereft of protectors by these wars,—often, in reality, for the enrichment of the church, to which pious ladies gifted their inheritances before dedicating themselves to God in Christ.

The Crusades occasioned and encouraged two mendicant orders—the begging friars and the sturdy beggars, who had acted as soldiery in the Crusades.

But, besides, the Crusades were a gigantic failure. They could not but be so, their ground principle was so erroneous. Thus two centuries of possible progress were lost to the world. When will the world learn the economy of truth, reason, holiness, and right principle? Then beneficial social progress will be possible to be realized.

## Greek Days and Roman Nights.

### No. I.—PLATO'S PHÆDO.

#### *Analysis of the "Phædo."*

#### INTERLUSIVE CONVERSATION.

WHEN Socrates had delivered the preceding affecting application of his argument, a long silence ensued. Socrates seemed wrapped in thought, and those around him pondered his saying in their hearts. After a while, Cebes and Simmias begin a conversation *aside*, which, attracting the attention of Socrates, induced him to ask, What think ye of what I have said? Does it appear reasonable? Doubts do indeed arise when a thought like that is thoroughly examined. If you are thinking of it I am ready to reconsider the matter; if you are engaged about anything else I have no heart now to attend to it; but of that I pray you do not hesitate to speak if it concerns you.

To tell the truth, said Simmias, we have been debating between ourselves, but we refrained from expressing openly our difficulties, lest we should annoy you in your present circumstances. Bless my heart, Simmias, how shall I convince others that I do not think my present state a calamitous one, when I fail to make you feel that I do not? Do I seem to you less tolerant of evil than a swan, who, knowing he must needs die, though as unused to singing previously as I have been to make verses, yet sings as if rejoicing to go away among the pure-robed gods, whose servant he has been? Death-fearing man belies even the swan, and avers that he sings in lamentation of the meaning of the last woe. It is not so. Birds do not sing when in pain—not even the nightingale, the swallow, or the hoopoe [the mythic representatives in Attic Greece for actual grief]. They, belonging to Apollo, sing with prophetic joy for the coming of a better day. I, too, am a fellow-servant of Apollo, like the swan, sacred to and inspired by him; shall I not, also like them, jubilantly depart from life? So long, then, as the Eleven of Athens allow, you are welcome to question as you choose, and ask me what you will.

Thanks, said Simmias, I shall tell my doubts, and he shall indicate his dissent. It is impossible to know such matters clearly, but it is our duty to examine into them thoroughly, exhausting every effort possible to common men; for here firm faith is of all things most needful to be had. (We give the next sentence in full: it is elaborate, beautiful, and correct in spirit and feeling.)

"But failing the attainment of a firm standing-ground (or sure foothold) for faith, and supposing that man can neither discover truth by the use of his own intellectual powers, nor gain a knowledge of it through the aid of another, then it behoves him, having

chosen, as far as in him lies, the best and most trustworthy of human philosophies, to embark thereon, like a sailor (in default of other conveyance) going to sea on a raft, and so to sail along the voyage of life; that is to say, if it is not possible to go on one's way more confidently, and with less danger, on some securer vessel; that is, some divine word.\*

As I think, continues Simmias, that what you have advanced does not sufficiently substantiate your opinion, I shall not refrain from stating my objection, in honesty now, and to avoid reflections hereafter. Perhaps you are right, my friend, said Socrates; but wherein do my arguments fail? In this, then, Simmias rejoined; a similar argument might be used regarding a lyre. The lyre and its strings are visible, composite material, and perishable, yet delicious harmonies lie latent in the instrument; they are not the instrument, but only the soul of it, as it were. If we destroy the lyre and break its chords, could we say truly the harmony subsists still, and is unimpaired, nay, improved, being freed from its earthly instrument? You will grant that the soul is the fusion and harmony of bodily elements; if, then, the harmony of the frame be destroyed, that most divine harmony, the soul, must needs perish also; and what could we reply to those who might say [as Parmenides, Zeno, Dicaearchus, and others have done] that in death the soul perishes first, and leaves its broken instrument, the body, to burning, burial, and decay?

\* This passage of the *Phædo* is of sufficient importance to merit a note on its purport and significance. The figure employed in it comparing life to a voyage over an unsounded sea in a frail raft, which must be guided by the single mariner upon it, either by human knowledge or divine wisdom, is very striking and apposite, so much so that Plato uses it frequently, *e.g.*, in "*Philebus*" and in "*The Laws*." Plutarch and Cicero also borrow the image. It is possible that Plato's immediate conscious reference is to the Homeric epic allegory—the "*Odyssey*"—where Ulysses escapes from Calypso's isle on a rudely constructed raft, which is subsequently shattered and shivered, yet is enabled to reach the shore in safety, by the divine aid of *Leucothea*; but it is not improbable that in the groping fervour of a philosophic seer he gives expression to a hope formed within his spirit, that in the fulness of time the divine wisdom required for the true guidance of the voyager over life's troubled main would be given; that, feeling in himself the need of "a more sure word of prophecy" than he could attain unto, with the prevision of a great spirit, he felt a presentiment within him that the light of life would be revealed from on high. The Socratic *Daimon* was a glimmer of this hope, and this aspiration of Simmias is evidently made with an allusion to the life-guidance which had been vouchsafed to Socrates, not only in compliment to him, but as a ground of probability for the inference. Did not Jesus Christ, the *Logos*, refine, exalt, and realize this anticipated god-like *Logos* of Plato? and does not the voice of Simmias, the Theban, sound here like "the voice of one crying in the wilderness" of human speculation for help to "make straight the way of the Lord"? Or was this glimpse of faith less even than "the shadow of a great rock in a weary land"?



Simmias speaks reasonably, said Socrates, looking on the interlocutors steadily; methinks he does not handle the argument badly. Why do not some of you, more ready of speech than I, reply to him? but we had better first hear Cebes, to gain time for consideration, and then we can either give in if they are right, or maintain our own argument if it seems right. What is your difficulty, Cebes?

I grant that you appear to have demonstrated elegantly and eloquently the pre-existence of the soul; but to its after existence I demur as unproved and improbable; although I differ from Simmias in believing that the soul is stronger than the body, to me it seems the noblest of all things. It may be said to me, Why then doubt? if when a man dies his weaker part, the body, endures, why should not his nobler moiety continue? Can I reply? I may, at least, illustrate. You spoke of the web which the soul weaves round itself, and this suggests that by parity of reasoning we might speak of a weaver who had died as still enjoying some sort of life, and point in proof of that to some garment, the product of his labours at the loom, and ask, How can the more perishable garment outlast the less perishable weaver? But mark this! Not one, but many garments does the weaver produce during his life, and yet decay comes on him while at his loom on the last one. As the man may be reckoned more noble than any single one of his works, though he leave behind him some work unfinished, so the soul may retain all her original glory over the body, which it may weave around itself many times successively, and yet she may come, in the long run, to the last one. And though she may survive many bodies or forms, and terms of life, who may be certain that the frail garment of his present life may not be the last the soul shall be permitted to weave and wear? Pre-existence, therefore, does not prove the continual, though it may make probable a continuous existence of the soul; hence death may be feared when it occurs, for it may be the soul is wearing out its last form, and passing its last term of being—dark extinction alone being thereupon fated to it. The soul in its longest round of changes may—nay, must exhaust itself, unless it is necessarily imperishable and immortal; but what guarantee have we that it is so?

At this point *Phædo*, the narrator, informs *Echecrates*, the hearer, that the whole company were sadly discomfited (for so they had confessed to each other afterwards); because that, having taken the previous arguments home to their souls as true, they were now compelled to distrust, not only the arguments which had so uplifted them, but themselves, that they were unable to reason fitly, or that no sure reasoning was possible on such points. *Echecrates* acknowledges that they had good reason; for he, though but receiving the argument by report, had been mightily taken with the reasoning employed, but is now brought to a standstill.

Was Socrates, equally with them, disconcerted and nonplussed? He begs to be told all candidly, accurately. *Phædo* says he was rapt in astonishment at the conduct of Socrates; not because he had something to say in reply, for that could have caused no wonder; but because he listened so sweetly, affably, appreciatingly; perceived so sympathetically what a dismal effect had been produced upon the hearers, and rallied them so rapidly after they had been so thoroughly vanquished. How was that? *Echecrates* asks; and *Phædo* answers, It happened that I was at the time sitting near the bed on a low stool, and Socrates, stroking my head, began to play with the long locks which lay curled on my shoulders, as he often used to do: to-morrow, perhaps, O *Phædo*, he said, you will have these beautiful locks shorn off (as a sign of grief for a departed friend). It seems likely, said I. Not if you are persuaded by me, quoth he; and I asked why so. To-day it is that I and you should both undo our locks with the scissors, if our argument must die, and we cannot revive it; and were I you, and this should happen, I would take an oath, like an Argive, never to suffer one hair to grow till I had fought again and been victor over the arguments of *Simmias* and *Cebes*. But even *Hercules* (as in his contest with the hydra) was no match for two, said I, quoting a proverb in self-excuse and apology for him. "Call me as your assisting *Iolaus*, then, while yet the day lasts." "I do call upon you, not as *Hercules* on *Iolaus*, but as *Iolaus* on *Hercules*." It makes little matter which, said he, but first of all let us be sure we expose ourselves to no mischance. "What?" I asked.

By this fine piece of interlusive byplay the intensity of the *Epitasis* of the philosophic drama is increased and continued, a pause and breathing-time is secured for the full consideration of the state of the question thus brought, with a felicitously arranged attention to plot-interest, to such an equipose of argument, that we are eager to proceed, that we may see who shall be vanquished in the strife of thought, and what theory of the future is likely to issue from the contest of the controversialists.

#### ARGUMENT IV.

With a finely toned prelude, like a high strain of orchestral music, calling up the very essence of the mental state of the bystanders, Socrates begins by warning them to beware of the error of distrusting reason and succumbing to doubt; for no greater evil can befall man than despair of the truth. Men become contemners of reason as they become despisers of their fellows—by putting confidence in the unworthy. They then blame men when they should blame themselves, and become misanthropes unjustifiably. They should have acted wisely, and taken precautions against being taken in by rogues. So if men assent to arguments which are fallacious, and afterwards discover their error, they mistrust arguments when they should distrust themselves. This is the case especially with those who cultivate controversial invest-

gation. Such persons are apt to imagine they grow very wise, so that (like the Sophists) they think that nothing is trustworthy in reasoning at all, but that, like the tides of the Euripus, truth is in a state of flux and reflux, to one thing constant never. Let us rather learn to reason soundly by attending to the laws of thought. You should do so, and the others too, for the sake of the future of your life; but I, who am about to die, behaving like a mere Sophist, bandying arguments, should depart in a manner unworthy of a philosopher.

Sophists care only to make the arguments they use seem to be true. I desire less to persuade others than to convince myself; for if it is true that the soul is imperishable, it is well I should know and believe it; and even if I should be wrong in that, I shall be better engaged in reflection than in lamentation; and for me, all ignorance on that score will soon be at an end. Wherefore let us with vigour and courage seek the truth: if I speak truly, assent honestly; if false, dissent unhesitatingly, lest in my zeal I deceive myself and you, and like a bee depart, leaving my sting behind. To proceed, let us resume the threads of our discourse. Simmias fears lest the soul should perish as the harmony latent in a lyre does when it is broken; but Cebes thinks death always imminent, and sometimes certain. Next let us note the points on which we are agreed. "What think ye of the argument from reminiscence?" "Assent ye to it?" "Yes, both." Well, harmony is a thing compounded, and you say that the soul is a harmony of compacted parts; but harmony is not composed prior to the things from which it issues; this would be the case if the soul existed before it took human form, while yet it was composed of things which did not exist. Harmony does not resemble the soul. The lyre, the chords, and the sounds all exist unharmonized; afterwards harmony is produced, and it perishes. How will your argument now stand? Not at all, said Simmias. "Yet if any argument should be harmonious, it should be one based on harmony?" "True!" "But this of yours is not harmonious!" "Well, which do you assent to—that knowledge is reminiscence, or that the soul is a harmony?" The former; for the latter came to me as specious and probable, but without demonstration. I know that probabilities are idle and misleading, unless one is on his guard. The doctrine of reminiscence has been satisfactorily proved, and it is incompatible with that of the soul being a harmony; hence I am wrong. But reflect farther, Simmias, that harmony is an agreement of parts—an agreement more or less, and therefore involving the idea of less or more. But we cannot say that of the soul—it is absolutely. Besides, philosophers hold that virtue and wisdom are the harmonies of the soul, and vice and folly its discords. Hence there must be a harmony of a harmony and a discord of a harmony; but, however this be, if one soul is not more and another less—and observe this too, if the soul were a harmony, there could be no vicious people at all! This is absurd; therefore, though there may be harmony in the soul, *that* is not its

essence. Still farther, the parts of the soul are sometimes opposed to each other—a man may be hungry or thirsty, and yet fast and refrain from drinking. One part of the soul thwarts and checks, restrains and controls the other, and reason is the ruling power; hence Homer, in the *Odyssey* (xx., 17), speaks of Ulysses—

“With these words, while he smote his breast, he chid his beating heart.  
Bear up, brave spirit, in years bygone thou’st borne a far worse smart.”

This he said under the impression that the soul bears rule over and controls the passions, as being something far more divine than a mere harmony. As a faculty of divine right the soul is sovereign.

“By Jove, O Socrates, I believe you are right.”

“Then, my friend, the soul is not a harmony, Homer being witness, and our own souls bearing testimony.”

“Such is the case,” he admitted. “Well, so be it,” said Socrates, and then (playfully alluding to the goddess *Harmonia*, worshipped in the native city of Simmias) he remarked, having so far propitiated *Harmonia*, we must now see, Cebes, how we may deal with your argument, the Cadmus (husband or nobler partner) of his *Harmonia*. You are likely to deal as triumphantly with it; you seem to me to make out the case against harmony wonderfully cleverly. While he was talking I thought nothing could be said against his argument, and I wondered he did not withstand at first; but now I am afraid that Cadmus shall be as successfully set aside as *Harmonia* was—so irresistible appears your argumentative might.

Hold there! use no boasting words, lest some disenchantment falling on us put our reasoning to the rout. Let us, like Homer’s heroes, grapple with the argument hand to hand, and try if we can do anything to the purpose in this case also. This, then, is the question:—Is the soul imperishable and immortal? Lest perhaps a poor fool of a philosopher, about to die hopefully, may have hoped in vain after all his leading of a life different from that of self-seeking. You admit that the soul is perdurable, not that it is ever-during; yet you feel that entrance into any body may be the beginning of the end, as at the close of any one of its passages from pre-existence to re-existence it may come to non-existence at death. Hence, howsoever frequent may be the possible transmigrations of the spirit, as death may come one knows not when, and non-existence one knows not at which change, man must be wretched if there is not good ground for a belief that man is undying, even though he die to present being. Such, Cebes, seems to be your difficulty. I am anxious that I should neither add to nor diminish from the precise matter for consideration.

“That,” said Cebes, “is exactly what I mean, neither more, nor less.”

Socrates hereupon paused for a short space, seemingly in deep meditation.

## The Essayist.

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### ALISON'S THEORY OF THE BEAUTIFUL.\*

THE origin of our ideas of the beautiful is a subject which has engaged the attention of philosophers from a very early period. In the palmy days of Grecian philosophy and art it afforded subject-matter for subtle speculation to Plato and Aristotle; and no modern system of philosophy is considered complete unless it at least professes to deal with it. A great deal has been said and written on the subject from the time of Plato to the present day, and many different theories have been propounded, each of which has been supposed by its author to contain a solution of the problem; but in reality nearly all of them have appeared satisfactory only when their application was confined to a particular class of objects, and their insufficiency has become apparent so soon as any attempt has been made to apply them to objects of a different class. We propose in this paper to confine ourselves to the examination of one of the most important of these theories, that which was first advanced and illustrated by Alison in his "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste," and afterwards adopted by Lord Jeffrey, and still farther elaborated by him, first in the *Edinburgh Review*, and then in his famous article on "Beauty" in the "Encyclopædia Britannica." The fundamental principle of this theory is that beauty has no existence as an absolute quality of objects, but is something purely relative, being, in fact, merely a feeling or emotion excited in the mind of the spectator by association of ideas. Alison was led to form this theory in consequence of his becoming persuaded of the unsatisfactory nature of all previous theories when examined in connection with two difficulties with which one is met on beginning an inquiry into the nature and origin of our ideas of the beautiful. The first of these difficulties is the very wide application of the term beautiful. It is customary to hear people speak of a beautiful landscape, a beautiful person, a beautiful animal, or building, or poem, or sentiment, or action, or machine, or flower, or tune, or idea, or even of a beautiful demonstration in mathematics; and the difficulty lies in the apparent impossibility of finding any one common quality in subjects so various. It may be mentioned, in passing, that we think that the term beautiful can be applied with strict accuracy only to objects

\* Our readers are recommended to read, in connection with this essay, the debate on the question, "Is Beauty a Quality inherent in Objects?" in vol. i., and the articles on *Literary Aesthetics* and the *Imaginative Faculty* in vol. iv. of the *British Controversialist*.

of sight, and that it is only by analogy that it can be used in reference to any of the others. The second difficulty is the well-known diversity of opinion in regard to questions of taste—two persons, apparently equally capable of forming a correct opinion, often arriving at the most opposite judgments regarding the beauty of any given object. On testing existing theories by these difficulties, he became convinced that they must all have been based on some radically defective principle. "It seems to me," he says, "that the *simplicity* of the emotion of taste was a principle much too hastily adopted, and that the consequences which followed from it were very little reconcilable with the most common experiences of human feeling;" and, starting from this point, he was gradually led to the conclusion which he has embodied in his theory.

It is desirable, in order to avoid unintentional misrepresentation in stating a theory, that the author's own words should, if possible, be used; but Alison has nowhere condensed a comprehensive and intelligible view of his theory into a passage short enough to be quoted. Jeffrey, however, has done this in the articles already referred to, and the passage may be accepted as a fair and accurate statement of Alison's theory. He says "that all objects are beautiful or sublime which signify or suggest to us some simple emotion of love, pity, terror, or any other social or selfish affection of our nature; and that the beauty or sublimity which we ascribe to them consists entirely in the power which they have acquired, by association or otherwise, of reminding us of the proper objects of these familiar affections." Mr. Alison adds "that the sensation of sublimity or beauty is not fully developed by the mere suggestion of some natural object of interest and affection, but is distinctly felt only when the imagination is stimulated to conceive a connected train or series of such objects, in unison with that which was first suggested by the particular form, which is called beautiful, only for having been the parent of such a train."

It will be observed that this theory is built upon the assumption that sensation forms the chief source of all the pleasure which, as sentient beings, we are capable of receiving; and beauty, it may be remarked, always causes pleasure. It will be observed, further, that it is assumed that we derive a certain amount of pleasure from all the emotions, both of a cheerful and melancholy kind, joy and sorrow, pity and tenderness, and even from the contemplation of suffering, so long as it is not forced too rudely upon our notice, or in such a way as to drown the pleasurable emotion in the sense of the duty of giving relief, or in some other feeling which, for the time, is stronger than our perception of beauty, and that we derive pleasure even from the emotion caused by the recollection of suffering in our own persons. We might be inclined to dispute this assumption, but, granting it to be correct, we altogether deny the deduction which is drawn from it, namely, that the object which is the cause—very probably the accidental cause—of receiving pleasure from the train of ideas which it suggests is

minds, can in any sense be called beautiful, merely because it happens to have been the parent of such a train. It may be interesting, or pleasing, or agreeable, but not necessarily beautiful. On falling into a reverie—as most persons sometimes do—the mind passes from thought to thought, and from feeling to feeling; and on being suddenly recalled to a consciousness of outward things, a thought is present to the mind, from which the train can be traced backwards to the object which excited the first thought, and so was the accidental cause of the train. We may have been at the moment in the enjoyment of perfect physical comfort and mental peace, and, in the course of the reverie, gentle sensations of love, pity, tenderness, or regret may have been experienced, from which we may have derived pleasure. In short, all the necessary conditions being fulfilled, according to the association of ideas theory, the object which suggested the first idea of the train must necessarily be beautiful. Now let us consider what this object may have been. As we walk along a road, a worm crosses our path, and we immediately think of it as it is represented in Scripture—as a type of degradation. The transition is easy to other forms of degradation—degraded humanity, the denizens of our wynds and closes, the heathen, the victims of slavery. We have in this a natural and simple train of thought, which affords ample materials for calling into exercise emotions of love, pity, sorrow, hope, and so on, and at the same time without having anything obtruded upon the sense to cause pain. We have fulfilled the necessary conditions, therefore the worm, as the object which excited this train of thought, must be beautiful. In this supposed case we have represented the chain of ideas as traced backwards from the point at which we became conscious that we were thinking. But in how many cases do we actually thus trace back a chain of thought to its parent link? Is it not the case that, in the vast majority of instances, the original exciting cause is as completely lost sight of as if it had never existed? If this be so, then we may justly assume that if this supposed case had really occurred in our own experience, the worm would, in all probability, have passed entirely from our recollection after the first casual glance of the eye. Would that particular worm, then, have become beautiful to us, or would its whole species have become so from that time thenceforward? If the former supposition be maintained, then the question arises—when was it beautiful? It would not have been so at all unless it had given rise to a chain of ideas, therefore it could not be so before it gave rise to such a chain; and if it only became beautiful after the chain of ideas had passed through our mind, we must, by that time, have passed far away from the spot where we saw the worm, and would never, in all probability, see it again. And as its beauty could not, of course, be apparent to any eye but our own, it follows that beauty was called into existence by human instrumentality, and yet was destined never to be seen by any human eye, a result which is contrary to all reason and common sense. But if it should

be held that the beauty, not being absolute, did not lie in anything of which the eye could take cognizance, then it follows that, if the worm had any beauty at all, it must have lain in some characteristic or idea peculiar either to itself or to its whole species. But as the only idea directly connected with the worm was its degradation, which idea would have been equally well suggested by any other of its species, we arrive at the *reductio ad absurdum* that degradation is beautiful. Where, then, did the beauty lie? According to this theory it must have lain in the object which excited the train of ideas, and if it has been proved that there was no beauty there, it has also been proved that there was no beauty in the case. In fact, it is a total misapplication of the term to say that the pleasure we experience from such a train of thought is our perception of beauty. It is neither more nor less than pleasure derived from the exercise of the imagination.

In further considering this theory we shall proceed to notice some of the particular examples which its supporters have brought forward to illustrate and strengthen their argument, and we will begin with the beauty of nature as it is exhibited in natural scenery—in a common English landscape, for example. There is visible a wide extent of country, with hills and valleys clothed with waving grain, rich pastures, and luxuriant woods; here a brook, and there a river or a lake. The fields are dotted with grazing sheep and cattle, and labourers are busy at their peaceful toil. On the hill-side there peeps out among the trees, here a church, and there a mansion, while villages, and picturesque and comfortable cottages are scattered over the scene. The whole landscape is perhaps clothed with the rich verdure of midsummer, and a balmy air, and bright sun and sky overhead, complete a picture on which we gaze long and earnestly, and turn away at last with a feeling of deepest pleasure and gratification. Whence do we derive that pleasure? Has colour anything to do with it? the emerald hue of the grass at our feet, the infinite variety of tint in the foliage of the trees, or in the fields of grain, or the deep blue of the vault above? No! colour has nothing whatever to do with it. Neither has form. Neither the graceful contour of the gently undulating valleys and uplands, nor the broken outlines of the hills, nor the ever-varying forms of the masses of cloud that change the monotony of the unclouded blue into an everlasting panorama. To none of these is its beauty to be ascribed. In what, then, are we to look for it? It is to be found, they say, in the connection of the scene with man—its adaptation to his convenience and requirements. Jeffrey says it is “in the picture of human happiness that is presented to our imaginations and affections—in the visible and unequivocal signs of comfort, and cheerful and peaceful enjoyment—and of that secure and successful industry that insures its continuance—and of the piety by which it is exalted—and of the simplicity by which it is contrasted with the guilt and fever of a city life; in the images of health, and temperance, and plenty, which it exhibits to every eye—and in t



glimpses which it affords to warmer imaginations of those primitive or fabulous times, when men were uncorrupted by luxury or emulation, and of those humble retreats in which we still delight to imagine that love and philosophy may find an unpolluted asylum." We readily grant that each or all of these ideas may pass through the mind of any intelligent spectator of such a scene as we have described; but we venture to think that an equally intelligent observer might gaze upon the very same scene, without having any one of these ideas suggested to his mind, and still his gaze might be as full of rapt admiration, and his appreciation of the beauty of the landscape spread out before him as keen as that of the other. As it is in the highest degree improbable that such ideas would occur to the mind of a child on beholding such a scene, it is evident that this theory, in order to be consistent, must necessarily deny to children, and even to unreflective persons of whatever age, all participation in the enjoyment of such beauty, and even impute to them a total inability to be cognizant of its existence. But almost every one has seen instances of thoughtless youths being hushed into stillness and silent contemplation when such a scene has been spread out before their view, while at the same time they were totally unable to give expression to any definite reason for their admiration; and we may safely affirm that, as ideas never exist in the mind altogether disassociated from words of some kind, if their admiration arose from tracing any such association of ideas as has been mentioned, they would be able, without difficulty, to give expression to them, and to state the particular idea which had roused their admiration into existence.

But another and even more serious difficulty arises. Suppose that we are travelling in a part of the country with which we were previously unacquainted, and that we are ascending a hill, from the top of which a fine view is to be obtained; but, being ignorant of the features of the country, of course we do not know this, and are accordingly unprepared for it. Suddenly, upon reaching the top, the view bursts upon our sight, and our admiration is immediate—instant. As fast as the eye can travel from point to point, from the broken ground at our feet to the valley down below, and away to the distant hills, and is able to take in the various features that go to make up the whole landscape—as fast, we say, as this takes place, and we know that it does so almost with lightning speed, we feel that the scene is beautiful; and if the prospect is wide, as we turn our eyes from side to side, new beauties open upon them. These fresh attractions the eye busies itself in discovering, while the uppermost thought in the mind is to thank God for mere existence in a world of such beauty. Then, indeed, we may begin to trace the links of association which connect all this with man, but this adds nothing—not one iota—to its beauty. That is felt instantaneously, and is only added to as we discover fresh beauties, which our imperfect senses cannot grasp at a glance. We may indeed feel a deeper *interest* in that beauty, from a consideration of

the relationship in which the parts that form the whole stand to man, and all the benefit to him of which it is the expression, but that is purely a matter of reason, and totally distinct from our instinctive perception of its beauty. Or, when we have begun thus to reflect upon it, we may not view its connection with man in this light at all, but if we have felt—as too many have reason to feel—bitterness of heart towards our fellow-men, we may go away, feeling that the presence of man is the only hindrance to our perfect enjoyment, because of its recalling to our mind the reasons we have for that bitterness of heart. But assuming that we have no cause of quarrel with our fellow men, and that we have the highest possible opinion of human nature, if we follow out to its legitimate result this theory, that the beauty of such a scene lies, not in what we have observed with the eye, but solely in its power of suggesting such associations, we shall arrive at a somewhat startling result.

It will be evident, on very slight consideration, that the number of such ideas of relation which it is possible to think out must be infinite, and that different individuals will have different degrees of ability to trace out these ideas; also, that some of these ideas of relation will be of a more pleasing and agreeable nature than others, and that, in general, the individual of greatest ability will be able to trace out the best of these relations, and the greatest number of them. If this be so, few of us—keeping in mind the great poets and thinkers of our day—will venture to claim for ourselves this high degree of ability. It will be admitted at once that men like Tennyson and Longfellow, Dickens and Trollope, or Carlyle and Kinglake, will be far better able than we to suggest these ideas of relation, and so, according to this theory, will be able to call into existence—not only to perceive, mark, but to call into existence—so much the greater an amount of beauty in the landscape; and not only can they do so while they are actually looking at it, but for so long afterwards as they choose to think of it, or retain it in their memories. Now, knowing as we do the power which these writers possess of expressing their ideas in such a form as to communicate them to others precisely as they exist in their own minds, it follows that they will be able to convey to our minds chains of ideas which we could not of ourselves have originated, but from which we may derive great pleasure; and as, according to this theory, the object which is the parent of the greatest number of such chains of ideas is the most beautiful object, it follows that the book in which this object is described by a great writer will be more beautiful to us than the object itself, because it causes to pass through our minds a greater number of these chains of ideas; and that we will derive more pleasure from that description—although we have never seen the object which is described—than if we had seen it for ourselves. Because this theory maintains that our pleasure from the sight of what we call a beautiful object is derived, not from the contemplation of the object itself, but from the chains of ideas connected with human life and hum

emotion which it causes to pass through our minds, we are led to the conclusion that this theory confounds two things which have no necessary connection with each other—the pleasure derived from the exercise of the imagination, and that derived from our perception of the beautiful.

The same arguments will suffice to meet another example adduced by Jeffrey in support of this theory. The one we have been considering was quiet, and, by comparison, tame scenery. The next is scenery of a bold and rugged nature—that of Wales or the Scotch highlands, for example. Of this he says, "It is sympathy with the present or the past, or the imaginary inhabitants of such a region, that alone gives it either interest or beauty." Suppose this region to have been depopulated, like so many of our highland glens, the inhabitants to have been superseded by sheep, and that the spectator is ignorant of its history. If it has any claim at all to be called beautiful—and unless it were called beautiful it would not be a case in point—we know, as a matter of fact, that its beauty would be observed instantaneously. And as we have supposed the spectator to be ignorant of its history, it is evident that he could not come with his mind filled with "sympathy with the past;" neither could he begin to people it with imaginary inhabitants, until he became aware that it was then destitute of them. It is therefore clear that its beauty cannot have been derived from any such chain of ideas. Some of its beauty is also ascribed by Alison and Jeffrey to the impression which it gives us of power and grandeur, by the contemplation of the vast strength and endurance of nature compared with the feebleness and insignificance of man. We willingly admit that these feelings are called into operation by the contemplation of such a scene, but we do not admit that the consciousness of their presence in the mind can be in any respect the cause of its beauty.

We now come to a part of the subject which is beset with difficulties, not the least of which is the common but erroneous idea that our judgments on the subject are formed solely by caprice, and not from any more philosophical or certain standard. In addition, however, to the fact that any discussion on the beautiful would be considered seriously incomplete without a reference to it, it has been used by the supporters of this theory as one of the principal illustrations of their argument, and one on which they evidently place considerable reliance. The subject is that of human beauty, or—as it is usual in discussions of this kind to limit it to the sex to which the most perfect types are universally allowed to belong—female beauty. In order to maintain the consistency of the theory, its advocates find it necessary, in treating of this part of the subject, to assert that the admitted beauty to be found in many faces is in no degree to be ascribed to their physical conformation, either as regards form or colour, nor to anything whatever that can be called intrinsic, or essentially, and by virtue of being so created, belonging to any countenance. Its beauty, they

say, "lies in the signs of two different sets of qualities, that are neither of them the object of sight, but of a higher faculty; in the first place of youth and health, and in the second place of innocence, gaiety, sensibility, intelligence, delicacy, or vivacity." On reading this assertion the idea naturally rises in the mind that although a beautiful face does in general express these qualities, a very plain face may, and very often does, express them also, and in a much higher degree than many faces which every one would call beautiful. There is no reason why—age and other circumstances being equal—the possessor of a plain face should not appear as youthful as one who is more beautiful. And, so far as concerns health, no one will deny that the rude and muscular girl who wields a rake in a hay-field, and who has not the smallest pretensions to beauty, may be a very picture of health as compared with the delicate and refined belle whose beauty is undeniable. It is also a well-known fact that consumptive patients are often made actually more beautiful by the very disease which is killing them, the brilliant eye and hectic flush lending a kind of ethereal beauty to the countenance which it would not otherwise possess. Neither will it be denied that the possession of beauty, unless counteracted by the influence of high principle, has a tendency to foster vanity, and, the face being the "index to the mind," vanity seldom fails to show its presence by its effects upon the expression of the countenance where the expression of vanity is quite inconsistent with that of innocence and some of the other qualities mentioned, and consequently it should destroy the beauty of the face. But we know that it does not do so; it renders it infinitely less pleasing, but not, theoretically, less beautiful. So a plain face may bear the impress of the possession of many amiable qualities, and may attract us far more powerfully than the other, and still be considered but a plain face after all. This very obvious difficulty is got over by saying, in effect, that in the first place these cases are exceptions to the rule, and that there is in general some physical cause for it suggestive of pain or disease; and, in the second place, that a beautiful face which does not express these amiable qualities is called beautiful in virtue of its youth and health, which, it is said, are sufficiently pleasing to compensate for the want of the other. We think that it is scarcely necessary to deny the statement that a plain face is in any but exceptional cases expressive of ideas of pain or sickness any more than a beautiful one; and of course, if this be not admitted, there is no room for argument on that point. And in regard to the second point, even supposing that we were upholding the association theory, we would deny that the expression of youth and health could compensate for the absence of those higher qualities which belong to the mind; and, of course, if the accuracy of the facts be denied, no argument can be founded on them. This would of itself be sufficient to overturn this part of the theory, but its fallacy may be more clearly demonstrated by pointing out some of the positions which it would necessarily involve.

Another argument may, however, be mentioned first. It is said that if the facts of nature were reversed, so that the smooth forehead, the firm cheek, and the full lip, which are now so distinctly expressive to us of the gay and vigorous periods of youth, and the clear and blooming complexion which indicates health and agility, had been, in fact, the forms and colours by which old age and sickness were characterized; and that, instead of being found united to these sources and seasons of enjoyment they had been the badges by which nature pointed out that state of suffering and decay which is now signified to us by the livid and emaciated face of sickness, or the wrinkled front, the quivering lip, and the hollow cheek of age,—if this were the familiar law of our nature, can it be doubted that we should look upon these appearances, not with rapture, but with aversion, and consider it as absolutely ludicrous or disgusting to speak of the beauty of what was interpreted by every one as the lamented sign of pain and decrepitude? Now we would submit that this is an altogether impracticable supposition. It would involve such a total reversal of all the laws of our physical constitution, that it is utterly impossible for us to conceive what would be our feelings with regard to anything whatever in such a case. We cannot conceive of our bodies being so totally changed without the senses, which form the sole means of communication between the outer world and the mental faculties, being also changed; and if these were changed, we can by no possibility guess what sort of impressions they would convey to the mind. We may therefore, we think, lay this argument aside as irrelevant, and confine ourselves to matters upon which we can reasonably argue.

We all know what diversity of opinion there exists on the subject of female beauty. It does not come within the scope of our present subject to consider to what type the palm should be awarded, but it is necessary to bear in mind the vast diversity of taste on this subject. How vastly different is the standard of beauty in Asia and Africa, in Great Britain and Lapland, Circassia and Greece! The belle of a Hottentot village would excite feelings very different from admiration in Princes Street or Rotten Row, while the noblest beauty in Britain would be looked upon by the Hottentot gallants as a pale, squeamish, and insipid fright. The advocates of the association theory argue from this that there can be no intrinsic beauty anywhere, or men would not differ so much in their ideas of what constitutes it. But, as perfection is not to be found in this world in any form, the highest type—that is, perfect beauty—need not be expected here; but there is a nearer approach to the divine standard in some cases than in others, and we doubt not that some one type approaches nearer to it than any other, although men with their imperfect capabilities of judging will never be able in this world to agree upon which is the one. It is well known that the taste is capable of being improved and refined by culture to a very high degree, and it is also known that an uncultivated taste is satisfied with the highest degree of beauty to which it has been

accustomed, and which it has hitherto considered as absolutely the highest degree; but, as it becomes accustomed to more refined objects and a greater degree of beauty, it seeks a higher ideal, and so becomes capable of appreciating a nearer approach to the standard of perfection. There is nothing in this at all inconsistent with what has been already advanced in regard to our instantaneous perception of the beautiful, because we perceive instantly just that degree of it which the state of cultivation of our faculty of taste enables us to grasp. Take the history of architecture as an illustration. All the great styles have been developed from the rudest beginnings, and have gone on in a gradually progressive advance, till, in the course of ages, they reached their culminating point, and each man who helped in the work, by the increased cultivation of his taste, brought it to a higher degree of perfection than those who went before him. And although these styles reached a high state of perfection, and then began to decline, it was not because they had reached absolute perfection; but we can trace the causes which led to the degradation of the national taste, and then they began to decline, and the people became content with a less degree of perfection. Since the faculty of taste can thus be educated to an indefinite extent, we are justified in believing that certain types of beauty are really and absolutely less perfect than others, and that the less perfect type is preferred only by those whose taste is not sufficiently cultivated to appreciate a nearer approach to perfection.

But to come to differences of type of a more subtle character than exist between an African negress and a British beauty, we find amongst ourselves distinctly marked types, the result of the composite character of the nation, descended as we are from Celt, Saxon, Dane, and Norman. We have the stately beauty of the right regal type, and the fairy-like sylph, bewitching by the very contrast; there are blonde and brunette, fair and dark, and many other types which it is needless to attempt classifying, and all and each of them find enthusiastic admirers amongst those who appear to be equally well cultivated, and equally able to form an opinion and give a reason for it, and who admire not merely the individual but the type. All of these different types are equally capable of expressing all the qualities, the signs of which, according to Alison's theory, constitute beauty. No one of them can claim any advantage over another in this respect, so, according to this theory, if these signs are expressed in them, they ought to be all equally beautiful. But if this were so, there would not exist this difference of opinion amongst those who are equally well qualified to judge. Suppose for a moment that we could find a blonde and a brunette in all other respects precisely on a par, so as both to fulfil the conditions necessary, by the association theory, to render them equally beautiful;—let them be equally "young," both in perfect "health," and equally possessed of "innocence, gaiety, sensibility, intelligence, delicacy, and vivacity." According to this theory it would be impossible to say that one of them was more

beautiful than the other. There should be absolutely not a feather weight to turn the scale either one way or the other; and yet who can doubt but that every man of taste would say decidedly that one was more beautiful than the other? And as we have left him nothing whatever to sway his opinion, except the fact that one is a blonde and the other a brunette, and as this could affect no question but that of their comparative beauty, it inevitably follows that the features, complexion, and colour of hair and eyes accompanying these different types have in them something intrinsically and absolutely beautiful, which causes one type or the other to be thought more beautiful according to the mental constitution of different observers.

In short, the whole theory of the association of ideas results from confounding the power of imagination with that of beauty. The imagination forms chains of ideas which are suggested by the object, but are totally independent of its beauty, and indeed are often directly antagonistic to the power of beauty, because they make us like objects which we know are not beautiful. The two powers are entirely distinct, and even the best writers on the subject, in trying to make them appear as one, have only fallen into contradictions and inconsistencies. Here is an example from Alison. He says, "There are scenes undoubtedly more beautiful than Runnymede, yet, to those that recollect the great event that passed there, there is no scene which so strongly seizes on the imagination." He here unintentionally admits—and he does it in other places also—that some scenes are intrinsically more beautiful than others, which is the very thing he argues against, and he only succeeds in proving that the power of the imagination is sometimes greater than that of beauty. Mr. Ruskin points out that the only logical conclusion which can be drawn from the above sentence is, that imagination is not the source of beauty, for although no scene seizes so strongly on the imagination, yet there are scenes "more beautiful than Runnymede." Mr. Ruskin puts the whole question in a nutshell when he says "that if the arguments on the subject be fairly sifted from the mass of confused language with which they are always encumbered, and placed in logical form, they will be found invariably to involve one of these two syllogisms:—Association gives pleasure, and beauty gives pleasure; therefore association is beauty. Or the power of association is greater than the power of beauty, therefore the power of association is beauty."

It will be observed that in this article our position has been purely a negative one. We have not endeavoured to lay down any theory of our own, nor to support any theory which we believe to be more correct than Alison's. All that we proposed to do was to examine Alison's theory, and to ascertain how far it is sufficient to account for the beauty which we see everywhere around us, and if we have succeeded in showing that beauty exists, and is perceived independently of any such trains of ideas as this theory involves, our purpose in this article has been accomplished. D. B. D.

## Coiling Upward.

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THOMAS COOPER: SHOEMAKER, CHARTIST, AND POET.

### CHAPTER V.

(Concluded from p. 309.)

As a well-known advocate of free inquiry, a consistent democrat and patriot, and a hearty admirer of the author of "Common Sense" and "The Rights of Man," Mr. Cooper was chosen to preside at a meeting in honour of Thomas Paine's memory, held on the 110th anniversary of his birth, Jan. 29, 1847, in the hall of the John Street Institution, London, and attended by many whose negations were much more dogmatic and sweeping than his own. He had himself stood only for a moment on the verge of the dread icy region of atheism—when his thought took form in the strong lines of awful fear already quoted. Perhaps the faith he afterwards rested in and advocated may be best termed a pantheistic Christianity. A few extracts from some of the orations\* will at the same time illustrate their style and exhibit Mr. Cooper's theological position.

"The principles of no religion ever yet taught to mankind have been sufficient to preserve its adherents from the most ridiculous and monstrous errors. . . . Did the acknowledgment of the unity of God, a belief so much vaunted as superior to the multiform polytheism of the rest of the ancient world, preserve the Jews from errors the most abhorrent to reason and justice and truth? Let their imputation of slaughterous commands to Jehovah, their assertions of missions received from Him to murder men, women, and children, that a certain country might be theirs; their stories of a deity empowering one of their prophets to call down fire and consume companies of men, or bears from a wood to tear and devour little children; their childish fables of another prophet living three days and nights in the belly of a great fish; and all their other absurd fictions—make answer. . . . I know it will be said that this is no argument against the fundamental truth of a religion. True: but ought we not to advance to another conclusion—that the errors, the legends which have been mixed up with all religions, either by their founders, or soon after the death of their founders, have been the true cause of the greater superstitions which in the course of ages have become mixed up with them? If the pure, and simple, and truly divine morality and philanthropy of the Man of Nazareth had

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\* From the *Reasoner's* reports.



been handed down to following generations in an uncorrupted form, the result, as it regards Christianity, might have been very different. But there was the record with its Egyptian and Hindoo incrustations of trinities, and incarnations, and miracles, and miraculous conceptions; its Chaldean hell, and its Platonic dreams of demons; and how were the succeeding ages, especially among barbarous people, to separate the moral precept from the legend, to enthrone the one and to reject the other?—" *Superstitions of the Middle Ages.*"

All the supernatural features in the evangelical histories have their counterpart in earlier writings and traditions. The supernatural Christ was the sun, whose rising and setting gave birth to the theory of the resurrection. The *real* Christ was simply a young Galilean, with a superior moral organization, and therefore capable of a higher discernment of true morality than those around him. His kingdom of heaven was not an ideal *hereafter*, but the substantial reign of goodness and brotherhood on earth. The superiority of Christ, as a teacher, to all other moral philosophers is in his elevation of the principle of love to men to a sublimity of preference never claimed before.

"Forgiveness of injuries, love even to enemies, and the spirit of self-sacrifice for others' welfare, were the crowning characteristics of his teaching, and in enforcing them he was revealing the true secret for chasing away the moral disorders of the world, and making it a scene of universal happiness."

But this proved no supernatural mission or dignity in Christ.—

"It is the revelation of the human heart, drawn from its deepest fountains."—" *The Superiority of Christ.*"

"Perish the false, and idolatrous, and enslaving forms in which priest-craft clothes that glorious Galilean peasant! Let him stand forth in his simple moral beauty, and he is more worshipful than in all his mythical and fabulous garniture! Stripped of the tinselled rags of miracle and imaginary Godship, the heart cleaves to him, loves him with intensity, as the noblest of human brothers, as the *One* who has shown most loftily what it is that man may become in moral perfectibility, and how he may learn to love goodness, and triumph over the passions of hatred and revenge, until he can expire, breathing out forgiveness even for his murderers."—*Ibid.*

Divinity is universal life and intelligence; man, as the highest development of intelligence, is the proper representative of divinity. Duty is another word for law; man cannot be happy without seeking to perfect his moral character, that is, his higher nature.

"Veritable religion consists in the acquirement of a knowledge of the laws of nature, the improvement of mind, and the perfecting of moral character. No religion had ever been perfect because it did not comprise these. The highest moralist was Jesus of Nazareth; but he was ignorant of science, his system needed its basis. Nothing more divine, nothing

more worshipful could be taught man than forgiveness of his enemies, and doing good to them that hate him. But until the universe is subdued, and its empire shared by ALL, man, a poor necessitous creature, evermore rendered selfish by his very necessities, will be more or less opposed to the principle of brotherhood. The doctrine of equal rights was often enunciated by Christ; but he could not show that *knowledge* would lead to their acquirement. His 'heavenly Father' had commissioned *him* to introduce the 'kingdom of heaven:' he, the 'Son of man,' would 'come in the clouds of heaven,' clothed with glory, and surrounded with his holy angels, to bring it. His glorious worship of goodness led him to wish that the 'kingdom of heaven' should be established on earth; his highly religious mind could not disrobe itself of the national belief entirely, and he personified the goodness he worshipped as the 'Jehovah,' though with widely different attributes to the old 'Jehovah,' and taught that He—the universal Father, as He became under Christ's teaching—would institute the universal brotherhood. More could not be expected of Christ, although a being so wondrously organized to perceive moral beauty. How slow has been the discovery of all great truths! . . . Dost thou say, priest, that I am seeking to dethrone Christ? I tell thee my worship of him is as ardent as thine. I tell thee that thou hast crucified him afresh, thou and thy dark tribe, these seventeen hundred years; but that science will prepare his throne; that his 'kingdom of heaven' was no dream, save in the mode of its realization,—but that universal knowledge will bring it. Not as Millenarian fanatics tell—not as orthodox teachers prophesy. I speak of no 'coming in the flesh,' or 'coming in clouds;' but of the universal recognition of the great law of goodness and brotherhood,—of the reverence and love of the name of that lowly young Man of Nazareth, as the highest of moral teachers,—and, above all, as the grandest example of the triumph of moral nature, the common nature of man."—*"Veritable Religion."*

Mr. Cooper also lectured on "The Legends of Greece"—during a course on Grecian history,—as illustrating the manner in which science not merely *denies* the supernatural, but clearly accounts for its growth into belief and dogmatic form.

He was an ardent upholder of the doctrine that man is the creature of circumstances, constantly reiterating its high moral influence in leading to special watchfulness over all thought and action, inasmuch as these become, in their turn, powerfully influential "circumstances" to both the individual and those around him. But in opposition to Robert Owen, George J. Holyoake, and many others of his friends, he strongly repudiated the idea that this destroys the possibility of merit and demerit, and insisted upon the recognition of an internal power to choose good and evil, from which results the moral consciousness of wrong or right.

As we have before said, the character and degree of Mr. Cooper's scepticism have been greatly misunderstood and misrepresented. It has really been a process of limitation rather than total loss of belief and hope, for even in the supreme moment of utter doubt of an external and superior love and guidance, he still clung boldly to the everlasting principles of benevolence, purity, and just.

The base upon which faith rested had gradually and painfully narrowed to a point; but it again enlarged, slowly at first, but surely, to—as we shall see—a more ample breadth and firmer substance than at first.

On May 10, 1847, a festival was held in Mr. Cooper's honour, at the National Hall, the chair being taken by Mr. William Howitt, in the absence of Mr. W. J. Fox, who had undertaken to preside. The chairman remarked:—"Mr. Cooper knows that when I first read his poem—his great poem—which I may call an epoch in literature, I then congratulated him, not upon having been liberated, but upon having been put in gaol,—and not only put in, but kept in. If it had not been for his confinement there, and the leisure thus afforded him, he might not have been enabled to abstract his mind from the every-day toil which he encountered, and so might never have given to the world that poem." Various sentiments were spoken to by Dr. Epps, Mr. William Lovett, Mr. J. W. Linton, and others, after which Mr. Cooper responded with a characteristic allusion to his mother, and recounted two incidents of his early life:—

"I have been just thinking of a little boy of five years old, and a woman, who, somewhat more than thirty, but not forty years ago, were passing over Gainsborough Bridge. The boy clung to a gate as a master chimney-sweeper went past. He wished to have the boy for an apprentice; and I remember the reply the mother made. I remember what that boy said: 'Mother, mother, do not let that ugly man take me!' That boy has become a man, and he now stands before you. If Thomas Cooper has done anything worth remembering—if, by any endurance of suffering, he has deserved this meed of approbation from his fellow-men, he owes it all to his hard-working mother, who had to work, and pine, and starve—and often gave her last penny to get him bread. I have heard her despair as her last shilling has been taken by the tax-gatherer: and by that bitter example Thomas Cooper came to be a Chartist before Chartistism was known. I hope I am true to my order. I was reared among the people, and I cannot forget the sufferings of my poor mother when in more advanced life. I think I see her now, sitting in her old chair. I had frequently to rise from my weary task to help her. I think I see her now, weak and faint, sitting smoking her pipe and listening to me while I recited pieces to her from Shakspeare or from Milton. But it is all over now, and she lies in Gainsborough churchyard. No stone is there to mark the humble spot; but near her lies the tax-gatherer, and he has gilded letters on his stone. 'Why do you not send this lad to work?' the neighbours would say, when they came in and saw me trying to write. 'Because I wish him to learn,' replied my mother; 'it will all come to something some day.'"

The same year witnessed the publication of a capital boys' book, "Triumphs of Perseverance and Enterprise." Sermons in the chapel at South Place, Finsbury Square, of which W. J. Fox was minister, papers contributed to *Howitt's Journal*, *Jerrold's Magazine*, and other miscellanies, added to the sum of work done during that energetic twelve months. In *Howitt's Journal* for April 8, 1848, a striking portrait of Mr. Cooper was given, followed by a

sketch of his career, and a hearty eulogy upon his character and genius.

On the 20th January, 1849, Thomas Cooper started the *Plain Speaker*, in conjunction with the "Black Dwarf," Mr. J. T. Wooler. It was a weekly periodical, chiefly political, and of course intensely Radical. Strong, racy, and often sarcastic letters on prominent topics of the day, addressed by Mr. Cooper to leading men in Church, State, and Society, formed its chief speciality. Among these were several to Dr. Philpotts, Bishop of Exeter, and others to Disraeli, Cobden, Hume, Lord Stanley (the late Earl of Derby), Lord Ashley (now Earl of Shaftesbury), Lord John Russell, Sir Robert Peel, Archbishop Sumner, John Bright, and Lord Brougham, with many notabilities besides. From the letter to Lord Ashley we quote the following passage:—

"Be assured from one who has had some experience of men, is in some degree conversant with the wisdom of books, and values not a straw the absurd conventional difference between you and himself, but puts forth his opinions with the fair challenge of mind to mind, that all your appeals to the *charity* and *fears* of rich men will never effect a thousandth part of what may be effected by an appeal to human *rights*.

"The appeal to right is the omnipotent lever with mankind. The wronged would cheer you in grasping it; they would hail with overjoyed hearts the auspicious sign of such a man espousing their just cause; the doers of wrong would be compelled to question the rectitude, as well as safety, of their doings; and before your life closed—if spared to the proverbial span of human existence—you would see a grand and happy, because moral, change brought about in this 'dear, dear land.'"

The main burden of the volume is its advocacy of national and compulsory education, manhood suffrage, and the reclamation of waste lands for the service of the poor. The earnest and stimulating "Eight Letters to Young Men," from which quotations have been so largely given, appeared first in the *Plain Speaker*. They were afterwards published separately, as a sixpenny pamphlet, which ought to be in the hands of every self-educator. They will excite his enthusiasm, confirm his purposes, and guide his footsteps in the path of progress.

Mr. Cooper also contributed (his name does not appear, but subjects and style alike betray the authorship) a series of notices of "Old English Political Literature," together with acknowledged letters on political subjects "to Working Men who think." He likewise appealed through the pages of the *Plain Speaker* to the working classes to supply him, during a journey through the country, with statistics for their respective occupations and localities, concerning hours of work, the number of women and children employed in proportion to the men, the rate of wages, the kind and value of houses supplied, the provision made by masters for sick, aged, and disabled workmen, and the assistance given by them to education; the loss of time by waiting for

or payment, the customs existing concerning the examination of work, the average proportion of stoppages for alleged faults in work, the average of short time and of total non-employment, special grievances, particular dangers attending work, and the precautions against these dangers taken by employers. Mr. Cooper's experience among the Leicester stockingers evidently guided him much in framing these inquiries. A great deal of valuable and interesting information which was obtained in this manner appeared in the *Speaker* in the form of special reports concerning the towns and districts Mr. Cooper visited. The further objects of starting young men's societies for mutual culture, and of lecturing at local institutions, were had in view during this tour.

In the autumn a serious illness stopped Mr. Cooper's editorial labours, and interrupted his contributions; the serial then passed entirely into Mr. Wooler's hands, and was discontinued at the year's end. A five days' visit to Paris in June, and the delivery of a funeral *éloge* upon Henry Hetherington, a Chartist leader and freethinker of much power and influence, must also be noted among the achievements of 1849.

Eighteen hundred and fifty witnessed the commencement and end of another venture—*Cooper's Journal*. In many respects, as in addresses to the working classes, letters to eminent politicians, and papers in assertion and advocacy of Radical principles and measures, it partook of the character of its predecessor, the *Plain Speaker*. Its poetic section was notable for Gerald Massey's contributions, some of his finest and most impassioned lyrics being first published there,—as the "Lay of Love," "Song of the Red Republican," and the "Cry of the Unemployed." Poems by J. A. Langford, William Jones, of Leicester, W. Moy Thomas, and others, also appeared, with two by Mr. Cooper. One of Mr. Cooper's—"Truth is Growing"—is fine and vigorous:—

"Truth is growing; hearts are glowing  
With the flame of liberty:  
Light is breaking; thrones are quaking:  
Hark the trumpet of the free!  
Long, in lowly whispers breathing,  
Freedom wandered drearily;  
Still in faith her laurel wreathing  
For the day when there should be  
Freemen shouting 'Victory!'"

The most striking feature, however, of the volume of this *Journal* is unquestionably its publication of the seven discourses containing a "Critical Exegesis of Gospel History," on the basis of Strauss's "Leben Jesu," delivered by Mr. Cooper in London in 1848 and 1849, in which the views of the great German theologian and critic were popularized and vindicated. The main conclusions are the same as those broadly indicated in the quotations from various relations already given.

In the same year was issued "Captain Cobler; or, the Lincolnshire Insurrection," an historical romance of the reign of Henry VIII., dedicated to Professor George Boole, Mrs. Cooper's cousin. This is a story wholly unconnected with modern politics, illustrative of the "Pilgrimage of Grace," a rising in 1536 to resist the king's and Cromwell's spoliation and suppression of the monasteries. Like other of the author's works, it abundantly exhibits the force of his historical imagination. Intimate local knowledge, mastery of genealogical, antiquarian, and heraldic lore, and vivid descriptive power, are amply shown. The portrait of Henry—in his mingled nobleness and shame—is especially lifelike.

Mr. Cooper continued to lecture and travel for some years. In 1853 a third edition of the "Purgatory" was published by Chapman and Hall, in a superior style—at the suggestion of Mrs. Carlyle,—with alterations and some additional notes. There also appeared, in two volumes, the remarkable story of "Alderman Ralph; or, the History of the Borough and Corporation of the Borough of Willowacre, with all about the Bridge and the Baronet, the Bridge Deed and the Great Scholar, the Toll-keeper and his Daughter, the Fiddler and his Virtues, the Lawyer and his Rogueries, and all the Rest of it. By Adam Hornbook, Student by his own Fireside, and among his Neighbours when he can secure the Arm-chair in the Corner." Of the quaint simplicity and naturalness of this work we cannot speak too highly, nor of the deep interest which is thrown around the life of a little river-port town by the author's skill and sympathy. The mere headings of the books and chapters into which it is divided have a rare smack of humour,—found, too, in the names of the various characters:—*Aquinas Buonaventura Petrus-Lombardus Duns-Scotus Dingyleaf* (or *Dingyleaf* of the four pronomina, as he styles himself), the scholar; Sir Nigel Nickem, the Baronet; Davy Drudge; Jack Jigg, the fiddler; Gregory Markpence, the toll-keeper; Peter Weatherwake, harbour-master; Diggory Cleavewell, the butcher; Mr. Pomponius Pratewell, town-clerk; Threap, the rascally lawyer; and others almost without end. The fine lovable characters of Alderman Ralph Trueman and gentle May Silverton, his niece, are charmingly drawn; and the whole work has a singular freshness and quiet about it, grateful in these pushing, anxious, unrestful days.

Another attempt, already noticed, was made by Messrs. Cooper, Gammage, and Ernest Jones to revive the Chartist organization, but it was made in vain. Eighteen hundred and fifty-four was marked by Thomas Cooper's connection with the *Northern Tribune*, a high-class journal published at Newcastle, and devoted to the calm, earnest, intellectual radicalism which had succeeded to the early type of impatient and unrestrained democracy. In its opening address the proprietor and editor, Mr. Joseph Cowen, wrote thus:—

"In political warfare reckless invective and personal denunciation have been regarded as the surest weapons. We have arrived at the very o--

conclusion. History and experience have taught us that truth is always modest, strength is always gentle, and consciousness of power is always unobtrusive."

He thus defined the aims of the new journal:—

"To induce a reverence for a worthier ideal of life, to enforce a belief in something holier than 'the ledger,' to teach a more ennobling faith than the cold materialistic creed of this 'work-day world,' and to proclaim that *man as man*, whatever his outward garniture, is greater and grander than all the creations of his genius, shall be the animating spirit of our enterprise."

Among the writers for the *Tribune* were, besides Mr. Cooper, W. J. Linton, Goodwyn Barmby, Henry N. Barnett, Gerald Massey, G. J. Holyoake, and Edwin Paxton Hood. Mr. Cooper contributed two papers in the style of his "Wise Saws and Modern Instances," one of which, "Miss Dinah and her Lovers," is particularly laughable and good; sketches of Bernard Gilpin and John Wycliffe; and four letters to young men upon the use of time. The *Tribune* did not trench upon the ground of theological discussion, though its sympathies were clearly in favour of "free-thinking."

"The Family Feud"—a psychological romance, showing a riper and richer power than "Alderman Ralph," while lacking somewhat of the quaint humour and simplicity which characterized that story—appeared early in 1855. The epigrammatic art of the following sentence from the author's "address to the reader" will be appreciated:—

"Consider, dear reader—and fearing that thou mayest, unhappily, regard consideration as an irksome employment, I address thee affectionately,—consider, I say, how wondrously various are the modes, not only of preparing food for the stomach, among the French cooks, but of preparing food for the brain, by the literary cooks of all civilized nations! Consider the vast subject but in one department of mental cookery—that of writing history.

"You may make it tell weighty truth, even in fables, like dear old Herodotus; or without fable, and in sentences as sharp and trenchant as Damascus blades, like Tacitus. You may make it tell lies to please yourself, like Hume; or to please your party, and to gravel those to whom you bear a grudge, like Clarendon or Burnet. You may make it as dry as a stick, like Echard or Rapin; or use it to dazzle your reader, to play will-o'-the-wisp with him, in order to lead him into the quagmires of Pyrrhonism, and then grin in his face, like Voltaire. You may write it eloquently, and after an extensive survey of the facts, like Gibbon; or magniloquently, and without troubling yourself much about the facts, like Robertson. You may write it learnedly, and so as to make your reader think, like Mr. Grote; or ingeniously, and so as to save your reader the labour of thinking, like Mr. Macaulay. You may make it thunder, and dash, and sparkle, like 'hierry' or flow monotonously, with an occasional ripple, like Boscoe.

"You may write it in a *sever*, as Lamartine did the '*Girondins*;' or in an *ague*, as the poor fellow has written the '*Restoration*.' You may write it in *apert*; you may write it in *sequest*. You may write it in rhyme, like the old English chroniclers; you may write it in reason, as it is to be hoped it will be written some time. . . . You may write your history in the first person, so as to give it all the intense interest of direct eye-witness or autobiography; or you may set it down in the third person, with modesty for the vehicle, but arrogance in the rider, like the imperial *Veni, vidi, vici*."

Part of that year was spent at Birmingham and Manchester in lecturing upon the Crimean War, and exhibiting a large model of Sebastopol, the property of Mr. James Wyld, M.P.

We now come to a turning-point in Mr. Cooper's life. For some time past we have not, in his writings or elsewhere, met with any advocacy or expression of sceptical opinions, but have rather been struck with the entire absence of any allusions to the subject. His novels are wholly free from any trace of political or religious preferences. They belong to the region of pure art—which we take to be the faithful portrayal of nature as read in the light of faith in its true vitality and meaning, apart from the prejudices or opinions of the painter,—and they are broad, tolerant, living, as nature itself. There is no projection of the author's shadow upon their pages; they reflect not the faintest outline of his personality. The reference to Voltaire in the quotation just made would seem to hint at a discontent with unbelief, though perhaps it has no real significance as to any change of the writer's own standpoint.

But towards the end of 1855 Mr. Cooper's views upon religious questions materially altered. The faith once narrowed to so small a point, but for long held firmly there, began to expand and again to base itself upon the admission of the supernatural, and the historical character of the Christian narratives.

We are not aware of any writings belonging to this or any subsequent period in Mr. Cooper's history, except, later on, some letters to the *Freeman*, and consequently cannot trace the steps of his return to evangelical belief in the same manner that his sceptical opinions have been illustrated. But there can be little doubt that the very studies which led to the production of his Straussian exegesis guided him further, and led him also to see that, however ingenious might be the theories of the so-called critical school, and however satisfactory their explanations at first might appear to be, they offered no definite and permanent standpoint of conviction for an earnest seeker after truth, and gave no truly rational explanation of the rise and progress of Christianity, but rather left it a fact more marvellous apart from the admission of the miraculous even than it could be with that admission fully made, and the whole scheme of a divine revelation and incarnation accepted. And as it seemed likely that the apathy of religious teachers towards the wrongs and sufferings of the labouring classes had much to do with the production



unbelief, so it may have been that a gradual consciousness of the impotency of sceptical principles to instil devotion to truth and right, and to regenerate either the individual or society, prepared the way for a return to the recognition of Christianity as a system, or rather as a power, originating with God himself, proved already by a wondrous change in the nations which have received it, and gradually but surely sapping and overthrowing the powers of evil throughout the world.

In the opening weeks of 1856 Mr. Cooper announced the change in his views to his former London audiences, and in the autumn he began to lecture in defence of natural religion. In the ensuing spring he undertook a course of Sunday evening discourses upon "The Evidences of Christianity," followed by discussions with his sceptical hearers. A competent and interested witness, in the *Freeman* (Baptist) newspaper, speaks of the interest excited by these addresses, and of Mr. Cooper's evident mastery of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, and of critical exegesis. He adds,—

"However hardships and persecution unto bonds may have told upon his outer man, they have not touched, unless to impart energy and fire to them, his mental faculties. . . . The speaker's manner is to walk backward and forward a little way on each side his chair with a half-meditative look, yet glancing continually sideways at the audience. His language is remarkably simple and lucid, yet replete with the energy of thought and of strong conviction."—*Freeman*, September, 1857.

After devoting about two years to the London sceptics and the hearers in their places of assembly, Mr. Cooper began to enter on his mission for England, lecturing on his new subjects, and entering into discussions at the close of them, at Norwich, Sheffield, York, Sunderland, Leeds, and other large towns. He also entered into public debate with leading freethinkers, particularly with Mr. G. J. Holyoake at York, in 1858, and with Mr. Joseph Barker (who has, however, like Cooper himself, lately returned to orthodoxy) at Bradford, in September, 1860. But he soon laid controversy aside, and the lectures became his chief work. These speedily took the form of a regular series, directed against the two great aspects of unbelief, its denial of a God, and its repudiation of the historical veracity of the Christian writings. Their main divisions correspond to these; as they may be generally classed into expositions of the design argument, and developments of the historical inquiry into the rise and spread of the Christian religion. The latter inquiry takes the form of a survey of the eighteen centuries of our era, entitled "The Bridge of History," and usually occupies two lectures. They must be listened to for the rare point, force, vividness, *livingness*, and cogency of the illustrations, facts, and arguments to be understood. In the lectures on Design, the wondrous mechanism of the animal frame, its joints and levers, compensations and adaptations, seems to grow before the mind, as if visibly built up part by part by the Creator's hand. A rich yet

reverent humour pervades many of the descriptions of birds and beasts, their dwelling-places, habits, instincts, and requirements, and the manner in which their special wants have been provided for. Instruction, mental and spiritual quickening, and intellectual delight, are wonderfully blended in Mr. Cooper's method of exposition. In the grand series upon the "Bridge of History" the centuries seem to outroll and pass before the eye like a magnificent panorama, each scene manifestly irradiated by the light from heaven, until we are led back to the very birth-hour, with all its supernatural splendours, of the Redeemer of the world. The Rev. E. Paxton Hood wrote of Mr. Cooper in the *Eclectic Review* for April, 1864,—

"The man of all other men, we believe, at whose feet, as a lecturer for popular purposes and audiences, we would delight to sit. Thomas Cooper is a lecturer in a very eminent degree; we think we should not hesitate to call him the king of lecturers."

But he goes on to speak of the lecturer's earlier sceptical influence in terms which we have not found justified by the facts of his life, or the character which his scepticism actually assumed. As we have seen, Mr. Cooper strove rather to lay down a positive basis for a certain amount of faith on the part of those who had none, than to shake the hopes of such as retained a wider belief than his own. Mr. Hood adds,—

"The second lecture, on 'Design in the Celestial Spaces,' compels the mind of the hearer to move with majesty; and the whole audience, when we formed a part of it, hung breathlessly on the story of the successive defeats, and the crowning, triumphant discoveries of Leverrier and Adams. The great discoveries of Galileo, Newton, Kepler, and Herschel, are not veiled; they become dramatic, and every auditor lives in a personal interest with every part of the unfolding problem. . . . We believe it will be increasingly found, as each lecture is heard, and as the mind, perhaps in private, turns over its stores, that, for fulness and fitness, for the memory which treasures, for the prompt prehensile faculty which seizes, and for the wisdom which perceives and applies, there is scarcely another teacher among us able to do the work which Providence seems to have appointed to Thomas Cooper."

Mr. Cooper's plan has now for some time been to take for a year's work a particular section of the country, and to visit each city, town, and larger village in it, wherever arrangements can be made for the delivery of his lectures. According to the length of his stay in each place, which varies from two or three to six or eight days, the substance of the course is given in a more or less condensed form. The full course comprises the lectures upon Design in the Human Body, the Animal World, and the Celestial Spaces: that on the *à priori* and moral arguments for the existence of God—one on Matter and Spirit; those on the Critical Evidence in Favour of Christianity—including the "Bridge of History"—and th-

Miracles, and another upon "The Excellency and Consistency of the Practical Teachings of the New Testament."

At present Mr. Cooper is busy in the northern English counties. Next year, we believe, he has already promised to devote chiefly to the large county of York; and he intends, if able, to spend the year 1872 in Scotland, in the same laborious work.

In addition to lecturing four, five, or even six times weekly, he usually preaches twice each Sunday, from Wesleyan, Baptist, Independent, or Presbyterian pulpits. A sermon of his upon "The Unsearchable Riches of Christ" has especial celebrity for its high reach of intellectual and spiritual thought.

In the intervals of his ordinary labour, Mr. Cooper has been busy with the preparation of a collected edition of his poems, in which the "Purgatory" will, we believe, appear unaltered, but with the addition of a preface in acknowledgment of the author's restored and deepened faith in Christianity.

For many years he has cherished the hope of writing a companion "rhyme" to the "Purgatory"—to be called "The Paradise of Martyrs." We are permitted to state that of this, three books, containing upwards of two hundred stanzas, have been written, and a fourth book is advancing towards completion. We wish the earnest author success in his noble religious work, and vigour to finish another poem worthy to stand along with "The Purgatory of Suicides," as the grand product of a working man's unwearied endeavour in "toiling upward"—a worthy crown to a long life of effort and aspiration.

The generous language of G. J. Holyoake, written, we ought to note, *after* Mr. Cooper's renunciation of scepticism, may fitly conclude this sketch:—

"The working class have to be proud of Thomas Cooper. He has done more than any other contemporary working man to win respect for his order. The shoemaker of Lincoln has won himself a place in the republic of literature, where distinction is only awarded to genius. As poet, as novelist, as orator, as political writer, he has placed his name where it will not soon die out. Had he a hireling tongue, or a saleable conscience, he might now be a wealthy man. A poor man with his talents can have his choice in this world—he may keep a conscience or may keep a carriage. Thomas Cooper has preferred to keep a conscience. He has always eaten precarious bread, and looks back with proud satisfaction on an incorruptible life. The author may look back from the platform through his chequered career, and find more than the world knows of to love and reverence. The working class can point to Thomas Cooper, and say—what cannot be said of all,—'Hear him, read his works, follow him home. He is one of us. *He* has nothing to conceal; *we* have nothing to fear.' The man whose career exalts the people should be respected by the people; and as one of the people, I am proud of Thomas Cooper, of his genius, and his reputation."\*

W.

\* "Trial of Theism," page 6.

## The Topic.

### SHOULD BABY-FARMING BE PROHIBITED?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

THAT a frightful, systematic, and flagrant form of crime—the wholesale and deliberate murder of infants in the tender months of their being, has grown up in the neighbourhood of large cities, and that there are especially in the vicinity of the metropolis many who accept of the vile hire of the infanticide is too obvious and too melancholy a fact to be doubted. And it follows from this fact that there are numbers who do not hesitate to employ these wretched hirelings to commit, for them, the deed (almost) without a name sufficiently blistering to the tongue, to which in many cases their poverty and not their will consents. As a defence and a protection to those waifs of social sin who are exposed to these fearful purveyors of death—as a defence and a protection to those who are tempted to embark in the trade in murder—and as a defence and a protection against the spread of criminality amongst those who hope, by hiring a murderess on moderate terms, to escape from the consequences of their vices, the trade in infant life ought to be prohibited. Every person taking or putting out a child to nurse should be compelled to register her own name, residence, age, position in society, and the name, age, and state of health of the child given or taken; all cases of baby-farming or nursing in which these formalities have not been taken to be regarded as *prima facie* evidence of criminal intent on the side of both giver and receiver. Unlicensed

baby-farming must be done away with.—R. A. F.

Certainly baby-farming ought to be prohibited, for various weighty reasons. 1. The sufferance of baby-farming is an occasion for the commission of such hideous crimes as those which Margaret Waters has just been executed for. In the interests of helpless children, therefore, baby-farming ought to be prohibited. 2. The toleration of baby-farming is a temptation to persons of a disposition similar to Waters to commit crime, and thereby to bring themselves to a dreadful end. *The prevention of crime* should be our aim; therefore, for the sake of those who are viciously disposed, baby-farming should be prohibited. If it be possible by legal enactment to prevent others from committing such crimes as Waters has been found guilty of, that will be a great end achieved. 3. The commission in our midst of such crimes as have recently been occasioned by baby-farming is a stigma on us as a people, which foul blot surely some means should be adopted to remove, and the prohibition of baby-farming is calculated to assist in doing this. By all means, therefore, let baby-farming be prohibited. 4. The permission of baby-farming indirectly encourages other great evils besides that of murder. The knowledge that infants can be easily disposed of at a baby-farm is calculated to make persons of a certain disposition careless as to the commission of the sin of fornication, an evil which is now so rampant as to call for a possible check to be put at

Baby-farming is an inducement to the mothers of illegitimate children to steal their hearts against them, to neglect their offspring, and to be perfectly indifferent respecting them. The fact that baby-farming holds out a hope to evil doers that the licentiousness which they have committed will be concealed, is itself a premium upon wickedness, therefore baby-farming should be prohibited. Whatever inconveniences may be occasioned to well-meaning mothers, or to well-intentioned persons who take the charge of infants, by the prohibition of baby-farming, these inconveniences would be vastly outweighed by the benefits conferred, therefore let baby-farming be prohibited.—S. S.

To neglect to follow up the prosecution which has been so rigorously commenced, and has succeeded in bringing one, let us hope, of the worst practisers of the system to light and condemnation, would sanction cruel and cold-blooded murder, and afford facility for immorality. But if the system is severely hunted down now, its followers will be lessened by fear of the risks, and this will perhaps check depravity. The more the system is considered, the more necessary does it appear to eradicate it. Supposing that the children lived, and the chances are that they would live, like other children, if properly attended to, the question arises, what would become of them? Pauperdom and crime seem the only destinations from such starting-places.—C. F. A. S.

#### NEGATIVE.

"Baby-farming" has become a byword and a reproach, not from any evil in itself, but in consequence of the evil course to which many of its practisers have given themselves. Baby-farming has got confounded with child-murder, with which it has really nothing to do. Baby-

farming really signifies the nursing and training of children for hire. It may take the forms of adoption, fosterage, boarding, conventualism, hospitalism, public schoolism, ragged schoolism, orphanage, reformatory, &c., but in every case it is baby-farming. Baby-farming is a necessity of civilization. Mothers die and leave their children in such helpless states as to make nursing a necessity. Many parents are incapable of duly nursing their children, either through illness or occupation. The demise of parents not unfrequently throws children destitute and helpless on the world. Many people are so circumstanced as to require to give the charge of their children to others, and not a few of our charity schools, hospitals, and public places of instruction, make it compulsory on those who would receive a share of their benefits to give up the personal care of their children. Were baby-farming to be prohibited the whole of the social and civil life of the country would require to be altered. Baby-farming may be licensed, restricted, and guarded, but it cannot be prohibited without the most disastrous consequences.—J. D.

Circumstances have arisen which demand the serious consideration of this question. It has been found that grave evils have become associated with baby-farming in some modern cases; and the world, as usual, taking alarm at these consequences, has been calling out for the prohibition of the system of giving out infant children to hired nurses. The cry of prohibition is easily raised, but prohibition itself is difficult of realization. The Scotch have a proverb which runs thus,—

"Gart wood is ill to grow,  
Chuckie stanes are ill to chew;"

which has about the same meaning

as the English saying, "It is easier to say force than do force." These proverbs have good reference to this question. It is impossible to do impossibilities, and to prohibit baby-farming or the nursing of children for hire is an impossibility. There are orphans in the world; there are children who are worse than orphans, their mothers being depraved, siling, lunatic, &c.; there are people who require to go abroad, to remove frequently from one place to another, or to attend to business where, and in circumstances in which, the upbringing of children is impossible. Either we must allow baby-farming, or we must prohibit marriage to all who cannot rear children, or we must provide for the State slaughter of those which cannot be cared for. Baby-farming should be regulated, and baby-farms should be inspected by female inspectors.—H. P.

Baby-farming is by many used as a synonym for infanticide; but this is a mistake. Our old English word to foster has been too much dropped out of use, and this ugly compound, baby-farming, has been substituted for it. Just as a man farms the tolls or the taxes of a district—that is, takes the management of them with a view to profit by the transaction,—so do nurses undertake to manage babies for those who cannot themselves manage them, as a means of gaining a livelihood. Tax and toll farmers fail, or embezzle, or cheat; but as this occurs we punish the malefactors, and take securities against the repetition of the crime; we do not clamour for the prohibition of the farming of tolls or taxes. While the world endures, the nursing of children by strangers and for hire must be a necessity. It cannot be done without, so that to speak of prohibiting it is nonsense. We must govern, and overlook, and supervise the nurses of children, but we cannot prohibit the exercise of

their functions. Safe baby-farming may be secured by examination, licence, and inspection; but prohibition would only make it cunning, expensive, and dangerous.—M. F. L.

Baby-farming is a word of evil omen and vile signification. It stirs the heart and sickens the affections. Up along with it come associations of seduction and shame, anguish and selfishness, villany and murder,—and we readily, if unthinkingly, cry, Put it down, do away with it, banish from the earth the accursed thing. This is unwise, for—1. Baby-farming is a necessity. 2. As a necessity it can be put under inspection. 3. It may often be a greater boon than woe. 4. It is capable of being applied to good uses. Can we not have baby-farming purged and purified? Can we not have baby-farming extended and systematized, recognised, and properly managed? These questions have engaged the attention of many serious thinkers, and it is felt that the farm-nursery system, the boarding-out system, may be not only retained, but utilized and improved. The sensational criminality which has become associated with the name is no more properly attached to it than is adulteration to shopkeeping, astounding casualties to railway traffic, scuttling of ships to navigation, bigamy to marriage, or murder to domestic life. If everything to which evil is attached is to be abolished, the better plan would be to abolish the human race. Children must be nursed; then nurses must do so either through affection or for pay: many cannot have nurses of the former sort; ought they, therefore, to be deprived of the latter?—L. L. Z.

It is authoritatively stated that 50,000 illegitimate children are annually born in this country, and that 90 per cent. of these die within the first year of their age, while the hig'

normal mortality is 30 per cent. One-tenth only of these unfortunate though blameless witnesses to weakness and wickedness survive the sad fate to which they are born. To this if we add the motherless, the orphaned, the deserted, and those who are deprived of the care of parents by illness, business, or the necessities of travel, or absence from the country, we must have a large number of children in the country who require to be taken care of. These must, in general, be put in charge of nurses who receive hire, and who, by having many under their charge, can do what is necessary at an economical rate. This is baby-farming. Were this not possible to be had, it is probable that private infanticide would greatly increase, adult suicide multiply, attempts at adult murder become more numerous, and nameless atrocities for concealment of sexual transgressions be conceived at. We cannot, therefore, prohibit baby-farming without running the risk of greater and grosser evils. But we may so hem in baby-farming by

registrative and legislative measures that it may be changed from being a maleficent to being a beneficent institution.—H. J.

If we would eradicate sin, cure disease, and prevent crime, we must remove the cause before we can prevent its effects. To punish the effects, more especially when the effects are in the form of human flesh, will never prevent the commission of the sin referred to in the topic. The prevention of the effects of sin is often an incentive to vice. Thus if we cannot remove the cause which has led to the establishment of baby-farms, we must of necessity either permit private baby-farms, or found public institutions for the reception of the same. We have only this alternative. Does not the innocence of the harmless offspring claim our charity and protection? For this we must either have "homes," "asylums," or "baby-farms," the name matters little; a greater responsibility, too, should be laid on fathers of illegitimate children.—GEORGE D. H.

## The Inquirer.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

901. The most accessible works on the Norse Mythology are Benjamin Thorpe's "Northern Mythology," and his "Yule-tide Stories;" appended to Ida Pfeiffer's "Visit to Iceland;" several myths are given, but a very fair notion of "Scandinavian Mythology" will be found in "Chambers' Encyclopædia," under that heading.—R. M. A.

903. What sort of wood the gopher of Scripture was, is not for certain known. Many conjectures

abound regarding it, the most prevalent being that it belongs to the cedar or cypress family. It is, however, more probable to be the cypress. The cypress, being noted for its great durability, was eminently suited for the construction of a vessel of such extraordinary dimensions as the ark. Besides, the Hebrew name of gopher resembling the Greek name of cypress makes the supposition of the cypress being the gopher wood of the Bible very conclusive.—C. R.

904. Mr. Helps, in one of his essays, makes a distinction "between the man who conquers and the man who steals," which we presume refers to the man who makes an idea his own by power of thought and might of subjugating intellect, and the man who merely appropriates and uses. Literature is commerce of thought, but in this commerce certain coins change hands; these are still the same, though they are put into new combinations and form new wholes. By inheritance, purchase, or exchange, all these coins must be obtained by the person who uses them as his own. These pass current, and are everybody's by turns, but nobody's long; no one thinks of making a special and peculiar claim to them or upon them. But commerce is also an exchange of products, natural or manufactured. Natural products, though they depend on seed and soil, yet depend also on taste, industry, and intention; and manufactured products are the results of adaptations of materials and machinery which have not in the same or any directly similar form been placed at the option of purchasers. These differ entirely from products or goods taken from others, or mere plausible imitations of them. Plagiarism is the purloining or the colourable imitation of that which belongs to or is the production of another. In every true production of genius each part grows into its place and develops into a homogeneous oneness. It assimilates all by the life that is in it. It is not a composite, made up of differing parts bound and fastened together, or a mosaic whose several portions have been collected and placed together. The plagiarist is one who takes and uses for his own purposes, without assimilating and without having any growth of the spirit which subdues and employs and places what has been

taken. Plagiarism is neither copying nor imitating, but copying or imitating from another without acknowledgment, and with pretence that the product is original. I do not know exactly what is the legal definition of plagiarism, but the signification it should bear in the morality of literature is plain. Plagiarism is the unacknowledged use of ideas, forms of expression, plots, &c., for the purpose of making believe that they, any or all, are the results of the personal thought of the employer of them at second hand, as if they had been wrought out by himself at first hand. The *gravamen* of plagiarism is the conscious though unacknowledged appropriation of another's thought, labour, or art, as if it were one's own.—W. O. D.

911. The word *technical* signifies relating to art or science, or to some particular profession. *Technical terms* are words which are employed with relation to the arts and sciences, words which are not in common use, thus, *abattis* is a military term, *ademption* is a legal or law term, *adnate* is a botanical term, *diagnosis* is a medical term, *diatonic* is a musical term, and all these are technical terms. *Technical education* is education in some particular art, science, trade, or profession, as distinguished from general education. The education which a gentleman receives in hospitals, in the dissecting-room, and from the lectures of professors, that he may be qualified to practise medicine or surgery is *technical education*. The education imparted by a lawyer to a young man who is artieled to him is *technical education*. Likewise the instruction communicated by a person who follows any particular trade—as a carpenter, grocer, or druggist—to his apprentice is *technical education*.—S. S.



## Literary Notes.

Bolton Corney, one of the ablest of our critical literary students, died August 31st, aged 87.

"Knight Commander of Christ" is the title which has lately been conferred on Octave Delepiere, the historian of Flemish literature, by the King of Portugal.

Dr. J. H. Dixon, of Lausanne, is about to issue his prose and poetical works, relating to the scenery and customs of Skipton-in-Craven, Yorkshire, in monthly parts.

A Manuscript of "A Conference of Pleasure, composed for some festive occasion, about the year 1592, by Francis, Lord Bacon, discovered by the late John Bruce among the papers of the Duke of Northumberland, having scribbled on its fly-leaf the name of William Shakspeare, has just been edited, with fac-simile of the fly-leaf, by James Spedding, the editor of biographer of Bacon.

A prize of £100 has been offered by an anonymous donor for the best essay on "*The Nature and Contents of Scripture Revelation as compared with other Forms of Truth*," to be competed for by students at any Scottish University, or at Trinity College, Glenalmond. Principal Tulloch, Professor Caird, and Dr. Hannah, have consented to act as judges.

The Wolfenbutter MS. of "Fordun's Chronicle," which is to form the text of the new edition of Fordun, preparing by Mr. W. F. Skene, in the series of "The Historians of Scotland," has been transmitted from the ducal library at Wolfenbutter to Mr. Skene.

A collected and revised issue of the novels and tales of Disraeli, in

monthly uniform volumes, has just been begun with the eighth edition of "Lothair."

In a "History of Hindoo Poetry," about to be issued, specimens will be given of the verses of twenty-eight female versifiers.

Mr. Morris has the fourth and concluding part of his poem, "The Earthly Paradise," ready. A considerable portion of it is in type.

The Narraganset Club in New England has produced a reprint of Roger William's "The Bloody Tenant yet more Bloody." Mr. E. D. Neill has brought out a history of the Virginia Company of London.

Dr. Strauss, author of "The Life of Jesus," has just issued an estimate of "Voltaire," on which Renan has written a critique.

As a mark of the progress of controversy, we may note that the *Christian World* had recently a debate on the Eternity of Future Punishments; and now the *Christian* (an improved issue of the *Ecivalist*) has inaugurated one on *Prophecy*.

A new edition of Mill's "Logic" is in the press.

A posthumous work by T. H. Buckle is about to appear under the editorship of Miss Helen Taylor, daughter of John Taylor, Esq., and step-daughter of Mr. J. S. Mill.

Dean Milman's "Contributions to the Quarterly Review" are to be republished in a collected form.

A condensed Reference Biographical Dictionary is in preparation by L. B. Philips.

## EPOCH MEN.

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### THOMAS HOBBS, OF MALMSBURY.

"One of the greatest and most original thinkers in the English language."—SIR WILLIAM MOLLSWORTH.

"Hobbes saw from the beginning to the end of his system. He is always, therefore, on firm ground, and never once awerves from his object."—WILLIAM HAZLITT.

HOBBS, who, as Professor Masson remarks, "seemed to be conscious that he was to live to the age of ninety-one, and was in no hurry to trouble people with his speculations," had attained the ripe age of sixty-four when "The Leviathan" was issued. Lord Bacon—some of whose works Hobbes had translated—had been dead more than a quarter of a century, and had left no inheritor of his unfulfilled renown; John Locke had but lately left Westminster School for Christ Church, Oxford, and Berkeley was not born till five years after Hobbes' death; Lord Herbert, of Cherbury, the first English Deist, had died about four years previously; John Milton was then, as Latin Secretary to Oliver Cromwell, residing in a pretty garden house, in Queen's Square, Westminster; Samuel Butler was but an upper servant in the household of Sir Samuel Luke, the original of Hudibras; and John Bunyan was passing painfully through "the Slough of Despond" on the way to his conversion. It was a time "when there was only one man of scientific note in England—William Harvey; when Sydenham was but beginning to practise; when Barrow was studying the Greek fathers at Constantinople; when Ray was yet unknown; when Halley was yet unborn; when Flamsteed was still teething; when Newton was a farmer-boy, munching apples as he drove to market on Saturdays; when Hooke was a poor student at Oxford, assisting Boyle in his manipulations; when Boyle lived in seclusion at the apothecary's, and was chiefly remarkable for associating with men whose names begin with W—Wallis, Willis, Wilkins, Ward, and Wren." "None of the founders of the Royal Society had then emerged from obscurity, and the Royal Society was only a small club that met in secret and called itself the 'Invisible College,'" for though originated in 1645 it was not incorporated till 1662.

It was only under "the liberty of unlicensed printing," gained for England by the splendid rhetoric of the *Areopagitica* of that John Milton whom Hobbes contemptuously mentions as "an English Independent," that "Leviathan" could have been published 1870.

Under the decree of the Star-Chamber concerning printing, 1637, it would have been impossible to have got an episcopal *Imprimatur* for a work containing such opinions—"opinions which, by their boldness, their vigour, and their consistency, startled the ethical consciousness of England, and formed a point of departure of British speculation" in morals, psychology, and politics, while they originated a school of philosophers who have taken a notable part in the procession of European thought, among whose leaders may be reckoned David Hartley, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, George Grote, J. S. Mill, and Alexander Bain; Condillac, Cabanis, Broussais, and Comte; Gall, Spurzheim, Blumenbach, Buchner, &c.

On the publication of the "*Leviathan*," Hobbes was denounced by the king's friends as the apologist of Cromwell, and was exposed to the danger of assassination as a traitor to the royal cause; he was also denounced by the French clergy as a perverter and subverter of religion, and the Justice having endeavoured to apprehend him, he was compelled secretly to flee out of Paris, and to return, through great difficulties, into England. Here he was not disturbed by the Cromwellists, and he emphatically denies that "ever he sought any benefit either from Oliver or from any of his party, or was in any way familiar with any of his ministers before or after his return, or carried favour with any of them." Hobbes, always fortunate in his friendships, now became intimate with William Harvey, the discoverer of the function of the heart and of the circulation of the blood, not only a staunch royalist, but a disturber of the holy calm of authority upon medical topics; John Selden, scholar, lawyer, and statesman, a parliamentarian, but yet a stirrer-up of questions exciting strife, and a mover of his age on matters of law, right, and policy; Sir John Vaughan, the eminent jurist, afterwards Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, a very judicious trimmer between royalism and revolution; Abraham Cowley, a wit, a poet, and a thinker, who, like himself, had been of the exiled party in Paris, and was a recipient of the sovereign's bounty; Sir Kenelm Digby, one of the chief speculative physical philosophers of that age, whom Ben Jonson pronounced to be "a gentleman absolute in all members;" Walter Charlton, a learned medical writer, who was acquainted with the most advanced opinions of his day in logic and philosophy, and wrote ably against atheism; Dr. Jasper Mayne, author of "*The City Match*," an eloquent divine and a keen controversialist, who acted as chaplain to the Duke of Devonshire; Sir William Davenant, who had been in the service of Sir Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, who had accompanied the queen to Paris, and had made the acquaintance of Hobbes therein; in his poem "*Gondibert*," issued from the Louvre at Paris, Jan. 2, 1650, Hobbes had taken an interest, and to some remarks in the preface to that poem Hobbes had written an answer; Edmund Waller, poet and politician; Samuel Butler, author of "*Hudibras*;" Sir C. Scarborough, physician to the king; Francis Osborn, author of "*Advice to a Son*," and some historical memoirs; Ralph

Bathurst, President of Trinity College, Oxford, Dean of Bath, &c. ; John Aubry, a fellow Malmesburian, who had been brought up in the same school and under the same master, who communicated to another of Hobbes' friends, Anthony à Wood's *Athenæ Oxoniensis*, a large amount of biographical matter regarding Milton, Dryden, Hooke, Hobbes, &c. In friendly relationship with these men he delighted to converse and debate, to read his works in outline, and to consult with them concerning their publication, maintaining his opinions with an earnestness bordering upon dogmatism, defending them with ingenuity and force, and giving in general the impression that he was possessed of a master mind and knew it.

In the danger which threatened him of persecution on every side, Royalist and Puritan, Catholic and Protestant, William, Duke of Devonshire, extended to Hobbes an efficient protection, and provided him with a secure asylum for studious years and future independent thought. As one of the members of the Devonshire household, Hobbes was permanently installed, and sheltered alike from the storms of party strife and the fickleness of fortune.

Shortly after the return of Hobbes to England, he issued "A Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique, containing in substance all that Aristotle hath written in his three bookes on that subject, except only what is not applicable to the English Tongue" (a copy of the very rare edition of 1652 is in the possession of the writer of this sketch). He is also said to have published about the same time "A Compend of the Logic of Peter Ramus," being thus the first English writer who sought to popularize in England the Ramean Dialectics. In the same year Alexander Ross, an Aberdonian, master of the Grammar School of Southampton, a *protégé* of Laud's, and a zealous partizan of Royalism, issued "Animadversions on Hobbes' 'Leviathan.'" So voluminous was this writer, that Butler notes the patience, fortitude, and dulness of

"An ancient sage philosopher  
Who had read Alexander Ross over."

He is "said to have had so much learning as to have been perpetually barking at the works of the most learned." Sir Robert Filmer published in 1652 his "Observations upon the Original of Government," against Milton, Hobbes, Grotius, Hatton, &c. Dr. Seth Ward, Savilian Professor of Astronomy, Oxford, and second President of the Royal Society, of which he was one of the founders, attacked Hobbes in the preface to his "Essay on the Being and Attributes of God; on the Immortality of the Soul, &c., 1652," and in several other tractates.

But Hobbes had engaged to the Lord Marquis of Newcastle to deal with the objections which the Bishop of Londonderry had made to his views on Necessity; this he did by the issue of his treatise on "Liberty and Necessity," 1654. At the same time he was employed, as "a monument" of his service to William Earl of

Devonshire, and an acknowledgment of his "lordship's bounty," on a treatise on "The Elements of Philosophy," of which he produced the "first section," entitled "*De Corpore*," in Latin, in 1655. Of this work a translation (perhaps by Jasper Mayne?) appeared, with considerable alterations and enlargements under the revision of its author, in 1656. George Grote says, "The first two sections of the treatise *De Corpore* appear to us among the most instructive and valuable of his works, exhibiting a rare combination of analytical sagacity with condensed and perspicuous expression, and assisting most powerfully to unravel those extreme abstractions, without the comprehension of which no man can successfully cope with the difficulty of mental philosophy."

Its author says, in his Epistle Dedicatory to the Earl of Devonshire,—

"It is a little book, but full; and great enough if men count well for great; and to an attentive reader versed in the demonstrations of mathematicians, that is, to your lordship, clear and easy to understand, and almost new throughout, without any offensive novelty. I know that that part of philosophy wherein are considered lines and figures has been delivered to us notably improved by the ancients; and withal a most perfect pattern of the logic by which they were enabled to find out and demonstrate such excellent theorems as they have done. I know also that the hypothesis of the earth's diurnal motion was the invention of the ancients; but that both it and astronomy, that is, celestial physics, springing up together with it, were by succeeding philosophers strangled with the snares of words. And therefore the beginning of astronomy, except observations, is not to be derived from farther time than from Nicolaus Copernicus; who, in the age next preceding the present, revived the opinion of Pythagoras, Aristarchus, and Philolaus. After him, the doctrine of the motion of the earth being now received, and a difficult question thereupon rising concerning the descent of heavy bodies, Galileus in our time, striving with that difficulty, was the first that opened to us the gate of natural philosophy universal, which is the knowledge of the nature of *motion*. So that neither can the age of natural philosophy be reckoned higher than to him. Lastly, the science of *man's body*, the most profitable part of natural science, was first discovered with admirable sagacity by our countryman, Dr. Harvey, principal Physician to King James and King Charles, in his books of the 'Motion of the Blood;' and of the 'Generation of Living Creatures;' who is the only man I know that, conquering envy, hath established a new doctrine in his lifetime. Before these there was nothing certain in natural philosophy but every man's experiments to himself, and the natural histories, if they may be called certain that are no certainer than civil histories. But since these, astronomy and natural philosophy in general have, for so little time, been extraordinarily advanced by Joannus Keplerus, Petrus Gassendus, and Marinus Mersennus; and the science of human bodies in special by the wit and industry of physicians, the only true natural philosophers, especially of our most learned men of the College of Physicians in London. Natural philosophy is therefore but young; but civil philosophy yet much younger, as being no older (I say it provoked, and that my detractors may know how little they have wrought upon me) than my own book *De Cive*."

In the author's epistle to the reader the following outline of his work is supplied :—

"In the first part of this section, which is entitled *Logic*, I set up the light of reason. In the second, which hath for title the *Grounds of Philosophy*, I distinguish the most common notions by accurate definition, for the avoiding of confusion and obscurity. The third part concerns the expansion of space, that is, *Geometry*. The fourth contains the motion of the stars, together with the doctrine of sensible qualities.

"In the second section, if it please God, shall be handled *Man*. In the third section the doctrine of *Subjection* is handled already [in the *De Cive*]."

In a subsequent part of the same address he delivers the following *commendatio philosophiæ* :—

"I would very fain commend philosophy to you, that is to say, the study of wisdom, for want of which we have all suffered much damage lately. For even they that study wealth do it out of love to wisdom, for their treasures serve them but for a looking-glass wherein to behold and contemplate their own wisdom. Nor do they that love to be employed in public business aim at anything but place wherein to show their wisdom. Neither do voluptuous men neglect philosophy but only because they know not how great a pleasure it is to the mind of man to be ravished in the vigorous and perpetual embraces of the most beauteous world. Lastly, though for nothing else, yet because the mind of man is no less impatient of empty time than nature is of empty place, to the end you be not forced for want of what to do, to be troublesome to men that have business, or take hurt by falling into idle company, but have somewhat of your own wherewith to fill up your time, I recommend unto you to study philosophy."

As we agree with George Grote, J. S. Mill, &c., in our opinion of the value of the early portion of this book, we shall present a brief compendium of the more important tenets and teachings of the first part.

PART I. COMPUTATION OR LOGIC.—Chap. I. Of Philosophy.—"My purpose is, as far forth as I am able, to lay open the few and first elements of philosophy in general, as so many seeds from which pure and true philosophy may hereafter spring up by little and little. . . . Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation : and again, of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects. . . . By ratiocination I mean computation. Now to compute is either to collect the sum of things that are added together, or to know what remains when one thing is taken out of another. So that all ratiocination is comprehended in these two operations of the mind, addition and subtraction. . . . Such things as we add or subtract, that is, which we put into an account, we are said to consider in Greek, *Logidzesthai*, in which language also *Sullogidzesthai* signifies to compute, reason, or rectify. Effects, and the appearances of things to sense, are faculties or *γ* of bodies which make us distinguish them from one another. . . .

end or scope of philosophy is that we make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that by application of bodies to one another, we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our mind, as far forth as matter, strength, and industry will permit for the commodity of human life. . . . The end of knowledge is power. . . . The scope of all speculation is the performing of some action, or thing to be done. . . . The subject of philosophy, or the matter it treats of, is . . . every body of whose generation or properties we can have any knowledge. . . . The principal parts of philosophy are two; . . . one whereof, being the work of nature, is called a natural body, the other is called a commonwealth, and is made by the wills and agreement of men. And from these spring the two parts of philosophy called natural and civil. . . . Civil philosophy is again commonly divided into two parts, whereof one, which treats of men's dispositions and manners, is called ethics;—and the other, which takes cognizance of their civil duties, is called politics, or simply civil philosophy. . . . I will discourse of bodies natural;—of the dispositions and manners of men; and of the civil duties of subjects."

Chap. II. Of Names.—"For the acquiring of philosophy some sensible monuments are necessary, by which our past thoughts may be not only reduced, but also registered, every one in its own order. These monuments I call Marks, namely, sensible things taken at pleasure, that, by the sense of them, such thoughts may be recalled to our minds as are like those thoughts for which we took them. . . . It is therefore necessary, . . . that there be certain signs by which what one man finds out may be manifested and made known to others. . . . And of signs some are natural, whereof I have already given an example; others are arbitrary, namely, those we make choice of at our own pleasure. . . . The difference, therefore, betwixt marks and signs is this, that we make those for our own use, but these for the use of others. Words so connected as that they become signs of our thoughts are called Speech, of which every part is a name. . . . A name is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had or had not before in his mind. The first distinction of names is that some are positive, or affirmative, others negative, which are also called privative and indefinite. . . . Positive and negative names are contradictory to one another, so that they cannot both be the name of the same thing. . . . Secondly, of names, some are common to many things, as a man, a tree; others proper to one thing, as he that writ the Iliad, Homer, this man, that man. . . . Hence proceeds the third distinction of names, which is that some are called names of the first, others of the second intention. . . . Fourthly, some names are of certain and determined, others of uncertain and undetermined signification. . . . Fifthly, names are usually distinguished into univocal and equivocal. . . . Sixthly, of names, some are absolute, others relative. . . . Lastly, there are simple and compound names."

Chap. III. Of Proposition.—"In philosophy there is but one kind of speech useful, . . . most men call it proposition, and is the speech of those that affirm or deny, and expresseth truth or falsity. A proposition is a speech consisting of two names copulated, by which he that speaketh signifies he conceives the latter name to be the name of the same thing,

whereof the former is the name; or (which is all one) that the former name is comprehended by the latter. . . . In every proposition three things are to be considered, viz., the two names, which are the subject and the predicate, and their copulation. . . . Now these words, true, truth, and true proposition, are equivalent to one another; for truth consists in speech, and not in the things spoken of; truth or verity is not any affection of the thing, but of the proposition concerning it. . . . Hence it is evident that truth and falsity have no place but amongst such living creatures as use speech. . . . Seeing every proposition may be, and uses to be, pronounced and written in many forms, and we are obliged to speak in the same manner as most men speak, yet they that learn philosophy from masters had need to take heed they be not deceived by the variety of expressions. And therefore, whensoever they meet with any obscure proposition, they ought to reduce it to its most simple and categorical form; in which the copulative word *is* must be expressed by itself, and not mingled in any manner either with the subject or predicate, both which must be separated and clearly distinguished one from another. . . . Seeing none but a true proposition will follow from true, and that the understanding of two propositions to be true is the cause of understanding that also to be true which is deduced from them; the two antecedent propositions are commonly called the causes of the inferred proposition, or conclusion. And from hence it is that logicians say that the premises are causes of the conclusion; which may pass, though it be not properly spoken; for though understanding be the cause of understanding, yet speech is not the cause of speech."

Chap. IV. Of Syllogism.—"A speech consisting of three propositions, from two of which the third follows, is called a syllogism; and that which follows is called the conclusion; the other two, premises. . . . A syllogism is nothing but a collection of the sum of two propositions, joined together by a common term, which is called the middle term. And as proposition is the addition of two names, so syllogism is the adding together of three. . . . The thoughts of the mind answering to a direct syllogism proceed in this manner: first there is conceived a phantasm of the thing named, with that accident or quality thereof for which it is in the minor proposition called by that name which is the subject; next the mind has a phantasm of the same thing, with that accident or quality for which it hath the name, that in the same proposition is the predicate; thirdly, the thought returns of the same thing as having that accident in it for which it is called by the name, that is the predicate of the major proposition; and lastly, remembering that all those are the accidents of one and the same thing, it concludes that those three names are also names of one and the same thing; that is to say, the conclusion is true."

Chap. V. Of Erring, Falsity, and Captions.—"Men are subject to *err*, not only in affirming and denying, but also in perception, and in silent cogitation. . . . The best way, therefore, to free ourselves from such errors as arise from natural signs, is, first of all, before we begin to reason concerning such conjectural things, to suppose ourselves ignorant, and then to make use of our ratiocination; for these errors proceed from our want of ratiocination; whereas errors which consist in affirmation and negation (that is, the falsity of propositions), proceed only from reasoning amiss. Of these, therefore, as repugnant to philosophy, I will speak principally. Errors which happen in reasoning, that is, in syllogizing, consist either in



the falsity of the premises or the inference. In the first of these cases, a syllogism is said to be faulty in the matter of it; and, in the second case, in the form. . . . The captions of sophists and sceptics, by which they were wont, of old, to deride and oppose truth, were faulty for the most part, not in the form but in the matter of syllogism; and they deceived not others oftener than they were themselves deceived."

Chap. VI. Of Method.—"Method is the shortest way of finding out effects by their known causes, or of causes by their known effects. . . . The first beginnings, therefore, of knowledge are the phantasms of sense and imagination. . . . There is no method by which we find out the causes of things, but is either compositive or resolute, or partly compositive and partly resolute. And the resolute is commonly called analytical method, as the compositive is called synthetical. . . . In any knowledge of the *δρα*, or that anything *is*, the beginning of our search is from the whole idea, and contrarily in our knowledge of the *διότι*, or of the causes of anything; that is, in the sciences we have more knowledge of the causes of the parts than of the whole. . . . According to this variety of things in question, sometimes the analytical method is to be used, and sometimes the synthetical. . . . The method of attaining to the universal knowledge of things is purely analytical. . . . The method of philosophy, to such as seek science simply, without propounding to themselves the solution of any particular question, is partly analytical, and partly synthetical; namely, that which proceeds from sense to the invention of principles, analytical; and the rest synthetical. . . . A cause is the sum or aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agents and the patient, as concur to the producing of the effect propounded; all which existing together, it cannot be understood but that the effect existeth with them; or that it can possibly exist if any one of them be absent. . . . In the method of invention, the use of words consists in this, that they may serve for marks, by which whatsoever we have found out may be recalled to memory; for without this all our inventions perish, nor will it be possible for us to go on from principles beyond a syllogism or two, by reason of the weakness of memory. . . . Seeing teaching is nothing but leading the mind of him we teach, to the knowledge of our inventions, in that track by which we attained the same with our mind; therefore the same method that served for our invention, will serve also for demonstration for others. . . . The whole method, therefore, of demonstration is synthetical, consisting of that order of speech which begins from primary or most universal propositions, which are manifest of themselves, and proceeds by a perpetual composition of propositions into syllogisms, till at last the learner understands the truth of the conclusion sought after. . . . A definition is a proposition whose predicate resolves the subject, when it may; and when it may not, it exemplifies the same. . . . A demonstration is a syllogism or series of syllogisms derived and continued from the definitions of names to the last conclusion. . . . It is proper to methodical demonstration, first, that there be a true succession of one reason to another, according to the rules of syllogizing delivered above. Secondly, that the premises of all syllogisms be demonstrated from the first definitions. Thirdly, that after definitions he that teaches or demonstrates anything, proceed in the same method by which he found it out."

Part second of "De Corpore" treats of the first grounds of

philosophy, and it contains many observations of value and excellence on place and time, body and accident, cause and effect, power and act, identity and difference, quantity, proportion, &c. Part third considers the proportions of motions and magnitudes, and Part fourth of physics, or the phenomena of nature. In the translated edition, chapters xviii. and xx. appear almost wholly changed from what they were in the Latin. This took place in consequence of another attack made on Hobbes by Dr. Ward, in his "*Vindiciæ Academiarum*," 1654; this onset was seconded by Dr. John Wallis, in an "*Elenchus Geometricæ Hobbianæ*." These antagonists were Savilian professors in Oxford, the former of astronomy, the latter of geometry. In reply to these attacks, Hobbes published as a supplement to his "*De Corpore*," translated, "*Six Lessons*," in which he treats his adversaries in a singularly cavalier manner, as "uncivil ecclesiastics, inhumane divines, dedectors of morality, unassuming colleagues, an egregious pair of Issachars, most wretched Vindices and Indices Academiarum," telling them to "remember Vespasian's law, that it is uncivil to give ill-language first, but civil and lawful to return it." This work is dedicated to Henry Lord Pierrepont, Viscount of Newark, Earl of Kingston, and Marquis of Dorchester, who had expressed favour towards, and entertained a good opinion of, the innovator in thought. Ward immediately replied in an "Epistle," and Wallis by a "Response;" and matters got complicated on Hobbes' hands by the *Animadversions* of William Moranus against his *Physics*, and of Andrew Tacquet against his *Mathematicæ*, published at Brussels in 1665; as well as objections taken to his doctrines by Harrington in his "*Oceana*," 1656; in the philosophical and critical dissertations of J. F. Le Grand, 1657, and in an examination of the political part of Hobbes' "*Leviathan*," 1657, by George Lawson. Besides these works, Bishop Bramhall had published "*A Confutation of the Errors of Chapters xii.—xiv. of the 'Leviathan*,'" and a "*Defence of True Liberty against Necessity*," as advocated by Thomas Hobbes." Hobbes, who had only found one distinct apologist, and that an anonymous one, in a "*Dissertation on the Principles of Justice and Virtue*, containing an Apology for the Treatise '*De Cive*,' of the most illustrious Hobbes," published in Amsterdam, 1651, nothing daunted, it seems, in his singular views, replied to Wallis, in a work entitled, "*Stigmæ, or Marks of the absurd Geometry, rural Language, Scottish Church Politics, and Barbarisms*" of that professor. In this he was assisted by Henry Stubbes, of Stratford-on-Avon, a learned but scarcely a judicious writer on many questions in morals, politics, and literature.

In 1657 a new edition was published "by a friend, with leave from the author," of the English version of Hobbes' treatise "*On Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy*," which had been prepared in 1640. In it F. B. (P) its editor, assures us that though it had been so long written, "it was thought a part of religion not to make any change without the author's advice, could not be suddenly obtained." This publication Hobbes

to sanction by the issue in 1658 of a Latin edition, dedicated to the Earl of Devonshire, in which he blames Ward and Wallis, likening the one to Demetrius, the other to Alexander, as the inducers of the delay in its publication, because he required to reply to them. An outline of the ideas it contains had been in conversation communicated to William, Earl of Newcastle, and had been, by his command, put into method in writing, and it was then committed to the press for the benefit of mankind. As the ideas contained in this treatise have been reproduced in a revised and enlarged form, in early chapters of the "*Leviathan*," of which we have given an analysis, we need not here occupy space with an epitome. In the same year, 1658, Bishop Bramhall published "*Castigations on the Question of Liberty and Necessity*," and forwarded to Hobbes "sixty objections" to the opinions in "*De Cive*," which have not been published. The Bishop of Man, William Lucy, (with the fear of Shakspeare's jest before his eyes?) under the cognomen William Pike, issued observations on the "*Leviathan*," in 1658; and Wallis, in 1659, renewed his attack on Hobbes' "*Mathematics*." Matthew Wren, in criticising Harrington's "*Oceana*," spoke somewhat in favour of Hobbes in 1660; Samuel Puffendorf, in his "*Universal Elements of Jurisprudence*," issued in the same year, refers to Hobbes' "*De Cive*" in high terms; Dr. J. A. Osiander, of Tubingen, inveighed bitterly against Hobbes in his "*Tractate on the Type of the Law of Nature*;" and Dr. Robert Sharrock, in his volume on "*The Aims and Duties of Life according to the Law of Nature*," enlarges on the immorality of the ethics and politics of Hobbes. Hobbes, however, during the same period, appears to have employed himself calmly on an "*Examination and Emendation of the Mathematics*" of his time, a Latin work which he dedicated to an Aquitanian nobleman, whom he much esteemed, (and to whom he afterwards inscribed a poetical record of his own life), Hieronymus Verdusius, one of his former Parisian friends, who had been introduced to him by S. Sorberius, the historiographer royal of France. Next year Hobbes published his "*Physical Dialogue on the Nature of Air*," which he dedicated to "his most illustrious and learned friend Sorberius;" a work which Robert Boyle opposed immediately in an "*Examen*" of the Experiments and the Theory. An attack upon the doctrines of the "*De Cive*" appeared in the "*Dissertations*" of Gisbert Coequius, and in a "*Disquisition*" by Gisbert Voetius, in 1661; while Hobbes' views on sensation and necessity were impugned by Henry More, the Platonist, in his book on "*The Immortality of the Soul*," issued in 1662, and republished in 1679.

The reiterated aspersions to which Hobbes was exposed, the clouds of dusty contumely in which his reputation had become involved, seem to have put him on his mettle, especially as it was now possible to bring his case against his calumniators and opponents directly under the judgment of the king, his former pupil, now as Charles II. occupying the sovereign seat. In 1662 he published his "*Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners*,"

and Religion of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury," in a letter addressed (for rhetorical reasons) to Dr. John Wallis. It is composed in a recriminatory and satirical vein, and is, it seems to us, intended to work favourably upon the restored monarch, who loved epigram and flattery. The king had met Hobbes at the Duke of Devonshire's, in Salisbury, in the summer after his Restoration, had permitted him to kiss his hand, had talked to him familiarly, and enjoyed the caustic wit of the courtly philosopher; with the result that Hobbes could say, "His Majesty said openly that he thought Mr. Hobbes never meant him hurt. Besides, his Majesty hath used him more graciously than is ordinary to so humble a person as he is, and so great a delinquent as you would make him; and testified his esteem of him in his bounty, in bestowing on him an annuity of £100 out of the privy purse.\* Following up the same course of cultivating the favour of Charles, Hobbes dedicated to him "Seven Philosophical Problems and Two Propositions in Geometry." In his apologetic epistle to the King he expresses a desire that his writing should be tried by his Majesty's excellent reason, untainted with the language that has been invented or made use of by men when they are puzzled; as one acquainted with all the experiments of the time, and whose approbation, if he had the good fortune to attain it, would stand him in stead against the contempt of his enemies; and he thereafter proceeds:—

"I will not break the custom of joining to my offering a prayer, and it is that your Majesty will be pleased to pardon this following short apology for my 'Leviathan.' Not that I rely upon apologies, but upon your Majesty's most gracious general pardon. That which is in it of theology, contrary to the general current of divines, is not put there as my opinion, but propounded with submission to those that have the power ecclesiastical. I did never after, either in writing or discourse, maintain it. There is nothing in it against episcopacy; I cannot, therefore, imagine what reason any episcopal man can have to speak of me, as I hear some of them do, as of an atheist, or a man of no religion, unless it be for making the authority of the Church wholly upon the regal power; which I hope your Majesty will think is neither atheism nor heresy. But what had I to do to meddle with matters of that nature, seeing religion is not philosophy, but law. It was written in a time when the pretence of Christ's kingdom was made use of for the most horrid actions that can be imagined; and it was a just indignation of that, that I desired to see the bottom of that doctrine of the kingdom of Christ, which divers ministers then preached for a pretence of their rebellion; which may reasonably extenuate, though not excuse, the writing of it. There is, therefore, no ground for so great a calumny in my writing. There is no sign of it in my life; and for my religion, when I was at the point of death at Saint Germain's, the bishop of Durham can bear witness of it if he be asked. Therefore I most humbly beseech your sacred Majesty not to believe so ill of me upon reports, that proceed often, and may do so now,

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\* "Deinde redux mihi Rex concessit habere quot annis,  
Centum alias libras ipsius ex localis,  
Dulce mihi donum."—*Vita, Carmina Expressa.*

from the displeasure which commonly ariseth from difference in opinion; nor to think the worse of me, if snatching up all the weapons to fight against your enemies, I lighted upon one that had a double edge."

At this period we get a glimpse of our author from Louis XIV.'s historiographer, M. Samuel Sorbriere (Sorberius), who came over to this country in 1663, and after his return to France published a narrative of his adventures (1664). One of his principal objects in visiting England, he states, was to renew his acquaintance with some old friends, and to be introduced to other learned persons here. One of those whom he had formerly known was Mr. Hobbes, whom, he tells us, he found much the same man as he had seen him fourteen years before, "and even," he adds, "in the same posture in his chamber as he was wont to be every afternoon, wherein he betook himself to his studies after he had been walking about all the morning. This he did for his health, of which he ought to have the greatest regard, he being at this time seventy-eight years of age. Besides which he plays so long at tennis ball once a week till he is quite tired. I found very little alteration in his face, and none at all in the vigour of his mind, strength of memory, and cheerfulness of spirit, all of which he perfectly retained.

In 1664, Hobbes, induced by a friend who was anxious for political reasons to have a well-grounded view of the nature and principles of legislation, began the study of law. He looked over the titles of the statutes from Magna Charta downwards, and left not one unread which seemed suitable to his purpose; besides, he diligently read over Littleton's book of "Tenures," with the commentaries thereupon of the renowned lawyer, Sir Edward Coke. From these studies resulted "A Dialogue of Common Law between a Philosopher and a Student of the Laws of England," in which he endeavours to show that the law of human nature, which is the law of reason, is the soul of law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason. This work was, however, retained in MS. till 1678. In the meantime he had been engaged besides in gathering up the scattered products of his thoughts, and putting them into such shape as would give them the fairest chances of perpetuity. He exercised particular care in translating his "Leviathan" into Latin, with the intention of publishing them in a fully revised form altogether. This intention having become known, a coalition of his foes was formed, and by an express decision of Convocation and of Parliament, in 1666—the year of the great fire in London—his "Leviathan" and "De Cive" were censured; and this was followed up by the introduction of a Bill into Parliament for the punishment of atheism and blasphemy, which Hobbes was told would be enforced against him without hesitation.

These events probably concurred to turn the mind of Hobbes to compose his tract "Concerning Heresy and the Punishment thereof," in which he says:—

"The word heresy is Greek, and signifies a taking of anything, and particularly the taking of an opinion : each several opinion was called a *heresy* ; which signifieth no more than a private opinion, without reference to truth or falsehood ; originally the name of *heresy* was no disgrace, nor the word *heretic* at all in use." He says something rather different in another place, viz. :—"Heresy is a singularity of doctrine, or opinion contrary to the doctrine of another man or men ; and the word properly signifies the doctrine of a sect, which doctrine is taken upon trust of some man of reputation for wisdom, that was the first author of the same . . . . Concerning heresy, Sir Edward Coke (3 *Inst.* p. 89), says, that five things fall into consideration. 1. Who be the judges of heresy. 2. What shall be judged heresy? 3. What is the judgment upon a man convicted of heresy? 4. What the law alloweth him to save his life. 5. What he shall forfeit by judgment against him. . . . The principal thing to be considered, which is the heresy itself, he leaveth out, viz., what it is ; in what fact or words it consisteth ; what law it violateth, statute law or the law of reason."—*Dialogue of the Common Law.*

The conclusion of the tract on Heresy, as being in part autobiographical, we quote :—

"In the seventeenth year of the reign of King Charles the First, shortly after that the Scots had rebelliously put down the episcopal government in Scotland, the Presbyterians in England endeavoured the same here. The king, though he saw the rebels ready to take the field, would not condescend to that ; but yet, in hope to appease them, was content to pass an Act of Parliament for the abolishing the High Commission. But though the High Commission was taken away, yet the Parliament, having other ends besides the setting up of the Presbyterate, pursued the rebellion, and put down both episcopacy and monarchy, erecting a power by them called *The Commonwealth*, by others *The Rump*, which men obeyed, not out of duty, but for fear ; nor were there any human laws left in force to restrain any man from preaching or writing any doctrine concerning religion that he pleased. And in this heat of the war, it was impossible to disturb the peace of the State, which then was none. . . . And in this time it was that a book called 'Leviathan' was written in defence of the King's power, temporal and spiritual, without any word against episcopacy, or against any bishop, or against the public doctrine of the church. It pleased God, about twelve years after the usurpation of this *Rump*, to restore his most gracious Majesty that now is, to his father's throne, and presently his Majesty restored the bishops, and pardoned the Presbyterians. But then both the one and the other accused in Parliament this book of heresy, when neither the bishops before the war had declared what was heresy ; when, if they had, it had been made void by the putting down of the High Commission at the importunity of the Presbyterians. So fierce are men, for the most part, in dispute, where either their learning or power is debated, that they never think of the laws, but as soon as they are offended, they cry out, *crucifige* ; forgetting what St. Paul (2 Tim. ii. 24, 25) saith, even in case of obstinate holding of an error : 'The servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves ; if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth ;' of which counsel, such fierceness as he<sup>th</sup> appeared in the disputation of divines, down from before the Council of<sup>1</sup> to this present time, is a violation."

The storm of threatened pains and penalties blew over, so far as regarded personal danger; but the heat of hate which his opinions had excited was so intense, that every obstacle was put in his way to prevent his gaining a licence to have his works printed. Foiled in his endeavours in London, Cambridge, and Oxford, he, bent on the attainment of his end, arranged with John Blauvius, of Amsterdam, to produce a complete, collected edition of his works. This very handsome specimen of Flemish typography was completed in 1668, and the author had the gratification of placing a copy of the same in the library of his college, Magdalen Hall, Oxford, then under the principalate of James Hyde, as a token of his gratitude and affection for the nursing mother of his genius.

The excitement arising from the issue of books which were held to confound all distinctions between right and wrong, and indirectly to undermine the foundations of all religion, "natural and revealed," caused much distress to the guardians of the press and the responsible guides of the public morals. A cry of reprobation was raised, but, as sometimes happens, unluckily, their zeal in opposition brought out the truth of Solomon's proverb, "Stolen waters are sweet." Of this we have a curious memorandum from a trustworthy confessor:—

"To my booksellers for Hobbes's '*Leviathan*,' which is now mightily called for, and what was heretofore sold at 8s., I now give 24s. at the second hand, and is sold for 30s., it being a book the bishop will not let be printed again."—*Sept. 3, 1668. Pepys's Diary.*

There set in naturally a still greater activity in discussion, and many learned and able replies were prepared. In the colleges the agitation was intensified by the enthusiasm of the youths who rebelliously loved what annoyed or distressed their elders. One of these—Daniel Scargil, B.A., of Corpus Christi, Cambridge—maintained some of Hobbes' tenets in a public disputation. The offender was expelled from the university. Hobbes resented this form of persecution, and endeavoured, though unsuccessfully, to gain a redress for the grievance his disciple had endured. The *odium theologium* grew so fierce that Bishop John Fell, then Dean of Christ Church, Oxford, one of the most zealous advocates of episcopacy of that age, when publishing a Latin translation of Anthony à Wood's "*History and Antiquities of Oxford*," corrupted the text of the same by omitting an eulogium which the author had passed on Hobbes, and by substituting instead thereof several strong animadversions upon his character and opinions. Against this censure, and this method of editorship, Hobbes protested to Wood, publishing his epistle. Wood, equally indignant, objected to his editor's course. Enraged by this exposure, Bishop Fell composed a fierce invective against Hobbes, as "that wrathful and self-glorious animal of Malmesbury." Hobbes disdained to hold any farther contention with the author of "*The Grammar of Reason, or Institutes of Logic*," the inheritor of the spirit of Laud, the

benefactor of Oxford, whose commemoration speech day (1st Nov.) has occasioned the epigram,—

"I do not love thee, Dr. Fell,  
The reason why I cannot tell;  
But this indeed I know full well,  
I do not love thee, Dr. Fell."

In the meantime, the reputation of Hobbes grew exceedingly among the highest thinkers abroad. Foreigners of distinction visited him as one of the ornaments of his country and century, and thought that they were honoured by his friendship. Amongst others, Cosmo de Medici, in 1669, the year before he succeeded his father, Ferdinand II., as Grand Duke of Tuscany, visited him frequently, admired his wisdom, got a portrait of him taken, and this, along with Hobbes' works, he had deposited in the Medicean Library begun by Michael Angelo and finished by Vasari. To this prince Hobbes dedicated some geometrical tracts on the quadrature of the circle, the cubing of the sphere, and the duplication of a cube, in 1669,—tracts which are reported on, by Augustus De Morgan, as having attained a "distinguished success in failure," and as "not being able to be admitted as proper solutions of the difficulties."

Samuel Parker, in a "Discourse on the Powers of the Civil Magistrate in Religion," 1669, which brought him into collision with Andrew Marvell, opposed Hobbes in this tract, as well as in his "Disquisitions concerning God and Providence," in 1778.

Thomas Levison, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, wrote in Latin, in 1670, "The Creed of Hobbes examined;" and the same was translated into English in 1671.

Joseph Glanvill, the acute and original author of "Scepsis Scientifica, or confest Ignorance the Way to Science," 1695, issued an attack on Hobbes in his "Philosophia Pia" in 1671. Richard Cumberland, Bishop of Peterborough, published, 1672, his "Philosophical Disquisition on the Laws of Nature, and Confutation of the Hobbian Philosophy of Elements." John Eachard, Master of Catherine's Hall, Cambridge, published "Hobbes' State of Nature considered," 1672; and "Some Opinions of Hobbes considered," 1673. Both works take the form of a dialogue between Philautus and Timothy. Dr. George Hickes, Bishop of Worcester, one of the most learned and honest men of that time, asserts, "I was in company with Hobbes when he swore and cursed and raved like a madman at the mention of Eachard's 'Timothy and Philautus.'" John Templer published "An Idea of the Theology of the Leviathan" in 1672, and James Shafto, in his "Great Law of Nature," 1673, opposes the opinions of Hobbes. Edward Hyde, Lord Clarendon, in 1674 produced, at Moulins, a "Brief View of the Pernicious Errors of Ecclesiastical and Civil Government which the 'Leviathan' of Thomas Hobbes contains;" and the same work was issued enlarged, in English in 1676. The Hon. Robert Boyle pub-



a "Dissertation concerning the Vacuum" against Hobbes in 1674; Regner, of Mansfeldt, in a critique of Spinoza's "Theologium Politicum" (in the first English translation of which we shrewdly suspect Hobbes was concerned), has a side blow at the 'Leviathan;' and Samuel Rachelius, the jurisconsult, in his work on "The Law of Nature and of Nations," 1676, disputes against the tenets of Hobbes with warmth. But in opposition to this we may place the fact that Samuel Puffendorf, in many parts of his treatise on the same subject, advocates similar views to those entertained by Hobbes. Renatus Rapinus, in 1676, published his "Reflexions on Philosophy, Ancient and Modern;" and in that work he mentions Hobbes frequently with praise. "Of all modern English philosophers," he says, "the most renowned are Bacon, Hobbes, and Boyle;" "Thomas Hobbes is distinguished for depth of spirit;" "he is the hardest Epicurean of these latter ages," &c.

The most able and generous of all Hobbes' antagonists was "that great master of learning and reasoning," Dr. Ralph Cudworth, whose "True Intellectual System of the Universe wherein the Reasoning and Philosophy of Atheism is confuted" was elicited by the doctrines of "Leviathan." Though he argues against the author, he does not expressly name him because he knew him.

In Wm. Howell's "Spirit of Prophecy," 1679, the "Leviathan" and an anonymous tract on "Human Reason" are sharply dealt with. We have now stated the greater portion of those who wrote against Hobbes during his lifetime. Many have opposed his doctrines since, and we may here, perhaps, quote a few of their names,—Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hawes, and Samuel Clarke; Mackintosh, Smith, Butler, Stewart, Hazlitt, Brown, Jouffroy, and Cousin,—names these which carry immense moral as well as intellectual weight.

But we have been led away, by the desire to deal at once with the opposition he encountered, from the simple annals of Hobbes' personal life. In 1671 he issued his "Rosetum Geometricum," and three letters to the Royal Society against Wallis; in 1672 his "Lux Mathematica," and he composed in the same year a biography of himself in Latin elegiacs; in 1674 he retired finally to the country to avoid the disquiet of controversy, and to employ his later years in calmer studies. At the estates of the Earl of Devonshire—Chataworth and Hardwicke—he amused himself or occupied himself as he chose. Of his serious labours we may note his "Decameron Physiologium," ten dialogues on natural history; "The Whole Art of Rhetoric," an appendix to his compendium of Aristotle's "Rhetoric." To this he added "The Art of Sophistry, or False Arguing;" concise, acute, caustic, and controversial; "Behemoth, or the Epitome of the Civil Wars of England, 1640-60." This work contained too much truth to be relished. It apportioned praise and blame with equal impartiality. "I would fain have published" this work "long ago; and to that end I presented it to his Majesty; and some days after, when I thought he had read it, I humbly

besought him, to let me print it; but his Majesty, though he heard me graciously, yet he flatly refused to have it published." Some copies, however, were taken, and several spurious issues were brought out, but the author's edition was not published till after his death. In 1676 he edited his "Controversy on Liberty and Necessity" with Benjamin Laney, Bishop of Ely; and he left in MS. an answer to a book published by Dr. Bramhall, late Bishop of Derry, called "The Catching of the Leviathan." "His book," says Hobbes, "containeth two chapters, the one concerning religion, the other concerning politics. Because he does not so much as offer any refutation of anything in my 'Leviathan' concluded, I needed not to have answered either of them. Yet to the first I here answer, because the words *atheism*, *impiety*, and the like, are words of the greatest defamation possible. And this I had done sooner if I had sooner known that such a book was extant. He wrote it ten years since, and yet I never heard of it till about three months since, so little talk was there of his lordship's writings."

He left behind him also "A Dialogue on Church History," in Latin elegiacs, which he had begun in 1659, and finished in his eightieth year. It was issued in 1688, under the editorship of Thomas Rymer, the compiler of "Fœdera;" and was translated into English in 1722. This must be said to have formed one of the recreations of his later years, but his chief *tour de force* in this line was the undertaking of a version of Homer's magnificent Epics, after he had passed his eightieth year.

"The translation of Homer was amongst the latest of Hobbes's works; a signal of retreat from those mathematical contests in which he had spent so much of his time. In 1673 appeared 'The Travels of Ulysses, as they were related by himself in Homer's 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th books of his *Odysses*, to Alcinous, king of Phœnecia,' published by Wm. Crook, in 12mo. . . . In about a year afterwards they were followed by the translation of the entire *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Copies are to be found of various dates; as 1676, 1677, 1684, 1686, and perhaps others: but there were but three editions, the second dated 1677, and the third 1686. . . . It may be fairly looked upon, as the translator has told us in his preface, that it was 'the amusement of his old age.'"

Pope spoke of this version as "too mean for criticism;" Coleridge thought it "as much too ballad-like as the later versions are too epic." G. L. Craik says "there are said to be only two lines in that work in which he is positively poetical:—

'Now Hector met her with her little boy,  
That in the nurse's arms was carried,  
And like a star upon her bosom lay  
His beautiful and shining golden-head.'—*Iliad*, vi.

But there are other passages in which, by dint of mere directness and transparency of style, he has rendered a line or two happily enough." This is scant praise; for our own part, while we thi

it far from poetical, we believe it gives a close approximate rendering of the bard's meaning, though it wants the glow of genius and the gleam of consecrating light which gladden one in poetry. But at eighty a man's fancy is feeble, and his blood chill; the fire has lowered to embers, and the blaze is well-nigh spent. If his verse lacks splendour it possesses clearness; if the lustre of rainbows does not beautify, the bleak dulness of the cloud-drift does not obscure it. There is a sharp, crisp, dry, powerful, epigrammatic imaginativeness in him which not unfrequently merits the name of poetic composition. In this, however, as in all his writings, he sought to make the meaning shine out through his words with the prompt directness of light.

Hobbes, with a few simple direct words, produces a greater impression than would all the swelling pomp of a passage bristling with notes of exclamation. "This is the secret of his style. It is also the characteristic of his speculations. Whatever faults they may have, they have no vagueness, no pretended profundity. As much of the truth as he has clearly seen he clearly exhibits: what he has not seen he does not pretend to see. . . . No writer has succeeded in making language a more perfect exponent of thought than it is as employed by Hobbes. His style is not poetical, nor glowingly eloquent, because his mind is not poetical and the subjects about which he wrote would have had the exaggerations of imaginative or passionate expression, if he had been capable of supplying such. But in the prime qualities of precision and perspicuity, and also in economy and succinctness, in force and in terseness, it is the very perfection of a merely expository style. Without any affectation of point, also, it often shapes itself easily and naturally into the happiest aphoristic and epigrammatic forms. . . . His language is singularly appropriate, so pure that no more than twelve words in his writings have become obsolete." Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham, describes it as,—

"Clear as a beautiful transparent skin,  
Which never hides the blood, yet holds it in;  
Like a delicious stream it ever ran,  
As smooth as woman, but as strong as man."

When about sixty years of age Hobbes had had a slight stroke of palsy, but he was essentially a healthy man, seldom ailed much, and scarcely ever took physic. About the middle of October, 1679, he was seized with an illness which somewhat prostrated him. In November, the Duke of Devonshire, with his whole family, were about to remove from Chatsworth to Hardwicke, and Hobbes, bent on accompanying his patron, insisted on being taken, though on a litter. In his weak state the journey was too much for him. A few days afterwards, paralysis affected his right side. He took little nourishment, slept much, at intervals attempted in vain to speak; gradually, though ministered to with extreme care, life waned away, and on the 4th of December, 1679, when he

wanted but four months of completing his ninety-second year, he died. He was interred in the family burial-place of the Devonshires, in the church near High Hucknall, under a monument of black marble, on which he is called "an honest man, highly renowned at home and abroad for learning."

Dr. Kennet, afterwards Bishop of Peterborough, in his "Memoirs of the Cavendish Family," supplies us with the following glimpse of the daily life of the philosophic retainer of that honourable house:—

"His professed rule of health was to dedicate the morning to his exercise, and the afternoon to his studies. At his first rising, therefore, he walked out and climbed any hill within his reach; or, if the weather was not dry, he fatigued himself within doors by some exercise or other, to be in a sweat. . . . After this he took a comfortable breakfast, and then went round the lodgings to wait upon the earl, the countess, and the children, and any considerable strangers, paying some short addresses to all of them; he kept these rounds till about twelve o'clock, when he had a little dinner provided for him, which he ate always by himself without ceremony. Soon after dinner he retired to his study, and had his candle with ten or twelve pipes of tobacco laid by him; then shutting his door he fell to smoking, and thinking, and writing for several hours."

He at no time read extensively: Homer, Virgil, Thucydides, and Euclid were his favourite authors; and he used to say, "if he had read as much as other men he should have been as ignorant as they."

Hobbes was tall and spare; his forehead was massive, and in old age deeply wrinkled; his hair was of a bright black, till time grizzled it; his eyes were quick and sparkling, and his nose long. His countenance, he tells us, "was not beautiful, but when I am speaking, far from disagreeable!" Charles II. ordered his portrait to be taken by "Samuel Cooper, the Apelles of his age," and the Royal Society possesses a portrait of him by Wm. Dobson, the English Vandyke; these have been reproduced by the engraver, so that the form and visage of the precursor of the sensational school of philosophy have become familiar to most of us as that of a man of extraordinary power; as one who stirred even the age of Cromwell into fierce and wide commotion by the pure vigour of his indomitable thought.

As to general personal character, the morals of Hobbes were pure, his conduct correct, and his habits regular. He appears to have been passionless and cold in disposition, as well as in intellect, but to have held fast his integrity as a thinker most honestly and honourably during that terrible transition time of revolution, when so many swerved into courtiership. In the face of roundhead and cavalier, protector and prince, he avowed his opinions, unperturbed though they were, and that, too, although "he and fear were together," and the nervous sensitiveness of his frame fel

vibrations of his mother's terrors when the Armada stirred the English Channel in the hour of his premature birth.

Our paper has already extended to such a length that we are unable to enter into a criticism of the tenets of the founder of sensationalism. We have few sympathies with his philosophy, but much with the philosopher. His earnestness, thoroughness, explicitness, and laboriousness command our admiration, still more do his unhesitant honesty and straightforwardness. He never sought to render his principles palatable by concealing their ultimate reach and meaning, or dodging the consequences of his doctrines. He pursued his thought inflexibly to its remotest issues, and being clear upon the elements and steps he proclaimed his conclusion, unflinching. He is far more consecutive than Locke, and even plainer in his statements of unpopular ideas than Berkeley, his style is as precise and clear as Hume's, but he exhibits neither the reticence nor the lurking irony of the sceptic, who strove to confine Hobbes and Berkeley alike in the meshes of an uncertainty which would make truth impossible, and philosophy a mere groping in the mist for a glimmer of hope. The criticisms of Hazlitt, Jouffroy, and Dr. James Hutchison Stirling are perhaps the ablest which have appeared in this century. We hope shortly, when we have spoken of Spinoza and Descartes, to lay before our readers an estimate of idealism and sensationalism, the scepticism to which each leads, and the way from either to a nobler truth.

Yet, before we close this sketch of the founder of Psychology, may we not say that, grave as are the defects we believe we perceive in his philosophy, he has high claims to human regard? Amid contention and quarrel, obloquy and slander, equally unmoved by the frowns or the seductions of men in power and office, by the threats of enraged multitudes, or of offended dignitaries, he pursued his thoughts like a free man, and expressed them with a fearless frankness which might have won him greater consideration then, and should gain him much now. Think of a life which extended from the turmoil of the Armada to the peace of Nimeguen; of a man whose education was acquired in Great Eliza's golden time, whose manhood's endeavours were quietly pursued in the days of James Stuart, whose authorship adorned the early years of Charles I., was active through the civil war and the two protectorates, and was busier than ever till within six years of the death of his royal pupil Charles II., with all the crowd of interests this implies; and all the powers of this great mind given to thought—to independent thought and search for the first principles of truth, with few helps, and little else than scorn for his reward. Whatever notion of worth or worthlessness we attach to his ideas, the thinker is an abiding force, a power given to the world to stir it to reflection, to quicken and enlarge the thoughts of men, and to be a pattern of the high indomitable life to which the thinker must devote himself who aims at being a man of mind,—a Truth-Seeker.

## Religion.

### IS THE GOSPEL ADAPTED TO MODERN LIFE?

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

WHEN this discussion was commenced in July, we had an idea that the terms of it were so simple that there could be no mistake about them, and we defined them in their natural sense. Great ingenuity has, however, been employed to twist different significations out of the plain words of the question. Not only so, but a goodly amount of dexterity has been exercised to turn the phrase about so as to assume quite a different aspect from that which it at first sight suggests. So far has this gone that in the case of B. C. R. the topic of discussion has been treated as if it had been "Is Modern life conformed to the precepts of the gospel?" which is a topic of quite a different import. B. C. R. has been trying his hand at a case of logical conversion, and has quite legitimately performed his transference of subject and predicate; but he has forgotten that a logical conversion which may properly enough be employed in a conclusion is not exactly the same in an inquiry. Our categorical assertion, "The Gospel"—(subject) is (*copula*) adapted to modern life (predicate), he has transmuted into Modern life (subject) is (*copula*) adapted to the gospel (predicate)—a very different assertion indeed, equivalent to the assertion of the coincidence and harmony of modern life with the precepts of Christianity.

Ethically F. F. A. denies the adaptation of the gospel to modern life (p. 40) because it does not contain specific precepts concerning the specific forms of sin prevalent in modern life. But the question is not, Do the gospels contain specific precepts against the specific sins of modern life? but do they contain principles deep-rooted enough, and capable of being easily applied to those sins, faults, follies, foibles, and enormities which the human heart yields itself to in modern times. Now "the law of the Lord is perfect." It goes not to the external forms of the offence, but to the internal source of the offence, and purifies *that*, whence are the issues of sin and of death. This is God's perfect cure, and is much superior, to our thinking, than F. F. A.'s much-desired specifics. Take away the root of bitterness out of the spirit, and it will not grow the bitter fruits of sin; take away the wickedness out of the heart, and there cannot thereafter come out of it iniquity and sin. Socially F. F. A. (p. 42) thinks the gospel is not adapted to modern life. Men have got so rich, customs and castes have so altered, circumstances have become so complicated, that the social life of modern times is quite unlike the life of the era in which the gosp

given, and to which it refers. But are men changed?—has human nature been entirely altered, such no person in his senses would affirm. On our part we undertook to show the suitability of the gospel to regulate, improve, develop, and purify modern life, and from this contention of ours we see no good reason for resiling. If men were moved by the spirit of the gospel, if men would follow the precepts of the gospel—if men would fulfil the law of Christ, modern life would be ameliorated, and civilization would be advanced. There is nothing incongruous between the gospel and the possibility of improving modern life. Indeed, to us the gospel seems indispensable to any adequate adjustment of the incongruities in the acts and practices of men. There is no cure for moral maladies such as those under which mankind labours by nature, which is divinely adapted to benefit the soul except the gospel. Philosophy fails and science fails even when tried in their best estate: but, wherever the gospel is adopted in spirit and in truth, it is found to be adapted to bring about the highest moral condition of men.

F. F. A. does not open the debate with frank openness. He uses adapted as “changed so as to suit,” and then argues that, as the principles of the gospel are essentially unchangeable, they are not adapted, nor are they even capable of adaptation to modern life. This is clearly a fallacious conversion of the terms, for which we cannot see any justification. Grate down your most exquisite modern fop of fashion and belle of elegance unimpeachable, till you have reached the core; and you will find that, singular as the exterior may be, the nature, the inner character, is in its elements much the same. If you can get to the heart, you have got to the very essence of the social life of all time; and the gospel expressly aims at and touches and reforms the heart, so that it cannot fail to be adapted to the purification of modern life.

F. F. A. is as far off the mark in regard to political as he is concerning social life and ethics. Politics are the issue of men's desires; purify and ennoble these, and you set politics right. Christian life is the loftiest possible life, and to make life happy is the very essence of politics.

F. F. A. is puzzled that believers in the gospel should desire an outpouring of God's Spirit to cause a revival of the religion of these times. I see no difficulty in this. We believe that the Spirit of God makes the gospel effective on the character, conduct, and life of men. It is not because the gospel is inapplicable, but because, by God's grace, it can be made more effective, that we wish God's presence and aid. This is no argument against the adaptation of the gospel to modern life; it is rather an evidence that the gospel is adapted to all times, as well as calculated to be “a joy for ever.”

A. F. F. thinks that this is an age of such “extreme civilization” (p. 113), that the gospel is not adapted to it. But then he discusses the theme as if it were, “Has modern life adopted the principles of

the gospel"? which we have not affirmed and do not affirm. We maintain, however, that so much of the principles of the gospel as is adopted into modern civilization is adapted to quicken its growth, to increase its purity, and to advance its perfection. It is not our part to apologise for modern life, still less to defend it. It is ours to affirm that the precepts of the gospel are such that they are adapted to any circumstances, that they are the wisdom of God and the power of God in all ages and in all times.

The number of apologies which A. F. F. mentions (p. 114), do not prove that the gospel is not adapted to modern life: they are each evidences of the express adaptation of the gospel to the conditions of the men of the age. They are proofs of the many claims the gospel has on men of any age. They are proofs too, alas, of the hardness of the human heart, of the exceeding desire each age has to escape from the gospel and its divine commands. All life is subject to God's law, however much men may endeavour to escape from its influences; and as the gospel is God's law, written for our learning, it is impossible but that it must be suitable to modern life.

B. C. R. argues that the present war is proof that the gospel is not adapted to modern life (p. 190); but this could only be valid as reasoning if he could prove that the conduct of both parties to the war was right; that their conceptions of the gospel are right; and that they are both regulating their entire lives by the gospel. He does not pretend to do either or any of these. We, on the contrary, contend that if the gospel was adopted as the rule of life, it is adapted to secure peace on earth and goodwill towards men.

His contention, again, regarding the organizations (p. 191) of Christianity and their ineffectiveness, does not hold. If with all these organizations for the spread of Christian civilization men are so prone to sin and so given to iniquity, what would be the condition of men without them and their efforts? That the gospel changes many men is undeniable, that the civilization due to the gospel has greatly ameliorated the state of man and largely improved the appliances of modern life can admit of as little doubt. Compare the civilization of Christendom with that of heathendom even in its palmy days and state, and then you will see that the gospels have been effective in making modern life come nearer to the divine purpose of God in the forming of man, and this is evidence complete that it is adapted to modern life.

"Diamond" is not quite so clear as he should be, and we fear his arguments, however valuable, are not so flawless as they should be, being diamond-set. That modern life is not in harmony with the gospel is not the fault of the gospel, but of the obdurate stubbornness of men's hearts, and the sinfulness of their lives. The effect of the gospel on those who are brought under its influences, shows what an agent of power it would be if universally accepted and acted upon. It has long been matter for lamentation that the preaching of the gospel should be esteemed foolishness; not be



it is unsuitable to change the life of man, but because of the unwillingness of man to accept of it. But that a man does not accept of anything readily and willingly, does not form good evidence that it is unfitted to his case, and inapplicable to his necessities. How often is advice rejected, and even favours flung aside, through the hardness of the hearts of the persons to whom they are proffered, not the unsuitability of that which is offered. Watt's engine was not accepted readily, and yet it was quite adapted to the age; Jenner's vaccination was not adopted willingly, though it was the thing best adapted to produce the desired effect. Non-acceptance is not proof of non-adaptation. This is known in every-day life, and ought to be admitted in regard to the gospel.

Infidelity and secularism—sad facts as they may be—do not impugn the adaptation of the gospel, but the nature of the human heart. G. W. N. affirms that if "the gospels were adapted to this age, they would change faithlessness, sinfulness, doubt, and misbelief" (p. 343). We say if the gospels were adopted by this age they would effect those changes; that is, they are adapted to produce such changes on being used in a proper manner. I cannot doubt that the wisdom of God is such that it can make the gospel effective in any age. I cannot but believe that His gospel is intended to act upon the whole course of the ages of the world. I am unable to comprehend how men can decry or deny the adaptation of the gospel to the present age, without their involving themselves in doubt as to the divinity of its inspiration and the truth of its revelations; and I cannot but think that those who have had the good seed of the word of God sown in their hearts, will confess and feel the adaptation of its precepts to all life. I scarcely believed, when the discussion began, that the question would bear debate. I now perceive that many misconceptions hang around the question. This debate will, I hope, put many of these misconceptions to rest: and when they are set aside by honest thought and fair reasoning, I should think that no one will assert the incompetency of the gospel to be profitable for all things, as "having the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come." A. A.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

It is not the duty of the writers on the negative to point out the cause of this failure of the gospel to exert a healing and hallowing influence upon life; we have, in this particular question, to point out, however much we may regret, the proofs of the fact. It is not enough either for the writers on the affirmative to quote, as S. S. does, the statements of the gospels themselves in regard to their quickening and reforming capabilities and influences. It is not a question of capability but of actual operation, and S. S. cannot surely look upon society, either at home, in public places, or even in church, and affirm candidly that the gospel has made itself influential over it.

Here is a notice of life, even in churches, which however true is

sufficiently melancholy, and is, we fear, only a great deal too accurately drawn:—

“If a man perform the common social obligations of his station, he is considered a religious man; for the world only looks to the outward development of the inward life, and at first sight it seems proper that it should do so, seeing that actions are all that men have to deal with practically,—that motives are beyond them. But it is found afterwards that the truth and healthfulness of the religious feeling from which they spring is of the nearest importance to us. . . . Our practical religion has degenerated. It has become a pure matter of cash, to be discharged by delegation; and a man is pious as his purse is light or heavy. He rides to town daintily; he returns daintily to his costly, luxurious home; and once a year collectors call for his annual subscriptions, which his cashier pays, and a debit in his ledger ends it all. In this is no active principle; no self-denial is employed; it has no effect on his comforts and superfluities, never breaks the sleek ripple that plays over the surface of his sluggish life, but is altogether a matter of figures. But alas! in sad truth, so spiritually dead are we that such a cold formality of charity passes current for genuine religion among us; until to speak of a good, charitable religious man, means merely that out of his abundance he gives a little; that he pays deputies to perform all his duties. . . . We are Christians now by machinery; we have a clock of dexterous workmanship, which, if only regularly wound up with its golden key, will chime for us all our Christian duties regularly enough, alarming no man with too earnest striking. Let a man pay pew-rents and a few annual benevolent subscriptions, and he may fold his hands comfortably without one distracting care, in sure knowledge that there is something to pray for him, to do good for him. Money having been seen to be God now, as is natural, money wins heaven; and he who has only cash sufficient to pay the tolls, will find the straight, narrow, upward road (macadamised since the time of Christ by modern progress), as easy travelling as the broad, open, downward one. . . . Cash they will give you, cold sympathy they will give, but action, even of the least onerous kind, self-denial even the most meagre, cannot be extorted from them. They have folded themselves in their mantles, and with their eyes within, have no care for anything abroad; they wish to run smoothly on in the sleek routine of voluptuous *laissez-faire* existence, and rather than be dragged into a rougher, manlier life, will consent—to contribute cash.”\*

This is the social aspect of church life, and charity feeling is equally overdone by associative mechanism. It is altogether too much done on the limited liability system to touch or interest. It comes coldly from the pocket, and it goes coldly to the heart. It is not the sort of “giving” which is “twice blessed.” Grudgingly bestowed it is thanklessly accepted, and it works with the usual mercilessness of machinery. Machinery makes very good average work, and wherever the same sort of stuff is to be worked into the same sort of article, it is beneficially and economically employed; but where individuality is concerned, not only as the stuff but the product, it is quite unsuitable. Is it not evident to any one who

\* “Social Aspects,” by John Stores Smith, chap. 17.

looks at the charities of London and our great cities, that they are not the issue of a good Samaritan personal charity, and that they do not result in the personal imitation of "Him who went about continually doing good." We have become so wise that we cannot feel the personal appeal of the gospel, and so enamoured of machinery that we cannot engage in the personal duties of religion. Men would take to doing the salvation of their souls by proxy even in the face of the command, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling;" and this surely is evidence that the gospel is not adapted to modern life.

Anglican Protestantism, whether nonconformist or conformist, is well-known by all observing minds to be dead to the intense self-sacrificing and sin-forsaking faith which beat in the hearts of the men of old; dead to the earnest love of the doctrines which were received as those which had been once delivered to the saints; dead to all the diviner charities of human life, and all the holier aspirations of following Christ which ought to animate the professed disciples of the gospel faith. It is well known that there is in the churches very little of that contentment with poverty and humility of social position which distinguished many of the saints of the ancient churches. It is the reproach of our churches that wealth-worship abounds, is rampant even to repugnancy in all sections of the Christian community. He who pays best is honoured most, and the homage paid to gold supersedes many of the laws of God. As at once an illustration and a proof of what we state, we quote from the *Oswestry Advertiser*, only giving the extract from the epistle of St. James ii. 1-4, which is referred to; "My brethren, have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect to persons. For if there come into your assembly a man with a gold ring, in goodly apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile raiment, and ye have respect to him that weareth the gay clothing, and say unto him, Sit thou here in a good place; and say to the poor, Stand thou there, or sit here under my footstool; are ye not then partial in yourselves, and are become judges of evil thoughts?" To this proof that St. James taught consistently that to the poor is the gospel preached, we now subjoin the following contrast:—

"The Bishop of St. Asaph is striking out a new path for himself. It has been customary for bishops at any rate to show outward respect to the apostles whom they profess to succeed; but Dr. Hughes has different opinions, and expresses them. We know what St. James thinks and says of the treatment of rich and poor in God's house. *He* believes that all distinctions should vanish there, and that inside the house, at least, the followers of Christ should not esteem themselves greater and better than their Master, by refusing to mix, as He mixed, with all ranks and classes of men. But St. James lived a very long while ago, and Dr. Hughes agrees with Mr. J. P. Robinson, of whom Lowell tells us, that—

John P.

Robinson, he

Saz they didn't know everythin' down in Judee.

And therefore the Bishop writes in this way to Mr. Gregson Fell, of Llangollen, who has been in communication with his Lordship respecting allotted pews *versus* free and open churches :—

‘If any inhabitant of Llangollen who is entitled to a seat in the parish church should apply to the churchwardens to have a seat assigned to him, and if there is a vacant pew, the churchwardens are in duty bound to assign the seat to the applicant, *having regard to his station and condition in the parish. If any other person of a higher standing has a worse seat, the churchwardens should assign him the better pew, and give to the applicant the one then vacated.*’

The italics are our own, and the words are certainly remarkable enough to deserve conspicuous type.”

Of course there is a ready excuse for *the Bishop*, that he wrote not as an interpreter of the Scriptures but of the law. That is good so far for him; but what excuse is there for the law in an age in which, as our opponents aver, the gospel is adapted to modern life? Such facts give the reply to R. M.’s two questions, p. 265, and go to prove that in the eye of the law and its priestly administrator, civilization has rendered the gospel unnecessary, and that if modern society adopted the gospel it would have to renounce some of the benefits of civilization. S. S. quotes many passages of Scripture to show that if they were adopted as the rule of life, society would be greatly improved, be, indeed, all right. That they have not been adopted proves that they are not adapted. We might reverse the argument of S. S., and say society is honest, pure, free from crime, for its laws are all of such a nature as to oppose and destroy these; but would that argument be valid unless we showed that the law produced these results? In the same manner, unless S. S. could show that the Scriptures have produced in modern life the changes he says they are adapted to do, he has failed to prove that they are adapted to modern life.

R. F. T.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

It would show very little confidence in the arguments which have been brought forward by our coadjutors were we to prolong this debate at its close. A. A. F. most trenchantly attacks the opposition with invaluable weapons. B. C. R. saves me from the need of replying much to A. A. “Diamond,” though slightly differing from us, gives good reason for advocating the negative; and Georgius D. E. strikes a hard blow, though from a somewhat different standpoint. Hence we have very few remarks to make, and therefore brief let us be.

A. A. in the opening paragraph of his paper assumes with perfect complacency that by the gospel the Scriptures are meant; and his paper implies that the gospel and the Word of God are not only co-extensive but co-inclusive; this is by no means the case. When the passages which A. A. so innocently quotes from St. Paul were written, not one of the four gospels had been composed. The Acts

of the Apostles were only in the course of being gone through. It is probable that St. Paul's Epistle to the Thessalonians (written shortly after he had preached to them) was the earliest portion of the New Testament. So that the gospels spoken of in the passages quoted were not the New Testament as we have it; nor were they the Old Testament either, for the Old Testament is not the gospel of Jesus Christ, but only the precursor of the revelation of Him. A. A. is misled by the fallacy of names. We now call the Scriptures or the gospel the Word of God, and he fancies that they who used this term in the old time meant the same thing as we by these words. This is a mistake, and all that A. A. founds upon this fallacy is equally erroneous. We accepted the supposition that the Bible was meant, but we are bound now to show the fallacy of such a supposition, when reference is made to passages of Scripture as an argument for its own utility, as has been done by S.S. in his contribution to this debate.

"We have got beyond the Bible," many say. They disbelieve its statements and its stories; they have applied criticism to its facts, and tested its averments by science; they have found mistakes in its numbers, contradictions in its contents, and impossibilities recorded in it as the staple of its instructions. It claims to be the work of a Divine author, and yet inspiration has not freed it from dogmatic error; and basing, as it does, its trustworthiness upon miracles, which are known to be contradictions, we cannot accept its doctrines as adapted to our times. Such expressions as these are to be heard from not a few in these times, and speakers of this sort will gravely wag their heads and say, No, no, sir; we have got past that; the Bible is behind our age. These, it is affirmed, are times of science and progress, when the spirit of inquiry has established itself among all classes, and nothing is taken for granted as it used to be. In Italy, at the opening of the Ecumenical Council, a demonstration was made in honour of Savonarola, and banners were carried on which this inscription was written, "Science, the only religion of the Future," and it is well known that the leading men in the conducting of the Sunday Lectures for the People hold a creed which is briefly expressed in the sentence quoted from that banner with its strange device.

The powerlessness of the gospel to touch, move, influence, and improve the life of our age is admitted on all hands. The Bishop of Manchester deplores the analogy between the pleasures pursued in the capital of his diocese and those which disgrace Paris; the Bishop of Peterborough laments the decay not only of religious faith or of godliness of life, but even of outward decorum and decency in the private life of the respectable and aristocratic circles. Church Congresses are engaged in discussing the means of dislodging the practical and theoretical godlessness of the age; Social Science Associations have been consulting how to bring the practice and the duties of life more into vogue; Congregational Unions have been engaged in conferring concerning the revival of the

religious life of the churches; Presbyteries and Synods have canvassed the growing immorality of the period; Baptist Unions have consulted about the means of bringing the gospel message more effectively home to the heart and conscience; Methodist Agencies have been invoked for the promotion of piety; Young Men's Christian Associations have been striving to arrest the tide of irreligion and unrighteousness. Sabbath School conferences have been lamenting the small hold taken upon the spirit by the instructions given to children; and men have long and seriously bewailed the education of the streets, the beer-shop, the skittle-alley, the singing saloon, the dancing platform, and the racecourse. Then what a witness against our so-called gospel civilization is borne by the reports of the working of the gang system in agricultural districts; of the factory system in manufacturing localities, and of the truck system in mining places. To this, if we add the observations each one is able to make for himself on drunkenness, family and personal purity, commercial dishonesty, and Sabbath-breaking, as well as the records of the daily papers of crime, detected and undetected, of social iniquities abounding, and the revelations of all the various courts in which misdemeanours, felonies, offences, &c., are adjudicated on, what a terrible sum of proof arises that, from some cause or other, the gospel has not been and indeed is not adapted to modern life.

It must be observed that in this debate the opponents of the affirmative may be either firm believers who long for and desire some strong adapting influence of the Holy Spirit to bring men to Jesus; they may be misbelievers who regard Christianity as one of the possible forms which religion may assume, or they may be unbelievers who doubt the gospel records altogether. But, besides these, there may be those, of whom I am, who believe that a better and brighter era is about to dawn on humanity, when the gospel, freed from all the elements of unreason in it, shall exert its due influence on all minds as the teacher of high moral truths certainly divine. Just because we hope some affirm that the gospel is not *now*, though it may be hereafter, adapted to become effective upon modern life.

F. F. A.

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## UGHT THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES TO BE REVISED BY A ROYAL COM- MISSION?

### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THE argument frequently rested on by the antagonists of revision, namely, that any such re-translation would lessen the regard paid to the Scriptures by the people, and destroy the reverence for the text of the Bible, along with the habit of reposing in its statements, s, in my opinion, just one of those which tell most strongly in avour of the opposed undertaking. The great bulk of church goers

are mere traditionalists. They have got into the idea that "all scripture is given by inspiration of God." They interpret this to mean every phrase and verse of Scripture, one equally with another. They are further fortified in this opinion by the habit of the clergy in almost invariably choosing one sentiment or verse as the text of their sermonizings. So people get hold of a verse which seems to them to inculcate or forbid some certain thing, and they quote these texts like proverbs, or legal decisions, or aphorisms from an oracle superior to that at Delphi. They lose (if they ever had) the idea of the unity and continuity of Scripture, and they become bibliolaters, text-quoters, and babblers about "to the law and to the testimony, if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no truth in them." In this adherence to the dead letter they lose the living spirit of the gospel.

It could scarcely be meant by our opponents that bibliolatriy is a virtue; for such an idea would be absurd. If we are not to be bibliolatrous, would it not be a great benefit to have our old notions put authoritatively to rout, and to get our verse-quoters given a quietus to? Of course, some of these would not be put down from their high-falutin position, even by a Royal Commission; but many would be kept from putting their confidence in isolated texts, if, by a translation which had received the sanction of a Royal Commission, the phrases on which they perilled their opinion were shown to read to a different conclusion; at any rate, it would surely be a great gain if the associations which have crystallized into these opinions were broken up and shown to be erroneous. Indeed, one of the great advantages of a revision would be this breaking up of old erroneous associations and ideas, and the resolving of many mistakes by the simplification of the rendering; while the advantage of such a translation, having the sanction of a Royal Commission, would be to put to flight the egotistic self-asserting confidentiality which many use concerning the doctrines, or rather dogmas, which they found on the mere verbal turn of the Authorized Version. Multiplicity of view would show them their error, and authoritative scholarship would demolish their confidence.

It is said, with a great appearance of considerateness, that there are now so many aids to Scripture study, that there is no need for a revision of the Bible. So we are to surround ourselves, when we desire to know the truth of God for the health of our spirits, with Bible Dictionaries and Cyclopædias, Concordances and Lexicons, Geographies and Atlases, Commentaries and Expositions, Annotated and Paragraph Bibles, Guides to Scripture Knowledge, Bible Word-books, Keys to Scripture History, Treasuries of Biblical Information, and all the array of scholastic theologians, in order that we may learn the meaning of that word, which is spoken of as being so plain that he who runs may read, and reading may understand. This is a preposterous idea. It would limit Scripture reading to a very select class, those who had wealth, leisure, culture, and patience; while a distinguishing feature of the Scriptures is that "to

the poor the gospel is preached." It is quite evident that our opponents do not mean what they say in this matter, that they find themselves in a difficulty, and that they are merely using this argument as a defence to cover their retreat and defeat; for if all these things are necessary to the comprehension of the present version of the Scriptures, no greater evidence could be given of the necessity of a revision of an authoritative nature, such as could be accomplished by a Royal Commission, and that only.

After all, this question of a Royal Commission is the most important matter in dispute. Few advocates for holding tenaciously to the present version are quite against emendation. Even S. S. consents to a small amount of revision. One argument strikes us in favour of a revision, which as it has not been previously touched upon, I may note here; the present Authorized Version was revised by a body of men such as would in our day be regarded as a Royal Commission; and it would, perhaps, be unfair to lay aside the present one, to adopt any one issued on authority less worthy of reliance. It would be difficult to convince people that the one proffered was as trustworthy as the one to be supplanted, unless it had attestors of equal eminence, collectively and individually, and as thoroughly guaranteed as those who had been engaged in giving the former one. It is very well known that in the present condition of public opinion, such a Royal Commission would be formed on broad and liberal principles, and would pursue its labours so as to ensure public confidence. It would contain all our ripest scholars and all our best theologians, and it is most probable that the final revision would be undertaken in public, while it is presumed that the version would not really take effect until the matter had been reported to Parliament, and had been subjected to full consideration by the representatives of the people.

Negative article 1 is anonymous, either intentionally or accidentally. It contains a good many excellent and able remarks, in several of which we heartily concur. The writer takes a course of argument which is somewhat unusual, and he states it with force. We mean his idea about the prevalence of the present authorized version in many countries. But a large proportion of the force of this argument in this particular question is taken away by the consideration that India, Africa, China, the insular territories of the Southern Seas, &c., owe their supplies of the Scriptures to England. Oxford and Cambridge, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Dublin Bibles; Bibles issued by the British and Foreign Bible Society, the Religious Tract Society, &c., are those which are used in these regions. So that, when this is taken into account, the difficulty brought forward in Negative article 1 resolves itself into this—Would the United States of America be likely to adopt a version of the Scriptures got up under a Royal Commission in Great Britain. I think they would, I think their critics would examine the work done with care and keen scrutiny; but I think also they would be likely to find the work so well done, that the churches of America would



accept the work with gladness and singleness of heart. But even though there were a Royal Commission appointed here, it might be empowered to consult with, and even to labour with, a commission appointed by the Government of the United States.

The objection made about unsettling the faith of the pure and fervent but simple believer in the present version as God's word, God's testimony, God's oracles; the word of truth, the word of salvation, appears to me of no material force. Such believers accept the present translation on the authority of the translators in the reign of James I. They cannot surely refuse to accept a version done by the best scholars in the days of Victoria, when the whole progress of the work would be subject to the criticisms of all scholars and all churches.

That it would be a triumph to scepticism I am unable to see any grounds for believing. It could not be affirmed that the translation proposed had altered any textual affirmation without good ground in the original, and hence there could be no accusation of ulterior views. I am, besides, of opinion that the authority and the influence of the Commission would be such as to place them above suspicion. This being admitted, what a benefit it would be to the unlearned sceptic, who has hitherto been withheld from giving his adhesion to Christianity on account of defects in the translation, to have these removed, and the rough places of the word made plain to him.

On all accounts I think we ought to have a revision of the Scriptures undertaken and completed by a Royal Commission, R. W.

#### NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THE advocates and opponents of a retranslation of the Scriptures have much to plead on behalf of their respective views of the question, but we think the balance of the weight of argument leans to the side of the opponents of any revision which could be made by a Royal Commission. Sincere believers in revelation do not require a revised translation to support or sustain their faith; and sceptics are not very likely to be satisfied with any revision which did not materially add to their confidence in their scepticism; hence for an uncertain and precarious good we ought not to rush hastily into certain and clearly foreseen evils. This objection covers the whole ground of the question as raised by H. K. in his long and rambling paper, which retails objections to the present version which have been so often repeated that they have become stale as ditch water; and we bring it forward here, not because we think it concerns the question we have got to discuss, but that it rebuts an elaborate argument which H. K. prolongs into tediousness.

One of the great arguments on the general subject, insisted on with great reiteration by the opponents of the present version of the Scriptures, is that a revision would render the text clearer by the use of modern phraseology and a nearer likeness to the literature of our day, especially by the avoiding of obsolete expressions. We

can admit that there are a few mistranslations in the present version, but we would ask if any possible version of any book whatever—least of all of the Scriptures—can be accomplished without what will be called or regarded as mistranslations? Look for a parallel to the translations of Homer, Horace, Virgil, Dante, Goethe, which issue in multitudes almost monthly. Is it probable that if men cannot rest satisfied with the best versions of the best men in regard to those books which refer only to fiction and matters of taste, they will acquiesce in a revised version of the Scriptures, which are held to be (or to contain) the word of eternal life. Would it be worth while to unbinge and unsettle all our literature; to destroy all the associations of time and circumstance; to arouse a jealousy of the ignorant against the acceptance of a new Bible, that a few unimportant phrases should be amended, any of which can be corrected in a word by a preacher, or shown by a simple collation of passages to be capable of being understood easily when Scripture is made its own interpreter? Would it be worth while to translate *pedagogue* as “guardian slave,” instead of *schoolmaster* (Gal. iii. 24); *deputy*, Acts xiii. 7, “proconsul;” *vile person*, Isa. xxxii. 5, as “sneaking man,” or to use “skip-offering” for *passover*?

It may be safely affirmed that of no possible version can there ever again be such a general acceptance, in none so common an acquiescence; for mere sectarian feelings, interests, hatreds, and disunions would hinder agreement, however perfect a textual revision might have been given, however exact and graceful a translation might have been attained. But all these elements of discord would be embittered were a Royal Commission to effect the revision. Voluntaries would argue against the right of the State to interfere with religion; one sect would refuse to be overridden by a majority in a matter involving conscience and faith; another would suspect bad faith in the choice of revisers, and still another would quarrel—as S. S. does—about the personal orthodoxy of individuals; politics would offend one sect, the wiping away of cant phrases on which favourite doctrines were defended or advanced would alienate another; while others would hold aloof because they had not been consulted with sufficient honour, or recognised with enough of suavity. Look at the Nonconformists, with their innumerable hymn-books, and hymn-book discussions and dissensions, and take that as a slight specimen of the confusion worse confounded which would arise when churches and sects debated—which Bible? the old or the new?

Without disparagement to the *rationale* of the question itself, I must note that the present agitation of the subject is in reality due to the disciples of the German neology, and was commenced in this country by the writers in the *Westminster Review*.—writers who treat the Pentateuch as an old wife's fable, full of Jewish nonsense and unbelievable incidents. It is not a little curious, and surely deserving of note, that such an agitation should have

been begun by such parties. It is not likely that they did that to secure greater aid to themselves in their struggles against scepticism, or to increase the faith of others in that which they doubted. A version which would satisfy the conditions of orthodox belief would not gratify them; but is it not probable that they calculate on the unsettlement of the churches which would result from such a revision, whether it were licensed and enforced, or left free to discussion and consideration? The great mass of those who have no doubts would be disturbed, they would be accused of forsaking their previous entrenchments, all the differences between the new and the old would be made so many grounds of sneers against those who could swallow such a version, and found not only their teaching and their preaching, but even their creeds, on such a crude basis.

We have been reminded in this debate of the practice of preachers criticising the received text, proposing amendments, and arguing on these substitutions; and as far as the people are concerned they might be suppositions, as if they were not only improved versions of their text, but as if they had been approved by critics. This, it is argued, is disastrous to the faith of the people, and shows that a revised and retranslated Bible is required as a protection of the people from this hacking and hewing, this tinkering and patching of the present version. But if this is disadvantageous, as our opponents argue, would not an increase of the evil aggravate the malady? Would not the old version always be liable to be brought up for comparison with the new? and would not the difficulty be enormously increased if we required to keep two Bibles, if not before ourselves, before our mind's eye? Moreover, would or could this artifice of rhetoric be given up by the expositors of the Scriptures? Some to show scholarship, others to elucidate the topic, others for the sake of attaining attention to a discussion of the questions involved, would still refer to the original, quote and criticize it, compare it with the versions old and new, and in all probability would make confusion worse confounded.

It should be recollected that we have all sorts of Bible helps for the elucidation of Bible difficulties; that any one in the least difficulty in regard to a point of doctrine and practice can have access to these sources in public libraries, church libraries, or in the libraries of their pastors. Besides, we have annotated Bibles, Bibles with commentaries, Bible cyclopædias, &c., which give every explanation that can reasonably be desired. The Bible has been critically sifted over and over again; the difficulties have been considered and treated of in regard to the present version, and if we were to have a revised translation, not only would all the Bibles, concordances, &c., at present in use and in stock be rendered useless, but almost all this literature would be rendered to a great extent worthless by the changes wrought in the new version. Everybody knows how hard it is to verify quotations which have been modernized or "improved;" how great would be the hardship

of having all our Scripture references in all sermons and theological works deranged! What a cost would the sacrifice of property, labour, and intellectual research involve—leaving all the upsetting of faith out of calculation! Are we prepared, for a few trivial hardships in comprehending the present version, to run such risks? Surely no!

Besides, let us consider what a battle of the books there would be! We should have the discussion of the authorship of the books, their canonicity, genuineness, and authenticity set loose upon the nation; the *Apocrypha* controversy, now for a longtime abandoned, reopened; the adoption of a text to be determined, the value of *varia lectiones* to be debated, each sect would hold to those readings which favoured its dogmas; and then the style of English to be adopted requires consideration,—Elizabethan, Augustan, Victorian? Each discussion would most probably result in a defeated minority, and all these minorities being set in opposition would most effectually destroy the unanimity of its reception.

Here comes in now our argument against a revision by a royal commission; either it would decide peremptorily upon what was to be the revised form in which the Bible would appear, or it would not. If it did not, we should be in no better case than we are now, for it would not gain universal acceptance any more than any of the other versions which have of recent years appeared. If it did, it would be a spiritual tyranny exercised by the State over the Church, which would not be submitted to by Nonconformists, and so again it would be an ineffectual step.

"Aspirate" thinks he has settled this question by his reference to the previous translation of 1611 (p. 256), but he has very imperfectly estimated the difference between the times of Elizabeth and those of Victoria on religious topics—especially the opinions entertained now-a-days by the people on the province of Government. Nor has he seen how little would be gained by getting a revised Bible for England which would not be the accepted Bible of all Christendom wherever the English language is spoken.

A Royal Commission is a dangerous form for getting Scripture questions settled. Indeed, royal commissions have become proverbial of late for incompetence in execution and latitudinarianism in suggestion. To be effective it would require to consist of known theologians. All known theologians are men who have taken up positions in their several sects, and who are more or less committed to particular views on this and similar matters. They could not bring an unbiassed mind or a free spirit to the consideration of such a subject; the dead weight of the past and its traditions would hang heavy on their consciences and hearts, while public opinion would court impartiality and recreancy, and thus the whole matter would be prejudiced. I do not think we can have an acceptable revision of the Scriptures done by a royal commission. M. N.

## 436 OUGHT THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO BE DISCONTINUED?

### Social Economy.

## DOUGHT THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TO BE DISCONTINUED?

### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

THE growth of great principles is slow. This is consistent with their nature, for their gravity and influence demand consideration, and it would show a very small appreciation of their importance if it were otherwise. They cannot be comprehended at one effort, but are the results of long meditation and anxious inquiry. The stages of their development are as well marked and recognised as those of the most ordinary natural phenomenon.

The question now under consideration has attained to that position which calls for the earnest attention of every one who is solicitous of the welfare of mankind. And, beyond this, our attention should be more firmly fixed, when men, on seriously discussing the question, arrive at such gloomy conclusions as those which are presented by contributors on the opposite side. Undoubtedly it falls to the lot of some to picture a disastrous future, when great subjects, similar to the present are debated. But it must not be forgotten that pictures of what may be are not arguments, and that, like all things else, they have a limit. Indeed, here, to shake the grounds of such forebodings, the question might be asked: what great changes in society, which have been cautiously and gradually accomplished, have given rise to anything but what has, on the whole, been beneficial? And while admitting the vast alteration which this reform will effect in society, it does not appear that it will be injurious to the body politic. The question is treated too exclusively as a women's question. It is by no means so; although legislation may apply to women more particularly; yet it is not at all confined to them. For, however far they may be removed in one direction or another from their present position in society, their sex, as a constituent, cannot be affected without influencing the remaining constituent. And this question is argued as if a sudden revolution will be the consequence of any alteration in the situation of women. But no such circumstance will happen. Women will not immediately embrace the changes which are offered to them. They will require the same period of time to thoroughly understand the changes as men will to prepare for their effects.

That women are subjected, or rather—to soften a phrase which is

certainly harsh—that something is wrong in the constitution of society, is almost implied when it is admitted that any alteration in the position of women will create a crisis. To bring this about, women must have capabilities to comprehend and enjoy what is novel in their situation. But this capacity exists under the old *régime*, and therefore proves the injustice of withholding from them privileges which they are able to exercise. If women are by their education and training unfitted to appreciate these privileges, and if it is feared that the removal of restrictions will give rise to all manner of evils, it must be remembered that men have still the upper hand, and that it is their office rather to guide the newly acquired powers than to grow jealous of female ascendancy, and to be alarmed at its portended existence.

Again, also, the fear that women will successfully compete with men, when they are admitted into those spheres of action which have hitherto been almost entirely confined to men, is a powerful argument to support the justice of women's claims. Although the case requires no such strengthening, yet one of the reasons adduced to prove that women should be retained in their present position, forms a strong reason that the change now proposed should be made. And if, as it is said, women, generally, are incapable of executing the higher functions of life, it is useless to adhere to laws and customs which prevent them from doing that which they cannot do. But no such thing is the case. Nature may declare that they are the "weaker vessels," but it does not indicate that they are unable to do those duties which they, as a rule, have never attempted. It cannot be denied that some women have performed creditably what has lain out of the ordinary course of women's work. And in all our great political and social changes, fears have been entertained that the many could not, or would not, exercise those privileges which the few were rightly enjoying. These fears have never been realized. In the present instance, therefore, by proper training and culture, the majority of women would acquaint themselves in a manner which would cause no regret that their claims had been recognised.

Women, so it appears, have less interest in the comforts and pleasures of life than men. We are told of the immediate decay of social happiness if women are allowed to enter into politics, or are allowed the use of those rights which belong to them. They will lose their lovingness, their gentleness, their tenderness. All those peculiar charms which women possess will vanish. Women will, in fact, be entirely transformed. But it may be asked, where and how are they to meet with influences which are to effect their degeneracy? Surely those qualities need not be eradicated by enjoying any kind of electoral franchises, by possessing property which no one can lawfully take from them, or by employing their time in deeper studies than have hitherto been their wont, to fit them for higher functions in life. Surely the natural affections and endearments are not so slender as to be unable to stand the extra tension which these

pursuits may impose; and if they gave way, women would suffer equally with men, and the old positions are not irretrievable.

Moreover, women will not be compelled to undertake duties which they may object to perform. Persons, as a rule, are capable of comprehending that for which they are most suitable. In the new order of things women will find their level; there must be free trade in labour, and no arbitrary endeavours to fix values, but by intrinsic merit of individuals, male or female. It is unfair to say that women are unable to do work which they have not been trained to do. It is also impossible to estimate the relative value of the sexes in the position they are in at present. For years of labour and experience must overbalance the attainments of a novice.

It is said that, as the case now stands, legislation will benefit the few. It is said also, that women, as a class, are not anxious for change, and that it is only a small number of strong-minded women who are agitating; but how this conclusion is arrived at we cannot tell. A little attention would perhaps have altered it. Glancing at the previous agitations which have any similarity, it would be found that it is not usually the claimants of privileges who first commence the movement for their attainment. The force has been from without. And, again, the position of women shows why no general interest is apparently taken by them in their claims; their subjection proves it; they have no organ wherewith to move public opinion, and they, as a body, are little accustomed to the means of making their wishes heard, with which, it is one of the objects of the present movement to make them acquainted.

The magnitude of the reform does not weaken the justice of the claims of women. Nor ought its novelty to be allowed to warp the judgment. And if women are incapable of entering at once upon the new position, it may safely be affirmed that those qualities which are the characteristics of womanliness, patience, endurance, forbearance, will be of inestimable value to themselves and to others, when they are so far advanced as to enjoy the alteration.

C. F. A. S.

#### AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THAT the position of women is not satisfactory may be taken for granted. Why is it so? is in all probability the most important topic of our times. The social and political dependence of women, or, as Mr. Mill puts it in emphatic phrase, "the subjection of women," is held to be largely the cause. It has been asked, Ought this subjection to continue? And the answer given has been a considerably decided No, from women of all ranks, and men of many shades of opinion—even good Mr. Punch, who takes care to laugh always on the winning side, having come over to the side of the advocates of the extension of female rights, privileges, and reforms, at least, as the following quotation shows, he may be said to have learned the alphabet of the advocacy of woman's cause:—

NEW EDITION OF A NURSERY RHYME.

*Revised and adapted to the present time.*

- A—Lady Amberley—well can she speak.
- B—is Miss Becker—the head of the clique.
- C—is Miss Cobbe—who wrote “Broken Lights,”
- D—Miss Davis—supports Educational Rights.
- E—is Miss Estlin—who works on Committee,
- F—Mrs. Fawcett—both learned and witty.
- G—is Miss Garratt—of medical fame,
- H—is Miss Hill—the “Poor Board” knows her name.
- J—Miss Jex Blake—follows in Miss G.’s line,
- K—is Mrs. King—who braved prison and fine.
- M—is Harriet Martineau—of experience ripe,
- N—is Florence Nightingale—whom to praise all men write.
- P—is Miss Pechey—the “Hope Scholarship” who gained,
- Q—ueer that the University gave her nought for her pains!
- R—is Miss Rye—who fears no ill wind,
- T—Miss Helen Tylour—few such speakers you will find.
- V—is the Victory whence these ladies’ efforts tend,
- W—is Miss Wolstenholme—the “Married Women’s” friend.
- X—the unknown Number of Friends to the cause,
- Z—are the Zanies who make all unjust laws.

I shall best fulfil the duty of respondent in this debate by limiting myself strictly to reply; not by—as is too often done—importing new matter into the material argument.

T. F. M. begins very *brusquely*. He evidently supposes that ridicule is the test of truth. I need only remark that the most sacred things have been exposed to the largest amount of ridicule but that they are sacred notwithstanding that. To show that he is mistaken, or that, if he is not, then his appeal to Scripture and St. Paul is irreverent, because capable of being ridiculed, Jesus took upon Himself no marital responsibilities, and did not seem to think that marriage was the ultimatum of either sex. St. Paul was a misogynist, and a bachelor who did not do his part towards the reduction of the difficulties of “marriage” solution of the woman’s question. He did indeed admit that in certain cases it was “better to marry,” but his general opinion was that while those who marry do well, those who refrain from marriage do better. St. Paul on marriage and the subjection of women should not, we think, much serve T. F. M. in this debate. His belief that universal custom is on the side of subjection is equally easily dealt with, unless he can show that all that is customary, all that is old, all that is acquiesced in, is right; in which case nothing would ever be altered, and nothing at all improved.

He asserts (p. 29) that “the subjection of woman has been universal.” Is he quite sure of this? Is it not a fact that *polyandry*, or women having many husbands, can be traced over half the globe? This fact counterbalances our Salic law of female subje-



tion. Besides, has T. F. M. considered that if his doctrines of the subjection of women was fully carried out it could only end as it has done in barbarous countries, and as it constantly tends to do in those where it is a doctrine or a custom, to promiscuousness of intercourse, and thereafter to female infanticide? Mormon polygamy is only a sort of licensed form of promiscuousness arising from the idea of the subjection of women; and we know that *polygamy*, in a less legalized manner, prevails in some countries where the subjection of women is kept most rigorously.

The argument (on p. 29) regarding "functions," if the term be translated into duties and requirements, is equally available against men as against women. In fact, the average of incompetency for duty is far larger in men than in women; this arises from the greater morality of females than of males. "In a world of work, thought, competition, and keen encounter," one would expect, on T. F. M.'s principles, to see men models of temperance, chastity, prudence, and industry; but we do not; women's disabilities are, therefore, not a proper buttress to the arguments he uses against the free rivalry of women with men.

If the husband is, as T. F. M. says, the income-producer, the *house-band* (p. 29), why is it that in the upper and middle ranks rich wives are so diligently sought? and why is it that the dower of daughters is a matter of so much care, anxiety, and consideration? Is it not one of the evils of the subjection of women that, being disabled from doing anything for their own support, they require to be dependent on their male relatives to supply them with a dowry,—that is, a bribe to induce a husband to take them? This of the higher ranks. In the lower, is it not too often the case that women require to work for the support of themselves and their families, often, too, for the support of the profligacy of their nominal husbands?—ay, even to the extent of personal demoralization, for their support? We contend that neither in upper nor lower society should women be subject to such treatment at the hands of men.

But T. F. M. thinks women should value this subjection (p. 30); a subjection which makes them the prey of fortune-hunters and marriage-gamblers, of ruffian rascals and cowardly knaves, which cuts off the right hand of independence that it may secure to them the allowed use of the left hand of dependence, when chance, opportunity, and good luck combine to make it possible. Does this need refutation?

But it seems, moreover, that this subjection is the safeguard of women (p. 31). Would you believe that such things could be affirmed? that it could be asserted that dependence on others was a greater safeguard and a more trustworthy resource than independence and power, will and opportunity to help one's self? But then T. F. M. destroys his own argument most wondrously in the very paragraph devoted to the proof of his assertion, by showing that this dependence which is woman's safeguard induces men to

offer, and women to accept, of sexual relationships unsanctioned and unprotected by marriage ties.

T. E. M. objects to "the competition of female against male labour" (p. 32); that is, he holds that the male sex ought to be protected in their monopoly of the wages-fund of the world, and that women ought to be condemned to practical pauperism, and live on the bounty of others. Surely no one will endorse this preposterous claim for a male monopoly of all the fruits of labour, and this ridiculous proposal to confer on women the special privilege of being dependent on the good feeling of their relatives to allow them a dole, and the convenience of men to ask them to occupy a wife's place, or an humbler and less protected position of subjection. I advocate as justice to women that they should be subject to no such restriction, and I maintain that such subjection ought to be discontinued wholly and promptly.

Turn we now to S. S., whose main affirmation is that there is "a subjection of women which is scriptural, natural, and reasonable" (p. 106). This is not denied by the most *ultra* advocate of women's rights. It is in the interpretation of these terms that the matter of contention issues. Women are to be subject scripturally to the laws of right and wrong which govern their position as the mother-sex, but man is subject to the same laws in his own place and position. Thus they are equally subject to equal laws, and clearly independence is the very principle of personal responsibility. The same reasoning holds as to nature and reason. "Rosalind" has most archly turned the point of his Scripture arguments against S. S., and we wonder that she did not see in his case of factory women and neglected homes a proof that the subjection of women to worthless husbands who spent their earnings elsewhere and otherwise than at home brought about the neglected homes which the independence of woman was striving to overcome as best she might. S. S. thinks that in cases of difference the husband should rule (p. 108); our contention is that worth and sense, not wrath and sex, should rule. To the closing paragraph of S. S. (p. 108) we reply that mutual responsibilities imply mutual duties, and that these ought to be adjusted righteously, and that each party should be declared to be justly subject to the performance of those duties which the responsibility incurred implies.

R. R. fortifies his argument with philosophy, as S. S. does with Scripture. "Sex is," he oracularly declares, "a settled matter." Who ever said it was not? But does sex signify inferiority or equality? If inferiority, on which side is it? He does not believe in "any natural inferiority arising from sex" (p. 208), but he considers that the subjection of woman is in reality a necessity of nature, and founded on the facts of life. Very clear and satisfactory such reasoning is. Is R. R. an old maid? Or was R. R. only having a quiet burlesque of what is sometimes said to be woman's logic? Do you think so? No. Yes. Why so? Oh, you know, because at sex so is it not? Charming simplicity of inconce-

quence! but not nearly so attractive in dead type as on lovely living lips. But something more serious remains behind. Political economy—the Malthusian spectre—proclaims that woman is the impoverisher of nations, and not, therefore, a fit and proper person to be done anything else with but to be set aside as an unlucky accident in opposition to the theory of wealth. “Women do work cheaply and well, and therefore they ought not to be employed, but they ought to be subjected by, and submissive to, men who do work ill at an expensive rate.” It seems wages is not calculated on the worth of the work, but on the principle that men should support women, and so they get wages to enable them to do so. Would it be wrong, then, R. R., to bring men into subjection to the law for non-fulfilment of contract, or for embezzlement of money not theirs? The hurry and competition of the world and world’s commerce are, it seems, too much for men now, and it would be worse for them if they had women to compete with. But that is not the question. We are not to consider what would be worse for men or better for women, but what would be best because most righteous and wise. If the majority should rule, then women ought not to be kept in subjection, and if their being emancipated would lead to the world’s work being done better and cheaper, then let the weaker—which in that case would be men—go to the wall. The days of protection are numbered. It has been thrust out of commercial, as it soon shall be out of social life. R. R. has chosen the wrong time to plead the argument of laziness. He is not contented with keeping women subject, he would make them abject.

R. V. believes that force of some sort or other is the supreme ruler of everything (p. 289). So do we; but we wish it to be the force of justice, not the force of selfishness and personal strength. We do not advocate for woman anything else than a fair and free opportunity of putting forth to usury for her own good, and the good of the world, of every power and faculty of her nature, so that she may be a fully developed creature.

R. V. ought to know that co-equality in the same thing (p. 289) is neither asked nor desired by any one. All that is claimed is independence to pursue what woman is best fitted for, duty being the inspiring motive, and success, which is the world’s test, being the ultimate umpire.

The great “argument entirely irrefragable” which C. H. brings forward does not seem to us worthy of the extraordinary confidence he places in it. Women have hitherto been overruled, *i. e.*, kept in subjection. All the arrangements of life have been moulded by the strong hand and tyrannous power of man. She has not had freedom of action in the matter of training; she has been compelled to accept things as they are; she has been studiously withheld from united action, and, by the adoption of the “divide and conquer” system, men have mastered, and overmastered, even her finer instincts and her purer judgment. Until, therefore, C. H. supplies freedom of action, unhindered opportunity, to women, he

has no good ground for the extraordinary confidence in his crowning and overwhelming argument, that women have, by their non-education of the race to allow independence to women, voluntarily stereotyped their own subjection or degradation. Woman-worship is not wanted, but we desire to gain for women the possibility of acquiring and exercising all that gives and shows worth.

It is with no little satisfaction that, on a review of the whole course of the argumentation on the opposite side, we find so slight a hindrance as the arguments offered present to the adoption of our thesis that "the subjection of women should be discontinued." Contrasting the arguments employed against us with those which have been advanced, they seem as if they were chassepots to needle-guns, and as the French before the troops of Germany; ours is decidedly the winning side. The field-marshal, T. F. M., has been unfortunate, either in his cause or in his recruits. On the other hand—except for her feminine slip of mistaking his initials, which she gives as "T. M. F." and which might, one would think, have got editorial correction,—how dexterously "Adeline" takes him to task! She is not one of those who are to be kept in subjection to an unreasonable tyranny. She advocates "just equality" (p. 101); she rejects "marriage as an investment," and "wifehood as a business" (103), and she rebuts the physical and political arguments of the foe masculine with point, emphasis, and skill. She claims a "woman's right to be a woman" (p. 105); but she does not believe that she should bring upon her the twin evils of "impersonality and impecuniosity." Bravely argued, "Adeline!" ay, and well spoken too, with force and feeling, are the words on marriage and the marriage laws contained on pages 104-5. God speed the day of emancipation!

"Rosalind" speaks as becometh her name—"the sweetest feminine name, compounded of *Rosa*;" and her lineage, being, as we believe, of Shaksperian descent, from one "more than common tall." She "speaks to some purpose," and it is to be hoped, after due reflection on his lesson, that T. F. M. shall resolve, like Orlando in the play, "I will chide no breather in the world but myself, against whom I know most faults." The fine railery of her opening words tempers down into most serious truth, and the closing passage of her paper is—well, I may, perhaps, be excused the Irishism, as "Rosalind" was given to masquerade in masculine attire—*masterly*.

H. K.'s careful and elaborate epitome of John S. Mill's great work in advocacy of woman's rights is highly valuable, as placing within reach of many who might not otherwise have seen them, the great good thoughts of a noble thinker and a "manly gentleman."

Of our own part in this debate we need say little. We opened the campaign with hesitation and diffidence, not in or for our cause, but for ourselves. On a careful review of the labours of our colleagues—ladies and gentlemen alike—we need not fear to leave the question to the decision of those who read with attention:

comparison of the arguments must, we think, end in the reader's conviction that the subjection of women should be discontinued.

We would now only, in conclusion, condense into the briefest terms a statement of the elements of our advocacy:—

I. The educational subjection of women ought to be discontinued. It should be recognised that the first principle of education is applied to the human race to insure the full and complete culture of all the powers and faculties of the human being ~~but~~ under training. Hitherto women have been excluded from all the gymnastical education by which men have been inured to patience and thought, effort and persistency. A few mere fragments of chopped history, mathematics made easy, arithmetic simplified, geography on the smallest scale, grammar in still more defective doles, have composed almost the whole of the intellectual education of women—practical fluency and passableness in everything intellectual has been the aim. This should cease, and woman ought to be diligently trained in all that will mature her nature to its highest perfection. The common idea that any sort of education will do for a girl ought to be hooted out of social life. It is, if possible, far more important that women should be trained than men,—if married, that they may fulfil matrimonial and motherly functions thoroughly; if unmarried, that they may support the celibate life in honour and with comfort.

II. The question of the social dependence of women has been pretty well spoken of in several preceding articles. I think, indeed, the principle of it has been very well brought out. Independence is an essential element in true personality. The first duty of each person is to be one's self as a distinct character. In this sense "most women have no character at all," because they are educated to social dependence. All the relations of life would be better fulfilled, were women brought up with a greater sense of independence, with spirits less crushed, and habits less depressed.

III. The personal subjection of women should be discontinued. The physical power of man has enabled him to usurp too great a dominion over the members of the female sex, while his monopoly of all the money-making arts and processes, all the most productive branches of industry, have given him too great a mastery over the sex, who have been educated to dependence, and are compelled in any emergency to take up what first falls to their lot. Man is able to become the tempter and the tyrant, because he absorbs the pursuits by which wealth is gained, and is cowardly enough to take advantage of the defenceless condition to which the usages of society have depressed women, or into which the accidents of life have brought them. The rights of person ought to be made far more sacred than those of property; "false pretences" in regard to the one ought to be more disgracefully punished than for the other; "frauds" in regard to the one should be more severely dealt with than for the other. Conjugal rights ought not to be all on one side, and conjugal wrongs so notorious and flagrant on the other.

IV. The religious subjection of women should be discontinued. Ignorance is perhaps not the mother of devotion, but it often is of superstition. As a religious being, woman ought to have all the rights of worship and worshipfulness accorded to her. Priests have too long exerted an undue influence for the humiliation of women.

V. The professional subjection of women ought to be discontinued. There are, there must be, special professional aptitudes and specialities in each sex. It ought not to be supposed that sex constitutes inferiority. In medicine, they ought properly to excel, from their tact, sympathy, quick perceptions, and general delicacy of manipulation. In education many of the same qualities fit them to excel. In pharmacy I see no reason why they should not succeed; as coiffureists, modistes, &c., they ought to have no rivals, and we fear that the man-milliner is only a witness to the voluntary degradation of those who preferentially employ him.

VI. The political subjection of women should cease. They have an interest in good government equal to men; they suffer the injuries resulting from bad government as much as men; and if they were trained with a due sense of responsibility they would fulfil the duties equally well.

Any further antagonism I could offer to the opinions of the various writers in the negative could not be more efficacious in showing that it is right and reasonable to emancipate woman and give her fair play in the matter of life, industry, and endeavour. Let woman be as nature decreed, in different relations superior, inferior, and equal to man; but let it be clearly due to nature, not to man's usurpation, selfish laws, and personal oppression.

L. S. G.

#### NEGATIVE REPLY.

I WOULD feel inclined to deny that in any true and proper sense it can be said that women are (in this country) now in a state of subjection. Without, however, attempting any quibble on this point, I would at once say that I am amongst those who oppose the introduction of a new system of things, which, if carried out in the manner desiderated by its zealous advocates, must derange all our social relations, and make woman no longer man's companion and coadjutor, but his competitor. All the love and regard, the admiration and esteem, which I acknowledge one may feel for individuals of the female sex, at once rises to protest against attempts to foist a character upon woman which her nature renders impossible, and which her history, as shown by past records and present observation, plainly indicates to be incompatible with her attainment to that degree of usefulness and happiness placed within her reach by her Creator. Granted that in many things which have to do with the development and education of the female mind we have for some time past, as a people, neglected to best

upon most of our girls and women that culture which must be to their advantage, and which has its beneficial reaction upon the opposite sex. Granted also that in social and public life there are prevalent (or rather, *have been*, for the times are rapidly altering) certain customs and rules which tend to place women under some disadvantages, even if they are not absolutely injurious to them; there is no reason that in abolishing or modifying these we should at once, like modern zealots in this matter, conclude that all is wrong, and nothing but an entire revolution can be beneficial. "Reform and improve" should be one of our standing mottoes; but this is very different from wholesale destruction. The wise horticulturist lops his trees, at times, as it may seem to a careless onlooker, rather unmercifully; yet, if he knows his work, he removes from them only the dead and exuberant wood. Were it done without discretion, and nothing aimed at but the removal of a certain proportion of branches, and the realization of an idea in the mind of the operator as to their shape and appearance, he would be deservedly punished by a fruitless garden and dying trees. Results not dissimilar would ensue in our national life, were the advocates of the so-called women's rights to have their way; and though fully prepared to grant the greater part of them credit for sincerity, not all the logic and logicians they can range on their side can win us to their views when they confront the sterner logic of irresistible facts.

I had purposed last month to deal more particularly with the statements propounded by H. K., but having been prevented from so doing, I have seen with satisfaction that his assertions and arguments have been most admirably met by C. H., in the greater part of whose article I heartily concur. Many have written or spoken in opposition to the modern theorists on the true position of women; few have so tersely and conclusively demolished their airy fabrics they build up from time to time, evidences of their unlimited faith in the undoubtedly able and acute thinker, J. S. Mill, though on the particular point before us he may be considered to have what De Quincey calls a "permanent craze." It seems to be ordained (and this is a notable case out of many) that the most distinguished of authors go so palpably wrong on some material point, lest the intensity of our reverence and admiration should lead us to regard them as at all approaching to infallibility in the opinions they advance. Were J. S. Mill twice the man he is, intellectually, his views on the natural characteristics of women, their capabilities and responsibilities, would lead the thoughtful generally to entertain the conviction that with this question, at least he has shown himself unfitted to deal. Marriage is very properly reinstated in its true position by C. H., nor can it be with any justice regarded as occupying the very subordinate place in woman's prospective career which H. K. would thrust upon it. This, however, it is not likely to do, unless woman could be unsexed, and the instincts of her nature totally perverted. Her

tendency is still, as ever, in spite of the prophets of this new school, to consider it as "the grand climax and ultimatum;" in fact, perhaps rather too much so (and there I differ slightly from C. H.), since under the circumstances of high civilization many women must necessarily pass their days in celibacy. The excess of men over women numerically may have something to do with this, though I doubt much if the preponderance is so great as to allow us to call it a "superabundance." It must be remembered, however, that in these days a great many women go abroad from these islands to every part of the globe.

To consider more particularly some of the prominent features showing themselves in the curious finale with which H. K. closes his sublime series of arguments and apophthegms, which are to work woman's deliverance, is my next office, and I shall perform this in as curt a way as possible. So completely has H. K. identified himself with his "prophet," J. S. Mill, that one cannot always feel certain whether, through the accidental omission of the marks of quotation, it is not Mr. Mill who is addressing us, and not H. K.; and so large a preponderance of extracts covers the pages written by H. K. (presumably all from J. S. Mill, though not all stated to be his), that the wish arises that we had before us more of the writer's individuality as it might have been manifested by a fuller exposition of his own thoughts. Then we should have been better able to judge to what degree he has adopted the views he propounds from a careful consideration of the actual state of matters amongst us, and of the history and idiosyncrasy of the female sex as ascertainable from books; and thus his conclusions would have had much greater weight than they can have now, when he only presents himself to us in the character of an ardent and over-enthusiastic disciple.

H. K. at the outset makes an assertion which no sensible man would for a moment give credence to, that it is essential to the happiness of the married state for the law to make the husband "absolute master." The expression "absolute master" means a great deal; and when, a little farther on, H. K. asserts that there has been no experience of a system which should deliver the wife from being her husband's "bondservant," one is tempted to ask, "Has H. K. forgotten that he is writing about the position of woman in England, and not in Caffraria or Turkey?" Not for many hundreds of years has any power approaching that which the words H. K. uses would imply been exercised by the husband over the wife. English law has for ages to a great extent protected the interests of married women as well as the single, and what was lacking with reference to the separate pecuniary interests and rights of wives has been over-supplied by a recent Act, which H. K. ignores, and by the operation of it those competent to judge think that effects will be produced which will render one class of matrimonial grievances no longer a *casus belli* between husband and wife. Indeed, as is often the case, this Act goes rather too far,



and by some of its clauses tends to destroy the right and desirable mutual confidence between husband and wife. But hear Mr. Mill again, and, as quoted by H. K., we find him next instituting a comparison, or rather drawing an analogy, between a business partnership and the bond uniting man and woman in marriage! Why, a partnership in trade is an engagement existing for a specific purpose, involving only a partial community of interests, and is usually terminable at any time by mutual consent, or without it, in fact. Poor, inadequate, and utterly erroneous must his idea of marriage be, who sees in it nothing but a transaction of a mercantile sort; wherein each gives so much and expects to receive so much; and in consequence of this gives no due place to love, the union of heart with heart; to him there is not in this state some remnant of a past paradise, and some promise of a paradise to come,—no, it all savours of the shop; let each party in the bargain be on the watch, but especially the woman, for man will be sure to cheat her, unfortunate creature! if he can. Were this so, we might indeed desiderate that marriage laws should interfere still more between the sexes, but, in all reason, make matters equal; and if the wife is to be so abundantly protected from all possible injury, let the husband have some additional securities also, for he may need them too. But has Mr. Mill no ideal? Yes, we have it, with a sort of cold recognition of the possibility of such a thing as love! He looks for a “school of sympathy in equality, of living together in love, without power on the one side and obedience on the other.” Very well, but what does that imply? Is equality necessary for the existence of sympathy? I should say not, nor for that of love either, else how could love exist between parent and child, or master and servant? or in that state of friendship which, according to a great authority, “passeth the love of women”?

Nor is the position really as represented in the closing words. Power and obedience are not necessarily correspondent. There may be power which is not used to enforce obedience, and there may also be obedience rendered to one destitute of power to compel it. Mr. Mill argues, and H. K. follows suit, that the majority of husbands, proud of their imaginary superiority, issue dogmatic commands, to which the trembling wife yields blind obedience, for she is a “legal slave.” How these individuals can expect this statement to be accepted by those who know anything of domestic English life in the palace or the cottage it is difficult to say; nor does my own observation, even amongst what is called the “naturally brutal” part of the lower classes, lead me to the conclusion that the men generally feel (or exhibit) a “disrespect and contempt” for their wives which they manifest not towards other women. The vicious, the heartless, and the brutal amongst mankind, will no doubt act viciously, heartlessly, and brutally towards their wives as well as towards others who do not hold them in awe; and the remedy for this is not certainly an alteration

in the form of the matrimonial engagements; but a radical amelioration of the character of the individuals. Until the fountain is purified, there is little advantage gained in merely damming up one of its outlets. H. K. supports J. S. Mill's notion that a man ought to be highly grateful to his wife, because she, "in addition to the physical suffering of bearing children, has the whole responsibility of their care and education in early years;" and if beside this she carefully spends his earnings for the good of the household, i. e., for a household of which herself and her children form the principal moiety—then what a paragon is she! "I fear that the writer of these statements cannot be personally acquainted with many families, or he would have found out the fact that much as a mother has to do with and for her children at an early age, there are few fathers who would throw upon her "the whole responsibility." H. K. throughout follows with fatal persistency in the track of those whom no amount of argument of the clearest sort can convince that inferiority does not necessarily imply either fault or degradation; that differences have existed and will ever exist between the sexes, which render man most capable for certain employments, and adapt women for others; and that to wrench violently one sex from its due position at home and abroad is to disturb the foundations on which rest the prosperity of the commonweal. Woman's true independence is to be found in honest subjection to the behests of the Most High, and the duties of her station. In that let her abide, and be wise, happy, and holy.

J. R. S. G.

## History.

### WERE THE CRUSADES BENEFICIAL TO SOCIAL PROGRESS?

#### AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In this controversy it is absolutely necessary that we should know the object and end for which the Crusades were originated and carried on. That was, simply, the expulsion of the Saracens, the followers of Mahomet, from the Holy Land, in order to place the Holy Sepulchre in the hands of Christians.

Such was their object. Now here, at the very outset, let me ask, Was it good or otherwise? It appears to me a right noble aim; an undertaking actuated by religious and devout motives, and requiring not only a fervent, earnest spirit, but sore toil and labour at their hands. It was not a war of ambition, with merely the view of territorial aggrandizement that led myriads of soldiers

from all parts of Europe to draw swords. They were not fighting for any gain, but for their belief; their convictions. The root was good. That wild hermit, rude and unclean, crying to the world that things were not as they ought to be, seems to me a veritable reformer. However rough the faith he nurtured in his breast, it was real, and its flame lit up all Europe with a blaze of holy feeling. Superstition call it if you will, yet it was the religion of the age; the rough gem of piety not yet smoothed down to beauty by the soft influence of love. No sham; no fallacy about it; all true as steel, hard, obdurate, unsubduable. Here, then, we have the first benefit of the Crusades—the quickening to life of the slumbering embers of pious fervour.

Look now, in the second place, to the beneficial effects likely to accrue from the mixing together of men of different nations. Every nation in Europe, almost, sent its contribution to the grand cause. Teuton, Gaul, and Saxon fought, side by side, to sweep the accursed Saracens from holy soil. Surely some good must come of this. To discover it, I ask, for what reason are the Industrial Exhibitions of our own day held? Is it not to promote a feeling of unity among the nations of the earth? In some degree, if not on such a peaceable errand, these Crusades had the same result. If the communion of peoples is desirable and beneficial, I maintain that the Crusades were productive of many benefits. Wranglings, I doubt not, there were many; petty quarrels, not rare; but, all in all, how nobly, how bravely soldiers, under every flag in Europe, banded together to gain the one great end! This oneness of purpose, this broadcast sympathy in one object, wrought for good in the hearts of men. Crusaders singing the same hymn—each in his own tongue—may make a fine target for the cynical scoffer at all sentiment; yet, I wot, the echoes that Canaan's hills then caught died not away until they had reached heaven. If so, then say not that no hallowing influence was showered down, soft as the dew of Hermon, on these rough warriors for the cause of Christ, raising their souls to higher aspirations after holiness than those that had led them out to battle.

Thirdly, let us look on the effect the Crusades had upon Moham-medanism. How fared that immensity of falsehood beneath the bright blades of the Crusaders? Methinks they well-nigh levelled that black imposition. Saracenic infallibility quickly paled before them. Koran declamations availed but little. European spears soon tore aside the veil that hid its leprous form, and showed to all the world its rottenness. Was this beneficial or otherwise? The voice of humanity cries out, "It was." That black cloud of night that hid the light of heaven from so many eyes, that will-o'-the-wisp they followed in the stead of the great sun, were seen but little when the Crusaders' lances gleamed on the city walls. The very necessity of some creed that might be relied on showed them the falsity of their own. They essayed to lean upon it, but it broke beneath them; and though the Crusades, in lieu of that

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great sham and shadow, gave nothing more substantial, though it took away a false guide and gave none, yet surely it was better so. Better for them that they should be left to make a creed than that that false prophet's mad visions should fill their souls with awe and reverence. With that red sun whose last rays glittered on the plumed helms of Western hosts beneath the walls of Joppa nine seven hundred years ago the might of Mohammedanism began to wane. A great boon this to the world, I doubt not. Men may look farther and see less. Such, then, are the three great stand-points from which we see the beneficial result of the Crusades; their origin, their effect on men during their existence, their after effect on the religion of the world. There can be no doubt but that they opened the way, not only for commerce, but also for the efforts of missions.

But, besides these, there was a secondary result the Crusades had which must not be overlooked, viz., they drew away the attention of warlike men; and thus helped to promote a more peaceful state of affairs at home. While the lion heart roamed over the plains of Palestine, those barons who were left in charge of the affairs of the realm turned themselves manfully to the improvement of the country. There can be no question about the fact that the germ of the glorious Magna Charta was laid in the hearts of the English people at the time when their king was leading his armies against the hosts of the Saracens. It was there, growing quickly; and when the fickle and worthless John attempted to override the nation with the iron heel of despotism, it shot up, straight and swift, and bade him hold. Since then it has ever been growing, and may the great Master of liberty grant that it may still grow, until all the peoples of the earth shall see its glory and follow in its wake.

SEMAJ.

## NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE enforcement of religious opinions at the point of the sword, the employment of soldiery as missionaries, the compulsory conversion of Saracenic heathens, the "discipling" of nations and races to the love and service of the Prince of Peace by the opening of the floodgates of the evil passions and horrid practices of war!—how can such things secure defenders in an age like ours? Can impiety rise higher than the Invocation of "Poet" Wordsworth,—

"O war, who art God's daughter!"

Yet "Samuel" would have us believe that the Crusades, the cruellest and most relentless of all wars, have been justified by the logic of history and the loving purposes of Heaven. I believe that it is the high and sole prerogative of God to bring good out of evil; but surely it cannot be maintained that, because God is able and ready to do so, man is justified in crying out in the words of an old foe,—

"Evil, be thou my good."

Whatever good issues result from the evils men perpetrate or seek to perpetuate by the providence of God, they form no justifying plea for men's evil desires or the wickedness of heart which set them to their evil courses. To justify the actions of men by the special results by which God in His goodness caused to flow from the evils done by men is not only illogical, but illusory. This is to make God the apologist of evil, and to use the very mercy of the Almighty as an encouragement in sin. The deep moral evil of such a course demands that we should set our face against any such phylandering with war—especially religious war. We see the ill results of a course of thought like this in the case of the Franco-Prussian war, in which many people took their sides from the consideration of the prevailing religion of the two countries—some looking on Prussia as the messenger of divine vengeance against the chief military support of the Papacy; and longing for its success because their opponents were professing Romanists. Others, equally ignoring the primary elements of dispute, looked with favour on the French as their fellow-upholders of the faith of Christendom, and hoped for the humiliation of the heretics. But such judgments are clearly wrong, because they are formed on side-issues. I do not mention it here to indicate any opinion regarding the right or wrong of the war of the year of grace 1870, but to show how disastrously, even down to the present hour, the superstition of the nobility of the religious wars of the Crusades acts on the moral sympathies of nations, and inclines them almost unconsciously to the belief that the end justifies the means, or that the (unintended) benefits which may result by God's good providence, not man's design, justify our approval of certain events which turn out favourably to what we approve in opinion or desire in politics, religion, or social economy.

L. A. asserts that the Crusades were holy wars (p. 359). Our contention is that holy wars are a misnomer. War is the organized selfishness of aggressive power, but holiness is peace and righteousness. We might as truly speak of holy sin, of righteous theft, justifiable covetousness, and pure iniquity, as of holy war. To do things that may be thought to be holy by unholy means is not to be holy. To commence and carry on such a war for the prosecution of an end, or the accomplishment of that aim which is thought to be holy, is to do evil that good may come: and though we may flatter ourselves and attempt to deceive others by calling a Crusade a holy war, that does not make war holy; it is only a juggling with words, an adding of hypocrisy to sin.

If it is advantageous, as L. A. thinks, to influence men to co-operate for an idea (p. 361), superstition must be a most beneficial thing for nations. It has brought men to co-operate for an idea; to burn their fellows at the stake, hang them on the gibbet, and imprison them in the dungeons of the Inquisition, to undergo the thumb-screw and the rack. For these purposes men co-operated for an idea. But L. A. is wrong in saying it is beneficial for men to

to operate for an idea. It is only advantageous for men to co-operate in the accomplishment and for the success of a *true* idea. But the idea of the Crusades was a false and mischievous one—one opposed to the doctrine of the Christ who declared that the hour would come when men would worship the Father neither in the mountain of Samaria nor yet at Jerusalem; and of that religion which affirms that the Most High dwelleth not in temples made with hands, but is everywhere that there is an honest and true worshipper. In fact, the Crusades gave birth to the terrible superstition of the pilgrimages, and this gave impulse to the evil notion of penances and indulgences, and a whole host of other superstitions about "sacred places"—though the religion of Jesus declares that there is no earthly sacred place except a sanctified human spirit.

The Crusades purified warfare from selfishness and worldliness (p. 362); but if they did this only to steep it in religious bigotry and superstition, the improvement was not much. But we deny that they did so: they were pursued for venal purposes and with venal intents. Popes used them to gain worldly ends, kings and nobles sought to act in them with intensely worldly and selfish interests, and the common soldiery caught no holiness of spirit from their being engaged in a so-called holy war. The quarrels of the camp, the vices of the armies, the intrigues of the generals, the cunning of the Popes, forbid us from supposing there was a lessening of selfishness and worldliness in the conducting of the Crusades. Gibbon does not agree in this with L. A.

Besides the preliminary objection to the Crusades as being wars, and being wars conducted on holy pretexts, but really from selfish motives and from superstitious ideas, we object to the Crusades that they were false in their conception; inasmuch as no possible amount of external force can be effective for the conversion of men's souls, and no possible missionaries of holiness could be chosen worse than soldiers. They were, moreover, mischievous in their implications; they led men to think that change of place and employment on a holy purpose could become substitutes for a change of heart and personal righteousness; they caused men to imagine that forced conviction was to be counted as a virtue. The man who went to force others could not but be under the impression that force exerted on himself was justifiable, and so the idea of Christian conversion was completely perverted. From this evil notion we are suffering still. Freedom of thought, of which Jesus was the first preacher, and of which His disciples were the first teachers, has been almost expunged from the creed of Christians for centuries, and the magic which has been flung around the Crusades has greatly contributed to give fascination to this short and easy way with the conversion of men—secure conformity anyhow: by conviction if possible; if not, then by force, fraud, or any other method open to you. As a Nonconformist, I object to believe that the Crusades, as agents for procuring conformity by force, were beneficial to social progress.

J. A.

## Greek Days and Roman Rights.

### No. I.—PLATO'S PHÆDO:

#### *Analysis of the "Phædo."*

#### ARGUMENT V.

"THE Philosophy of Causation requires consideration, Cebes. In my youth I was an eager inquirer into the science of nature, and diligent in my efforts to know the causes of things; such as whether heat, moisture, or fermentation excited generation; whether blood, air, or fire are the elements of thought; and if not, if the brain was the organ of sensation, from which memory and opinion proceed, and from which knowledge arises. So, pursuing my speculations, I became so puzzled and perplexed that I no longer knew what I thought I knew, how a man grows, why ten exceeds eight, &c., and doubt unhinged me. But I always sought the best helps attainable; and, having heard one quoting from a book by Anaxagoras [the inquirer of Clazomenæ] on *Nous* [supreme mind], whose chief tenet was "matter, ever numerically the same, undergoes combination and separation from the dictates and energy of an over-watching intelligence," I was charmed. This was excellent: a regulating mind would put every person and thing as should be best, and one had only to know "what is best" to comprehend nature. Here was a teacher just to my *mind*: he would tell me at once, and explain too, by cause and necessity—is the earth round or flat?—is it the centre of the universe? and what of the sun, moon, and stars, their motions, orbits, and phenomena; and so I got the book and read it eagerly. I was quite disappointed. He made no use of mind; nor did he show that it is the source of order. He makes air, ether, fluids, &c., causes! and hence he seemed to me as if some one would say, Socrates acts always by thought, and should then explain why I am sitting here; for instance, by saying, I am an anatomical machine composed of bones, sinews, joints, and so on, possessed of pliancy, and so I sit here now. Or speaking of air, voice, hearing, should affirm, I sit here through them instead of the real causes—the Athenians thought proper to condemn me, and I think it right to endure the punishment. For by the dog [who guards the entrance to the after world], had I not thought this best, these bones and sinews would long ere now have been off to Megara or Bœotia by stealth. True I could not do justly and honourably now without bones and flesh, but to call these the causes is absurd. Cause differs from occasion, condition, or concomitance. Such mere secondary *ideas* show a disregard of reason. I would gladly learn real, not sham principles of causation; so I finished voyage the first in search of

knowledge: would you like to know how I set about voyage the second? Exceedingly! said Cebes.

"Well, I turned my course quite otherwise. I did not risk my eyesight on the eclipse-like appearances of things as seen by the senses. I sought to apprehend them in the clearer light of reason—do you understand?" By Jove I don't! at least not well. "Ah, then, I begin with causation.

"The ultimate of causation is ideation. If things are caused it must be by the infusion of those supersensuous principles which we call *ideas*. Beauty, goodness, greatness, &c., are ideas of which, when phenomena partake, they become beautiful, good, great, &c. *E.g.*, one would not say of one man that he was greater than another *by* a head, or less than another *by* a head, as assign a cause. This form of the concrete phenomena must depend on the idea of greatness of which it is an appearance being true, and therefore its proper cause. Ideas are the inner essences of things, and phenomena are only the outward manifestations of these. I confess I cannot see the inner link between ideation and causation, and I cannot undertake to explain how the one leads to the other. But unless supersensuous properties are possessed by and inherent in sensible phenomena, I do not know how they can manifest them; the universal must precede the particular. I accept this, then, as the secret of causation, and I leave to others the employment of high-flown refinements. If they should assail this hypothesis you would consider it, and try from their conclusion to their consequences: in like manner you would proceed to test your conclusion by its consequences. You would not confound consequences and conclusions—at least, not if you were philosophers, would you?" You speak correctly, said Simmias and Cebes at once.

Here Echecrates the listener addresses Phædo the narrator:—"By Jove, Phædo, they said so properly, for he has made out his case admirably." "Certainly so," says Phædo, "and all present appeared satisfied." "Well, on report, I think he was right; but what else?" As well as I can recollect, proceeds Phædo, when it had been granted to him that ideas exist in themselves, and are the essences which cause appearances, he went on thus:—

When you say Simmias is taller than Socrates, but of lower stature than Phædo, do you not mean that magnitude and littleness are both in Simmias? "Yes!" And yet that is not because Simmias is Simmias, or Socrates Socrates, or Phædo Phædo—excuse my lawyer-like phraseology,—the assertion is relative, not absolute. Magnitude does not increase and diminish at one and the same time. I am the same little Socrates, in concrete identity, as I was when compared with Simmias as with Phædo; and so ideas are neither disposed to be or become contraries in themselves.

"So it seems," said Cebes, when some one ejaculated, By the gods, this is the very opposite of the conclusions we arrived at before, regarding the transition of life into death, &c. Socra<sup>tes</sup>



leaning forward listening, remarks, You rebuke me manfully; but you do not perceive the distinction between the subjects then observed and those now before us: then we spoke of phenomena, now of ideation—phenomena change, ideas do not; phenomena may lose their essences, but ideas ~~are~~ *are* essences. Cebes, my friend, are you disconcerted at what has been said? I cannot say I am; but I do not deny that many things disturb my thoughts.

"Well, we agree on this,—that a contrary can never be the contrary of itself." "Certainly." But do you call heat and cold anything? I do! The same as fire and snow? Oh no! Then the idea differs from the phenomena through which it becomes known. *Threeness* has no opposite, but *oddness* has, namely, evenness or equality. Three can never cease to be three, but over and above that it can never be an even number; it must always expel the idea of parity from our thoughts; modified contraries imply mutual opposites. What then is it that when it is in the body, the body will be alive? "The soul." Always? Yes; Has life any contrary? Yes, death! Well, then, if we cannot think of soul except in combination with life, and the idea of life excludes death, that which is always accompanied by and associated with life cannot be subject to death. That which is immortal is imperishable, and therefore it is impossible for the soul to perish when death approaches it. It is then indestructible. The immortal, indestructible, despite of any external phenomenal change, such as death is, must survive—the mortal does perish, the immortal passes full of life into another state of being.

Cebes, Simmias, and the other hearers have nothing to say against this argument; it is voted to be perfectly conclusive and convincing as reasoning; "but no amount of reasoning, considering the weakness of the human intellect and the weightiness of the topic under consideration, can hush the whispers of doubt in the spirit, and give it perfect peace." At each link of the argumentation there is a possibility of error. "Quite right," Socrates admits, wherefore it behoves us to test not only the processes, but the premises; but if we do this fully, fairly, and precisely, to the utmost of our capacity, we can ask no farther.

If the soul is immortal, my friends, it is proper that we should consider this, that it demands our care, not for this portion of time which we call life, but for the whole extent of its duration; and the danger of neglecting it would truly be dreadful. If death brought the end, the bad might rejoice to shuffle off both soul and body together, but if it does not, as all that it carries hence is its training here, it much concerns us to make it good and wise. The fleshly frame perishes, but the soul takes with it the character it has acquired, that does not perish with the body; nor does man pass away into the void gulf of an eternal nothingness. There is no gain in pursuing an evil course, but there is in becoming, by philosophy, superior in death to what we have been in life.

## The Reviewer.

*Socrates and the Socratic Schools.* Translated from the German of  
Dr. E. ZELLER by OSWALD J. REICHEN, B.L.C. and M.A.  
London: Longmans & Co.

DR. EDWARD ZELLER is one of the living lights of Germany in philosophy and theology. He was born 22nd January, 1814, at Kleinbottwar, in Wirtemberg. Having gone through the preliminary studies requisite to enable him to enter the university, he attached himself to the faculty of theology in Tübingen, the second capital of his native kingdom, whose university is both old and famous. Here he was brought under Hegelian influences through F. C. Bauer, the chief of "the Tübingen school," and D. F. Strauss, who, though only four years his senior, issued in 1835 the first edition of the "Life of Jesus." He subsequently went to Berlin, where he studied under Neander, a teacher of great power, whose views approach much more nearly to those which are regarded as orthodox. In 1840 Zeller was appointed professor of theology at Tübingen. In 1844 he published his "Philosophy of the Greeks," and in 1847 he was promoted to the University of Bonn—having issued in the same year his "History of the Christian Church." From Bonn he was transferred in 1849 to Marburg, the capital of Upper Hesse. In 1854 he published, "The Church of the Apostolate, in its Nature and Origin." In 1862 he was advanced to Heidelberg as Professor in Ordinary of Philosophy in the University there. He is not only the author of many works on philosophy and theology, but also a prolific contributor to the literary serials devoted to the diffusion of knowledge on these branches of learning. He has been associated in the conductorship of many of these with men of the highest repute in his native land; and he may be regarded as being at the head of his school of thought in Germany.

His chief contribution to philosophic thought, in extent and value, is his History of the Philosophy of Greece; and the work now under examination by us is a reproduction in substance of the part of Zeller's work which treats of Socrates and the Socratic schools. The production, perhaps, owes its publication to the interest excited in the schools of the university by Grote's view of Socrates and the Sophists, increased as it has been by his more recent treatment of the philosophy of Plato. The work is of much value for its thoughtful thoroughness, and though it might have been better had we had a distinct and definite translation, yet we should be glad that handy access has been given to the matter of the ideas of such a thinker as Dr. Zeller. We believe that those

who are desirous of knowing about the philosophy of Greece in its earlier phases could scarcely get in the same bulk so much important information and thought. We should like to see published in a similar style the Socratic chapter from Grote's great Greek history.

We subjoin the following paragraphs to show the spirit in which the work is composed, and the style in which the ideas have been reproduced :—

"The intellectual life of Greece had reached a point towards the close of the fifth century, in which the only alternatives open to it were either to give up science altogether, or to attempt a thorough transformation of it on a new basis. The older schools were not, indeed, wholly extinct; but all belief in the systems taught had been practically undermined, and a general disposition to doubt had set in. Following the practice of the Sophists, men had begun to call everything into question—to attack or defend with equal readiness every opinion. Faith in the aim of human ideas, or in the validity of moral laws, had wholly disappeared. Natural philosophy, on which the attention of thinkers had been engrossed for upwards of a century and a half, had now become distasteful; and, in fine, scientific inquiry had been supplanted by a merely superficial culture of thought and language, and by the acquisition of such accomplishments only as were likely to serve the purposes of social life.

"This state of things was, however, naturally calculated to lead men to search after a new method of knowledge—one which would avoid the defects and one-sidedness of previous systems by a more rigorous treatment of the questions raised. The possibility of a new method had been indirectly pointed out by the logical inconsistencies of previous speculation, and the instruments for scientific inquiry had been sharpened by eristic quibbles and subtleties, and ample material for the erection of a new structure might now be gained from the ruins of those that had preceded it. Moreover, the practical effect of the Sophistic tendencies had been to open up a new field of inquiry, which gave promise of a rich harvest for speculative inquiry. The question now proposed to Greek philosophy was, whether a creative genius would arise to make use of the material prepared, and to direct thought into a new channel. It was at this crisis that Socrates appeared" (pp. 1, 2).

"The leading object of Socrates was to institute a real inquiry into the necessity of knowledge, into the nature of morality, into the conception of the various virtues, and to gain a thorough insight into man's moral and intellectual nature. This object he pursued by giving practical directions for the formation of conceptions, and by asking critical questions which obliged those who replied to consider what their notions implied, and at what their actions aimed. Can we wonder that such inquiries should have produced a deep impression on the contemporaries of Socrates, and an entire change in the Greek mode of thought, such as the testimony of history records? or that a keener thinker anticipated behind those apparently commonplace and unimportant expressions of Socrates, which his biographers unanimously record, the sight of a newly discovered world? It was reserved for Plato and Aristotle to conquer this new world, but Socrates was the first discoverer of it, and to open the way to it for others. Fully as we may recognise the shortcomings of his endeavours, and the

limits which his individual nature imposed on him, we shall still find enough to make us honour him as the originator of a philosophy of conceptions, as a reformer of method, and as the first founder of a scientific doctrine of morals" (p. 155).

"It was a happy thing for his honour and his cause that he did not escape. What Socrates in pious faith expressed after his condemnation—that to die would be better for him—has been fully realized in his work. The picture of the dying Socrates must have been at the time in the highest degree what it is now after centuries have passed, a simple testimony to the greatness of the human mind, to the power of philosophy, and to the victory of a spirit pious and pure, reposing on clear convictions. It must have appeared to his followers like a guiding star for their inner life, shining in all its glory; and thus it is depicted by Plato's master hand. It must have increased their admiration for their teacher, their zeal to imitate him, their devotion to his teaching. By his death a stamp of higher truth was impressed on his life and words. The sublime repose and happy cheerfulness with which he met death was the strongest corroboration of all his convictions, the zenith of a long life devoted to knowledge and virtue. Death did not add to the substance of his teaching, but it added greatly to its influence. A life had been spent in sowing the seeds of knowledge with a zeal unequalled by any other philosopher either before or after; the result was seen at his death, when they brought forth fruit abundantly in the Socratic schools" (p. 201).

*The Legendary Ballads of England and Scotland.* Compiled and edited by JOHN S. ROBERTS (Editor of the Crown Edition of Burns' Works). London: Frederick Warne and Co.

A COLLECTION of ballads is an essential of every good library. This is a cheap and well-edited selection of the best of the ballads of Great Britain. It forms one of the "Chandos Classics," and supplies upwards of six hundred pages for half-a-crown. The editor is thoroughly acquainted with the best versions of all the best historic rhymes of the people, and often gives different forms of the same *historiette*. This is of great importance to the completeness and the compactness of the work. Some very rare ballads are inserted, and these impart greater value than it would otherwise have to this excellent, cheap, and full compilation of the rough rude rhymes to which the people of this country have always given so much attention. We cordially commend the work to our readers.

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## The Topic.

### SHOULD POST OFFICE EMPLOYEES TO BE DEBARRED FROM DISCUSSING THEIR REAL (OR SUPPOSED) GRIEVANCES?

#### AFFIRMATIVE.

BUSINESS is business; and the terms of engagement offered to special officials are matters of business. A code of honour rules in all engagements that the secrets of a business are not to be divulged to, are not even to be canvassed before the public while one eats the bread of an employer. Some people have got into the habit of impersonalising the Government in its departmental character, because in its imperial character it is impersonal, is, in fact, an abstraction of which we can speak, and concerning whose doings we can discuss without any idea of personal animosity or friendship. As an imperial board it may, say, it must be subject to public discussion in all that it does. Departmentally, however, the case is quite different. In this case it is an employer of labour, and it has the same right as other employers to insist on the terms which shall hold between its *employees* and itself. It has a right to the respect, obedience, and service of those whom it engages. It is a matter of contract. It cannot go to the house-tops and bawl aloud whenever any offended officer chooses to howl. He can remonstrate with his superiors, he can appeal to the chiefs of the department; but as the public are no parties to the contract, they have no right of umpireship, except through the one competent court of review—Parliament.—F. M. C. B.

Order, subordination, and proper respect for superiors must be maintained in every service. Private

wishes, desires, and requests are not to be lightly made public only on one side, and without a due sense of the view taken by those who are acquainted with all the facts. Public agitation is only proper in considering public questions. The Post Office is in reality a large business establishment. Its officials are employed on definite terms; if they dislike the terms they can leave, but they have no right, having made their bargain in private on terms known to them, to rush before the public with a cry of woe as if they were harshly dealt with. No other body of *employees* make public statements about and engage in public discussion about their private relations to their employers. In no wise do we see any justification for personal, independent, one-sided discussion among those who voluntarily seek the service, and may voluntarily leave it. The Post Office authorities undertake certain responsibilities on conditions known to them as those accepted by their *employees*, if the relations between these *employees* and the authorities were altered in deference to public discussion, there would arise a necessity for changes in their responsibilities which are not always possible, however plausible they may seem. Government is right to exact from its servants such conditions as shall secure peace and constancy of management.—T. H.

Public servants like the officials in our Post Offices are under the charge of heads of departments. The heads of departments are pre-

pared, we presume; to consider every individual case laid before them; they are likewise responsible to Government and to Parliament for the manner in which the whole work is accomplished, and any individual case of hardship can easily be looked into through these means. Public discussion, by bringing the private concerns of Government offices before the public in a one-sided and irregular way, would be very destructive to the proper conducting of official business; besides, anything like a strike among Post Office *employés* would bring the entire business of the community to such a dead lock, that no opportunity should be given for any such an occurrence. Public agitation, too, generally leads to extravagant statements and general charges, while a plain statement of real practical grievances being made before the proper authorities are able to be investigated and settled at once on the specific merits. I certainly think it would be injudicious in the extreme to permit the general, above all the public discussion of the concerns of our Government departments, and especially by those of the parties who are engaged in the working out of the ordinary work of the department. It would promote discontent and encourage changes in the business arrangements of the Government offices.—N. P.

#### NEGATIVE.

It is a moral as well as a religious fact that every man is entitled to enjoy his own opinion. We, as "enlightened Englishmen," fully congratulate ourselves on this privilege. Yet we at the same time prevent the *employés* of the Post Office from expressing their opinions *en masse*. The only possible excuse for this which I can conceive is *fear*. It has been well said, "The

fear of man bringeth a snare." Even in this, one of the strangest anomalies and weaknesses of a Liberal Government is seen. "Reform" and "Liberty of Speech" are their watchwords: the prevention of public discussion, when it relates to their management, is one of their acts. As the *employés* are not exempt from voting for members of Parliament, have they not a right to express their opinion and to criticise the management of public offices?

This I maintain to be the duty and privilege of every one who has a vote in the government of his country.—GEORGEUS D. E.

"Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely, above all liberties."—(Milton.) Such was the desire of our great epic poet; and such may now be claimed by every Briton as an undeniable right. The question therefore comes to this,—*"Can a Government which recognises such a right consistently withhold it from those whom they more immediately control?"* Certainly not. We know that the masses have the right of protection and representation on any subject which affects their interests, and may use that right with perfect impunity. Why, then, withhold it from any class or section of the community, as in the present instance Post Office officials? Order is, of course, absolutely necessary to the satisfactory management of public affairs, and must be maintained with "a strong hand;" but that does not imply the necessity to curb freedom of speech or discussion, or in any way hinder them from giving expression to their thoughts, and to seek redress for any grievances they may have, as long as it does not materially interfere with the execution of their duties.—W. I. C. K.

I suppose the reason for bringing forward this topic for discussion is

the late order of the Postmaster-General prohibiting the meeting together of the *employés* to discuss what they fancy are grievances.

The first question that arises in my mind is, Are there any grievances? If there are none, the prohibition or debarring of the *employés* meeting together is a piece of supererogation; for in discussing *supposed grievances* they would soon find out the unreality of their pretensions. If there are *grievances*, is it justice to debar men from presenting them to their fellows, in order that they may be remedied by their aid? If it is an *injustice* to the bearers of those grievances to debar them from bringing them to light, such injustice ought not to be tolerated. We love freedom (not licence), we hate tyranny; and what can be more tyrannizing than the *preventing* of men with one common sympathy, one just object, and one aim, meeting together calmly to discuss what they feel to be their wrongs? I expect the exigencies of the public weal will be urged as a reply to such a piece of tyranny; but will the public suffer more by knowing what the Post Office *employée* want,

and what they are doing, than by allowing a state of chronic dissatisfaction and indifference to their labour to exist secretly and work *silently disastrous* results to many of the said public? Is it possible for men who feel accumulating wrongs heaped upon them to throw that energy into their toil which is necessary? The foregoing are some of the reasons which incline me to the negative.—GUTHRIE.

I cannot understand why, on any grounds of common justice, these public officers should be prevented from discussing their grievances. In a land of liberty like England there ought to be freedom of this sort, and it would be most unfair to debar any of her Majesty's subjects from exercising an Englishman's right of pointing out wherein they suffer any grievance whatsoever. If there be in reality any evils, they should be remedied; but if, on the other hand, there be supposition merely, of course any complaints would fall to the ground. I have pleasure, therefore, in forming one of those who take the negative side of this topic.

Bristol.

R. D. ROBERT.

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**LIFE AND LIVING.**—A man may sit all his life in a pair of scales, and when he sees the other side going down may restore the equipoise with a few ounces of food, or, contrariwise, may fast till the pampered flesh give in and restore the balance; but we have more respect for the day labourer who gives out his vigour in honest trenching and delving, and then recruits it with a wholesome meal and a half-hour's nap on the softest plank, than for the hypochondriac in his nightcap inside the screen watching the thermometer, and with tear and wear on the one side and morsels of toast on the other maintaining the perpetual see-saw. And the Christian has received life from on high for some other purpose than simply to watch it, he has got to use it. Nor is the highest life destructive of any other. It may leave the poet and the minstrel, whilst it creates the saint; and even if a man should not be this last, it is better to be either of the other two than remain the mere animal or the mere automaton.

## Our Collegiate Courier.

### THE PROGRESS OF POESY.

A PINDARIC ODE.

BY THOMAS GRAY.

[Of Shakspeare, his genius and his powers.]

#### STROPHE III.

Far from the sun and summer gale,  
In thy green lap was nature's darling laid,  
What time, where lucid Avon strayed, 85  
To him the mighty mother did unveil

At a distance from the sun and the breezes of summer, the delight of the universe was placed in thy verdant lap, at the period when the parent of power, Nature, presented her glorious countenance to him, where clear

(83) "Thus Genius rose and set at ordered times,  
And shot a dayspring into distant climes,  
Ennobling every region that he chose;  
He sunk in Greece, in Italy he rose;  
And tedious years of Gothic darkness passed,  
Emerged all splendour in our isle at last.  
Thus lovely halcyons dive into the main,  
Then show far off their shining plumes again."  
*William Cowper's "Table Talk,"* 557—568.

(86) "Indulgent Fancy! from the fruitful banks  
Of Avon, where thy rosy fingers cull  
Fresh flowers, and dews to sprinkle on the turf  
Where Shakspeare lies—be present, and with thee  
Let Fiction come, upon her vagrant wings  
Wafting ten thousand colours through the air,  
Which, by the glances of her magic eye,  
She bends and shifts at will through countless forms," &c.  
*Akenside's "Pleasures of Imagination,"* i., 18.

Akenside speaks of—

"Each trembling heart with grateful terrors quelled."  
"*Pleasures of Imagination,*" i., 270.

Southey refers to the readiness with which we open our hearts to such fears:—

"'Tis pleasant by the cheerful hearth to hear



Her awful face; the dauntless child  
 Stretched forth his little arms, and smiled.  
 "This pencil take," she said, "whose colours clear  
 Richly paint the vernal year:  
 Thine, too, these golden keys, immortal boy;  
 This can unlock the gates of joy,  
 Of horror that, and thrilling fears,  
 Or ope the sacred source of sympathetic tears."

90

Avon wanders; the unaffrighted infant extended his small hands, and laughed lovingly. Receive this crayon, said she, the brilliant hues of which splendidly reproduce the fruitful year. To thee also belong, famous child, these precious keys; this is able to unclothe to thee the portals of joy, that the gates of terror and entrancing despair, or give occasion to the outdash of the grief-drops of the eyes, or ar-brimming from a fellow-feeling with sorrow.

Of tempests and the dangers of the deep,  
 And pause at times, and feel that we are safe;  
 Then listen to the perilous tide again,  
 And with an eager and suspended soul  
 Woo terror to delight us."

(91—94) Akenside objected to the idea of *keys opening a source*; but wells are frequently kept locked, and these are the sources of water supplies.

(93) "Superstition, wont to tell  
 Of many a grisly sound and sight,  
 Scaring his path at dead of night,  
 When Christmas logs blaze high and wide,  
 Such wonders speed the festal tide;  
 While Curiosity and Fear,  
 Pleasure and Pain, sit crouching near,  
 Till childhood's cheek no longer glows,  
 And village maidens lose the rose.  
 The thrilling interest rises higher,  
 The circle closes nigh and nigher,  
 And shuddering glance is cast behind,  
 As louder moans the wintry wind."

*Scott's "Rokeby,"* ii., 10.

In such circumstances, as Schiller says,—

"Pain is rapture, tuned more exquisitely soft."

(94) "The graceful tear that flows from others' woes."  
*Akenside's "Pleasures of Imagination,"* i., 506.

Of such sympathetic tears Darwin has beautifully said,—

"Not gilded pearl that crested Fortune wears,  
 Nor gem that twinkling hangs in Beauty's ears,

[Concerning Milton and Dryden.]

## ANTISTOPHE III.

Nor second he, that rode sublime 95

Upon the seraph-wings of ecstasy,

The secrets of the abyss to spy.

He passed the flaming bounds of place and time;

The living throne, the sapphire blaze,

Where angels tremble while they gaze, 100

He saw; but, blasted with excess of light,

Closed his eyes in endless night.

Nor inferior in his own course to he who soared aloft, upon the angel-pinnions of rapture, to inquire into the mysteries of the eternal world. He journeyed beyond the blazing environments of space and calculable periods; he witnessed the sovereign seat of life, the bright blue brilliancy of those gems on which, while the hosts of the skies look, they exceedingly fear and quake; but blinded by the fierceness of the splendour of its glare, he shut his eyes in the total eclipse of darkness.

Nor the bright stars that night's blue arch adorn,

Nor radiant sun that gilds the rising morn,

Shine with such lustre as the tear that flows

Down Virtus's manly cheeks for others' woes."

- (95) "The greatly gifted centaur smiled,  
Then thus with counsel pure replies:  
'Tis soft persuasion's secret key  
Unlocks the gates of ecstasy."—*Pindar's "Pythian Odes,"* ix, 65.

Rapture, enthusiastic absorption, resistless poetic power:—

"Dissolve me into ecstasies,

And bring all heaven before mine eyes."

*Milton's "Il Penseroso,"* 165-6.Winged "as the seraph who adores and burns."—*Pope.*

- (97) "Who shall tempt with wandering feet  
The dark, unbottomed, infinite abyss,  
And through the palpable obscure find out  
His uncouth way, or spread his airy flight,  
Upborne with indefatigable wings,  
Over the vast abrupt?"—*"Paradise Lost,"* ii, 404-409.

(99) "The spirit of the living creature was in the wheels." "And above the firmament that was over their heads was the likeness of a throne, as the appearance of a sapphire stone;" "and it had brightness round about; as the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about. This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord" (Ezek. i. 20-28).

- (101) Withered up, blinded, as if by lightning. "And, behold, seven 1870.

Behold, where Dryden's less presumptuous ear  
Wide o'er the fields of glory bear,  
Two coursers of ethereal race, 105  
With necks in thunder clothed, and long-resounding pace.

See! whither along the spacious territories of renown, a pair of steeds of heavenly breed, black-maned and powerful, in their speed carry on the less daring chariot of Dryden.

[The poet speaketh modestly of himself.]

### BROWN III.

Hark! his hands the lyre explore;  
Bright-eyed Fancy, hovering o'er,  
Scatters from her pictured urn  
Thoughts that breathe, and words that burn. 110  
But ah! 'tis heard no more—

Listen! his hands bring out the secrets of the harp; clear-seeing Imagination brooding over him besprinkles from her casket of visions ideas that live and expressions that glow. But, alas! these sounds are not again to strike upon the ear.

thin ears and blasted with the east wind sprung up after them (Gen. xli. 6).

"The blasted stars looked wan,  
And planets; planet-struck, real eclipses  
Then suffered."—"Paradise Lost," x., 412-4.

(106) "Hast thou given the horse strength? hast thou clothed his neck with thunder?" (Job xxxix. 19).

(106) "Waller was smooth, but Dryden taught to join  
The varying verse, the full-resounding line,  
The long majestic march, and energy divine."

An equally high opinion has been expressed by Churchill thus:—

"Here let me bend, great Dryden, at thy shrine,  
Thou dearest name to all the tuneful Nine!  
What if some dull lines in cold order creep,  
And, with his theme, the poet seems to sleep?  
Still, when his subject rises proud to view,  
With equal strength the poet rises too.  
With strong invention, noblest vigour fraught,  
Thought still springs up and rises out of thought,  
Numbers ennobling numbers in their course,  
In varied sweetness flow, in varied force;  
The powers of genius and of judgment join,  
And the whole art of poetry is thine."

(110) "Words that weep, and tears that speak."  
"The Prophet," by Cowley, l. 20.

O lyre divine, what daring spirit  
 Wakes thee now? though he inherit  
 Nor the pride nor ample plinion  
 That the Theban eagle bear, 115  
 Sailing with supreme dominion  
 Through the azure deep of air;  
 Yet oft before his infant eyes would run  
 Such forms as glitter in the Muse's ray,  
 With orient hues, unborrowed of the sun, 120  
 Yet shall he mount, and keep his distant way  
 Beyond the limits of a vulgar fate,  
 Beneath the good how far!—but far above the great.

O celestial harp, what adventurous genius rouses thy tones at this time? Notwithstanding that, he does not possess by descent, either the high temper or the mighty power which carry the kingly bird of Thebes (Pindar), as he floats in full sovereignty along the blue spaces of the heavens; still frequently before his youthful vision would such fancies as glisten in the light of poesy—in Eastern splendour underived from the common light of day—flash and rush. Nevertheless, he shall move upward and onward, and preserve the course of his life above the boundaries of the ordinary destiny of mortals—at a lowly distance from the holy and the just, but equally far removed from the life-path of those whose station alone ennobles them.

(114) Gray has a similarly humble, yet confident self-reference and estimate, at the close of his "Elegy written in a Country Churchyard":—

"Here reests his head upon the lap of earth,  
 A youth to fortune and to fame unknown,  
 Fair Science frowned not on his humble birth,  
 And Melancholy marked him for her own.

"Large was his bounty, and his soul sincere,  
 Heaven did a recompence as largely send:  
 He gave to misery all he had—a tear;  
 He gained from heaven ('twas all he wished) a friend.

"No farther seek his merits to disclose,  
 Or draw his frailties from their dread abode,  
 (There they alike in trembling hope repose,  
 The bosom of his Father and his God."

(115) "Pindar compares himself to the eagle, and his enemies to ravens, that croak and clamour in vain below while he pursues his flight regardless of their noise."—Gray.

## The Societies' Section.

### OBJECTIONS TO DEBATING SOCIETIES.

By John Storer Smith, Author of "*Mirabeau: a Life History.*"

PERHAPS the only generally successful portion of the actual machinery of literary institutions are the debating clubs, the few advantages of which are overwhelmed in their disadvantages. They are the natural result of the employment of associations for the intellect; encouraging, as that must, a showy outside of knowledge with no inner root, rather than well-smelted, well-assimilated information. Beginning at a late hour in the evening, a young man is drawn away from home to admire his own glib utterance, and astonish a few of his fellows by an exhibition of a miracle peculiar to our century—the manufacture of glittering textures from perfect vacuity and emptiness. Were he to choose from the library any book at random well-nigh, and to retire home and read it, it cannot be but he would retire to read a wiser man than after a month's attendance on a debating club. It would be difficult to tell what result springs from such societies, except the augmenting of unadvised babble, and the increase of vain sciolism. Nothing can be more intensely comical than the *dilettante* depth and metaphysics of these debates; the pen of Cervantes is wanting to describe the Quixotic scene of a meeting of men arguing with fiercest gesticulations, with inflated oratoric pomp and self-importance, as though pleading for the rights of man before the universe upon some such topic as these:—

"Have the Crusades really benefited humanity?" "Does Andrew Marvel deserve the thanks of posterity?" "Whether is Kirke White or the prophet Isaiah the truest poet?"—while, you hear, as I have heard, in the most florid harangues, the most childlike ignorance displayed: Burns designated as one of our finest nineteenth century poets; Mahomet spoken of as the predecessor of the Saviour! The resolute, independent knowledge-seeker does not herd with such as these; knowing the falsity of the gregarious system, he is perfecting himself slowly, but truly, and surely, in his quiet home—not there.

The general purpose to which such institutions are applied is a kind of lounge, where there are companions to be met, benches to loll upon, romances to read; where cane-heads can be sucked and time killed until an amusement is decided upon, the casino opens, or the opera begins. The only excuse or palliation the warmest supporters of these institutions as they are bring forward, is that they keep young men from the tavern and elsewhere. But I believe that the good of such a change is much exaggerated. What can you call these places but intellectual taverns? this debating, concert-attending, lounging existence, but mental dissipation? You only change the form of the evil; the evil is there unmitigated under a new phase: and if you simply compare the bodily dissipation of the tavern or brothel with the mental dissoluteness of these places, I am

by no means convinced that there is any gain in the metamorphosis. To society it is a gain, certainly, to change the form of profligacy from the tavern to the Athenæum; but to the individual himself there is little or no gain. We always lose sight of the fact that it is the soul, and not the body, that it is of importance to keep active and alive; that the body is alone of importance because of its influence upon the soul. In the actual fact of my pouring down my throat certain potations, or giving myself over to certain bodily intemperances, is no evil, no crime; but it is so because the body has an indissoluble union with the soul, and all bodily pollution reacts upon the soul. . . . It is no great achievement to rescue a soul from being soiled and dissipated in taverns by beer and wine, to soil and dissipate it by empty quakeries in literary institutions. Nay, the latter is even a retrogression, inasmuch as the tavern-haunter knew his dissipation to be base, and blushed while he went astray; while the other prides himself upon his conduct, and looks down alike upon his grosser and his wiser brethren.

Are, then, these literary associations entirely useless, entirely noxious? And would it be advisable, if possible, that they should be discontinued? By no means; with all their evils they do really accomplish somewhat; and their evils are only so strongly unadverted upon here because I do not consider that the question resolves itself to the narrow point of "to remain as they are, or to cease to be." I believe it within the compass of human intellect to see the causes of this lamentable vindication of an otherwise mighty and beneficent agency, and seeing,

to reform. The cause is merely the calling in the principle of association in matters where their application is hazardous without perceiving that, and without bestowing the corresponding care and attention. The evils arise from having fallen into ecstasies at the machinery, forgetting what it was erected to perform; in concentrating thought and energy upon the means, and losing sight of the end. . . . People do not see that in all these plans and machines, and club with club, and society with society, is no beauty, no benefit, except in proportion as they spread enduring knowledge among the members of the same. They should be regarded as necessary evils, not as a positive good. For every man to have all the books he needs, all the instructors he requires, so that the use of institutions would be superseded by individual possession, that would be the highest state to be attained. For those who feel they want their assistance they supply a good; but he is the strongest man who requires them not. They are a benefit when they serve to aid a man in his pursuit after learning, and to teach him how super-eminently great is that, rather than not to have which he calls in such intricate auxiliaries; but they are an inexpressible harm where they lead any one to consider them as good in themselves, and so to mechanize their minds by mingling among objectless mechanism; when they cause any one to conceive he can win, even by the most elaborate cramming, the most subtle patent medicine system, that which can alone be bought by patient investigation and examinations by long nights of laborious studies.—*Extracted from "Social Aspects."*

### EDINBURGH WATT LITERARY AND DEBATING ASSOCIATION.

THIS association, which is perhaps the largest and most popular of its kind in Edinburgh, not having as yet been noticed in this magazine, it may not be out of place at present to bring its nature and claims before our readers. The society is connected with the Watt Institution and School of Arts, which was founded in the beginning of the century, and in which Sir Walter Scott, Horner, Jeffrey, Cookburn, and other learned and philanthropic men of that time, took a practical interest. For upwards of forty years it has been the only institution where working men could obtain, at a nominal rate, the advantages of a scientific and technical education.

The thoroughness of the knowledge imparted in it has long rendered it famous—many men who have risen from the workshop to eminent positions having attributed their success in life principally to the instruction received in it. Somewhat late in its history, classes of English literature, French, and German were added to the syllabus of the institution. As a consequence of this a number of young men of literary tastes were brought into contact, and in 1863 the question of forming a debating society was mooted. On application to the directors, the lecture hall of the institution was at once freely granted as a place of meeting. An inaugural address was then delivered by Mr. David Pryde, M.A., lecturer on English literature; and the society was successfully brought into operation. The rapidity of its growth was astonishing, and showed that such a society had long been a desideratum with the students of the institution. Its second year has just been completed, and the roll-

book shows that the number of members was nearly 150. An additional impetus was given to its progress by the admission of ladies into the institution, a number of whom at once took a warm interest in it, and not only claimed but exercised all the privileges of male members. The summer session has just been concluded, and the programme which is given herewith will show that the subjects discussed are of varied interest.

It may be mentioned that the association is open only to those who are or have been students of some class in the Watt Institution.

Young men of literary tastes in Edinburgh could scarcely do better than join the English Literature class, and thus make themselves eligible as members of the association. Should any act upon this hint, we are sure they will afterwards confess themselves indebted to the *British Controversialist* for being the means of introducing it to their notice.

Syllabus, Session 1870.

May 3rd, essay, "Novels," (to which the first prize was awarded in the English Literature class), Mr. James Dowie. 10th, debate, "Ought Britain to adopt the Non-Intervention Policy in its Foreign Relations?" affirmative, Mr. J. Mitchell: negative, Mr. J. Burden. 17th, essay, "Solitude and Society," Mr. S. Kinnear. 24th, debate, "Should Spinsters and Widows (otherwise qualified), possess the Political Franchise?" affirmative, Mr. John Young: negative, Mr. P. Mathewson. 31st, essay, "Shelley: his Character and Works," Mr. Wm. Turnbull. June 7th, debate, "Is Beauty a Quality inherent in the Object?" affirmative, Mr. R. A. Marr: nega-

tive, Mr. Robert Hume. 14th, essay, "Female Education," Miss Ella Burton. 21st, debate, "Is Anonymous Criticism advantageous to Literature?" affirmative, Mr. Edward King: negative, Mr. Thos. Martin. 28th, essay, "Mary, Queen of Scots," Mr. C. D. Butler. July 5th, debate, "Does the present Multiplicity of Periodicals tend to retard Intellectual Progress?" affirmative, Mr. J. Allison: negative, Mr. D. L. Shepherd. 12th, essay, "Genius," Mr. Geo. Addison. 19th, debate, "Ought a National System of Compulsory Education to be purely Secular?" affirmative, Mr. Alexander Frazer: negative, Mr. D. W. Walker. 26th, Annual Business Meeting. Recess till November.

#### SUBJECTS SUITABLE FOR DEBATE.

Does the human soul, on quitting its present abode, become the tenant of another material vehicle?

Is the possible annihilation of any spiritual being opposed both to Scripture and reason?

Does a national church necessarily imply persecution, either actively or passively?

Has the volunteer movement conferred any benefit on the country, or on those connected with it?

Is the National Debt as injurious to the country as it is generally supposed to be?

Should laws be framed for the preservation of animals not naturally domestic, or restricted to locality? Or, Game laws—are they just?

Was there ever a period, after the first blow was struck in the great civil war, when a reconciliation between Charles the First and his Puritan subjects was possible?

Was Cromwell justified in the measures he adopted with the parliament elected during his protectorate?

Is the literary character of the articles written in modern magazines adequate to the advancement of the age generally?

Is the present organization of our police force excellent on the whole, or should it be reconstructed?

Should the State repress immoral and infidel literature?

Is there marked advantage derivable from the study of the dead languages?

Does the judicial system of this country require a thorough reform?

Should the English Church be disestablished and disendowed?

Are the writings of Thomas Carlyle worthy of national admiration? Or, Is the tendency of the works of Thomas Carlyle beneficial?

Which is the greater writer, Charles Kingsley or Lord Lytton?

Would the present state of affairs in Greece taken in connection with the recent massacres justify the interference of the protecting powers?

Should it be in the power of a M.P. to exclude strangers from the House of Commons?

Was sin predestined?

Which is the greater writer, George Eliot or Mrs. Beecher Stowe?

Which is the greater writer, the author of "John Halifax, Gentleman," or Mr. Disraeli?

Do the land laws of this country require alteration?

Does the ecclesiastical system of this country require to be reformed?

Do our Newspapers form the new (true) Church of England?

Is the Influence of the Pulpit on the Wane?

Has the Immorality of France been influential in its failure in War?

Which is the greater loss, Sight or Hearing?

Is the Influence of War more ennobling than debasing?



Ought unwilling People to be annexed in conquest?

Is a United Germany as essential to European progress as a United Italy?

Is France favourably situated for forming a good Republican Government?

Is Commercial Neutrality possible?

Ought every citizen to be a trained soldier?

Is a National Militia sufficient for the proper defence of a Country?

Is Euclid's Elements suitable as a Text-book of Geometry?

Does Bain or Ferrier supply the better Theory of Knowing and Being?

Why have Scotchmen succeeded and Englishmen failed in Song-writing?

Has the Telegraph superseded the Historian?

## The Inquirer.

### QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

914. The writer has not read the famous (or notorious?) work called "Essays and Reviews," but he finds it mentioned so often in newspapers and conversation that he would like to get some idea of the book, and also the reason why its authors appear to be all marked men.—L. DE C.

915. Did G. H. Lewes complete and (or) publish separately his interesting papers on the "Principles of Success in Literature." If they are to be had separately from the *Fortnightly Review*, will any reader kindly say where?—L. DE C.

916. A leading article on Herbert Spencer has long been promised. The undersigned waits patiently for some estimate of this philosopher.—L. DE C.

were continuation of that essay on "Byron," and of the contributions of E. W. S. Of this critic it is not expedient to report more now.—S. N.

906. Issue a small circular calling a meeting, and get it brought under the notice of working men, shopmen, clerks, &c. At the meeting make a few remarks on Bible inquiry, its importance, necessity, and advantage, enrol members, and begin with any number attainable, however few. These when once engaged in the work will bring their companions. Let the Bible be read systematically and studiously, "with diligence, preparation, and prayer;" let the style be free and frank, and allow the utmost latitude of inquiry and remark within the limits of good taste and common politeness; encourage thoughtfulness and discourage talkativeness; let informing matter lead the way to remarks tending to reformation; keep close to the topics suggested by the portion read, and be as varied in the kind of matter and the range of illustration as possible; be regular, and never be unprepared to fill up the time properly, and with God's blessing all will go well.—R. R. R.

### ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

861. I am in a position to state that in 1855 the proprietorship of the *British Controversialist* changed hands for a time, as indeed did the editorship. In 1858 this temporary alteration ceased. During that space much was lost, and among the losses

911. This, though a new phrase, is expressive of an old principle, though it has recently been brought into marked prominence. It means simply this: that, in every trade or pursuit each man or woman therein engaged should understand the most important facts, actual and historical, connected therewith; not merely, like semi-automata, performing a daily routine of processes unintelligible to the mind. And as in the bustle of life few can afford sufficient time to acquire this knowledge properly, the advocates of technical education would have it decided while a lad is at school what his occupation is to be; and then would make his education bear upon it. The inquirer is referred also to Scott Russell's work on technical education.—J. R. S. C.

Technical education signifies a course of training intended to bring into combined operation the theoretical knowledge which the results of science yield with the manipulative skill which practical industry induces. It is not a scheme for promoting and extending the study of pure science. It accepts of the investigations and researches of the highest thinkers, and assumes their results to be accurate; and these results, taken as the firstlings of a practical system, are brought together into a form in which they may be learned as rules and applied as tests. It is such an education as may give to the practical industrial arts the fullest benefit to be derived from the wide diffusion of a correct knowledge of the ascertained facts of the several sciences. In fact, it is knowledge suited to the workshop, the factory, the warehouse, the forge, the loom, and the laboratory; and might be fairly explained as such an education as may make a working man more useful in his daily labour by making known to him such facts, results, and pro-

cesses of the exact sciences as have been agreed upon and determined as guiding information in the employment in which he is engaged.—R. M. A.

Technical education means instruction in the practical application of the arts and sciences to the improvement of manufactures. Our workmen are only skilled by experience, and in most cases cannot work beyond it. By educating them in the principles of mechanics and the nature of materials; by teaching them drawing and designing, and encouraging them to cultivate their taste, it is expected that processes of manufacture and manufactured articles will be greatly improved, while at the same time the workman acquires new powers and pleasures, and becomes a more valuable member of society. "A Learner" may be interested in the issue of a complete course of technical education. On the 16th of the present month (November, 1870) Messrs. Cassell, Petter, and Galpin, commence the publication in 14d. weekly numbers and 7d. monthly parts of the "Popular Educator, Technical Series." A prospectus of this interesting and most important work can be had free of charge at any bookseller's.—L. DE C.

920. In the *British Controversialist* for 1861, Jan.—June, two articles occur which contain abstracts of each of the papers in "Essays and Reviews," biographical notices of their authors, and criticisms of the papers from "a logical, not a theological" point of view. They bear the signature S. N.—E. B. C.

921. They have not been republished. Their author intends to expand, revise, and complete them.—S. N.

923. The paper is in preparation, but the attainment of reliable facts regarding popular living authors requires time and research.—E. B. C.

## Literary Notes.

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MR. MURRAY now positively, we believe, announces the first volume of a long-promised new edition of Pope's works, illustrated with portraits, with numerous introductions and notes, by the Rev. Whitwell Elwin; also, several hundred unpublished letters, the suppressed satire on the Duke of Marlborough, and many new lines and various readings from the original manuscripts of the principal poems.

A new *Illustrated Literary Review* is announced; thirty-two pages quarto; is to review literature, the arts, the drama, &c., and to be profusely illustrated.

The Jews are reported to be desirous of producing an Anglo-Jewish Translation of the Scriptures.

A second edition of the Marquis of Lorne's "Trip to the Tropics and Home through America" has just been issued, *à propos* of the projected alliance of the princess and the marquis.

The papers on *Military Life in Cornhill* and *St. Paul's* are said to be the work of A. Forbes, editor of the *London Scotsman*.

Miss Fox is engaged on a History of Holland House and its Proprietors, Guests, and Associations. It will contain specimens of many literary curiosities.

James Key has won the Early English Text Society's prize, given yearly to the University of St. Andrew's, Fife, for the best examination in English up to Chaucer's death.

THE SYSTEM OF FAGGING. — A £50 prize is offered by a lady for the best essay upon *The System of Fagging*, as practised at schools.

The essays will be adjudicated upon by Dr. Edmunds, 4, Fitzroy Square, London, W.

Dr. Jeremie, Dean of Lincoln, has offered £1,000 for the establishment of two Greek Septuagint prizes in the University of Cambridge, where he had held the Regius Professorship of Divinity.

A prize of 100 Friedrichs in gold has been gained by J. H. Ferguson, an Englishman at Aruba, in the Dutch West Indies, for the best essay on "The method of succouring the sufferers in a naval engagement." The theme was proposed by the Prussian Society for the tending of the Wounded.

Robert Moffat, who has acted as missionary in South Africa for more than half a century, has returned, and intends to devote the evening of his days to the printing of a Dictionary of the language of Bechuana and the preparation of a new edition of the Bible in that tongue.

"Life Studies of Character," by John Kelso Hunter, a self-taught painter and poet, though a working shoemaker and an able humorist, will be published about Christmas-time, and contain a considerable amount of unpublished information regarding those who were satirized by Burns.

George Moir, LL.D., formerly professor of Rhetoric in Edinburgh University, translator of "Wallenstein," author of "Poetry and Modern Romance," &c., died 20th October.

A new vol. of De Quincey's "Works," to contain "Sequel to the Confessions of an English Opium-eater," is in the press.

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